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 In 1965, Britain was less than a decade removed from world shipbuilding 
supremacy. They yet remained second only to Japan in the industry and boasted a 
long and proud heritage as one of the world’s best shipbuilders. South Korea, by 
contrast, at that time had only the barest rudiments of a shipbuilding industry and was 
not even an inconsequential factor in world shipbuilding. What little shipbuilding was 
done in Korea in 1965 was primarily concerned with wooden vessels. 
 
By 1982, the situation had completely reversed. South Korea was the world’s second-
leading shipbuilder and gaining rapidly on Japan, the industry leader. Meanwhile, 
Britain’s presence in the industry had declined to near-irrelevance and was fading 
rapidly. This paper examines the technological, social, economic and governmental 
factors involved in that positional shift and explains how, in roughly two decades, 
Korea became a world shipbuilding power while the British shipbuilding industry 
virtually disappeared. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Take it all in all, a ship of the line is the most honorable thing that man, 
as a gregarious animal, has ever produced. Into that he has put as much 
of his human patience, common sense, forethought, experimental 
philosophy, self-control, habits of order and obedience, thoroughly 
wrought handiwork, defiance of brute elements, careless courage, 
careful patriotism, and calm expectation of the judgment of God, as 
can be put into a space 300 feet long and 40 feet broad.1 
 
 
In 1965, the year Sir Winston Churchill died, Britain was the world’s second-largest 
shipbuilder, trailing only Japan. Shipbuilding had been one of the nation’s staple 
industries since before the Industrial Revolution and despite the largely completed 
transformation from Empire to Commonwealth, it still contributed considerably to the 
British economy. The nation which boasted renowned seafarers like Drake, Hawkins, 
Cook and Nelson remained one of the world’s major maritime nations. The Clyde 
River in Scotland had long been known for the number and quality of its shipbuilders. 
Across the Irish Sea in Northern Ireland, the sprawling Harland and Wolff Shipyard 
was the largest shipbuilder in the United Kingdom and would soon dominate the 
skyline of Belfast with its two huge gantry cranes, “Samson” and “Goliath.” 2 Builders 
of such memorable ships as R.M.S. Titanic, Harland and Wolff that year began 
constructing what would be the largest drydock in Europe.
 3
 
 
                                                 
1 John Ruskin, “The Shipbuilder,” cited in Elijah Baker III, Introduction to Steel Shipbuilding, 2nd ed.  
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1953) p. xviii.  
2Booz, Allen and Hamilton BV, British Shipbuilding, 1972: A Report to the Department of Trade and 
Industry. (London: HMSO, 1973), pp. 93-95. Measured by both gross and deadweight tons delivered, 
as of 1971 Harland and Wolff in Belfast was the largest shipbuilder in the United Kingdom. Its average 
ship size delivered was well more than three times the average of United Kingdom shipbuilders as a 
whole,  (49563 gross tons compared to 15303 gross tons) and close to three times that of its nearest 
United Kingdom competitor, Doxford and Sunderland (18436 gross tons). Harland and Wolff’s 
eighteen available shipbuilding berths represented a much greater capacity than any other individual 
shipbuilder in the United Kingdom.  
3 Harland and Wolff Heavy Industries Co., Ltd. , Technical Specifications for Dry Dock and Gantry 
Cranes (Belfast: Harland and Wolff, 2010), pp. 1-9. The Main Dock at Harland and Wolff is 556 m 
(1824 ft.) long by 93 m (305 ft.) wide. “Samson” and “Goliath” can lift 840 tons each at 80 and 70 
meter heights, respectively. 
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South Korea, a dozen years after the 1953 UN Armistice ending the Korean War, was 
a poor, agrarian country deeply dependent on American support to defend itself from 
its Communist neighbor, North Korea. It effectively possessed no shipbuilding 
industry worthy of the name. Only in 1966 did it first show up on the Lloyd’s Register 
charts as a shipbuilder, and with less than a thousandth of the British output for the 
same year. 
 
40 years later, in 2005, the situation was completely reversed. South Korea was the 
world’s leading shipbuilding nation, with an output of 14,768,000 gross tons, while 
Britain in 2004 produced only 2,000 gross tons. South Korean shipyards in aggregate 
were launching at least one major vessel per day and its shipyards were the most 
technically advanced on the planet. Britain, trying to build two new aircraft carriers 
for its dramatically shrunken Royal Navy, was finding it hard to source much of the 
required equipment in the United Kingdom because its shipbuilding manufacturing 
base no longer existed. South Korea had the world’s largest and most productive 
shipyard in Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI) at Ulsan, Korea, and hot on HHI’s heels 
were two other Korean competitors, Samsung Heavy Industries (SHI) and Daewoo 
Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering (DSME), located in Geoje, Korea. These three 
largest Korean shipbuilders, all belonging to Korean chaebôl, along with numerous 
smaller Korean yards, were expanding at breakneck pace and pouring huge sums of 
capital investment into their facilities.
4
 Meanwhile, in Britain, shipbuilding on the 
                                                 
4 Woo, Jung-en. Race to the Swift. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), p. 13.  A Chaebôl, 
as defined by Jung-en Woo, is a “family-owned and managed group of companies that exercise 
monopolistic or oligopolistic control in product lines and industries.” They are comparable to Japan’s 
prewar zaibatsu. The Chinese ideographs depicting chaebôl in Korean are the same as those depicting 
zaibatsu in Japanese. In Chinese they mean “fortune cluster.”  
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Clyde had atrophied to almost nothing5 while Belfast’s Harland and Wolff was down 
to below 150 workers and had been forced to “mothball,”6 or decommission, one of 
its landmark gantry cranes due to lack of work.7 
 
The obvious question is this: how could Britain, with its rich seafaring history and 
numerous technological and economic advantages, could so completely lose this 
industry? Conversely, how could poor, backward South Korea, with no seafaring 
history worthy of note since the 16th Century, have come to eclipse not only the 
British, but the world, in the building of ships? What did South Korea and Britain do 
differently that led to such diametrically opposed outcomes? What were the major 
factors in each country that influenced their respective shipbuilding industries to 
travel such divergent paths?  A careful perusal of Table 1 below, which compares the 
major national shipbuilding industries by annual amounts of tonnage delivered, 
clearly shows that the most rapid part of this change took place in the decade from 
1972 to 1982.8 Because the factors influencing this shift were most clearly illuminated 
in that decade, this inquiry will primarily focus on that time period. 
 
The structure of this paper will first recount the industrial requirements for modern 
(post-1960’s) shipbuilding. Following that it will discuss the British history of 
shipbuilding from the end of the First World War until the 1980’s, concentrating on 
the factors and decisions that most affected the industry. From that point the Korean 
                                                 
5 The iconic pictures of Clyde shipyard Scott Lithgow’s large gantry crane being leveled by demolition 
charges truly mark the end of the commercial shipbuilding era on the Clyde.  Clyde shipbuilding since 
the late 1980’s has been minimal; two small shipyards remain and what little work they have is 
commissioned almost exclusively by the Royal Navy. 
6 Cassidy, Martin. “Titanic Apology to City Shipyard.” BBC.co.uk. British Broadcasting Company. 5 
October 2007. Web. 28 January 2013. “Goliath” was “mothballed” in 2003 due to lack of work. It was 
restored to service in 2007 as part of a plan for building structures for offshore wind farms. 
7 Ruddock, Alan. “Where is the Bright New Future?” Management Today   Mar. 2006:  p. 44. 
8 Source: Lloyd's Register of Shipping's "World Shipbuilding Statistics" (now published by IHS 
Fairplay), 11 October 2010 
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shipbuilding industry and its actions since 1972 will be examined and contrasted with 
the British experience. The final section will be the conclusions to be drawn from that 
comparison. 
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INDUSTRIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR MODERN SHIPBUILDING 
 
To provide a basis for properly understanding the issue, the first requirement is to 
consider the practical reality of constructing a modern commercial ship. Much 
changed from John Ruskin’s day, many modern vessels constructed since the 1970’s 
are huge structures more than 300 meters long and 60+ meters wide. Ships are 
generally constructed as a box girder, meaning it is a predominantly hollow, mostly 
rectangular steel fabrication externally covered with steel plating. This plating and its 
attached strengthening (often referred to as “stiffeners”) is supported by internal 
structural support beams, webs and brackets. Those internal structural supports have 
to be solid enough to enable the external plating and its support members to withstand, 
in the worst cases, 30+ meter (100+ foot) waves and 100+ knot (115 mile per hour) 
winds. However, they must also leave sufficient interior space to carry the cargo that 
pays for the vessel’s construction and operating costs.  
 
Every ship design represents a long series of engineering tradeoffs. Many things are 
desirable on a ship which simply cannot be justified by the proposed return on 
investment. Consequently, ship designers are always seeking to find the optimum 
choice between performance and cost. One of the factors most carefully considered in 
initial vessel design is the eternal maritime dilemma concerning weight and speed. All 
ship owners and shipbuilders know every additional ton of steel strengthening 
represents both an initial construction cost and a lifelong increase in operating costs, 
particularly for fuel. Fuel costs for ship owners are constantly increasing due both to 
internationally mandated higher product purity requirements and the ever-escalating 
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price of crude oil.9 Since it can easily cost more than one million dollars to “bunker”10 
a large vessel, this is a major operating expense. Finding ways to reduce operational 
costs is a ceaseless quest in which owners are always diligently engaged. Cutting fuel 
costs to the absolute minimum is a goal all shipowners have in common and hold dear 
to their hearts. The age of sail may be passed but the desire to have the fuel costs of 
those days still lingers on in the boardrooms of shipping companies!  
 
Meanwhile, inside that box girder are several thousand miles of wiring and several 
hundred miles of piping. In addition to the normal systems required to operate, propel 
and maneuver the vessel, much of this infrastructure facilitates electronic monitoring 
equipment designed to do many tasks formerly done by larger human crews.
11
 This 
places a greatly increased emphasis on equipment reliability as the safety factor/repair 
capability provided by a higher manning complement no longer exists. Now operated 
by what would in the past have been considered “skeleton crews,” modern ships are 
incredibly complex and expensive structures expected to consistently work properly 
with a minimum of crew-provided post-delivery maintenance. Consequently, much 
more responsibility devolves on the newbuilding shipyard to provide a safer and more 
consistently seaworthy vessel. 
                                                 
9 The International Maritime Organization (IMO) is a part of the United Nations and is responsible for 
promulgating rules governing international shipping. With regard to marine fuels, the predominant 
usage has been of residual fuels. These fuels are primarily composed of the remaining parts of crude oil 
after higher-value products, such as gasoline and kerosene, have been distilled away. They commonly 
have varying, but relatively high, concentrations of toxic chemicals such as hydrogen sulfide, lead, 
nickel, sulfur and vanadium. Due to concerns about the impact of shipping on international air 
pollution, in the last thirty years more and more sections of the world’s oceans have been designated as 
“special areas” where only fuels with very low sulfur content can be used. These fuels, due to the 
higher purity required, have considerably greater refining costs. These, of course, are passed on to the 
customer. It should also be noted that due to pollution regulations and the serious potential for damage 
to vessel engines from mixing incompatible elements, most residual fuels cannot now be combined. 
Imagine if you had to have several fuel tanks in your automobile because you could not mix fuel 
bought from one station with fuel bought from another!  
10 To “bunker” a vessel means to load it with fuel. 
11 In the 1970’s it was common to find vessels with crews of forty or more seafarers. In the 21st 
Century crews are now down to 20 or less and the technological capability exists to have ships that 
need no onboard personnel at all. 
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CRITICAL LOCATION AND FACILITY PREREQUISITES 
 
A modern shipyard is “an assembly plant geared to the assembling of structural steel 
units…with an important subsidiary manufacturing role cutting, shaping and 
otherwise fabricating sheet and plate steel and pipe in conformity with the 
specifications of ship design.”12 Starting from this definition, it becomes clear that to 
support a modern world-class shipbuilding industry, a number of physical and human 
factors are prerequisites.  
 
First, given the huge dimensions of modern vessels, shipyards must have access to 
deep-water harbors. Modern vessels 300-plus meters in length will often have fully-
laden drafts approaching thirty meters. Harbors where vessels of this size can be 
launched without having to resort to expensive and repeated dredging operations are a 
tremendous advantage to a shipbuilding nation. Moreover, it helps greatly if these 
harbors are located in areas with relatively mild tidal variances since shipyards 
located on tidal rivers with major level fluctuations experience launching availability 
limitations and constraints on the movement of heavy items by floating cranes.13  
 
Second, adjacent coastal land must be available at reasonable prices due to the large 
amounts of land needed for the construction of large modern ships. The construction 
process of a modern ship bears a clear resemblance to the assembly of a jigsaw puzzle. 
                                                 
12 Daniel Todd, The World Shipbuilding Industry. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1985), p. 28. Todd 
presents a clear argument as to how modern shipyards producing ships on a “flow-line production 
principle” must, for maximum efficiency, be laid out to provide “straight-line, minimum-distance hauls 
between the various stages of production.” 
13 Sung-Leep Jung, DSME Okpo Shipyard: Three Decades of Trust and Passion, 1973-2003 (Okpo: 
Samsung Printing, 2004), p. 167. According to Jung, the Korean Government chose the location for the 
Okpo Shipyard on Geoje Island based on it meeting five major criteria: water depth of at least 15 
meters, less than 1 meter of tidal rise/fall, generally moderate wind conditions, ability to dedicate at 
least 1,652,900 square meters to shipyard usage, and proximity to a large port. 
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Modern vessels are assembled in “blocks,” which are composed of various smaller 
sub-structures. These “blocks” correspond to individual puzzle pieces. It is common 
for a “block” to exceed twenty-five meters in length, and fifteen meters in height and 
breadth, and a modern ship may well have in excess of four hundred of these “blocks.” 
The “blocks” are then welded together to make “mega-blocks.” “Mega-blocks” can 
include six or more “blocks” in their construction.  
 
These “mega-blocks” are then erected, or placed together, in a drydock, which is 
normally a trench cut in the ground below sea level and closed off by a movable “gate” 
at its seaside end. When the drydock “gate” is open, the drydock is full of water to the 
level of the external body of water. When the “gate” is closed, thus isolating the 
drydock’s internal area from the external body of water, the drydock can be pumped 
out and provide a dry area for construction/assembly of vessels.14 When construction 
is completed, the drydock can be flooded again and the vessel gently floated out of the 
drydock. This is a major technological advance over inclined construction berths since 
the launched vessel never need be exposed to the danger of mishandling and collision, 
a not infrequent occurrence during launches from inclined berths.15  A drydock will 
usually have concrete walls and a concrete floor with an elaborate and robust drainage 
infrastructure.16 Some large dry-docks are longer than 500 meters in length and 130 
                                                 
14 The drydock “gate” is actually a caisson which can be ballasted and deballasted. When it is desired 
to close the “gate,” while the drydock is flooded the caisson is moved into place by tugboats and 
ballasted, thus causing it to sink into place and isolate the drydock. The drydock can then be pumped 
dry. When it is desired to flood the drydock, valves in the drydock are opened and water is allowed to 
enter until levels inside and outside are equalized. The “gate” is then deballasted, which causes it to 
have additional buoyancy. It will then float up out of the “closed” position and can then be moved to an 
unobtrusive storage position by tugboats.   
15 In addition to making safer launches possible, drydocks also considerably eased many construction 
difficulties as a drydock-built vessel was built on a level base line. Therefore it was not necessary for 
designers and shipyard assembly workers to take into account the angle presented by the ship’s position 
on an inclined launching slipway. 
16 There are also floating drydocks, made of steel, which are ballasted to sink them deeper in the water 
thus permitting the flotation and launching of vessels constructed within. 
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meters in width.17 These are spanned by gantry cranes often rising 90 meters or more 
above the drydock and whose main support beam is often longer than two football 
fields.  
 
Fabrication and storage areas for these “blocks” and “mega-blocks” are required18, as 
are specialist shops for sandblasting, coating and painting them.
19
 Other specialist 
shops required are for rudder fabrication and assembly, propeller mounting, piping 
fabrication, tank assembly and cargo containment membrane fabrication. Extensive 
machine shop facilities for metalworking operations are an absolute necessity.
20
 
Covered and climate-controlled storage for expensive marine equipment supplied by 
external vendors is mandatory, in addition to outside storage for vast amounts of steel 
plating and piping. Almost every conceivable type of electric cabling must also be 
stored on site, often in huge amounts, and it must be readily available. See Table 2 for 
a general listing of needed equipment. 
 
                                                 
17 17Jung, DSME Okpo Shipyard, 171. The Okpo Shipyard’s No. 1 Dock is 530 meters long, 131 
meters wide and 14.5 meters deep. DSME claims it is the world’s largest drydock and has a maximum 
construction capacity of 1 million deadweight tons. The associated “Goliath” gantry crane is 91 meters 
high, 206 meters long, and can handle 900 tons. 
18 In a large shipyard with a high volume of steel throughput, already constructed “blocks” need to be 
stored someplace while the remaining components of the “mega-block” are fabricated. Depending on 
the size, order book and fabrication schedule of the yard, the storage area required can be as much as 
several hundred acres. 
19 Given that the marine environment of high UV sunlight, salt air and salt water is so corrosive, the 
coating systems on a vessel are of extreme importance. As a general rule, more than 10 percent of the 
cost of a newly built vessel is spent on painting and coating materials. Coating technology is a 
shipbuilding sub-discipline in its own right, whose practitioners are fond of reminding customers that 
“rust never sleeps” and that their choices are either, “paint now or replace with new steel later.” 
20 While there are a great many machining requirements for large vessels, the most commonly 
impressive is the fabrication of propeller shafts. It is quite common to see propeller shafts which are in 
excess of ten meters long. In most cases these shafts are machined from forged billets of chrome-moly 
steel. The process begins with a battered, blackened, roughly rectangular forged steel billet, with 
dimensional tolerances measured in inches/centimeters, entering a machine shop. It reemerges as a 
gleaming, precisely and intricately machined cylindrical shaft with dimensional tolerances measured in 
hundreds of a millimeter. Watching this transformation happen to such a huge piece of steel is to see 
the true beauty of industrial manufacturing. 
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Table 2: MODERN SHIPYARD EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS
21
 
Function Equipment Needed 
Steel Receipt and Storage: Ship/barge, railway or truck transshipment 
facilities; cranes or conveyors; extensive storage 
area 
Blast-cleaning and Pickling Covered assembly area; blast-cleaning/pickling 
vat; rail cars; tractors, trucks, conveyors, cranes 
Steel Marking Covered assembly area; templates, numerically 
controlled marking equipment, conveyors, cranes 
Steel Cutting Covered assembly area; numerically controlled 
burning equipment and skids; cranes 
Rivet Punching Multiple punches, drills, conveyors, cranes 
Cold Forming Covered assembly area; complete machine shop 
capability. Rolls, presses, cranes, templates, 
lathes, milling machines, shapers, drilling 
machines, precision measuring equipment, non-
destructive testing capabilities, including radiation 
and ultrasound. 
Hot Forming Furnaces, presses, forms and jigs, cranes 
Intermediate Storage (I) Railway facilities if possible; conveyors, storage 
and holding brackets, trucks, forklifts, movable 
cranes, large storage area 
Precut Parts Assembly Jigs, panel assembly line welding equipment, 
joining brackets, burning equipment, gouging 
equipment, preheating equipment and 
temperature-recording devices, non-destructive 
testing capabilities, including radiation and 
ultrasound; cranes 
Intermediate Storage (II) Railway facilities if possible; conveyors, storage 
and holding brackets,  
Erection on ways/in drydocks/assembly areas Large tower or gantry cranes; keel blocks; large 
JLG/cherry pickers; forklifts; rudder stock 
carriages; preheating equipment; welding, burning 
and gouging equipment; laser measuring 
equipment/transits; non-destructive testing 
capabilities, including radiation and ultrasound;  
Outfitting Welding, burning and gouging equipment; quay 
or jetty cranes. 
 
 
Once these material/logistical needs are met, there remains the necessity of providing 
for the most important factor: the human component. A large shipyard is much like a 
small city. It will have administrators, designers, engineers, production personnel, 
quality management personnel, maintenance personnel, cleaning personnel, catering 
                                                 
21 D.M. Mack-Forlist and A. Newman, The Conversion of Shipbuilding from Military to Civilian 
Markets (Praeger, New York, 1970), pp. 38-39. This chart is adapted to shipyard equipment required of 
a major modern shipyard ca. 2013. 
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services, fire and security departments, and medical personnel. They often have 
branches of local banks inside as well as a post office. The offices, canteens, medical 
facilities, testing centers, and other structures needed to house the workforce must be 
of commensurate size. Given that some Korean shipyards employ more than 30,000 
personnel on site, the required support infrastructure represents a major expense.  
 
As a general rule, the more of these facilities which can be located inside the shipyard 
itself, the more useful they are, if only due to the savings in travel costs permitted by 
close proximity. If land cost is exorbitant, the industry will be constrained in growth 
simply because satellite construction facilities located distant from the main shipyard 
add an additional transport cost which the overall profit margin may not support. It 
must always be remembered that shipbuilding is a cyclical business, and generally not 
one which yields a great profit margin compared to the vast amounts of capital 
required to construct the necessary facilities. This fact concerning shipyard profit 
margins plays a large part in the relative trajectories of the South Korean and British 
shipbuilding industries, as will be shown later. 
 
Third, but most important, there must be a plentiful, skilled and relatively willing 
workforce available. Despite the large amount of machinery used in modern 
shipbuilding, it still remains a very labor-intensive industry. Fabrication of large, 
curved metal parts such as bows, sterns and pontoons is a very complex business. 
While computer-aided design has increased productivity considerably, the 
construction, fitting, assembly and welding of such items is still primarily done by 
hand and requires years of experience to do properly. Hand welding and pipefitting, 
while far diminished from the requirements of even thirty years ago, still requires 
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many experienced and competent specialist workers. Even those parts which are 
generally square and can be welded by machine must have welders who know how to 
set and operate the welding machines within the proper parameters.22 Painters, 
insulators, cleaners, tile-setters, joiners and carpenters are all vitally important in the 
construction of a modern vessel. Given the huge amount of electrical equipment and 
instrumentation aboard a modern vessel, electrical engineers, electronics technicians, 
electricians and cable layers are in greater demand than ever before. Workers 
performing any of these jobs in the modern era must be capable of following written 
directions properly and understanding the relevance of their job to the overall 
construction of at least their segment of the vessel.23  
 
The supervisory force must be even better educated and skilled at their tasks because 
they not only have to know how to perform the tasks of their subordinates, they must 
also know the design requirements of the system. This means they must be able to 
read and properly interpret engineering drawings, recognize when work is not 
properly done, know how to function within the shipyard’s quality system to redress 
                                                 
22 For a proper weld to be made, certain critical variables must be correct prior to weld initiation. These 
variables include metal compatibility, voltage type, voltage magnitude, amperage, type of electrode, 
travel speed of the electrode, gas or flux used, thickness of the metal, overall heat input, preheating, 
postheating and stress relieving, among others. Failure to meet any of the required variable values can 
result in brittle, cracked or incomplete welds, potentially endangering the vessel. Such welding errors 
resulted in the loss of numerous American “Liberty” and “Victory” ships constructed during the crash 
shipbuilding effort for United States merchant shipping during World War II; on occasion vessels 
simply broke into two pieces from encountering normal levels of wave motion. 
23 Governments have not always understood the importance of this requirement. An egregious example 
is the effort by the United States government in the 1970’s to reinvent the former Brooklyn Naval Yard, 
in Brooklyn, New York, as a commercial shipyard. The intent was twofold: first, to take under-
educated inner-city minority youths and train them to be shipbuilders and ship fitters, and second, to 
rehabilitate a crime-ridden section of New York City. The project was an abject failure, which 
collapsed as soon as the U.S. Government stopped pumping huge amounts of money into it. The U.S. 
Government loss was eventually well in excess of $500 million, a vast sum at the time. The author had 
the misfortune to sail on one of the vessels that was constructed under this scheme. A VLCC (Very 
Large Crude [oil] Carrier), it was undoubtedly the most poorly built vessel I ever sailed on in a thirty-
year seagoing career, albeit one of the most expensive in initial shipbuilding cost.   
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quality issues, keep close track of their area of responsibility24, and maintain a 
sometimes impossibly tight schedule.25 Moreover, they must understand their unit’s 
role in the processing hierarchy of flow management in order to properly assign 
priority to the tasks at hand. In South Korea, there is the additional requirement of 
high-level technical proficiency in English, the international language of shipping and 
ship construction.
26
 
 
To produce employees capable of completing such challenging tasks properly, there 
must already exist a decent education system capable of training them to the standards 
necessary. Also, given that shipbuilding is often a dirty, difficult and dangerous job, 
the workforce must be sufficiently motivated to want to accept such labor for the 
remuneration on offer. In both Korea and Britain, this last point would prove to be a 
critical determinant of their eventual success or failure. 
 
Fourth, and arguably most critical, there must be government support at a high level. 
All modern national governments have the power of life or death over any business 
entity within their borders. National economic planning can, and very often does, 
determine the success or failure of industries within an overall national economy. For 
                                                 
24 The author once had a Korean shipyard quality control manager bemoan the fact that he had to 
cancel an inspection due to the fact that he had “lost a block.” Unable to resist the temptation, I feigned 
astonishment and asked, “How could you lose this block? It is twenty meters long, fifteen meters wide 
and fifteen meters high. It weighs more than one hundred tons!” In reality, given the size of the 
shipyard and the numbers of equivalently huge blocks for which each quality manager was responsible, 
it was surprising such “losses” did not happen far more often. 
25 Korean dedication to schedule adherence is legendary and is a major reason they are the world’s 
most productive shipbuilders. To paraphrase Kipling, Korean shipyard managers have “faith in 
Schedule most men withhold from God.” 
26 Without certification from a recognized classification society that a vessel has been built according 
to its rules, it is almost impossible for a vessel to obtain insurance. The world’s leading ship 
classification societies are Lloyd’s Register (British), American Bureau of Shipping (American), DNV-
GL (Norwegian/German), Nippon Kaiji Kyokai (Japanese) and Bureau Veritas (French). These 
classification societies, which operate worldwide, effectively create the rules under which all modern 
ships are built. Shipyard supervisory personnel must deal with classification society personnel on a 
daily basis about intricate matters of serious technical import. For all parties involved, fluency in 
English is a mandatory prerequisite for employment. 
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a favored industry, government can provide a myriad of benefits: beneficial tax policy, 
low or no-interest loans, outright grants of capital, access to hard currencies to permit 
acquisition of needed imports or new technology, lax or non-enforcement of 
environmental regulation, and suppression of labor unrest. 
 
Fifth, there is a relatively amorphous yet vitally important factor involved; the idea of 
economic nationalism. Walt W. Rostow described this very well in his book, The 
Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto. Every modern 
industrialized country has obtained the capital to become industrialized by taking it, 
generally through taxation, from other productive segments of the national society.27 
These resources have then been deliberately redirected into industrialization. To a 
greater or lesser degree, this requires the consent of the governed to such extraction of 
capital because they must be willing to submit to this rather than rise up in rebellion 
against onerous taxation. Most industrializing governments have presented this to the 
population as “strengthening the country” and necessary for national advance, or as in 
the case of South Korea, simple survival. President Chung-Hee Park, under whose 
administration Korea actually began its economic “takeoff,” was fond of justifying his 
push for industrialization by using the phrase pukuk kangbyeong (부국 강병) which 
means “rich country, strong army.”
28
  
 
Obviously, the stronger the nationalistic sentiment in a country, the more successful 
such an appeal will be. Nationalist sentiment in Japan in the 19th century made the 
Japanese people willing to reallocate the profits of the silk industry to a Meiji 
                                                 
27 Walt W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1960), pp. 5-7. 
28 Chung-In Moon and Byung-Joon Jun, “Modernization Strategy: Ideas and Influences,” The Park 
Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea.  Editors:  Byung-Kook Kim and Ezra F. Vogel. 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), p. 116. 
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government desperately anxious to keep Japan free from European colonial rule. 
South Koreans in the 1960s and 1970’s remembered the hard-won stalemate of the 
Korean War barely a decade past and recognized a bitterly hostile North Korea as a 
clear and present danger to national survival. Korea and Japan share a long and 
frequently interwoven history and culture.29 That South Korea’s response to the North 
Korean threat was closely akin to the Japanese response to external danger in the 19
th
 
Century is not surprising.  
 
All of the aforementioned five areas played important parts in both Britain and Korea 
relative to their shipbuilding industries. They will be closely examined to determine 
what effect these factors had on their national shipbuilding industries and how each 
nation differed from the other in their reinforcement, or lack of, these critical areas.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
29 There are many cultural similarities between the two countries, which is a source of some 
embarrassment to nationalists in both places, particularly in Korea. One must be careful about placing 
too much weight on such similarities. However, it is obvious that the Koreans of what is known as the 
“Japanese Generation,” (i.e., the Koreans raised between 1910 and 1945), had a great deal of respect, 
even if grudgingly yielded, for the Japanese ability to plan, organize and carry out tasks of major 
complexity and difficulty. Even though the Japanese were acting almost completely for their own 
benefit, the opportunity Koreans had to witness Japanese practice in these areas paid great dividends in 
postwar South Korea.  
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MAJOR TECHNICAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN KOREAN AND 
BRITISH SHIPBUILDING 
SHIPYARD LOCATION AND EXPANSION IN BRITAIN AND KOREA 
 
British shipbuilding in the post-World War II era concentrated on Harland and Wolff 
in Northern Ireland, Scotland’s Clyde River, and England’s Tyne, Tees, Wear and 
Mersey Rivers.30 These areas, usually initially established in the 19th Century as 
shipbuilding venues, possessed sufficient water depth for the size of the vessels being 
constructed at that time. British shipbuilders of a later era, trying to work within 
existing yards originated when vessel sizes were considerably smaller and vessel 
building programs both smaller and less linear, found themselves facing vexingly 
intransigent physical constraints that the newer South Korean yards did not. As vessel 
sizes expanded dramatically in the 1960’s, it became increasingly apparent that most 
British yards faced severe production problems stemming from insufficient water 
depth.31 Moreover, with the exception of the Harland and Wolff shipyard at Queen’s 
Island, Belfast, they were all located on relatively narrow, sinuous rivers, another fact 
which would prove increasingly problematic as ships grew larger and longer.
32
 Even 
at Harland and Wolff, the least difficult venue for delivery of large vessels even prior 
to the construction of the massive new drydock, it still required skillful use of 
                                                 
30 N.S. Ross, “Ship Repairing in Great Britain,” Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series A 
(General), Vol. 115, No. 4 (1952), pp. 524. 
31 K. Warren, “The Location of British Heavy Industry: Problems and Policies.” The Geographical 
Journal, Vol. 139, No. 1 (Feb. 1973), pp. 78-81. 
32 Most of the major shipyards on the slender Clyde had launching berths sited at an acute angle to the 
downstream flow so as to provide vitally necessary additional launching space. During Britain’s period 
as the world’s primary shipbuilder most ships were built on inclined building berths. “Sliding down the 
ways” refers to a ship’s path as it glides down the greased inclined berth into the water. Given that the 
vessel itself is a massive object and is picking up speed as it moves downhill, it acquires a considerable 
amount of kinetic energy during the launch.  In a narrow waterway the task of taking a launched vessel 
in tow and controlling its movement before it runs aground on the opposite bank is no small feat. The 
skill of tugboat operators on Britain’s shipbuilding rivers was critically important to British 
shipbuilding’s success.  As a salient example, a picture of the Queen Elizabeth II being launched at 
John Brown’s Clydebank works shows that only the additional width provided by the mouth of the 
River Cart as it joins the Clyde permits the launching of the vessel. The ship itself is quite obviously 
longer than the width of the Clyde at that point.  Robert Jeffrey and Ian Watson, The Herald Book of 
the Clyde: Glasgow’s River from Source to Sea. (Edinburgh: B &W Publishing, 1998), p. 83. 
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ballasting, drag chains and tugboats to make possible launching vessels in excess of 
193,000 deadweight tons.  
 
Korea’s three major shipbuilding facilities are located on deep-water harbors in 
sheltered areas that open fairly directly onto the ocean. Mipo Bay in Ulsan, where 
Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI) is located, lies right on the peninsula’s east coast, 
while Samsung Heavy Industries (SHI) and Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine 
Engineering (DSME) are located on the island of Geoje-do. In both cases, the 
necessary physical deep-water harbor requirements for large-scale shipbuilding are 
available.33 Moreover, the newly constructed South Korean shipyards never installed 
the inclined building berths used in almost all the older, technologically obsolescent 
British shipyards.34 Consequently, the width of the available launching area never 
posed a problem. From the earliest planning stages of Korea’s first major modern 
shipyard, HHI’s 1972-built Mipo Bay facility, a large dry dock was arguably the most 
important part of the initial design.35 It is relevant to note here that when Britain 
finally, in 1965/66, decided to formally address the problems of its declining 
shipbuilding industry at Parliamentary level, the British Department of Trade 
commissioned a Shipbuilding Inquiry Committee to investigate what changes might 
be necessary to “make the shipbuilding industry competitive in world markets.” The 
                                                 
33 Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering has a quay depth of 19 meters at its “H” quay and 
dredging, to date, has not been necessary to maintain this depth. This information was recorded by 
author from Daewoo data submissions during preparations for conduction of inclining experiment of 
Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit “Bicentenario” in February, 2010. 
34 Harland and Wolff in Belfast was significantly different than other British shipyards in that it 
established a modernization plan which did include the construction of a large drydock capable of 
accommodating a 1 million deadweight ton vessel. 
35 The South Koreans entered shipbuilding at the tail end of the VLCC/ULCC (Very Large Crude 
Carrier/Ultra Large Crude Carrier) era and always intended to build large vessels. Inclined launching 
berths were, for them, a relic of shipbuilding’s past in which they had only academic interest. The self-
produced histories of Korea’s top three shipbuilders, Hyundai Heavy Industries, Daewoo Shipbuilding 
and Marine Engineering, and Samsung Heavy Industries, all make quite clear the fact that their 
shipyards were designed to facilitate final construction in a large drydock equipped with powerful 
crane capacity. From the first stages of planning the dry dock was always intended to be the end point 
of the flow-line production system.  
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Committee’s findings, commonly referred to as the Geddes Report after its chairman, 
Mr. R.M. Geddes, note that “in recent years some overseas yards have developed the 
practice of building ships in a dry dock. This method is particularly appropriate to 
building very large ships but ships of any size can be built in a dry dock.”
 36
 At the 
time the Geddes Report was issued, the Japanese had been very successfully building 
increasingly larger commercial ships in this fashion since 1952. However, the Report 
was somewhat skeptical about the necessity for British shipyards to invest in facilities 
capable of building truly huge vessels such as Very Large Crude (Oil) Carriers 
(VLCC).
37
 
 
As for the availability of adjacent coastal land, the situation differs considerably 
between Korea and Britain in the major shipbuilding areas. Those sites in Britain were 
initially begun on riverside locations in relatively flat, open areas. This stands in clear 
contrast to the major shipyards on the eastern side of the mountainous Korean 
peninsula. There, the general topography is composed of rocky coastlines with small 
amounts of flat land between the ocean and the foothills of the mountains. This 
topographical difference, which in an earlier era might have posed near-insuperable 
difficulties, has actually posed little problem for modern Korean shipbuilders as they 
have not hesitated to use explosives and mechanical means to remove whole mountain 
spurs to expand their facilities. As an example, in 2009 Daewoo Shipbuilding and 
Marine Engineering’s Okpo Shipyard simply tore down and dismantled a 
                                                 
36 Parliamentary Papers, Shipbuilding Inquiry Committee 1965-1966 Report, (Geddes Report), HMSO 
(London, 1966), Cmnd. 2937, p. 17.  
37 In this skepticism they were more correct than they could possibly have known at the time. They 
were writing just prior to the inception of the Very Large Crude Carrier/Ultra Large Crude Carrier 
boom which started with the 1967 closure of the Suez Canal. That would have appeared to show them 
mistaken in their assessment. However, the following 1973 “Oil Shock,” when OPEC raised crude oil 
prices by 400%, caused a near-collapse in the tanker industry as Western economies drastically cut 
their energy usage. With price-imposed oil conservation biting deeply into energy transportation 
requirements, VLCC/ULCC tonnage rapidly fell out of favor in the world tanker shipping markets. 
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basalt/granite mountain spur 100 meters in height over the course of the year. They 
then used the removed stone to construct the access aprons and foundations for 
DSME’s new “H” Quay. 
 
Despite initially being an advantage for 19th and early 20th Century British 
shipbuilders, the relative accessibility and habitability of the areas around the major 
British shipbuilding yards has proved to be the basis of a serious restriction in the 
post-World War II era. In addition to the difficulty posed by being sited on such 
slender, winding waterways as the Clyde, Tyne, Tees and Wear rivers, British 
shipyards were usually more than a century older than their newly established South 
Korean rivals. Towns and infrastructure had grown up around them and hemmed 
them in.38 Even had they wished to expand and been able to obtain the necessary 
governmental permission, something by no means guaranteed, there would have been 
little or no nearby uninhabited land for doing so. Expansion would have required the 
dispossession of large numbers of tenants in possession who would undoubtedly have 
been very unhappy with such actions and whose MPs would certainly have raised 
difficult questions in Parliament. Even with full government assistance and approval, 
concessions which would almost certainly not have been forthcoming in a democratic 
Britain not at war, such actions would undoubtedly have been ruinously expensive 
with tenants requiring fair compensation for their relatively expensive urban property. 
In the modern shipbuilding business, with its emphasis on straight-line, minimum-
                                                 
38 Warren, “Location,” pp. 80-81. He notes that Britain, as of 1973, had not built an important new 
shipyard in almost fifty years. Discussing this matter with Mr. Ernest Woodcock, a Glaswegian who 
had served an apprenticeship on the Clyde and worked in Lithgow’s, he noted that “the yards were 
caught between the river and the road. There was no place to go.” What he referred to was that the 
shipyards on both sides of the Clyde were prevented from expanding by the roads which ran parallel to 
the Clyde on both banks. What small amount of expansion might have been possible would have had to 
be done parallel to the river in that narrow, constricted band of property. Senior Electrical Supervisor 
Ernest Woodcock, personal interview, 22 January 2013. 
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distance transport of components, “the availability of site space goes right to the heart 
of shipbuilding competitiveness.”39 Most British shipyards just didn’t have sufficient 
existing space for modern, optimized large-vessel construction and had no 
economically feasible way of obtaining it. As Kenneth Warren rather sadly stated in 
1973, “Britain, as the pioneer industrial nation, continues to pay a high price for past 
glories.”
40
 
 
The Korean shipbuilders generally found no such problem, as they were building on 
“greenfield” sites to modern shipyard designs. They also had the full weight of 
government support behind them, of which more will be mentioned later. South Korea 
has approximately two-thirds of the population of Great Britain concentrated in much 
less space, with the country being slightly larger than the American state of Indiana.41 
Korean population density is particularly heavy in the greater Seoul area, as roughly 
one-half of the total population of South Korea lives within 50 kilometers of Seoul. 
By comparison, with the exception of Busan, the peninsula’s eastern coast was in 
1972 quite empty. Geoje Island, where SHI and DSME are now located, had little but 
small and depopulating fishing villages on it when these shipyards were begun. 
Largely mountainous and with relatively little arable land for farming, Geoje’s lack of 
population made it easy to initially acquire land quite cheaply near the island’s natural 
deepwater harbors and to expand as business grew.42 
 
                                                 
39 Todd, “Shipbuilding,” pp. 30-31. 
40 Warren, “Location,” p. 83. 
41 Central Intelligence Agency World Fact Book, South Korea, “Geography,” 2012. Web. 
42 Mr. Sung Hyuk Hwang, former Senior Vice President, Hyundai Heavy Industries, personal interview, 
24 September 2009. Mr. Hwang noted that the major reason locations on the southeast coast were 
chosen for shipyard siting was because “land was cheap and easily attainable.” 
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Neither Mipo Bay nor Geoje had even the rudiments of the population base necessary 
to man a large modern shipyard. However, both were roughly equidistant 
(approximately fifty kilometers) from South Korea’s second-largest city, Busan, and 
could immediately draw on that large metropolis for manpower.
43
 HHI’s Mipo Bay 
shipyard was near Ulsan, a city only slightly north of Busan and easily accessed by 
road from there. Such close proximity greatly facilitated personnel access. Material 
access proved a different matter, with the roads connecting Busan and Ulsan soon 
requiring considerable improvement and upgrading as they were not initially 
constructed to withstand either the heavy weight or the massive volume of tractor-
trailer traffic that quickly began traveling on them.44  
 
Geoje, as an island, posed a more difficult problem. Prior to the 1970’s there existed 
only one small bridge for access to the mainland, and it was on the western side of the 
island. Both SHI and DSME are on the northern side of the island and roughly south-
southwest from Busan across Masan Bay. Driving from Busan to the Geoje shipyards 
entailed almost completely circumnavigating Masan Bay, a trip which required a 
minimum of 3.5 hours and which Korea’s frequent traffic jams often made longer. In 
the 1970’s the Korean Government built a second, larger bridge parallel to the first 
Geoje bridge. A scheduled daily multiport passenger ferry service was also started to 
provide access for workers coming from Busan and points north.  
                                                 
43 Many workers in all three major shipyards came from Busan. However, one of the major milestones 
of Korean industrialization was the construction, in the 1960’s, of the Seoul-Busan National Highway. 
This highway, known as National Route 1 or the Gyeongbu Expressway, tied four of Korea’s five 
major cities together and greatly facilitated business expansion. It also made it reasonable for Seoul-
based workers to accept employment at the three major shipyards, as dormitory-housed employees 
could utilize inexpensive express bus service to make weekend visits home. As an example of relative 
distances, in 2012 Korea it takes approximately five hours driving time to reach Seoul from the most 
distant southeast point, which is roughly Geoje Island.  
44 Alice H. Amsden, Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1989), p. 276. The South Korean government paid for the infrastructure 
improvements necessary. Amsden points out that this was common practice and had also been done for 
the construction of POSCO’s integrated steel mill at Pohang. 
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The Okpo shipyard on Geoje Island, initially begun in 1973 by the Korean 
Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering Company (KSEC), has been called “a 
masterpiece of shipbuilding ingenuity.”
45
 Located in what is now Aju-Dong, Geoje 
Island, the Okpo yard’s construction was facilitated by the South Korean government 
permitting relocation of the inhabitants of two small villages, Ajoo and Ayang.
 46
 The 
villagers were compulsorily moved to modern, newly constructed housing located 
outside the intended shipyard footprint.47 This relocation permitted the Okpo Shipyard 
construction project to complete the removal of Daedeung Mountain, a requirement 
for completing the yard layout.48 Such removal of obstructive natural features was 
common in the construction of all of Korea’s three major shipyards as expanding 
order books required larger and larger marshaling yards, stock yards, steel fabrication 
sites and office space. However, an important factor to be recognized is that the space 
to expand was available if the shipyards were willing to make the infrastructure 
improvements because they would face no obstacle from either government 
                                                 
45 Daniel Todd, Industrial Dislocation: The Case of Global Shipbuilding (London: Routledge, 1991), p. 
188. Todd notes that at the time of construction the Okpo Shipyard’s “spacious layout was expressly 
modeled to accommodate optimum flow-line principles.” Designed by A&P Appledore, it also had one 
of the two largest shipbuilding cranes in the world (a Krupp crane capable of lifting 900 tons) and was 
designed with the construction of complex vessels such as chemical and gas carriers in mind. 
46Jung, DSME Okpo Shipyard, p. 169.   In 1978 the South Korean Government forced KSEC to turn 
the Okpo Shipyard over to Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering (DSME) due to KSEC’s 
insufficient financial liquidity. 
47 Byung-Kook Kim, “The Labyrinth of Solitude,” The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of 
South Korea.  Editors:  Byung-Kook Kim and Ezra F. Vogel. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2011), p. 161. Kim describes a similar situation regarding government land purchases for the 
Gyeongbu (Seoul-Busan) Expressway, another high-priority national industrial project. “[President 
Park Chung Hee] directed provincial governors and the Seoul mayor to get landowners’ consent to sell 
within one week by ‘mobilizing county magistrates, town heads and other civil servants’ under the 
Ministry of Home Affairs’ control.” Such near-expropriations were common occurrences in South 
Korea’s heavy and chemical industrialization drive.  
48 Jung, DSME Okpo Shipyard, pp. 97, 172. Daedeung Mountain was initially 72 meters high, 82, 645 
square meters in area, and composed primarily of basalt and granite. Seen as an obstacle requiring 
removal to allow the yard footprint to be laid out as planned, the rubble from the mountain was 
intended for use in constructing embankments and as fill for reclaimed land in Okpo Bay. The biggest 
construction project in South Korea at the time, 2.4 million meters of rock was eventually moved to 
other locations within the shipyard facilities from the former site of Daedeung Mountain. 500 tons of 
high explosive was used in the demolition project. 
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bureaucracy or prior tenants. This ability to build on “greenfield” sites with complete 
governmental support stands in great contrast to the position of British shipyards and 
has to be considered one of the major advantages accruing to Korean shipbuilding.  
THE KOREAN LABOR FORCE AND POSTWAR KOREAN HISTORY 
 
Recognizing the quality of the Korean labor force is key to understanding the rapidity 
of Korean industrialization. Korean culture and history had put into position the 
factors which would produce a generation of world-class white and blue-collar 
workers who accomplished unprecedented feats in the process of industrializing their 
nation. 
 
Of course, the most important factor in the development of the South Korean work 
force was Korea’s deep poverty. During the first three quarters of the Twentieth 
Century, Korea was a very poor nation located in a rough, turbulent region filled with 
rapacious predators. Dominated in turn by Imperial China, Imperial Russia, and 
Imperial Japan (which annexed Korea in 1910), between 1900 and 1953 Korea and its 
people were never able to concentrate on building up the domestic economy solely to 
benefit Koreans.49 The Second World War saw no battles fought in Korea but the 
Japanese war effort drained the country of as much manufacturing and agricultural 
production as Japan could forcibly extract.50 In addition to the material resources 
                                                 
49 Crawford Young, The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1994), p. 251. Young notes that in Korea “systematic reorganization of the agrarian 
zones provided most of the resources needed for the [Japanese] colonial project.”  
50 Mason, Edward S., et al. The Economic and Social Modernization of the Republic of Korea. 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980) pp. 83, 85.  The Korean economy under mercantilist 
Japanese colonial rule was designed to provide foodstuffs to the metropole and accept manufactured 
goods in return. The authors note that “throughout most of the 1920’s and 1930’s, foodstuffs accounted 
for 60 percent and more of Korean exports, most of which were destined for Japan. From 1925 through 
1939, an average of 40 percent of Korea’s total rice crop was exported to Japan.” The Korean rice crop 
increased but at the direct expense of Koreans: tenant farming, as opposed to actual ownership, greatly 
increased during the period of colonial rule.    
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extracted, there was a major human cost as well. Large numbers of Koreans were 
forced to move to other sections of the Japanese Empire to work as unskilled labor.51 
Korea, a primarily agrarian nation, suffered absolute as well as relative losses under 
colonial rule. As Edward Mason put it, “the main inheritance from the Japanese in 
agriculture in 1945 was an impoverished, hard-working mass of tenant farmers.”52 
 
Following the end of World War II, Korea was effectively divided by Russia and the 
United States at the 38th Parallel. The northern half was entered by Soviet troops who 
disarmed and repatriated the Japanese colonial government. The southern half was 
occupied by American troops. A temporary postwar American Military Government 
in Korea was installed in September 1945 to oversee a transition to Korean civilian 
rule. The initial intention of the United Nations toward Korea was to establish a 
united, independent country. However, the forms of government established in the 
southern and northern occupation zones were totally different and completely opposed 
to one another. Soviet and American cooperation gradually dwindled to mere 
formalities as the Koreans on either side of the 38
th
 parallel proceeded to form 
economies that had no hope of being peacefully combined. At American request the 
United Nations in 1947 formed the Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) to 
supervise general elections in all Korea. This commission was refused entry into the 
Soviet-occupied northern half of the country.53 With the northern half of the country 
refusing to participate, elections took place in the southern half in May 1948. 
American forces returned power to the elected South Korean civilian government on 
                                                 
51 Mason, “Modernization,” p. 79. At the end of the Second World War there were nearly two million 
Koreans working in mainland Japan as well as another million working in Manchuria.  
52 Ibid., p. 10. 
53 Michael E. Robinson, Korea’s Twentieth-Century Odyssey: A Short History. (Honolulu: University 
of Hawai’i Press, 2007), p. 110. 
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15 August 1948. This action effectively formalized the national division which had 
been gradually taking place since September 1945.  
 
Once established, the financially strapped and aid-dependent
54
 South Korean 
government had to spend much of its meager funding fighting Communist guerillas 
raised within its own territory, not to mention others dispatched from Soviet-
influenced North Korea.55 The steady escalation of Communist aggression finally 
culminated in the summer of 1950 with a full-scale mechanized military invasion 
from North Korea. The United Nations, led by the United States, intervened on behalf 
of the South and prevented its quick collapse. Consequently, the war dragged on for 
four years as the warring armies moved up and down the peninsula. During this time 
the capital and most important Korean city, Seoul, changed hands four times. The 
devastation in both the North and South was extreme. In 1953, at the end of the 
Korean War, most of South Korea was in ruins and it was arguably the poorest nation 
on earth.56 It was gratefully receiving foreign assistance from the likes of Ethiopia and 
the Philippines. There were many legacies from the war, but two of the most 
important for South Korea’s future history were an abiding fear of another Northern 
invasion and the establishment of the South Korean military as the legitimate and 
final guarantor of South Korean national survival. These factors would play a very 
large part in the grudging acceptance of military rule and consequent unilateral 
governmental action not normally permitted in a democratic country. In effect, South 
                                                 
54 Mason, “Modernization,” p. 176. Foreign aid, mostly from the U.S., “financed practically the total of 
Korea’s imports since regular commercial exports were negligible during this period.” 
55 Bruce Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History, 2nd ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 
2005), pp. 217-224, 243-247. These sections cover the Yeosu and Cheju-do Communist insurrections 
as well. 
56 Junghyo Ahn, White Badge (New York: Soho Press, 1989), p. 54. Ahn describes how, as a boy, 
going to the garbage dump outside the American military base and picking through the scraps often 
provided his family with the best food they would have that day. Eventually Ahn’s father joined him in 
these searches. 
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Korea under the threat of invasion and conquest by the North operated under a de 
facto, if not de jure, Defense of the Realm Act for more than forty years.57 
 
Once the Korean War was effectively over
58
, a tremendous hunger for education 
swiftly manifested itself as one of the prime concerns of the South Korean populace.59 
Education is and for millennia has been a tremendously valued attribute among 
Koreans. Young Korean men during the Silla Dynasty (356-918 A.D.) were already 
noted as assiduously studying the five main classical texts of Confucian learning. 
Bruce Cumings noted that in the Choson Dynasty, (1392-1910), “the primary method 
to bettering a family’s station in life was through education, a kind of socio-economic 
upward mobility; study therefore went on ceaselessly, morning, noon and night.”
60
 
King Sejong, who ruled the Choson Dynasty from 1418 to 1450, invented the modern, 
extremely logical Korean alphabet known as Han’gul. Reputed to be a genius himself, 
he did this so as to allow the commoners of his country to be able to read and write 
without the necessity of spending many years learning complicated Chinese 
pictographs.
61
  
                                                 
57 The Defense of the Realm Act was enacted in the United Kingdom in 1914. It effectively granted the 
British monarch, through his ministers and Cabinet, control over almost every facet of life and property 
existing in the United Kingdom. It was never formally repealed but subsequent postwar legislation 
made most of its provisions invalid. In South Korea, democratic government can only be said to have 
been completely unfettered since 1992, when President Young Sam Kim was elected. 
58 The war has never officially ended. An armistice was signed in 1953 which ended the major fighting 
but no peace treaty has ever been signed. The fact that South and North Korea are still officially at war 
has played a major role in South Korean politics and economics from 1953 to the present day.  
59 Amsden, “Asia’s Next Giant,” p. 217. According to Amsden, one year after the end of the war Korea 
already had “as much as 17% of its population enrolled in school.” 
60Cumings, “Korea’s Place,” p. 59. Cumings also remarked that, due to study requirements, Korean 
schoolchildren today may only sleep four hours per night. Personal experience of the author with 
Korean high school students confirms Cumings’ observation.  
61 Michael Breen, The Koreans (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998),  p. 91.King Sejong is, without a 
doubt, the national figure Koreans most admire. During his reign (1418-1450) the Choson dynasty 
enjoyed good government, peace and good harvests. While his introduction of wet paddy farming 
techniques and rice transplantation methods from China contributed greatly to those harvests and 
general Choson prosperity, Michael Breen refers to King Sejong’s invention of Han’gul as “his greatest 
contribution to history.” Breen notes the emergence of Han’gul as “striking, coming as it does from the 
Chinese cultural sphere where the complex characters serve as a conspiracy by snobs who have 
mastered them to keep the masses illiterate.”  
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While Han’gul was rapidly adopted by lower-status groups such as the peasantry, 
women, and the military, it did not come into general use until the twentieth century.62 
However, when it was finally brought into general use after the Second World War, it 
proved to be a very useful tool for rapidly raising the literacy rate in South Korea.63 
Koreans still work very hard at acquiring education-based skills and their assiduous 
efforts toward that acquisition invariably pays real-world dividends. As a 
consequence, the average Korean high school student graduates with an educational 
attainment level approximately equivalent to that of the average American college 
junior.64 This means that the average Korean high school graduate, who generally 
learns most of what he will need for his adult career in high school, has a four-year 
time advantage over his Western counterpart. It also means that in Korea, even the 
blue-collar work force with no post-secondary education has a considerably higher 
educational achievement level than its Western equivalent. This high baseline level of 
education plays a very large part in the ability of Korean companies to flexibly shift 
their work force between the manufacture of different products.   
 
                                                 
62 Cumings, “Korea’s Place,” p. 66. 
63 Dr. Sang-Mok Suh. “The Evolution of the Korean Economy: A Historical Perspective,” Working 
Paper No. 8603, Korea Development Institute, 1989, p. 6. Han’gul was restricted to lower-status social 
groups until the end of the Second World War. This was due to three causes. First, prior to the 
annexation of Korea by Japan in 1910, the upper-class socioeconomic groups used Chinese ideographs 
in much of their writing. Second, after the annexation, the Japanese language was forced on the Korean 
people in an endeavor to overwrite their culture and assimilate them into the Japanese Empire. This 
policy eventually reached its end point when all Koreans had to take a Japanese name and the use of 
Korean for any official or public business was forbidden by law. Once the Japanese were deposed and 
deported at the end of World War II, popular opinion prevented the upper-class socioeconomic groups 
from reassuming primacy as many of them had been guilty of collaboration with the Japanese. The 
unleashing of Korean nationalism invariably led to the widespread reintroduction of Han’gul teaching, 
and the policy was an instant success. From a 22 per cent literacy rate in 1945, by 1960 the literacy rate 
was 72 per cent.  
64 Cumings, “Korea’s Place,” p. 344.  
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Korea is considered “both a general case of a well-educated late industrializing 
country and a special case of an exceptionally well-educated one.”65 Complementing 
the high Korean educational achievement level was a major wage disparity just 
waiting to be exploited. In 1975 the Korean manufacturing production work force was 
earning $0.34 per hour compared to Japanese earnings of $3.05 and U.S. costs of 
$6.36.
66
 The twin advantages of higher educational skill and much lower 
compensation costs were paradigm-changing elements. They represented formidable 
weapons in South Korea’s battle to wrest a considerable amount of manufacturing 
market share away from its worldwide competition. 
 
Another major factor played heavily into the development of the South Korean work 
force: the Republic of Korea (R.O.K.) Army. By law, from the end of the Korean War 
until 2013, every South Korean male citizen owed his country two years of military 
service.67 For many military conscripts their military service was a life-changing 
experience. As an example, in the period between 1951 and 1970, the R.O.K. Army 
played a huge part in eradicating illiteracy in South Korea, educating a total of 
approximately one million men to at least basic literacy levels.68 Moreover, a 
                                                 
65 Amsden, “Asia’s Next Giant,” p. 219. 
66 Frederic C. Deyo, Beneath the Miracle: Labor Subordination in the New Asian Industrialism 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), p. 91. Deyo provides a 1988 U.S. Department of 
Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics chart showing hourly compensation costs in U.S. dollars for 
manufacturing production workers in selected countries. The countries include the U.S., Japan, Mexico, 
Brazil, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and South Korea and the comparisons are made in 1975, 1980 
and 1986. In 1986 American workers were making $13.21 per hour, Japanese workers were making 
$9.47 per hour, and South Koreans were making $1.39 per hour. Wage increases as an overall 
percentage remained roughly equivalent as did the Korean labor cost advantage. It is worthy of note to 
recognize that as of the date of this writing (2012) South Korea is beginning to see the kind of 
“hollowing out” bemoaned by earlier industrial powerhouses such as the U.S. and Japan as the Korean 
chaebôl move production to lower-cost facilities in China.  
67 The military service obligation has, as of 2013, been reduced to eighteen months. 
68 Do Young Chang, “The Republic of Korea Army and its Role in National Development,” Asian 
Affairs Vol. 13, No. 4 (Winter, 1986-1987), p. 59. Chang notes that the military had three programs for 
raising literacy levels: basic, elementary education, and junior high school. Approximately 600,000 
men finished the basic literacy course; another 400,000 completed the elementary and junior high 
courses. 
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considerable amount of technical training was provided to South Korean servicemen, 
a great many of whom would later carry this training to the shop floors of Korean 
industries.  One Korean historian noted that 
 
The major portion of the education and training in the (R.O.K.) army’s 
[technical] branch schools has been in technical skills that were 
necessary for or related to the nation’s developing industries. The 
army-trained manpower had obviously been the main source of skilled 
labor in the 1960’s and early 1970’s, when the Republic of Korea 
lacked skilled workers for rapidly growing industries.69  
 
The R.O.K. military also provided education of a different, but equally important, sort. 
It is an understatement to say the R.O.K. military does not coddle its recruits. After 
two years of military service, young South Korean men fully understand military 
discipline and have learned through harsh experience to respond almost automatically 
to command.
70
 This deliberate molding of recruits’ character to the acceptance of 
military authority carried on into civilian life.71 Donald Kirk notes that in the initial 
overseas ventures (Thailand, Saudi Arabia) undertaken by Hyundai Construction 
Company in the 1960’s and 1970’s, in which successful results were considered a 
major national priority, Hyundai’s workforce was deliberately organized along 
                                                 
69 Chang, “Army,” p. 59-60. Chang also cites the Hapdong News Agency’s Korea Annual for 1969 and 
1971 to show that in 1970 Korea had only 1.3 million workers, out of a total work force of 10 million, 
working in mining and manufacturing. Noting that by the end of 1975 more than 685,000 officers and 
men had received Military Operational Specialty technical branch training, he concludes that a large 
percentage of the 1.3 million mining and manufacturing workers were veterans who had acquired 
related training while in the military. 
70 Cumings, “Korea’s Place,” p. 303. Cumings states that the Korean military had “an authoritarian 
practice that chilled even the most hard-bitten American officers” and “provided a school for industrial 
discipline.” 
71 The author notes that this tendency is very evident in daily shipyard activities. All Class Society 
surveyors entering or leaving DSME, SHI or HHI shipyards are saluted by the guards at the gate in a 
manner equivalent to that military courtesy rendered to commissioned officers. At major milestone 
ceremonies in both DSME and SHI, something which the author has seen dozens of times, the safety 
and success prayer is always read by a senior shipyard production foreman with the upright bearing and 
unmistakably stentorian tones of an experienced senior non-commissioned officer.    
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military lines.72 Consequently, when South Korea began to implement its third Five-
Year Plan in 1972, with its extreme emphasis on heavy industrialization and 
shipbuilding, the Korean labor force was exactly suited for the task. It was smart, 
educated, disciplined, inured to hard work and very hungry for economic 
betterment.73  
SHIPBUILDING CONSTRUCTION OVERSIGHT DIFFERENCES 
BETWEEN SOUTH KOREA AND BRITAIN 
 
Two major construction oversight differences clearly set British shipbuilding apart 
from both Japanese and Korean shipbuilders. These two differences were in the use of 
skilled labor and the level of managerial intervention. 74  Edward Lorenz refers to the 
two primary methods of construction oversight as bureaucratic administration and 
craft administration. He defines bureaucratic administration as 
 
having the following features of the work process planned in advance 
by persons not on the work crew: the location of tasks; the movement 
of tools, materials and workers to those locations; sometimes the 
movements performed to complete tasks; the time allotments for tasks; 
and the inspection criteria for particular operations. 
  
 
Craft administration, by comparison, is defined as having “these characteristics of the 
work process governed by workers in accordance with craft principles.”
75
 The choice 
of which oversight method to use was initially dictated to shipbuilders by the 
knowledge and expertise available in the construction workforce.  
                                                 
72 Donald Kirk, Korean Dynasty: Hyundai and Chung Ju Yung (Hong Kong: Asia 2000 Ltd., 1994), p. 
84. Kirk stated that “those who had gone through reserve officers’ training in college and served as 
junior officers made ideal leaders of small units.”   
73 T.C. Rhee, “South Korea’s Economic Development and Its Socio-Political Impact,” Asian Survey 
Vol.13, No. 7 (July 1973), 677-690. 
74 Edward H. Lorenz, “An Evolutionary Explanation for Competitive Decline: The British Shipbuilding 
Industry, 1890-1970,” The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Dec. 1991), p. 911-912. He 
notes that his definition of “bureaucratic administration” and “craft administration” is taken from 
Arthur L. Stinchcombe’s “Bureaucratic and Craft Administration,” Administrative Science Quarterly, 4, 
Sept. 1959, p. 170.  
75 Lorenz, “Explanation,” p. 912. 
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British shipbuilders followed the craft administration principle of construction 
oversight. In the first half of the 20th Century they were accustomed to the luxury of 
having a large number of skilled craftsmen available who were experts at their trades. 
British shipyard workers, in a system which evolved during the 19
th
 Century when 
Britain produced the vast majority of the world’s ships, were organized into seventeen 
craft unions.
76
 These unions were, in the main, responsible for supplying to a 
shipbuilder whatever might be needed in the way of skilled craftsmen. Craft unions 
such as the Boilermakers Society required long apprenticeships for advancement in 
the trade, thus insuring that skilled workers at the highest levels were extremely 
competent. 77 Britain’s long experience with high levels of talent and experience on 
the shop floor had allowed the emergence of a work culture where British 
shipbuilders required much less specialist and managerial talent to oversee 
construction. 78  
 
Parallels can clearly be drawn between British military practice and British shipyard 
construction practice. Both devolved a tremendous amount of responsibility on long-
service but non-managerial level subordinates. In the shipbuilding industry these men 
were not referred to as “non-commissioned officers,” but they effectively performed 
the same role. As Edward Lorenz noted, “well into the twentieth century many British 
                                                 
76 By the 1970’s this number had been reduced to fifteen unions. They were the Amalgamated Society 
of Boilermakers, Shipwrights, Blacksmiths and Structural Workers; the Electrical Trades Union; the 
Amalgamated Engineering Union; the National Union of General and Municipal Workers; the 
Amalgamated Society of Painters and Decorators; the Plumbing Trades Union; the National Union of 
Sheet Metal Workers and Coppersmiths; the Transport and General Workers Union; the Amalgamated 
Society of Woodworkers; the United French Polishers Society; the Heating and Domestic Engineers 
Union; the United Patternmakers Association; the Amalgamated Society of Woodcutting Machinists; 
the Clerical and Administrative Workers Union and the Draughtsmen’s and Allied Technicians’ 
Association. 
77 John Foster and Charles Woolfson, The Politics of the UCS Work-In. (London: Lawrence and 
Wishart, 1986), p. 134. The apprenticeship period was normally at least five years and often extended 
to seven. 
78 Lorenz, “Explanation,” pp. 921-922 
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industrialists remained highly dependent on their skilled workers for shop-floor 
control and organization.”79 This reliance permitted what the 1962 Patton Report 
referred to as “a long tradition of working with a minimum managerial and technical 
staff.”
80
 The British Shipbuilding 1972 report by Booz, Allen and Hamilton (BAH 
Report) noted a truly critical difference between Asian and British shipbuilding when 
it stated that “Informal scheduling and planning, depending on the skill and 
experience at foreman level, is often the only detailed planning available once original 
plans have been bypassed and due dates have been issued.”81 One highly experienced 
machinery superintendent who had worked on the Clyde in the 1960’s and 1970’s 
confirmed this when discussing British shipyard drawing fabrication in those days. He 
said, “The design department made a lot of the drawings after the ship was built 
because by then they had been shown what had actually been done!”82 
 
This lack of institutional structure represents an almost unimaginable difference from 
the way that modern Korean shipyards work. Original construction plans do not get 
“bypassed,” as this would be a critical error for a yard engaged in constructing 
multiple vessels to the same design. They are revised as frequently as necessary—and 
certainly whenever problems are found--by dedicated design engineers who are tasked 
with making certain that all construction details of the vessel are properly captured 
                                                 
79 Edward H. Lorenz, Economic Decline in Britain: The Case of the Shipbuilding Industry, 1860-1970. 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), p. 68. 
80 James Patton, et al., Productivity and Research in Shipbuilding: Report of the Main Committee, 
Under the Chairmanship of Mr. James Patton, O.B.E., to the Joint Industry Committee. (London: 
Gresham Press, 1962), p. 75. It should be noted here that this “tradition” is exactly the kind of 
weakness with regard to the undersupply of trained engineers available for construction oversight that 
made it so difficult for British shipbuilders to adapt to the problems posed by larger vessels and longer 
production runs. 
81 Booz, Allen and Hamilton BV, British Shipbuilding, 1972: A Report to the Department of Trade and 
Industry. (London: HMSO, 1973), pp. 143-144. 
82 Mr. Rolf Olsson, Senior Machinery Superintendent, GOLAR Shipping Co., personal interview, 16 
May 2013. 
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and recorded in the vessel documentation.83 The revised plans, usually after 
approval/reapproval by a classification society, are then provided to production line 
management. It is their specific obligation to insure that the people actually building 
the vessel have the latest plan revisions easily available to them. Moreover, 
production line management and actual production personnel are working under the 
near-constant observation of shipyard quality control personnel. These quality control 
personnel, who report to a different internal shipyard organization, have the authority 
to immediately stop work if they see incorrect or unsafe actions taking place. In the 
bureaucratically administered, hierarchically systematic production system of Korean 
shipyards, a shop foreman or welding supervisor simply would not have the authority 
to formally change or waive approved construction details. If it became known that an 
individual had even informally done so, his continued employment would be in 
serious jeopardy.  
 
French shipyards in the early 20th Century were early examples of bureaucratic 
administration. The French were forced to institute a bureaucratic, top-down system 
of production management because, unlike their British competitors, the French 
production personnel actually building the ships did not have sufficient training or 
experience to operate independently.84 As had the French, both the Japanese and the 
Koreans adopted this more centralized approach to production management. They did 
so for the same reason: the relative lack of skill in the local shipbuilding labor force. 
However, the massive increases in vessel size and construction scale, along with the 
                                                 
83 Detailed plans may go through a considerable number of revisions before a vessel is completed. For 
example, plans for main equipment foundations are often revised in light of the results of updated stress 
calculations or finite element analysis. In most Korean shipyards, pre-production plans intended for 
third party review and analysis start with Revision A, followed by Revision B, etc. Production plans 
start with Revision 0, followed by Revision 1, etc. The final “as-built” plans provided to the vessel at 
delivery are designated as Revision Z or Revision 00. 
84 Lorenz, “Explanation,” p. 921. 
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move to vessel standardization and series fabrication, eventually proved the 
hierarchical, bureaucratic administrative model to be the more efficiently productive 
one for the shipbuilding circumstances prevailing in the second half of the 20th 
Century.
85
  
 
In the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 Centuries, the British model of highly skilled craftsmen 
making “bespoke” adjustments to initial building plans actually was a competitive 
advantage.86 In that era ships were smaller, less specialized and less uniform. 
Innovative “one-off” solutions for individual vessels that might be inordinately 
expensive if performed on a mass production scale were considered acceptable costs, 
particularly when the exercise of such initiative by front-line production personnel 
was seen as diminishing the cost of design and management overhead. When 
compared with other Western European shipbuilders, an observer noted that in British 
shipyards “the comparatively small proportion of supervisors is especially striking” 
and “there is comparatively little production pre-planning.”87 This anomalous 
condition was explained by a longstanding British managerial perception that “the 
[shipbuilding] industry’s particular technical and market characteristics preclude the 
use of more systematic methods of production planning.”
88
  
 
The Geddes Report recognized this mindset and gently addressed it with the comment 
that “We would only emphasise that faster throughput and the tighter programming of 
work will require both more and better qualified supervision than many yards seem to 
                                                 
85 Lorenz, “Decline,” p. 71 
86 Bernard Elbaum and William Lazonick, “The Decline of the British Economy: An Institutional 
Perspective,” Journal of Economic History, Vol. 44, No. 2 (June 1984), pp. 573-574. 
87 Lorenz, “Decline,” p. 93.  
88 Ibid., p. 94. Lorenz sees this inability as a consequence of managerial unwillingness to take actions 
which might induce a strike or other disruptive labor action. 
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possess at present.”89 Britain’s shipowners, in their responses to Geddes Report 
questionnaires, were considerably less tactful. They generally found British shipyard 
management to be poor and were not reticent about saying so. One critical respondent 
was Sir Stewart MacTier, Chairman of Alfred Holt and Co. Alfred Holt and Co. 
owned the Blue Funnel Line, one of Britain’s major shipping concerns.  MacTier 
stated that “in his view, there had to be more interest in production planning and 
production engineering, and this could only be achieved by an influx of graduates and 
the introduction of top management from other industries.”90 Other major British 
shipowners such as the directors of Clan Line, BP and P&O, echoed MacTier’s 
observations in their statements to the Shipbuilding Inquiry Committee.91 They 
clearly saw British shipbuilding management and engineering as major problem areas 
in need of serious attention. 92 
 
                                                 
89 Geddes Report, p. 85. 
90 Lewis Johnman and Hugh Murphy, British Shipbuilding and the State since 1918: A Political 
Economy of Decline. (Ithaca: Regatta Press, 2002), p. 195. The comments are taken from PRO, BT 
186/32, Shipbuilding Inquiry Committee, Note on a Meeting with Sir Stewart MacTier of Alfred Holt 
and Co., 6 July 1965, and Notes by Alfred Holt and Co., Liverpool, 11 August 1965.  
91 Ibid., citing PRO, BT 186/32, Shipbuilding Inquiry Committee, Peninsular and Oriental Steam 
Navigation Company, Evidence for SIC, August, 1965, PRO, BT 186/32, SIC, Replies to 
Questionnaire from the Ben Line, Cunard, British and Commonwealth Shipping and Shaw Saville and 
Albion, August-October 1965, and PRO, BT 186/32, SIC, BP Tanker Company, Completed 
Questionnaire to SIC, undated but probably August-September 1965. It should be noted here that Shaw 
Saville and Albion’s response to the questionnaire noted that poor responsiveness by shipyard 
subcontractors was “the root of all our industrial troubles affecting delivery of home requirements and 
exports alike.” This issue remains a problem for shipbuilders to the present day. As ships have grown 
more complex, shipyards have become even more susceptible to delays caused by subcontractor 
mismanagement. Often long lead time items ordered from distant firms are found to have problems 
taking considerably longer to repair than expected, and these delays invariably impinge on the final 
vessel delivery date. 
92Some of the British shipyards publicly acknowledged these failings. In its Annual Report for 1966, 
Harland and Wolff acknowledged that it had “problems of an organizational and commercial nature. 
The management structure has been untidy and has lacked strength on the marketing side.” Harland and 
Wolff Heavy Industries Ltd., Harland and Wolff Annual Report, 1966. Belfast: Harland and Wolff, 
1967. 
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The modern era of standardized shipbuilding did not come into its own until the 
massive American production began for World War II.93 Once the Americans began 
making ships on a scale never before seen and utilizing the assembly-line techniques 
commonly used in the American automobile industry, shipbuilding was changed 
forever. Mass assembly-line ship construction meant the British craft administration 
method of shipbuilding was doomed. Standardization was a prerequisite to efficient 
mass production and it could generally be adapted very easily to a relatively untrained 
workforce as long as there were sufficient numbers of production managers and 
supervisory personnel.
94
 “Rosie the Riveter” of wartime aircraft manufacturing fame 
had many counterparts in American shipyards. She served as a clear example to late-
developing industrial nations that proper management could successfully obtain good 
industrial production from intelligent but untrained laborers.95 Unfortunately for 
British shipbuilding as a whole, the realization that efficient modern ship construction 
demanded major production management/technique changes came too late and met 
too much internal resistance. In a very Darwinian way, British shipbuilding’s failure 
                                                 
93 Todd, “Dislocation,” p. 13. Daniel Ludwig, head of National Bulk Carriers, had owned and operated 
a shipyard in Norfolk, Virginia, during World War II. In the early 1950’s, he was looking for an 
expansion site capable of constructing larger vessels than his Norfolk works would permit. He found 
the Kure Naval Dockyard in Japan, which had a huge building dock, available for a ten year lease. 
Ludwig took the flow-line series-production construction techniques he used during the war to Japan 
and had a very successful decade building tankers there. The technology transfer was of great benefit to 
the Japanese, who studied it closely and made improvements. By the 1960’s Japan had slashed the 
man-hours needed to build one gross ton of tanker from 100 in 1958 to 40 in 1964. Korea as a late 
industrializer was able to adopt many of the Japanese improvements for the construction and operation 
of Korean shipyards. 
94 Ibid., p. 41. Referring to the U.S. Government’s WW-II era Emergency Fleet Corporation’s work 
force, Todd noted that “Scratch labour forces, subjected to only a rudimentary training in shipyard 
practices, proved perfectly adequate for the exacting business of producing standard ships in 
unprecedented numbers.” 
95 David S. Landes, The Unbound Prometheus: Technological Change and Industrial Development in 
Western Europe from 1750 to the Present. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969.), p. 501. 
Landes notes that “one of the salient characteristics of modern technology is the division and 
simplification of complex tasks, so that work that once called for a high degree of skill can be 
performed by the unskilled. Moreover business enterprise has learned to replace or supplement slow 
and costly methods of man-to-man apprenticeship by group training programmes, so that raw men, 
fresh in from the country, can be turned into semiskilled workers in a matter of weeks to months. Some 
enterprises even prefer such new men to experienced workers on the ground that, while they have more 
to learn, they have less to unlearn.” 
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to adapt to changed circumstances played a significant part in the demise of their 
industry. 
SALARIED ENGINEERS AND CONCENTRATING ON THE SHOP 
FLOOR 
 
Modern-era shipbuilding, with its long production runs of standardized vessels, seeks 
to maximize economies of scale through consistency and undeviating repetition in 
construction. The economic necessity to achieve the optimal productive utilization of 
the hard-won and expensive shipyard infrastructure justifies the high cost of the 
bureaucratic management required.
96
 As an example, building increasingly larger 
vessels means dealing with bigger and heavier vessel components. This in turn 
demands more capital investment in higher capacity lifting/transport appliances and 
fabrication machinery.  
 
This necessity for higher capital investment is particularly true with regard to cranes. 
Cranes are the most prominent “muscles” of a shipyard and, as Table 2 showed, are 
required in almost all aspects of shipbuilding.  Indeed, one quite good way to assess 
the raw technical capacity of any given newbuilding shipyard is to count the number 
of cranes and their tonnage ratings. Efficient utilization of these expensive 
construction force multipliers cannot be done without precise and detailed logistical 
planning for production flows. The proper management of resource (raw materials, 
production personnel) flow into the fabrication areas and the timely dispatch of 
finished assemblies from them requires personnel who not only understand the 
process of construction but the logistical imperatives connected to that construction. 
                                                 
96 Lorenz, “Decline,” p. 70.  
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Amsden notes that for late-industrializing countries that are attempting to develop a 
manufacturing industry, 
 
The shopfloor is the focus because it is here that borrowed technology 
is first made operational and later optimized. Because products similar 
to those that the company produces are internationally available, the 
strategic focus is necessarily found on the shopfloor, where the 
achievement of incremental, yet cumulative improvements in 
productivity and product specification are essential to enhance price 
and quality competitiveness.97  
 
 
This is one of the critical areas where British shipbuilding practice and Korean 
shipbuilding practice were highly divergent. The Koreans, knowing they did not have 
a shopfloor workforce familiar with the requirements of flow-line production, 
followed the historical lead of other shipbuilding countries which had also found they 
lacked sufficient skilled labor to utilize an informal craft administration management 
system. Like the French and Japanese had before them, they put salaried, degreed 
engineers who did understand flow-line production requirements in managerial 
positions on the shopfloor.98 Consequently, management and administration were 
intentionally placed in much closer communication with the shopfloor workforce than 
in the British system. While this additional level of management cost more than craft 
administration, it had the advantage of preventing many potential mistakes and 
mitigating the deleterious effects in damage and downtime when mistakes inevitably 
occurred.99   
                                                 
97 Amsden, “Asia’s Next Giant,” p. 5. 
98 This manning policy is still in use. The author’s experience is that many production personnel 
serving in foreman positions in both DSME and SHI are college-degreed engineers, often from the 
Korea Maritime Academy. That hiring personnel with such backgrounds for these positions is a 
specific policy of Samsung Heavy Industries was confirmed in an oral interview on 16 Oct. 2012 by 
Mr. Ki-Dong Park, Project Manager, Pacific Drilling Company Drillship Project, Samsung Heavy 
Industries. 
99 The author’s sailing experiences with 1970’s-era Korean-built vessels from HHI was that their 
quality, while acceptable, was uncertain and somewhat eccentrically non-standard. A good example 
would be the flange alignments on large pipes. Flanges joining pipes should be, according to accepted 
piping standards, in alignment with one another axially, vertically and horizontally. Japanese-built 
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While personnel-intensive and more expensive in man-hour terms, close engineering 
supervision proved a major asset to Korean management.100 It required many more 
mid-level managers/engineers to become personally knowledgeable about the actual 
vessel production process. This paid tremendous dividends when Korean yards had to 
ramp up production to meet the requirements of rapidly growing order books, 
something that happened repeatedly.
101
  
 
British shipyard management, relying so greatly on their quasi-autonomous skilled 
labor force, found itself at a great disadvantage with regard to providing the guidance 
required to improve production throughput. There simply weren’t enough sufficiently 
knowledgeable management personnel available to replace the skilled labor force 
when there were manpower shortages, something that happened often due to strikes, 
craft demarcation issues and absenteeism.102 This disadvantage was even more greatly 
exacerbated when the skilled British workforce deliberately chose to engage in 
                                                                                                                                            
vessels invariably had proper flange alignment. Korean vessels in that era, however, did not always 
meet these standards in that it was not uncommon to find flanges which were tilted or misaligned. 
While such a flange might, with a proper gasket, achieve an operable fluid seal, pipe replacement posed 
a difficult problem for future maintenance. Every such non-standard joint was a bespoke fit which 
might well have been brought into alignment only through unacceptable levels of pipe stress. Its proper 
replacement would often require specialized pipefitting skills not normally found onboard modern 
ships. Such problems gradually became much less common in Korean shipyards by the end of the 
1980s. 
100 It is logical to assume that even with a tabula rasa from which to start, a bureaucratic management 
system such as is utilized in Korea could not have been implemented in Britain. Sufficient trained 
engineers were not available. Even if they had been, the wage differential between British and Korean 
engineers would have made implementation of such a scheme prohibitively expensive. 
101 Amsden, “Asia’s Next Giant,” p. 172. She notes that between 1960 and 1980 the number of 
engineers in Korea’s manufacturing sector increased tenfold while managerial personnel increased but 
2.2 times. 
102 The Geddes Report noted that “the use of labour in shipbuilding is wasteful; nobody who discussed 
the industry with us has challenged this statement. Partly this waste is due to shortcomings of planning 
and supervision, partly to the practices on which the unions insist, and partly to the level of response 
and application of the individual participant which is itself conditioned by the first two factors.” 
Geddes Report, p. 110. It should also be noted that as the British shipbuilding industry declined it was 
the best and most talented employees that “jumped ship” earliest as they were most easily able to find 
more stable employment. 
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disruptive labor activities such as slowdowns, overtime bans or “working to rule.”103 
Craft administration had many admittedly serious deficiencies when it came to 
managing modern flow-line production. However, that is what British shipyards used 
and management was extremely dependent on it being properly practiced if there was 
to be any hope of satisfactory production progress and timely vessel delivery. In the 
circumstances it is clear that even strongly motivated employees doing their absolute 
utmost to make that administrative system work would have had a tough task ahead of 
them. In the late 1960’s and 1970’s, British shipyard management was dealing with 
an increasingly dissatisfied, truculent and strike-prone work force. Depending on 
them to operate this administrative system properly was not wise policy. It was a 
mistake management paid heavily for in many ways.  
 
One other point should be made here with regard to the British shipbuilding labor 
force. British shipyards were dealing with a relatively old group of workers.104 The 
BAH Report noted that in the five merchant shipbuilding companies it studied more 
than 50% of the work force was over 40 years old and 25% of the work force was 
over 50 years old. This constituted a two-edged sword for British shipbuilding 
management. While older employees were more knowledgeable and experienced as 
shipbuilders, thus better able to carry through the informal craft administration 
required by the British style of management, older employees were also often imbued 
                                                 
103 “Many of the tasks performed in the construction of a ship give the work-group a high degree of 
discretion…to allocate work and control the speed and co-ordination with those who precede and 
follow them. Because the work lends itself to self-supervision the traditions of the industry protect the 
autonomy of the workgroup.” Commission on Industrial Relations, Shipbuilding and Shiprepairing, 
Report No. 22, HMSO (London, 1971), Cmnd. 4756, p. 102.  “Working to rule” is when union 
personnel insist on absolute compliance with every work rule in the contract between the union and the 
company. It is something short of a strike but can have a tremendously negative effect on productivity 
when fully applied by workers intent on slowing down production. 
104 BAH Report, pp.159-163.  
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with the history of past grievances.105 This often made them more rigid in their 
attitudes with regard to accepting changes in craft demarcation and production 
methods. Older employees would also generally have been more independently 
intractable when they felt wronged by shipyard management, a factor which 
undoubtedly led to earlier willingness to resort to industrial action to resolve problems. 
The issue of age was also a contributing factor with regard to delays in actual ship 
construction. The Geddes Report referred to the work as “tough and largely 
outdoor”106 and noted that, “Of its nature a good deal of shipbuilding work must be 
conducted either in large sheds which are not easy to heat or on open berths where 
working has to take place sometimes in very cramped surroundings and sometimes in 
conditions which are cold and wet.” Such physically demanding work is, all other 
things being equal, better suited to younger men, particularly given the inclement 
weather often encountered in Britain’s shipbuilding districts.107 Former Clyde 
shipyard workers remembered absenteeism as being particularly high during periods 
of extreme heat or cold.108 
 
Tim Colton, who spent a long and distinguished career in the shipbuilding industry, 
graduated from Glasgow University as a naval architect in 1964. His autobiography 
casts some light on how one of the major British shipbuilders on the Clyde dealt with 
                                                 
105 Geddes Report, p. 112. The Report noted that “the shipbuilding industry is located mainly in the 
older industrial centres where traditional attitudes by employers and trade unionists tend to be strong 
and where memories of past disputes and of past periods of depression are more enduring.” 
106  Ibid., p. 46. 
107 Heren, Louis. “British Shipbuilders: Proud, Hard Men Who Love a Challenge.” The Times (London) 
25 June 1980: 12. Heren went to Tyne Shiprepairers in South Shields to see what shipbuilding was like. 
He noted that while repairing a ship’s damaged keel plating, “men crouched in contorted positions” that 
he “could not have held for more than a few moments,” and that “most people would . . .refuse to work 
under such conditions.” Having visited the yard on a rainy day, and returned drenched to the managing 
director’s office, he was told to “imagine working out there in snow or freezing rain…the steel gets so 
cold it can take the skin off your hands.” 
108 Senior Electrical Supervisor Ernest Woodcock, personal interview, 22 January 2013. Woodcock 
joked about watching Scott Lithgow workers disappear into lavatory stalls with blankets on cold days, 
not to be seen again until quitting time.  
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the challenge of foreign competition and technological advance. As part of an 
apprenticeship scheme for the Shipbuilding Employer’s Federation, he combined his 
undergraduate studies with concurrently working as an apprentice at Lithgow’s 
Shipyard in Glasgow. Including his apprenticeship, in total he worked eight years at 
Lithgow’s. He remarked in his autobiography that, “when I got my degree, the 
number of university graduates with technical degrees at Lithgow’s went up by 50%. 
And this was a company with 5,000 employees.”109  
 
Colton recalled that in 1964, after Lithgow’s Managing Director, Ross Belch, 
obtained orders for five vessels on a very quick delivery schedule, “the word 
‘planning’ was used for the first time.”
110
 Having been already employed in 
investigating methods to increase steel throughput, Colton was tasked with creating 
the first production schedule at Lithgow’s that incorporated all the facets involved in 
building the vessel: fabrication, erection, launching and outfitting. Prior to this set of 
vessels, there had been a general allowance of time for each stage. Launching would 
take place within two months of completing fabrication; outfitting
111
 and delivery 
would be completed within three months after launching.  Modern shipbuilding 
practice has a considerable amount of the outfitting done prior to the launching of the 
vessel, thus saving a great amount of time since in many cases it is easier to install 
equipment (such as heavy engines, large pumps, motors, pipes, etc.) when there is 
                                                 
109 Tim Colton, Staying Afloat: A Life in Shipbuilding. (Delray Beach, Florida: Maritime Business 
Strategies, 2009), p. 26. 
110 Ibid., p. 32. How much importance Lithgow’s placed on this function at the time is shown by the 
fact that Colton was a relatively low-level design office employee who was not even involved in 
management activities. He states that it wasn’t really fair to say that no “planning” was going on at 
Lithgow’s, but that it was not referred to as such and was rudimentary even by the standards of 
advanced contemporary shipyards. Colton stated that “Ross Belch’s basic management tool was a 
single large sheet of grid paper, with hull numbers down the left-hand side and calendar months across 
the top. The figures in the matrix were tons per month of steel through the fabrication shop and they 
had to add up to the corporate target.” 
111 “Outfitting” is the installation of equipment, piping, wiring and accommodations facilities aboard 
the vessel.  
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increased access to individual “blocks.” In those days, according to Colton, “the ship 
that slid into the water was all steel – absolutely no outfitting was done until the ship 
was in the water and moored in the outfitting basin.”112  
 
This stands as a major example of how British shipbuilding was technically behind its 
Japanese and European competition since many of those yards were doing as much 
outfitting as possible prior to assembly. Outfitting, given all the electrical/electronic 
wiring that has to be installed as well as the various piping systems, is both difficult 
and time-consuming. The fact that the British had not yet adopted this policy of pre-
outfitting prior to construction is a window into one of the main causes for late 
deliveries from British shipyards.
113
 
 
Colton remarked that at the start of his planning career, he was provided with no 
resources, guidance or instructions. Nevertheless, drawing on his academic experience 
and researching some new American planning techniques enabled him to eventually 
produce a production schedule that covered the five vessels. A year later he was in 
charge of planning all Lithgows’ contracts, “although the Planning Department still 
was just me and my one assistant.”
114
 Colton’s recounting of his planning experience 
at what was arguably the most advanced and proficient shipyard on the Lower Clyde, 
and thus one of the two or three best shipyards in Britain, only serves to highlight how 
far behind British shipbuilding had fallen and to confirm the charges made in the 
                                                 
112 Ibid., p. 32-33.  
113 Olsson, oral interview, 16 May 2013. Mr. Olsson described his surprise when, on a trip to a Swedish 
shipyard, he saw workers installing complete lighting fixtures on an unattached “block.” He had never 
seen that level of pre-assembly outfitting in any of the British shipyards where he had worked. 
114 Colton, “Staying Afloat,” p. 33-34. 
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Geddes Report about the necessity for major changes in British shipyard 
management.115 
 
In contrast to Britain, Korea’s engineering educational system produces large 
numbers of new engineers yearly and that this has been greatly beneficial to Korean 
industry: “In terms of sheer quantity, enough engineers have been trained to ensure 
that sufficient numbers pursue the career intended by their education. A large number 
of engineers has meant competition among them for the best jobs and the fastest 
promotions, thereby driving up productivity.”
116
 This situation was possible in Korea 
because engineering as a profession, while even today held in high regard despite a 
massive proliferation of Korean engineers, was even more greatly respected in the 
period 1960-1985 due to their relative scarcity.117 Such was not the case in Britain. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
115 Rød, Per Olav, Senior Production Supervisor with Gotaas Larsen, oral interview 12 February 2013. 
Mr. Rød worked for several years at Govan Shipyard on the Clyde. He was still impressed many years 
later with how adamant the British management and workers were about clinging to the “old” ways of 
doing things. According to Rød, they were incredibly resistant to change. 
116 Amsden, “Asia’s Next Giant,” p. 9. 
117 Mr. H. J. Park, Project Manager/Group Leader, Det Norske Veritas Korea, 23 October 2012. Mr. 
Park remarked that as a youth in the 1960’s, his parents strongly pushed him toward an engineering 
career. They did so because they saw it as a prestigious and economically remunerative profession with 
high stability.  Mr. Park also noted that there was a serious element of national pride involved as South 
Koreans firmly believed that advances in Korea’s engineering capabilities strengthened the country.  
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“THE STATUS OF ENGINEERS IN GREAT BRITAIN IS LOWER 
THAN IN ANY COUNTRY I KNOW OF”
118
 
 
 On 25 March 1966, in a speech reported by The Times, Lord Snow, Joint 
Parliamentary Secretary of the Ministry of Technology, called for Britain to “raise the 
status of engineers to an extent commensurate with their importance to society.” 
Speaking to an assembly of engineers in London, Lord Snow remarked that “I have 
said in public more than once that the status of engineers in Great Britain is lower 
than in any country I know of.” For a country arguably primus inter pares worldwide 
with regard to technological advance, it was a stunning admission. Coming from a 
Labour Party minister three years after Labour Prime Minister Harold Wilson had, in 
1963, promised a new “Britain that was going to be forged in the white heat of 
[technological] revolution,” it was a frank admission of how little progress had been 
made toward that goal.
119
 As has been noted earlier, even had British shipbuilders 
wished to do so, Britain simply did not have sufficient numbers of trained engineering 
personnel to implement the kind of bureaucratic management oversight later 
implemented by Koreans and required to compete in modern post-1960’s shipbuilding.  
Britain, as a “First World” nation and one much richer than Korea, certainly had the 
potential to produce them. However, despite intermittent encouragement given by 
government to the idea of advancing and increasing engineering and technological 
                                                 
118 “Engineers Need Higher Status.” The Times (London), 25 March 1966: 7.  It deserves noting that in 
an editorial written the same day (“Engineers in Society,” p. 13), The Times castigated Lord Snow for 
his ”harsh” judgment. They then stated that unless engineers became less enamored of “conformity,” 
“students of ability will continue to prefer pure science or economics.” Snow could not have had his 
argument more solidly supported than by this attempted rebuttal.  
119 Harold Wilson made this statement to the Labour Party Conference, Scarborough, England, 1 
October 1963, as part of a Labour electoral strategy intended to present them as a modernizing 
alternative to the Conservatives. 
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training, it simply had not then occurred on anything near the scale required.120 Why 
this was the case has been a matter of controversy since before the Second World War.  
 
Corelli Barnett, in The Audit of War: The Illusion and Reality of Britain as a Great 
Power, severely criticized Britain’s engineering training model. Comparing it to the 
German model, he noted that Britain produced some extremely talented degreed 
engineers whose quality was equivalent or superior to the best the Germans produced. 
However, there were relatively very few of them.  Barnett provided United Kingdom 
Government statistics showing that the absolute number of degreed British engineers 
graduated annually was much less than the German output. Moreover, in his opinion 
the quality of British technical education short of degree level was greatly inferior to 
that of Germany both in knowledge transfer and in numbers of individuals trained. 
Barnett believed this to be a critical failing.121  
 
While there has been considerable debate in post-World War II Britain about the 
problems of British education in general, the difficulties with technical education have 
been particularly marked for criticism. Bernard Elbaum and William Lazonick 
concurred with Barnett in finding that the British educational system failed to provide 
appropriately trained managerial and technical personnel. They stated that “the 
existing system of higher education was designed almost explicitly to remove its 
“aristocratic” students as far as possible from the worldly pursuits of business and 
                                                 
120 Moreover, much contemporary commentary exists in major British magazines and newspapers that, 
as of the time of this writing (2013), it has yet to occur. 
121 Corelli Barnett, The Audit of War: The Illusion and the Reality of Britain as a Great Power. 
(London: Macmillan, 1986). Barnett’s tome is a book-length indictment of the British technological 
education system. This book was widely read by senior civil servants in the Thatcher administration 
and considered to be quite influential with regard to related public policy. 
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applied science.”122 One critic of British education said, “The [British] education 
system is held uniquely and exclusively responsible both for the low standards of its 
products and for their unreadiness for the working conditions of contemporary 
industrial society.”
123
 A commenter in the influential Opinion column of The Mail on 
Sunday, stated: 
 
This country doesn’t need more academics or top civil servants. It 
needs better educated white and blue collar workers. It needs people 
who go into industry from choice, not as a second-best option. We 
need, in short, a totally different kind of work force—modern, 
educated and sophisticated. There’s nothing wrong with the British 
people. It’s our institutions like our universities that are letting us down. 
 
 
 Peter Wilby, Educational Correspondent for The Independent, wrote the following: 
 
Schools are not producing youngsters with the desire or qualifications 
required to undertake engineering and technology courses. When the 
government provided extra money for these subjects in 1984 and 1985, 
hundreds of places went begging. Eighteen of the 29 polytechnics 
which got the extra funds fell below their recruitment targets, some by 
as much as 35%. Two had to close their courses.
124
 
 
 
In the face of statistics such as those shown above, one question naturally arises. If the 
British government of the day (1980’s) saw engineering and technology training as 
sufficiently important to provide considerable additional funding, why were British 
students so uninterested in taking up the positions on offer? What would potential 
engineering and technology students find so off-putting about entering these fields of 
study?  
                                                 
122 Elbaum and Lazonick, “Decline of British Economy,” p. 572. 
123 Margaret Mathieson and Gerald Bernbaum, “The British Disease: A British Tradition?” British 
Journal of Educational Studies, Vol.36, No. 2 (July 1988), pp. 126-174. The authors argue that 
technical education has been held in contempt by a British educational establishment made of people 
whose senior members invariably come from an academic background. Such people, they believe, 
generally hold an anti-scientific worldview and are ambivalent at best about scientific progress and 
technological advance.   
124 Ibid., p. 131, quoting Wilby‘s article in The Sunday Times of 25 May 1986. 
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 The answer appears to be that students bright enough to successfully undertake 
studies in these fields were also bright enough to understand that they were embarking 
on an educational course which would relegate them permanently to “boffin” status. 
This term, similar to the modern-day term “nerd,” is British slang for a technically 
educated person. It has moderately pejorative connotations for the British public.125 
However, those engaged in the professions to which this term would be applied 
understood exactly how such social status would preclude their advancing to 
management level. As F.M.L Thompson noted, “[Lack of upward mobility for 
technical personnel] was symptomatic of one of the failings of British industry since 
the First World War, that technicians, even university-educated technicians, were 
regarded as useful, especially for research in science-based industries, but not of 
managerial caliber.”126 University students realized that as far as British industry was 
concerned, becoming an engineer meant being “pigeonholed” for an entire career with 
no avenues for further advance.127 
                                                 
125 Jenny Rohn, “Who Are You Calling a Boffin?” Guardian (Manchester), 24 September 2010. Ms. 
Rohn goes to great lengths in an effort to dispel what she admits is a long-standing stereotype of 
technically educated people. She is trying to overcome a public image of “boffins” she sees as 
“befuddled, bespectacled, bad-hair-day (or no-hair-day) man, socially inept but somewhat cuddly 
(think Doc in “Back to the Future”); and there is the more sinister iteration: the equally dishevelled but 
cold, arrogant and/or mad male meddler, bent on no good (think Rotwang in “Metropolis”).” That this 
perception is still a matter of concern to the technical community in egalitarian, inclusive 21st Century 
Britain is indicative of the depth and strength of its influence. 
126 F.M.L. Thompson, Gentrification and the Enterprise Culture. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001), p. 134, 139. Thompson’s work aims to rebut the claims of writers such as Barnett and Martin 
Wiener (English Culture and the Decline of the Industrial Spirit.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1981)) who charge British upper-class culture with being antipathetic to business interests. 
Thompson’s book attempts to exonerate the major vectors of that culture, the public school system and 
Oxbridge, from blame for Britain’s postwar economic decline. However, even Thompson’s 
counterargument admits that there is clearly some justification for the arguments posed by Barnett and 
Wiener, as shown by the following statement: “It could be that at this point, roughly between 1950 and 
1980, the British universities failed to succor industry as well as they might have done, and that the 
failure was due to the predominantly anti-vocational, Newmanite prejudices of the university 
establishment, attitudes closely paralleled by the technological and pure science, non-managerial values 
of university engineers and natural scientists.” To an outside observer, Barnett, Wiener and Thompson 
all agree a problem exists with regard to British technological education. Their differences arise in 
assessing magnitude and determining culpability.  
127 Oral interview with Mr. R. J. Sutherland, Deputy Project Manager, Pacific Drilling Corporation, 27 
December 2012. In his comments, Mr. Sutherland used the term “pigeonholed.” He remarked that from 
his 2002 class of oil and gas engineering graduates from Robert Gordon University in Aberdeen, only a 
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The marginal social status of technical personnel did not begin with World War I. 
Kipling’s “McAndrew’s Hymn,” composed in 1893 and the only poem he ever wrote 
about a chief marine engineer, contains the following verse: 
 
Then, at the last, we’ll get to port an’ hoist their baggage clear— 
The passengers wi’ gloves and canes—an’ this is what I’ll hear: 
“Well, thank ye for a pleasant voyage. The tender’s coming now.” 
While I go testing follower-bolts an’ watch the skipper bow. 
They’ve words for everyone but me—shake hands with half the crew. 
Except the dour Scots engineer, the man they never knew.128 
 
The chief engineer of a vessel is the senior and most important technical officer 
aboard a ship. In rank he is second only to the captain. Moreover, in all but cases 
involving imminent life or death, the captain must follow the chief engineer’s advice 
on technical issues or risk cashiering and formal legal charges by an admiralty court. 
It should also be noted that at this time, due to the relatively recent introduction of 
steam propulsion, chief engineers were considerably less common and more valuable 
to shipping companies than captains. Despite this novelty and the importance of the 
position given how critical steam navigation was to Britain’s far-flung empire, 
Kipling makes clear the fact that it received little respect from civilian passengers.129  
 
There has been serious criticism of Britain’s technology education system for more 
than 100 years. A long line of critics has included, among the most recent, Barnett, 
Martin Wiener, Sidney Pollard, Monty Finniston, Sir Keith Joseph and a host of UK 
Government reports. However, it is very clear the system’s would-be reformers have 
                                                                                                                                            
handful, less than 10 per cent, remained in the U.K. to work despite the robust U.K. oil and gas 
industry. Mr. Sutherland attributed this exodus to foreign companies and postings offering greater 
opportunities for career advancement. 
128 Rudyard Kipling, “McAndrew’s Hymn,” Rudyard Kipling’s Verse, Definitive Edition. (New York: 
Doubleday and Co., 1940), pp. 120-126. 
129 Ibid., pp. 128-134. Kipling makes another reference to this in “The ‘Mary Gloster’.” Sir Anthony 
Gloster, head of the Red Ox shipping line and a man who had sailed as captain with McAndrew, notes 
that McAndrew was his oldest friend, but that he had never asked him to dinner. 
 51 
 
failed to make lasting improvements in the system. With regard to the reformers, it 
has been said that “their failure stands as a monument to the outstanding success of 
the British education system in embodying and perpetuating the values of British 
society’s dominant elites.”
130
  
 
British authors with views as divergent as Kipling and Orwell agreed on one thing at 
least: the elites running the British governmental bureaucracy had little regard for 
those involved in “trade” and considered them socially inferior to the Civil Service.131 
Given that technical knowledge, accomplishment and practical application was most 
generally considered part of “trade,” those elites simply did not value it very highly, 
particularly when it was part of the private sector.
132
 Consequently, many bright, 
talented and enterprising students133, who might elsewhere have become engineers, 
simply never even considered the idea because of engineering’s devalued standing in 
British society.134 In this educational area so important to modern shipbuilding, the 
differences between Korea and Britain could not have been more distinct. 
                                                 
130 Mathieson and Bernbaum, “British Disease,” p. 127. 
131 George Orwell, “Rudyard Kipling,” A Collection of Essays  (1946; Orlando, Harvest, 1970), p. 119. 
Also see Kipling’s “The ‘Mary Gloster’,” where Sir Anthony Gloster, on his deathbed, speaks to 
“Dickie,” the effeminate son he clearly detests. Gloster lists the inheritance he can expect: “three 
‘undred thousand, in trust and the interest paid. I wouldn’t give it you, Dickie—you see, I made it in 
trade. You’re saved from soiling your fingers….” 
132 Kipling’s slighting references to “box-wallahs” and Orwell’s juxtaposition of rude, arrogant 
philistine Lieutenant Verrall with the humane teak merchant John Flory in Burmese Days are good 
examples of what Orwell referred to as “the outlook…of the salaried bureaucrat who despises the “box-
wallah.”  
133 Colton, “Staying Afloat,” p. 1. Colton attended Radley, a British public school which he states, “was 
not used to its bright young men doing anything other than going on to either Oxford or Cambridge.” 
He notes that, when discussing careers with the master responsible for careers guidance, it was clear 
that “a technical career of any kind would never have occurred to him; manufacturing was simply not 
something that one did.” 
134 Paul Scott, in The Jewel in the Crown (London: William Heinemann, 1966), A Division of the 
Spoils (London: William Heinemann, 1975) and in Staying On (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1977), several times refers to English technical personnel in India. The “technicians” are always 
described in such a way as to draw a clear delineation between them and the type of university-
educated, public-school “gentlemen” who used to govern the Raj. In one reference Scott refers to the 
technical personnel as “beefy-looking fellows in shorts and shirts. Their shirts were black with sweat. 
They were drinking beer from the bottle.” One of Scott’s characters, an Anglicized Indian lawyer 
named Srinivasan, notes that “So many of your present-day [British technical] experts are not what 
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DOING THINGS THE OLD WAY: BRITISH SHIPBUILDING 
AND POSTWAR TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 
 
SHIPBUILDING IN THE 1950’S AND 1960’S: BRITAIN MISSES THE 
BOAT 
 
While Britain’s relative disdain for engineering and technology contained the seeds of 
future industrial problems, in the decade following World War II all was well. 
Shipbuilding went through an incredible boom in the first thirty years of the postwar 
era. Not only was it necessary to replace all the wartime tonnage losses, a 
considerable amount in itself, but international seaborne trade also concurrently 
underwent an unprecedented expansion.  As Table 3 shows, shipbuilding tonnage 
delivered worldwide went from 1,880,000 tons in 1947 to 27,532,000 tons in 1977. 
However, the British percentage of that delivered tonnage declined from 50.2 per cent 
in 1947 to 3.7 per cent in 1977. Therefore, in the midst of a vast increase in 
shipbuilding worldwide, British shipbuilding output remained stagnant. However, 
even the absolute amount of delivered British tonnage dropped off after 1978. Britain 
was the only leading shipbuilding country which achieved no growth in the period 
1950-1977, a period which constituted the largest shipbuilding boom in history to that 
time.
135
 While undeniably true, this failure to grow appears counterintuitive given that 
British shipbuilding had for so long been the world’s leader in the field. The reasons 
for this failure will now be examined. 
                                                                                                                                            
members of the [Mayapore Gymkhana] club of twenty years ago would have called gentlemen, are they? 
They are what the English ladies of Mayapore would have called BOR types? British Other Rank?” He 
also remarks that “in those days, you know, the commercial people were always looked down upon as 
the lowest form of Anglo-Indian life.” The final and most egregious example comes in the interview 
between Stubbs, the middle-class, bigoted and openly racist Technical Training Manager for the 
British-Indian Electrical Company and Hari Kumar, the Chillingborough-educated Indian. In pointing 
out the obvious class differences between the two groups of people and portraying the technical 
personnel as having more plebeian behavior, Scott’s descriptions provide a good barometer of the 
attitude of academically educated Britons about those who worked in technical fields. 
135 Brian W. Hogwood, Government and Shipbuilding: The Politics of Industrial Change. (Westmead: 
Saxon House, 1979), p. 24. 
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In the immediate post-World War II era Britain was one of the few countries left with 
intact capacity for building ships and its shipyards garnered a sizable amount of world 
demand. This was fortunate for Britain given the nation’s serious balance of payments 
deficit and desperate need to increase exports to earn foreign currency.  However, 
Britain was not alone in her parlous postwar economic straits and many of her 
industrialized prewar competitors also saw an opportunity for economic revival 
through shipbuilding. Sweden, France and the Netherlands in Europe, and Japan in 
Asia, were quick off the mark, with the Japanese particularly aided by the large 
American investment in Japanese manufacturing caused by the 1950-1953 Korean 
War.  
 
The West Germans were allowed to restart their shipbuilding industry in 1950 and 
also soon began making excellent progress. By 1953 they lagged only Britain in 
worldwide shipbuilding. However, as Table 4 below shows, by 1956 the Japanese had 
overtaken Britain’s shipbuilding tonnage totals and were rapidly increasing their lead 
over the field.
 136
 In that year Japan slightly more than doubled its previous year’s 
output, from 829,000 launched tons to 1,746,000 launched tons. Continuing their 
unprecedentedly explosive growth, the Japanese doubled British output by 1962 and 
by 1965 Japanese-launched tonnage was almost 500% of the British tonnage launched. 
In the late 1950’s and early 1960’s Japan and Germany were clearly Britain’s most 
competitive rivals in the world shipbuilding industry despite, until 1949, having been 
restricted in the size of vessels they had been allowed to construct.137  
 
                                                 
136 Tim Colton, LaVar Huntzinger.  A Brief History of Shipbuilding In Recent Times.  (Alexandria, 
VA.: Center for Naval Analysis, 2002), p. 7. Colton and Huntzinger were using statistics provided by 
Lloyd’s Register of Shipping. taken from Appendix H of the Shipbuilding Inquiry Committee Report 
(Geddes Report) 
137 Lorenz, “Decline,” pp. 82-84.  
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Table 3: BRITAIN'S SHARE OF WORLD SHIPBUILDING TONNAGE 
138
 
 
What is most striking is that while the world caught up to and surpassed British 
shipbuilders, the British did not really begin to even formally recognize that changes 
were necessary until 1959. It was in that year the British Ministry of Transport 
became responsible for shipbuilding in Britain, this responsibility being transferred to 
it from the British Admiralty.139  Over the next fourteen years, as Britain’s position in 
                                                 
138 Ibid., p. 23. Hogwood is using statistics taken from the 1966 Shipbuilding Inquiry Report (Geddes 
Report), p. 185; “British Shipbuilding 1972” (Booz-Allen Hamilton Report), p. 91, and British 
Shipping Statistics 1976/77. 
139 Hogwood, “Government and Shipbuilding,” p. 242-244. Hogwood argues that the British 
Government’s rationale for making this change “represented a hangover from the days of the symbiotic 
relationship between British shipping and shipbuilding…and a failure to diagnose shipbuilding’s 
problem as a failure to compete in world markets rather than to hang on to the coat tails of the British 
shipping industry.”  
Year Delivered
Tonnage Delivered World 
(000 grt.)
Tonnage Delivered U.K. 
(000 grt.) U.K. Market Share (%)
1947 1,880 944 50.2
1948 2,482 1,213 48.9
1949 3,114 1,353 43.4
1950 3,254 1,389 42.7
1951 3,557 1,340 37.7
1952 4,211 1,264 30
1953 4,938 1,250 25.3
1954 5,450 1,496 27.4
1955 4,967 1,322 26.6
1956 6,291 1,457 23.2
1957 8,117 1,421 17.5
1958 9,059 1,464 16.2
1959 8,697 1,383 15.9
1960 8,382 1,298 15.5
1961 8,058 1,382 17.2
1962 8,182 1,016 12.4
1963 9,028 1,096 12.1
1964 9,724 808 8.3
1965 11,763 1,282 10.9
1966 14,105 1,074 7.6
1967 15,157 1,188 7.8
1968 16,845 1,047 6.2
1969 18,739 828 4.4
1970 20,980 1,327 6.3
1971 24,388 1,233 5.1
1972 26,749 1,197 4.5
1973 30,409 1,067 3.5
1974 33,541 1,198 3.6
1975 34,203 1,170 3.4
1976 33,922 1,500 4.4
1977 27,532 1,020 3.7
1978 18,194 1,133 6.2
1979 14,289 691 4.8
World and U.K. Delivered Tonnage and U.K Market Share 1947-1979
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world shipbuilding steadily declined and British governments became increasingly 
concerned, there would be five major reports on shipbuilding from either Government 
or the shipbuilding industry commissioned and delivered. 
Table 4: DELIVERED SHIPBUILDING TONNAGE COMPARISON FOR 
LARGEST WORLD PRODUCERS140 
 
Year United Kingdom Japan Germany 
  A B C D A B C D A B C D 
1953 1,317 952 364 27.7 557 354 203 33.8 818 454 364 44.5 
1954 1,409 927 482 34.2 413 271 142 34.4 963 442 521 54.1 
1955 1,474 935 539 36.6 829 246 583 70.3 929 525 404 43.4 
1956 1,383 949 434 31.4 1,746 504 1,242 71.1 1,000 379 621 62.1 
1957 1,414 1,153 261 18.5 2,433 920 1,513 62.2 1,231 453 778 63.2 
1958 1,402 1,064 338 24.1 2,067 810 1,257 60.8 1,429 569 860 60.2 
1959 1,373 1,257 116 8.4 1,723 725 998 57.9 1,202 356 846 70.4 
1960 1,331 1,185 146 11.0 1,732 808 924 53.3 1,092 308 784 71.8 
1961 1,192 911 281 23.6 1,799 1,051 748 41.6 962 420 542 56.3 
1962 1,073 908 165 15.4 2,183 1,306 877 40.2 1,010 326 684 67.7 
1963 928 644 284 30.6 2,367 870 1,497 63.2 971 327 644 66.3 
1964 1,043 894 149 14.3 4,085 1,364 2,721 66.6 890 302 588 66.1 
A: Total Tonnage Launched (‘000 gross tons) 
B: Launchings for Home Registration (‘000 gross tons) 
C: Launchings for Export (‘000 gross tons) 
D: Export Launchings as Proportion of Total (‘000 gross tons) 
 
These were the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR) Report of 
December 1960, the Shipbuilding Advisory Committee (SAC) Report of April 1961, 
The “Productivity in Shipbuilding” (Patton) Report of March 1962, the Shipbuilding 
Inquiry Committee (Geddes) Report of March 1966 and the British Shipbuilding 1972 
                                                 
140 Geddes Report, Appendix “H,” pp. 180-181. Figures adapted from “Tonnage Launched in Principal 
Shipbuilding Countries Showing Proportion for Home and Overseas Registration” graph. 
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Report of February 1973 from Booz, Allen and Hamilton. There would also be 
several minor ones delivered such as the “Shipbuilding Orders Placed Abroad by 
British Shipowners” Report of 1961 by Peat, Marwick and Mitchell and the Hill, 
Samuel Report, “Shipbuilding on the Upper Clyde,” issued in 1972.
141
  
 
This clear documentary trail tracing British shipbuilding’s decline from world 
leadership into global irrelevance shows that both British governments and 
shipbuilders eventually grasped exactly what was causing it. However, even a clear 
knowledge of the causes for their decline did not enable them to halt or reverse it. 
Structural and historic reasons precluded the British from taking the drastic actions 
necessary to make their shipbuilding industry competitive with either its established 
rivals or the newly industrializing countries such as South Korea, Brazil and Taiwan. 
Obtaining that understanding was not helped by thirteen transfers of governmental 
responsibility for shipbuilding in the years between 1959 and 1977, as shown by  
Table 5.142 While rapid shifting of responsibility for shipbuilding within government 
departments made official responses somewhat more disorganized than they 
otherwise might have been, the underlying issues remained the same.  
                                                 
141 These would be the Peat, Marwick, Mitchell Report on ship purchase credit facilities and the Hill 
Samuel Report concerning the economic feasibility of government aid to Govan Shipbuilders. Peat, 
Marwick and Mitchell found that British shipowners were very unhappy with both the cost of British 
ships and the general inability of British shipyards to complete a vessel by the scheduled delivery date. 
The Hill Samuel Report looked into the economic viability of Govan Shipbuilding and found it 
unsound as a commercial venture.  
142 Hogwood, “Government and Shipbuilding” p. 252. Hogwood, whose study of the matter remains 
the seminal work on the issue, stated that his research showed that the changed responsibilities for the 
industry came about due to “the need [for Government] to achieve acceptable [departmental] 
workloads rather than attempts to improve coordination of policy.” He concludes that “changes in 
responsibility for shipbuilding…have, if anything, reduced the government’s ability to deal with the 
industry.” One must also suspect that within the permanent civil service there may well have been a 
recurring element of wishing to hand the responsibility for shipbuilding’s seemingly intractable 
problems on to someone else.  
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Table 5: TRANSFERS OF BRITISH GOVERNMENTAL SHIPBUILDING 
INDUSTRY RESPONSIBILITY143 
Date of Transfer Dispatching Group Receiving Group 
(Major) 
Receiving Group 
(Minor) 
November 1959 Admiralty Ministry of Transport Shipbuilding and Repair 
Group 
1960 Ministry of Transport Ministry of Transport Shipbuilding, Ports and 
Shipping Group 
1961 Ministry of Transport Ministry of Transport Shipbuilding and 
General Group 
1963 Ministry of Transport Ministry of Transport Shipping Policy and 
Shipbuilding Group 
1964 Ministry of Transport Board of Trade Engineering Industries 
Division 
1965/6 Board of Trade Board of Trade Division 4 
Nov. 1966 Board of Trade Ministry of Technology Shipbuilding, Electrical 
Engineering and 
Chemical Plant 
Division 
March 1967 Ministry of Technology Ministry of Technology Shipbuilding Industry 
Board 
October 1970 Ministry of Technology Department of Trade 
and Industry 
None 
Nov. /Dec. 1971 Department of Trade 
and Industry 
Department of Trade 
and Industry 
Shipbuilding Policy 
Division 
March 1972 Department of Trade 
and Industry 
Department of Trade 
and Industry 
Industrial Development 
Executive 
June 1974 Department of Trade 
and Industry 
Department of Industry None 
July 1977 Department of Industry British Shipbuilders, 
Inc. 
None 
 
 
GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS RESPONSES TO BRITISH 
SHIPBUILDING’S DECLINE 
 
To be able to see what South Korea did differently than Britain in dealing with its 
shipbuilding industry, some background for Britain’s earlier actions must be provided. 
The decline of British shipbuilding in the post-World War II era arose from the 
confluence of many factors, history not least among them. Earlier in this paper it is 
clearly shown that of the world’s major shipbuilding countries Britain alone missed 
the chance to expand its shipbuilding industry during the long postwar boom from 
1945 to 1975. There is an obvious question to be asked: why did British shipbuilders, 
                                                 
143 Ibid., p. 240. 
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the world industry leaders after the war, fail to seize a larger share of this 
tremendously increased worldwide shipping demand? The majority of the explanation 
can be attributed to two major factors: the institutional memory of the period after the 
First World War and the fragmented nature of the British shipbuilding industry. 
 
First, it needs to be remembered what happened to British shipbuilding after the First 
World War. British shipbuilding capacity had expanded both before and during the 
war. In 1914 there were a total of 450 berths in Britain for the construction of 
seagoing vessels. By the early 1920’s there were 650 berths.
144
 Once the war ended in 
1918, a frantic but short-lived boom began which lasted until 1921 as British and 
other shipowners replaced the tonnage lost during the war.
145
 During that halcyon 
period, many shipbuilding firms came to believe there was a long period of robust 
trade ahead and began to invest large amounts of capital in facilities expansion. To 
cite just one example, Harland and Wolff planned major new expansions at their 
Belfast, Govan and Greenock works.146  
 
                                                 
144 Johnman and Murphy, “British Shipbuilding,” p. 12. They also cite statistics from the Tyne and 
Wear that show the combined capacity of the shipbuilding firms on that river as having increased from 
1 million gross tons in 1906 to 1.8 million gross tons in 1918. 
145 Ibid., p. 16. Just how frantic the boom was is shown by contrasting the building costs of a 7,500 
deadweight ton steamer from 1914 until 1939. See the below table. 
Year Cost (in £) Year Cost (in £) 
1914 (Baseline) 54,375 1929 67,250 
1920 225,000 1930 67,750 
1921 97,500 1931 66,938 
1922 67,500 1932 63,094 
1923 72,188 1933 62,344 
1924 68,000 1934 63,884 
1925 60,000 1935 65,594 
1926 64,500 1936 72,000 
1927 66,000 1937 100,000 
1928 65,500 1938 108,000 
  1939 100,000 
 
146 Ibid., p. 14. 
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The boom and consequent expansion plans were unsustainable for two major reasons, 
both due to Britain’s extraordinary effort in World War I. First, British shipping 
companies and shipbuilders largely exited from international commercial shipping 
and shipbuilding during the war. Prior to the war, British shipping firms had been 
very active in the tramp trading sector of worldwide maritime commerce. When the 
British Government needed those ships for wartime use in carrying supplies and 
munitions, British firms, as required by the Defense of the Realm Acts, tendered them 
as requested for war needs. The foreign customers of these British shipping firms, 
finding their British shipping firms now unable to provide transport, then found other 
carriers for their products. Once the war was over and the British shipping firms 
sought to reacquire their former trade, they found their positions had been filled by 
shipping companies from other nations whose vessels had not been required for 
wartime use. As an example, British shipping companies trying to regain their pre-
World War I Asia trade found that they had been replaced by American and Japanese 
shipping lines that had not been involved in wartime service and who now had no 
intention of ceding the business.
147
 
  
Second, this decline in British shipping business posed a serious problem for British 
shipbuilders in light of the fact that Britain’s shipowners almost invariably placed 
orders with them. When Britain’s shipping lines found themselves with less work, and 
thus needing fewer vessels in the post-World War I era, British shipbuilders—and 
their newly-expanded facilities--found themselves with much less work also. British 
shipbuilders found they had the same problem that British shipping firms did with 
regard to regaining export market share lost during the war. Forced to find alternative 
                                                 
147 Ibid., p. 12. 
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suppliers when presented with British inability to complete, or even accept, new 
shipbuilding orders during the war, foreign firms discovered that much of the world’s 
new shipbuilding tonnage capacity was government-subsidized and therefore willing 
to accept below-market prices for new construction. The number of foreign shipyards 
had increased dramatically during the war. There was twice as much world 
shipbuilding capacity after World War I as there had been prior to its outbreak. Much 
of this new shipbuilding capacity was in countries who fully intended to protect their 
nascent industries until they could compete internationally.148 Britain, as the world’s 
primary shipbuilder prior to the war, was of course worst hit by this additional 
capacity and its accompanying protection.149 Britain’s shipbuilders were soon forced 
to realize that much of their previous custom was now lost permanently. 
Consequently, once the boom was over, British shipbuilders found both their 
domestic and foreign orders deeply reduced.  
 
When freight rates collapsed at the end of 1920, the order logs of British shipyards 
received a tremendous blow. According to Lloyd’s Register of Shipping, by April 
1921 almost 850,000 gross tons of orders had either been delayed or cancelled.150  
Most of those delayed or cancelled orders would never be built.  The predicted and 
widely expected expansion of world trade after World War I did not occur. Instead, 
the international mercantile fleet grew barely 8 million gross tons between 1923 and 
1938, from 62 million gross tons to approximately 70 million gross tons, an increase 
of less than one percent per year. The British shipbuilding industry as it existed at the 
                                                 
148 Richard T. Harrison, Industrial Organisation and Changing Technology in UK Shipbuilding. 
(Aldershot: Avebury Publishing Co., 1990), p. 53. 
149 Lorenz, “Decline,” p. 8.  Lorenz notes that “direct subsidization of shipbuilders was not common. 
Subsidization was primarily indirect through support to shipping companies. The most common forms 
of support to owners were postal subventions and direct operating subsidies tied to ship construction in 
the home country.” 
150 Johnman and Murphy, “British Shipbuilding,” p. 17.  
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end of World War I could have supplied the entire worldwide interwar growth from 
its own resources.151 Consequently, the interwar period between 1921 and 1937 
turned out to be a massive bust as far as British shipbuilding was concerned.  
 
Because of this stultification, “there was a veritable blizzard of [shipyard] closures in 
the 1920’s.”
152
 Many of Britain’s shipyards went bankrupt and were liquidated while 
others found themselves slipping perilously close to receivership.153 The statistics 
show that 37 shipbuilders occupying 45 sites failed in the 1920’s while 22 more with 
38 sites closed their doors in the 1930’s. The 1930’s closures, however, represented a 
much larger diminution of shipbuilding capacity in that while 206 berths and 389,500 
tons were lost in the 1920’s, 216 berths and 1,411,500 tons of capacity disappeared in 
the 1930’s.154 By any measure it was a tremendous loss of potentially productive 
industrial plant as well as a human tragedy given the large increase in unemployment 
accompanying this rationalization.  
 
When the British Government was asked to intervene by the industry, it did little 
more than provide guaranteed shipbuilding loans for qualified customers. Moreover, 
its ratification of the 1922 Washington and 1930 London Naval Treaties placed major 
limitations on the sizes and numbers of naval vessels Britain could build. This, along 
with Whitehall’s adoption of the “ten-year rule” positing that there would be no major 
                                                 
151 According to the Lloyd’s Register of Shipping, there was 2.25 million gross tons of shipping under 
construction in the United Kingdom in the first quarter of June 1919. 
152 Ibid., p. 25.  
153 The following shipyards closed on the Clyde between 1921 and 1929: Chalmers and Co., 
Campbeltown Shipbuilding Co., Ross and Marshall, Dunlop Bremner, Murdoch and Murray, Caird and 
Co., John Fullerton and Co., Clyde Shipbuilding Co. (Castle Yard),  and Ailsa Shipbuilding. On the 
Tyne, Northumberland Shipbuilding Co., Eltringham’s, Rennoldson’s, Hepple’s, Wood and Skinner, 
Newcastle Shipbuilding Co., Dobson’s, and Tyne Iron Shipbuilders all failed. Armstrong-Whitworth 
was dismantled and reorganized with its shipbuilding concerns taken over by Vickers. On the Wear, 
Harkess, Raylton Dixon, Irvine’s, Ropner’s, Richardson-Duck, Osbourne, Graham and Co., Sunderland 
Shipbuilding, and Blumers were taken into receivership.  
154 Todd, “The World Shipbuilding Industry,” p. 122. 
 62 
 
war for at least ten years, meant there was little help forthcoming from naval 
construction for the beleaguered British shipbuilding industry. The industry was, in 
effect, left to “sink or swim” on its own. 
 
For all British shipbuilders, the period from 1921 to 1937 was a time of great fear and 
worry. Only when Britain began rearming in preparation for World War II did the 
gloom pervading the industry begin to lift. Those firms which survived the interwar 
depression learned some very serious lessons from it. One of the most salient was that 
postwar booms were short-lived and not to be trusted. As one British shipbuilding 
trade publication put it in 1954,  
 
If the ‘bulls’ are right, and the present strength of the freight market 
develops into what may be described as a ‘boom’ next year, and if it 
continues for any length of time, owners will undoubtedly become 
more interested in the possibility of acquiring additional vessels, 
whether secondhand or new. A resumption of ordering for dry-cargo 
ships will be welcomed by the shipyards; but it cannot be expected on 
any large scale, at least until the huge volume of war-built tonnage still 
in existence begins to show definite signs of breaking down or wearing 
out.155 
 
It is interesting to note that this comment came after seven years of full postwar order 
books!   
 
Another lesson was that those shipbuilding firms which overspent in capital 
investment were rash to do so and that shifting from older, more labor-intensive 
methods to more capital-intensive modern ones was not necessarily a way to become 
more profitable. The classic example of this was William Beardmore and Co. on the 
Clyde, which opened up a modern “state of the art” shipyard and engine 
                                                 
155 Lorenz, “Decline,” p. 83. Lorenz here is quoting the British shipbuilding trade publication 
“Shipping World and World Shipbuilding,” 1 Dec. 1954, p. 581. 
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manufacturing plant in 1905. However, servicing the capital expenditure required for 
this step continually hindered yard profitability compared to older, less-modernized 
yards and eventually played a large part in its 1930 demise.156   
 
The problem was that in Britain’s staple industries like shipbuilding where there 
existed both considerable excess capacity and cutthroat competition, a producer who 
had long since written down his capital costs was always ready to “ruin the market” 
for modernizing competitors who were endeavoring to increase productivity through 
capital deepening.
157
 The Geddes Report formally recognized this factor as a serious 
deterrent to investment in British shipbuilding, noting that “the yards which invested 
most [in labor-saving machinery and improvements] did not thereby become the most 
competitive. Their depreciation and overhead charges could not be readily recovered 
from the restricted business available when they could be outbidden by yards whose 
equipment was less up-to-date and less labour-saving. Yard modernization was not of 
itself any guarantee of commercial efficiency.”158 (Emphasis added). 
 
The men who managed Britain’s shipyards in the critical post-World War II period 
had been battered by war, depression, labor problems, supply problems, and foreign 
competition. Their entire working lives had been spent fighting a long retreat from 
worldwide shipbuilding supremacy. Those who had survived these forces were hard-
bitten, skeptically practical men from Ulster, Scotland and the North who had learned 
through harsh and bitter experience that times were always tough. Their mindset was 
that any apparent improvement was bound to be short-lived, not to be trusted and 
                                                 
156 J.R. Hume and M.S. Moss, Beardmore – The History of a Scottish Industrial Giant. (London: 
Heinemann, 1979), p. 88. 
157 Elbaum and Lazonick, “Decline of British Economy,” p. 577. 
158 Geddes Report, p. 23. 
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needed to be used to build up reserves against the inevitable resumption of difficult 
conditions. As Parkinson described them, 
 
They were in the main an inbred lot of men who believed in the virtues 
of being brought up to the construction of ships in the old way; of 
learning by doing; of education being applied in technical institutions 
in preference to universities; of being able to control the men by sheer 
force of personality rather than by recognizing their aspirations; of 
being clannish and inward looking. It is these attitudes that stand out in 
all examinations of the shipyards in the post-Second World War period 
when those brought up in the slump were still in power.159 
 
British shipbuilding in the 1950’s needed men of vision to grasp the potential for a 
much brighter future. Unfortunately for Britain, such men were in short supply in the 
postwar shipbuilding industry. 
 
The head of Britain’s Shipbuilding Advisory Committee, Sir Graham Cunningham, 
realized in the late 1950’s that Britain was beginning to badly underperform its 
worldwide shipbuilding competition. During 1959 he worked assiduously with 
shipowners, shipbuilders and union representatives to have a special subcommittee 
established with a mandate to investigate the problems in Britain’s shipbuilding 
industry and recommend changes. Ultimately unsuccessful in this effort, he staged a 
very public resignation of his post on 16 March 1960. The inquiry he had endeavored 
to initiate was enthusiastically supported by two legs of the involved triumvirate: 
shipowners and union representatives. Shipbuilding managements, however, “wanted 
the question to be postponed further,” with the clear intimation that they believed 
nothing need be done and the “postponement” should be effectively made 
                                                 
159 Harrison, “Industrial Organization,” p. 60, quoting Parkinson, J.R. “Shipbuilding,” pp. 79-102 
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permanent.160 Cunningham, in his letter of resignation to Mr. Ernest Marples, 
Minister of Transport, stated with reference to the shipbuilders’ reasons for delay, “I 
consider these excuses so frustrating that to continue serving the industry as chairman 
would be fruitless.”
161
  
 
The open dissatisfaction expressed in Cunningham’s letter of resignation embarrassed 
the Government, as he had intended, and it also achieved another of his goals. 
Transport Minister Marples accepted the necessity of establishing a special 
subcommittee of the Shipbuilding Advisory Committee to “review the prospects of, 
and the problems facing, the shipbuilding and shiprepairing industry and to make 
recommendations.”
162
 The formal report of the Shipbuilding Advisory Committee was 
delivered in April 1961. 
 
The question naturally arises as to why British shipbuilders would have wished to 
postpone an inquiry into the problems facing British shipbuilding.  It was clear from 
the decline in market share that something was amiss. Some of the industry’s 
problems, such as British ships costing too much and delivery times taking too long, 
would have been considered embarrassing but arguably justifiable on the basis of 
better British quality and higher labor costs.163 However, the airing of British 
shipbuilding’s problems did not have to wait for the SAC Report. The Department of 
                                                 
160 Hogwood, “Government and Shipbuilding,” p. 44. A newspaper article cited below, “Strong 
Criticism of Shipbuilders.” The Times (London): 6, states that the shipbuilding industry had previously 
refused to “sit down with the Ministry of Transport to examine its problems and to consider solutions.”  
161 Ibid. 
162 Hansard, House of Commons Debates, 30 March 1960, cols. 1315-18. 
163 Higher labor costs would have been true with regard to Sweden; it would not have been with regard 
to Germany and Japan where labor costs were 20 per cent and 45 per cent cheaper, respectively. 
Quality would probably at this time be considered to be equivalent. “’Insufficient’ Research into 
Shipbuilding Problems.” The Times (London), 16 December 1960: 8. 
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Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR) Report preceded it and caused a 
tremendous stir in Britain’s shipbuilding industry.   
THE DEPARTMENT OF SCIENTIFIC AND INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH 
REPORT 
 
The formal DSIR Report, entitled Development Requirements of the Shipbuilding and 
Marine Engineering Industries, was released in December 1960. 164 It found that 
“research and development in the field of shipbuilding and marine propulsion is 
insufficient in relation to the serious problems now facing the industry” and that 
“almost no organized research has hitherto been applied to the industry’s production 
and management problems with the object of increasing the productivity of labour and 
capital and reducing costs.”
165
 However, much harsher criticisms were presented, and 
in a more direct manner, by a draft DSIR Report leaked to The Times and published 
by them in October 1960. 166 In that report, it was claimed that British shipbuilding 
productivity “has perhaps improved by 1 per cent since 1951, compared with 3½ per 
cent in manufacturing industry and with great advances by foreign shipyards.”167 The 
reasons behind this poor showing were supposedly “bad labour relations, demarcation 
problems, technical backwardness, poor quality of management, too many small firms, 
and lack of standardization in ships and parts.”
168
 The draft report also stated that, 
with reference to shipbuilding management quality, “production control is primitive, 
work-study non-existent, personnel management old-fashioned and there is too little 
contact with other industries whose techniques might benefit the yards.”
169
  
                                                 
164 Ibid. This article described the formal DSIR report as “severely curtailed.” 
165 Ibid. 
166 “Strong Criticism of Shipbuilders.” The Times (London), 8 October 1960: 6.  
167 Ibid. 
168 Ibid. With regard to the demarcation problems, the draft report noted that there was little hope of an 
end to such problems until shipyard workers were given security of employment and their unions some 
financial inducement to cooperate. 
169 Ibid. 
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The formal DSIR Report was much less critical as the controversy over the draft 
report had stimulated shipbuilders to angrily rebut some of the stronger criticisms of 
the draft DSIR Report.
170
 However, The Times noted that, compared to the draft 
version, “the published version has been purged not only of some admitted 
inaccuracies and questionable generalizations but also of a great deal of serious and 
valid criticism of the industry contained in the original, especially in the fields of 
management, productivity and labour relations.”171 One last item from the DSIR 
Report needs to be mentioned: British shipyards “had been slow to reorganize their 
production methods. Many had employed production engineering consultants to 
advise on production layouts and programmes, but the implementation of such advice 
had frequently resulted in labour upsets, which, in a period of full order books, may 
have made the industry reluctant to use the results.”172 This statement is just one of 
the early warnings concerning what would prove to be one of the greatest detriments 
to British shipbuilding competitiveness: labor activism. However, the DSIR Reports, 
draft and formal, deserve credit for clearly delineating in 1960 the problems that 
would eventually destroy British shipbuilding: high costs, late deliveries and bad 
labor relations. 
THE SHIPBUILDING ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT: A 
WASTED OPPORTUNITY 
 
 The special subcommittee convened by the Ministry of Transport upon the 
resignation of Sir Graham Cunningham consisted of members from the Shipbuilding 
Conference, the Shipbuilding Employers’ Federation, and the Confederation of 
                                                 
170 “Strong Exception Taken to Shipbuilding Report.” The Times (London), 10 October 1960: 3. 
171 “’Insufficient’ Research into Shipbuilding Problems.” The Times (London), 16 December 1960: 8. 
This article described the formal DSIR report as “severely curtailed.” 
172 Ibid. 
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Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions. As mentioned earlier, the Ministry of 
Transport had not wished to initiate this special subcommittee and the report produced 
reflected that unwillingness. The special subcommittee met ten times in ten months to 
produce a report of fourteen pages in April 1961. Unsurprisingly enough, 
disagreements between the labor and management members of the subcommittee 
precluded emphatic agreement on anything except the idea that “the government 
should give the industry’s need for credits the most sympathetic and urgent 
consideration.” The report’s other recommendations blandly called for urging 
improvements in management/trade union relations, increasing efficiency, 
considering the potential benefits from amalgamation among smaller shipyards, 
implementing  a scrap and build scheme
173
 and urging the government to increase the 
total of vessels it planned to order in the next several years. One prominent reviewer 
stated that “in terms of the non-implementation of its recommendations the SAC 
Report can be regarded as an almost complete failure.”174  
 
It is widely suspected that the special subcommittee chairman, Sir James Dunnett, 
who was the Permanent Secretary of the Board of Trade, “in his capacity as a civil 
servant advised the Minister [of the Board of Trade] to reject the advice he had given 
him in the report to which he [Dunnett] put his signature.”175 What the SAC special 
subcommittee and Report did was act as a shield to deflect criticism from the 
governing Conservatives about their lackluster response to shipbuilding’s problems. 
                                                 
173 This scheme at this time was generally unwanted by British ship owners and actively disliked by 
many of them, calling as it did for major expenditures at a time when it was not at all certain to said 
shipowners that there was any necessity for new tonnage. Hogwood notes that a similar scheme put 
into effect in the 1930’s had a similar poor outcome. Such schemes work well in the face of rising 
demand. 
174 Hogwood, “Government and Shipbuilding,” p. 56. 
175 Ibid., p. 52. 
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Other than that it left little other trace and British shipbuilding still continued its 
steady decline.  
 
This was an excellent opportunity to solidly address the industry’s problems while 
there was still time to make the necessary changes. Sir Graham Cunningham 
sacrificed his position to force this inquiry hoping that its findings might impel some 
badly needed corrective action. His resignation in protest of Government policy was 
an honorable act and in the best traditions of British politics. Unfortunately for both 
him and the British shipbuilding industry, it was done in vain. Cunningham was a 
man ahead of his time in recognizing that Britain’s position was eroding rapidly and 
that something had to be done. In 1961 British shipbuilders were still remembering 
Britain’s leadership of the industry a scant five years earlier. There had not yet been 
enough pain to make them willing to listen to men with Cunningham’s message. It 
would take another five years of steady decline to provide that motivation. 
THE PATTON REPORT 
 
The Patton Report, which was actually titled Productivity and Research in 
Shipbuilding: Report of the Main Committee under the Chairmanship of James Patton, 
O.B.E. to the Joint Industry Committee, was commissioned by the Joint Industry 
Committee for Productivity in Shipbuilding, a part of the British Ship Research 
Association (BSRA).  This 1962 shipbuilding industry-sponsored report “pinpointed 
the underdeveloped nature of managerial hierarchies in the industry as a serious 
weakness and recommended a more systematic approach to production control.”176 
Greater in length and detail than any other report on British shipbuilding prior to the 
                                                 
176 Lorenz, “Decline,” p. 131. 
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Geddes Report, it was intended to serve as a guideline for modernization of the 
production practices utilized in British shipyards with the intent of bringing them up 
to a higher productivity level.  
 
As an industry-sponsored document, it had both advantages and disadvantages. 
Among the advantages were that the specialists who produced the Report knew both 
their own industry and their foreign competition quite well. The Patton Report 
contained some very effective and practical suggestions on how to increase shipyard 
productivity, the adoption of which would have led to considerably more efficient 
output. British shipbuilders who read the Report agreed that its recommendations 
made good sense and implementing them would definitely streamline production and 
remove bottlenecks. The major disadvantage was that BSRA had no power to get 
shipyard managements to even open the Report, much less implement any of its 
conclusions. Moreover, it recommended changes that would impose costs which 
might not be able to be quickly recouped, always a sore point with shipbuilders 
everywhere and particularly Britain’s seriously undercapitalized ones. Nevertheless, 
there was a great deal of useful information in it and the Geddes Report stated that 
“the influence of the Patton report on British shipbuilding technology has been 
strong.”177 The Patton Report is just more evidence that the technical and production 
advances taking place in Japanese, German and Swedish shipyards were generally 
known in Britain. British shipyards were not ignorant of their deficiencies; they just 
did not see the benefits of implementing new methods outweighing the twin costs of 
financial expenditure and likely labor unrest. 
 
                                                 
177 Hogwood, “Government and Shipbuilding,” p. 49, citing the Geddes Report. 
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THE GEDDES REPORT: BRITAIN FINALLY TRIES TO SAVE 
ITS SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY  
THE SHIPBUILDING INQUIRY COMMITTEE REPORT             
(Geddes Report) 
 
In October 1964, the newly elected Labour Government decided that shipbuilding’s 
problems had finally reached the point where they urgently demanded to be formally 
addressed. This decision came as no surprise since the “vast majority of shipbuilding 
yards lay within Labour parliamentary seats.”178 The decline in shipbuilding had 
obviously affected many Labour constituencies in Scotland and the North. It was only 
pragmatic politics for the Labour government to officially display its concern since 
the already bad situation for the government on both the commercial and political 
fronts in those areas promised to rapidly deteriorate.179  
 
However, there was more to this effort than just mere politics. Only ten years earlier 
Britain had still led the world in this industry and even if Britain no longer “ruled the 
waves” in the post-World War II era, no British government wanted to see the 
industry vanish and British-built ships disappear completely from the world’s oceans. 
Moreover, there was a deeper and darker concern underlying shipbuilding’s decline, 
the question of how closely British shipbuilding’s problems mirrored Britain’s entire 
industrial establishment. As the Geddes Report so clearly stated in its Preamble, the 
problems in shipbuilding were not special in kind so much as in degree. The truly 
                                                 
178  Johnman and Murphy, “British Shipbuilding,” p. 159.  
179 J. Foster and C. Woolfson, “UCS Work-In,” p. 108. In the political sphere, Foster and Woolfson 
point out that the Conservatives had been losing seats in Scotland since 1955. By 1972 they had lost 
approximately one-third of their original total. Labour, which had been the beneficiary of a 
disenchanted Scottish public’s turn away from the Conservatives, started in 1964 to lose a significant 
percentage of their seats to the Scottish National Party. 
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trenchant question the Report asked was, “If Britain cannot stand on this front, where 
does she mean to stand?”180 
 
The appointment of the Shipbuilding Inquiry Committee was Britain’s most serious 
postwar endeavor to investigate and resolve the problems of British shipbuilding short 
of nationalizing the industry. It had the full support of both the Labour Government 
and the Conservative opposition. From its inception it was understood that any 
solutions the Committee might propose to shipbuilding’s difficulties would be given 
great weight and held a high likelihood of implementation. From all accounts the 
Committee took its remit as a grave responsibility. Its members had been selected 
with considerable care in a deliberate effort to produce both a highly competent 
organization and one completely free from any suggestion of bias. The Committee 
clearly made a thorough and conscientious effort to understand the problems affecting 
the industry and the report it produced demonstrates that high level of engagement. It 
certainly shows the Committee understood the magnitude of the task facing Britain’s 
shipbuilding industry in trying to once again become internationally competitive. 
 
Table 6, which was presented in the Geddes Report, showed the manpower losses in 
the British shipbuilding industry between 1958 and 1963.181 Britain had suffered a 
32.3 per cent decline in shipbuilding employment in only five years. The decline was 
particularly acute in Scotland, where, between 1958 and 1966 ten Clyde shipyards had 
either ceased operations or merged with other yards.182 Given that Scotland was 
                                                 
180 Geddes Report, p. 11. 
181 Shipbuilding Inquiry Committee Report (Geddes Report), Cmnd. 2937, appendix E, p. 172. 
Employment number changes and percentage changes extrapolated from information in the cited chart. 
182 The ten yards were as follows. In 1958, J. and J. Hay in Kirkintilloch failed. It was the first Clyde 
shipyard to go under since 1936. In 1962, the North Yard of Ardrossan Dockyard Ltd. ceased 
operations. In 1963, George Brown and Co. Ltd., of Greenock, W. Denny and Bros. Ltd., of Dunbarton, 
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already suffering from higher unemployment than most of the rest of the U.K., the 
problems with Clyde shipbuilding registered even more acutely there. 
 Table 6: BRITISH EMPLOYMENT IN SHIPBUILDING, 1958-1963 
Year Operatives  
(New Construction) 
Other than 
operatives 
(shipbuilding 
and 
shiprepairing) 
Change in 
Actual 
Employment 
Numbers  
Percentage 
of Decline 
from 1958 
Merchant Naval 
1958 77,600 14,600 21,300 -- -- 
1959 80,100 13,600 21,100 +1,300 +1.145% 
1960 71,800 12,200 21,100 -8400 -7.4% 
1961 58,600 9,600 20,400 -24,900 -21.94% 
1962 50,400 12,000 19,400 -31,700 -27.93% 
1963 47,900 10,800 18,100 -36,700 -32.33% 
 
Mr. Reay Geddes, the Managing Director of the Dunlop Rubber Company, was 
selected to chair the Shipbuilding Inquiry Committee. Geddes was chosen because he 
“was regarded as being a dynamic industrial leader” and “was interested in achieving 
productivity through enlightened labour relations.” 183 The Committee’s remit was to 
a) “establish what changes are necessary in organization, in the methods of production, 
and any other factors affecting costs to make the shipbuilding industry competitive in 
world markets; b) to establish what changes in organization and methods of 
production would reduce costs of large main engines to the lowest level; and c) to 
                                                                                                                                            
Harland and Wolff ‘s Govan Shipyard, Blythswood Shipbuilding Co., Ltd., of Scotstoun, Simons Yard 
of Renfrew, Lobnitz Yard of Renfrew, and Fleming  & Ferguson Ltd., Paisley, closed down. W. 
Hamilton and Co. in Port Glasgow merged with Lithgows’ Shipyards. In 1966, Greenock Dockyard Co. 
Ltd of Greenock merged with Scott’s Shipyard.  
183 Hogwood, “Government and Shipbuilding,” p. 66. Hogwood notes that this interest in “enlightened 
labour relations” was particularly relevant to shipbuilding. 
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recommend what action should be taken by employers, trade unions and government, 
to bring about these changes.”184 Its recommendations were expected to be applicable 
to all shipyards normally employed in the construction of vessels equal to or greater 
than 5,000 gross tons in size.
185
 Roy Mason, who was Minister of State at the Board 
of Trade and thus responsible for the shipbuilding industry, asked the Committee to 
complete its investigations and report within twelve months of its initiation on 2 
February 1965. In the event, the Committee submitted its report to the Board of Trade 
on 24 February 1966.  
GEDDES REPORT FINDINGS 
 
It is generally accepted that the Committee’s diligent work produced a serious, 
judiciously considered and valuable document. During its year of inquiry, its 
members visited and/or received representations from a host of organizations both in 
and away from the United Kingdom. Committee members visited all twenty-seven 
British shipyards186 which would be affected by their recommendations as well as a 
representative number of overseas shipbuilding and manufacturing facilities.187 They 
spoke and corresponded not only with shipbuilders and marine engine builders but 
also with shipowners, ship operators, union leaders, senior Government officials,188 
                                                 
184 Hansard, House of Commons Debates, 2 February 1965, cols. 685-7. 
185 Hogwood, “Government and Shipbuilding,” p. 66.  
186 “Geddes Report Suggests £67m Loans to Streamline Shipyards.” The Times (London), 25 March 
1966: 7. The newspaper article mentions that Britain has 62 operating shipyards and implies that they 
would be included in the proposed groupings. It is somewhat misleading in that it does not mention the 
fact that Geddes Report findings were only intended to be applied to the twenty-seven largest shipyards, 
those building vessels of 5,000 gross tons or larger. These shipyards are listed in the Geddes Report in 
Appendix D, pp. 170-171. 
187 Members of the Committee traveled to Japan, Germany and Sweden to see the latest innovations in 
shipbuilding technology. 
188 Some or all Committee members made inquiries to the Board of Trade, the Export Credits 
Guarantee Department, the Ministry of Commerce for Northern Ireland, the Ministry of Defense, the 
Ministry of Health and Social Services, the Ministry of Labour, the Ministry of Technology, the 
National Physical Laboratory and the Scottish Office. 
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steel industry leaders, academicians, related professional associations and industry 
research bodies.189  
 
Their investigations were conducted in both public and private meetings. This was 
intentional since the Committee truly wished to discover the industry’s underlying 
problems and its members recognized that blunt truths sometimes could not be openly 
admitted in formal settings. Indeed, some of those private discussions were brutally 
frank and might have been legally actionable if spoken in public. However, their 
investigations did reveal a clear view of the reasons for the industry’s decline while 
convincing the Committee that shipbuilding’s problems were structural, multi-faceted 
and interlocking. The Committee completed their Report with guarded optimism but 
was absolutely honest when in the Report’s Preamble they stated, “there is no one 
easy way in which [British shipbuilding] can become competitive.”190 
 
The Committee Report mentioned a long list of serious problems. Among them were 
the following: 
• high vessel costs 
• late delivery dates  
• extremely poor labor relations   
• obsolescent physical plant 
• craft demarcation infighting  
• weak management 
• lack of strategic business planning 
• short term outlook  
                                                 
189 For the full listing, see Appendix B of the Geddes Report, pp. 166-167. 
190 Geddes Report, p.8. 
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• inadequate design and production planning  
• insufficient engineering talent   
• antiquated and inefficient marketing  
• failure to control subcontractors  
• financial mismanagement 
• incomplete and deficient accounting and budgeting practice 
• uncoordinated purchasing practice  
• misapplication of skilled labor  
• misdirected and inadequate technical research  
• lack of specialization  
• insufficient work measurement 
 
Most of these faults the Committee believed could not be rectified within the current 
structure of the industry because of the relatively small sizes of Britain’s shipbuilding 
firms. The economies of scale which could be practiced by large firms and which the 
Committee believed essential for British shipbuilding to be competitive in the world 
market simply were not possible for them. According to the Committee, their small 
size meant Britain’s current shipbuilding firms had “insufficient influence with 
customers and suppliers.”
191
 Moreover, because they lacked sufficient resources they 
were severely constrained in their future planning and unable to look beyond the 
current, crisis-ridden short-term horizon. Consequently, in its conclusions and 
recommendations the Committee attempted to address what it saw as British 
shipbuilding’s major problem: industry fragmentation.  
 
                                                 
191 “Geddes Report Suggests £67m Loans to Streamline Shipyards.” The Times (London), 25 March 
1966: 7.  
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Elaborating on the point of “insufficient influence”, they pointed out the following 
financial information in Table 7 comparing British shipbuilding with other British 
industries.192 After providing this comparison with other well-known British industrial 
firms, the Report remarked that “the turnover of each of these individual concerns is 
larger, in some cases several times larger, than the combined sales of the twenty-
seven yards concerned. Yet each of these yards is seeking to compete, unprotected, in 
conditions of acute international competition.”193 The Shipbuilding Inquiry 
Committee Report firmly established the rationale for its primary recommendation 
when it stated “it is, in our view, no accident that the leading foreign firms are those 
who attack the growing world market and operate on a large scale.”194  
 
It was a valid observation and one with which the Korean Government certainly later 
agreed. Korea, as a “late-industrializing” nation, had the luxury of benefiting from 
observing the errors made by those who had initially blazed the trail. The Korean 
Government’s analysis of what was necessary for Korean industrialization to succeed 
concluded that company size and capitalization were critically important. 
Consequently, their industrial policy held the idea of building up “national champions” 
of industry as a core principle. President Park Chung Hee made his intentions in this 
direction very clear when he stated in 1971 that “every aspect of our [Korean] 
national economy, including its scale, should be enhanced to a level where it can be 
evaluated favorably on an international standard.”
195
 Korean shipbuilding firms such 
as Hyundai, Samsung, and Daewoo benefited greatly from the assistance provided as 
a result of this governmental stance. President Park was very well aware that when it 
                                                 
192 Geddes Report, p. 14. Figures taken from “The Times 300” (The Times (London), 1965). 
193 Ibid. Chart adapted from figures provided in Geddes Report, Table 2 and associated data. 
194 Ibid., p. 9 
195 Park, Chung Hee, To Build A Nation (Washington D.C.: Acropolis Books, 1971), p. 199. 
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came to business, size mattered a great deal. It was no accident that his government 
had been pushing Korean businesses to increase growth since shortly after taking 
power in 1961.  
 
However, when comparing Korea and Britain it must be recognized they operated 
very differently with regard to economic policy. In Britain one major political party 
had a sizable, possibly even a majority, segment that contended there should be no 
government economic policy and that the markets alone should dictate the allocation 
of capital and resources. In Korea, and particularly during the administration of 
President Park, there was never any doubt that there would be a government economic 
policy. The only question to be answered there concerned which companies would be 
its beneficiaries.196 
Table 7: FINANCIAL TURNOVER FOR SELECTED BRITISH FIRMS 
Industry Turnover 1964-65 (£m) 
Imperial Chemical Industries 720.2 
British Motor Corporation 444.1 
Guest, Keen and Nettlefold 338.1 
Distillers Company 303.0 
Courtaulds 227.7 
Bowater Paper Corporation 171.2 
British Shipbuilding (27 Largest Firms 
Combined) 
159 (ca. 1963) 
 
 
                                                 
196 The economic literature on this subject refers to a state such as Britain as a “regulatory state;” South 
Korea is often referred to as a “developmental state.” The difference, which is addressed below, is 
primarily concerned with the existence of a national industrial policy.  
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Having spent a year analyzing an industry comprised of relatively small businesses 
unable to benefit from the economies of scale its overseas competitors enjoyed,197 the 
Shipbuilding Inquiry Committee formally concluded that the most important action 
needed to halt British shipbuilding’s decline was horizontal integration to achieve 
those economies of scale. Consequently, they proposed “concentrating most of the 62 
yards into three or four big groups, two in north-east England and one or two on the 
Clyde.”198 By far the most sweeping of the Report’s suggestions, this was a bold 
recommendation and not one easily implemented.  However, it was economically 
logical, comparatively inexpensive and addressed an obvious problem. If shipyard 
grouping didn’t guarantee a halt to the decline, it certainly looked like movement in 
the right direction. 
    
The Committee Report recommended providing funds to assist in grouping 
shipbuilders according to regions and construction specialties since those grouped 
shipyards, as larger, centralized enterprises, would have that greater “influence with 
customers and suppliers” the Committee deemed vitally important. The Committee 
assumed the planned new shipbuilding aggregations would be able to attract stronger 
management, enjoy immediate cost reductions through combining design, drawing, 
                                                 
197 Appendix P of the Geddes Report shows the percentage of tonnage launched in shipbuilding 
countries (Japan, Germany, Sweden, United Kingdom), by the size of the shipbuilding group 
constructing the tonnage. Japan had 83.7 percent of its tonnage built in yards constructing more than 
100,000 tons per year, and only 8.8 percent of its tonnage built in yards of smaller size. Britain had 
42.2 percent of its tonnage built in yards constructing more than 100,000 tons per year and 57.2 per 
cent of its tonnage built in yards of smaller size. 
198  “Geddes Report Suggests £67m Loans to Streamline Shipyards.” The Times (London), 25 March 
1966: 7. Although the Report was aimed at only the 27 British shipyards building vessels larger than 
5,000 tons, The Times had consulted with other political sources who believed that it was quite likely 
some additional shipyards of smaller size would also be consolidated in the groupings suggested by the 
Report. 
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planning and purchasing offices, and provide a more flexible and effective use of the 
labor force.199 
 
The Report envisaged having the shipbuilders on the Tyne, Wear and Tees Rivers in 
North-East England amalgamated into two groups, while the Clyde shipbuilders 
would also be amalgamated into two groups, one for the Upper Clyde and one for 
Clydebank. Harland and Wolff in Belfast was posited as comprising its own group 
due to its size as the U.K.’s biggest shipbuilding firm, its relative geographic isolation, 
its intent to specialize in construction of large vessels and Northern Ireland’s unusual 
political situation. It should be noted here that even prior to the Geddes Report 
Harland and Wolff had received considerable sums in special financial assistance 
from the Government of Northern Ireland.200 This was in large measure due to its 
position in the local economy as a major, extremely important employer during a time 
when Northern Ireland was rapidly losing jobs and investment due to a major upsurge 
in sectarian violence.201 
 
The proposed grouping of yards with regard to construction specialties was suggested 
to be as follows: 
 
 
                                                 
199 Geddes Report, p. 90. The Report also noted the Committee’s belief there was “real regional and 
‘river’ loyalty and pride on which to build morale.” 
200 Hogwood, “Government and Shipbuilding,” p. 122. He notes that Harland and Wolff had been 
receiving subsidies from the Northern Ireland Government since World War II and that they had 
provided a loan of £3.5 million in 1966 to prevent the shipyard from going into receivership. 
201There was serious concern in both Westminster and Stormont that if an important firm such as 
Harland and Wolff were allowed to collapse due to a lack of financial support from the British 
government, this would be taken as the beginning of an economic withdrawal by the mainland United 
Kingdom from Northern Ireland. Both governments feared that any indication of economic withdrawal 
would be taken as the precursor of a formal U.K political withdrawal from the Province. It was always 
assumed during Northern Ireland’s “Troubles” that any such indication would make an already bad 
sectarian violence problem exponentially worse.  
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S yards: Yards which would build the more sophisticated ships 
involving a large proportion of fitting-out work and possibly steel work 
of special quality. Examples of this type of ship are destroyers, frigates, 
passenger ships and the larger ferries. 
 
M yards: Yards building multi-deck mixed cargo ships. If there were 
two yards of this type in a group they might specialize in different 
sizes of ship. 
 
B yards: Yards building ships without ‘tween decks: bulk carriers 
and tankers.
202
 In a group with two such yards one might concentrate 
on the larger tankers while the other built bulk carriers for dry cargo 
and smaller tankers.203  
 
The Committee recommended that each grouping have no more than one “S” yard but 
possibly two or more “M” and “B” yards. The final outcome of grouping was 
envisioned as combining four or five current shipbuilding firms, all within one hour’s 
travelling distance, to create yards with approximately 1,500-2,000 men per “M” or 
“B” yard while “S” yards might employ up to 3,000 workers. The aggregate size of a 
group was expected to be approximately 8,000-10,000 workers with an annual 
production output of 400,000 to 500,000 gross tons per year.
204
 Even at the lower 
output ranges the Report mentioned, the anticipated output was a minimum of 2 
million gross tons per year. This rate of assumed production from five groups must be 
considered as surprisingly optimistic since it meant British tonnage output would 
approximately double. As Chart 1 shows, the total aggregate tonnage output of British 
shipbuilding in 1965 was only 1,282,000 tons.  
 
                                                 
202 “’Tween-decks” is a term generally referring to vessels that have additional decks between the keel 
and the upper deck of a vessel. Bulk carriers and tankers, in their cargo-carrying spaces, do not have 
such decks. With their cargo-carrying spaces making up the vast majority of the vessel, they are 
basically a linear assemblage of large steel boxes bounded by the ship’s sides, upper deck and keel. 
Such vessels are the simplest types of ships to design and construct and are almost always the vessel 
types initially built by new entrants into the shipbuilding industry.  
203 Geddes Report, p. 88. 
204 Ibid., p. 89. 
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Judging from the anticipated output stated for the proposed groups, the Committee 
clearly believed that grouping would yield a great many advantages in efficiency and 
productivity not currently enjoyed by the industry. However, they were not 
completely sanguine about the issue. The Report recognized that “human problems 
will inevitably arise and these will range from top management to the newest 
employee.”
205
 They also stated that grouping would pose “many financial problems” 
and that “overhead and other costs may have to be incurred on which no early return 
can be expected.”206 This was a clear reference to their belief that costly 
training/retraining of existing workforces and the importation of expensive new talent 
into group managements would be required. Additionally, the Committee recognized 
that production facilities “will have to be rationalized” and this would inevitably 
“involve some disruption of production.”207 Grouping was not going to be achieved 
without overcoming some serious problems and the Report recognized that.  
 
At bottom, however, the Committee firmly believed there was no other choice that 
would have any chance of making British shipbuilding a viable concern. They did not 
believe that the normal business procedures of “closure and take-over” would suffice 
to form the sizes of groups they deemed necessary in anything approaching a suitable 
timeframe. They also rejected the idea of just having the Government subsidize 
existing shipyards because they did not see the current state of the industry allowing 
such subsidies to be profitably spent. With reference to subsidization, the Report 
stated that “We see no hope of the shipbuilding industry becoming competitive on the 
world market in this way. British shipbuilders are not short of orders but the business 
                                                 
205 Ibid., p. 91. 
206 Ibid., p. 92. 
207 Ibid. 
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they have booked is in general unprofitable.”208 Their final analysis of the subject 
stated that “the effort which is required to make the shipbuilding industry competitive 
cannot be achieved without grouping and complete merging of businesses, resulting 
as this should in unified direction and the most efficient use of resources of 
management, labour and equipment.”209 The Committee was absolutely correct in its 
conclusion that unified direction and efficient use of resources were desperately 
needed given the magnitude and variety of the problems facing the industry. Those 
problems will now be given closer examination. 
PROBLEMS REVEALED BY THE GEDDES REPORT 
 
First, Britain’s shipbuilders were generally considered to be more costly than their 
competitors, and by an average of 20 per cent.
210
 With shipping being an intensely 
competitive industry and shipowners being by necessity a notoriously parsimonious 
lot, this was a damning criticism.
211
  The Shipbuilding Inquiry Committee received a 
number of reports from British shipowners who had experience of requesting tenders 
for construction from UK, European and Japanese yards. For the same ship, in many 
cases the cheapest British tender exceeded the cost of the highest Japanese tender and 
sometimes even the highest European tender.212 Facing such serious price differentials 
the export market for British ships had dwindled to unprecedentedly low levels. More 
ominously, even British shipowners such as P & O and BP, with long histories of 
procurement from particular British shipbuilders and a pronounced preference for 
                                                 
208 Ibid., p. 93. 
209 Ibid. 
210 Ibid., p. 48. Geddes claimed it was only 15 per cent but admitted that the public perception was 20 
per cent. Given the costs incurred by other factors, including late deliveries, it may have been even 
more than 20 per cent. 
211 One of the comments often made about vessel owners by hard-pressed crews trying to run ships on 
sparse budgets was, “These guys throw nickels around like they’re manhole covers.” 
212 Johnman and Murphy, “British Shipbuilding,” pp. 195-197. 
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“buying British,” found themselves forced by business economics to begin ordering 
abroad.  
 
To add to an already difficult problem, what the Committee found when they 
investigated this cost differential was that even with higher received prices British 
shipyards were still not profitable.213 As the Report noted in a subchapter entitled, 
“Profitless Prosperity 1965,” even those British shipyards which had sufficient work 
on their order books at the time found that “many of the orders now in hand will not 
be remunerative enough even to cover costs.”
214
 
 
Like most of the other difficulties with British shipbuilding, there was no easy 
solution to what was a complex and deeply interconnected problem. Breaking down 
the general cost structure for British shipyards showed that shipyard overheads, such 
as management, design, planning, purchasing and sales, constituted roughly 10 
percent of costs. Shipyard labor costs accounted for between 15 and 20 percent, steel 
15 to 20 percent, main engines 10 to 15 percent, other machinery 15 to 20 percent, 
and other hull materials and equipment roughly 20 percent.215 Finding 20 percent to 
cut from these categories was never going to be an easy task as both shipyard labor 
and material/equipment vendors were already suffering from the downturn in British 
shipbuilding.  
 
The Geddes Report’s recommendations concerning shipyard grouping were, among 
other aims, intended to produce firms with sufficient size to wield major influence 
with material and equipment suppliers. The hope with regard to vendors/suppliers was 
                                                 
213 Geddes Report, p. 44.  
214 Ibid., p. 26. 
215 Ibid., p. 48. 
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that the prospect of increased sales volume to a larger customer would induce them to 
provide at least somewhat cheaper prices. The Report accepted as given that shipyard 
grouping would produce economies of scale with regard to overhead costs for 
management, design, marketing and purchasing. Of course, even had shipyard 
grouping managed to eliminate shipyard overhead expenses entirely, it would still not 
have produced a sufficient cost reduction to bring British shipyards to cost parity with 
Japanese yards. That said, cost reduction had to start somewhere and this was one of 
the few aspects fully within the control of the yards themselves. 
 
Second, late delivery dates were an incredibly difficult problem for British shipyards, 
particularly when compared to the Japanese competition.
216
 The British already took 
longer to build vessels than their major shipbuilding competitors and to have late 
deliveries on top of that just made a bad situation worse.217 Late delivery was a hydra-
headed monster for the shipyards because there were so many factors that could 
disrupt delivery schedules and few of them were within the control of the yards 
themselves.  
 
Late delivery is potentially a danger to all shipbuilders because of the difficulties of 
maintaining proper subcontractor/vendor control. Shipbuilding is a business where the 
builder assembles a great many pieces of discrete equipment into a coherent and 
                                                 
216 Ibid., p. 29. The Report comments that “The Japanese have acquired an enviable reputation for 
delivery on time” while noting that “at present one of [British shipbuilding’s] most serious problems is 
to provide speedy and reliable delivery.” 
217 Ibid., p. 174. Appendix F of the Report is “Average Times Taken from Order to Completion in 
British Yards in Recent Years.” For merchant ships, tankers took from 24 to 27 months to complete, 
bulk carriers took from 14 to 20 months to complete, and cargo liners took from 13 to 17 months to 
complete. By comparison,  according to Johnman and Murphy, “British Shipbuilding,” pp. 196-7, 
Japanese times for construction of cargo liners was roughly half of that in the U.K., while tankers built 
in Swedish yards took “six or seven months” compared to “twelve to sixteen months” in British yards. 
In general, British yards were taking nearly twice as long to build a vessel as their main international 
competitors. 
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integrated whole. If any one of the major parts of the vessel—special plating, castings, 
engines, electronics, shafting, rudders, anchors, propellers, winches, etc. are delayed 
in production or delivery, the entire vessel suffers from that delay.218 Keeping close 
watch on the status of all the equipment required to complete a vessel is imperative 
but very challenging. What is required is sufficiently exact logistical control to insure 
exactly what is wanted is delivered to the right place at the right time, thus allowing 
the fulfillment of tight delivery schedules.219 Since most of these items are not 
produced by the shipyard, the yard is at the mercy of its equipment vendors should 
those vendors fail to deliver orders as promised.  
 
For the shipyard’s purchasing department, which is charged with managing this issue, 
communicating with all the suppliers involved in equipment procurement about order 
status is like herding cats: a difficult and thankless task. Even in the second decade of 
the 21st Century, with all but instantaneous worldwide communication, procurement 
problems with vendor-supplied equipment are still the most common reason for late 
delivery of vessels. For the British shipbuilding industry of the 1960’s, with its 
minimally manned purchasing departments struggling with much slower 
communications that were both cumbersome and expensive, this was a major problem 
that often had critical impact on delivery times.220  
                                                 
218 Geddes Report, p. 29. The Report noted that “delay in obtaining supplies” was often a problem. 
219 It should be noted here that most vessel equipment, and certainly every piece of major equipment, 
has to have a product certificate issued by the vessel’s classification society. It is not at all uncommon 
to have more than 1000 product certificates for the equipment of a complex vessel. Testing required to 
issue this certificate is normally done at the equipment manufacturer. If this document isn’t provided 
with the equipment, it generally means a great deal of extra cost and time is incurred at the shipyard 
while the testing required to issue the product certificate takes place. Another consideration is that 
sometimes storage space is at a premium, particularly climate-controlled storage space for such things 
as electronic components. Consequently, having equipment delivered too early when there is no 
available/suitable storage space can also pose problems.  
220 It should be noted here that one of the issues cutting into the profitability of all shipbuilding from 
the 1960’s on was the tremendous expansion in the international regulations governing the construction 
and operation of seagoing vessels. 
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Late delivery also contributed greatly to the unprofitability of British shipyards 
because of a change in industry pricing practice initiated in the late 1950’s and which 
gradually became standard throughout shipbuilding. This was the practice of fixed-
cost pricing. Prior to the mid-1950’s, most shipbuilding contracts were written on a 
cost-plus basis where there was general agreement between owner and builder about 
the vessel cost but with the final price not actually solidified until after delivery. This 
allowed the owners to make changes in the vessel right up to delivery and allowed the 
yards to include such changes in their charges. 
 
This was acceptable when ordered vessels were more of a “one-off,” individual 
transaction.221 With the movement to standardization entailing long production runs 
where shipyards were building multiple vessels of exactly the same type for different 
owners, the need for that level of design flexibility all but disappeared.  Moreover, 
owners needed a predictable delivery cost for their vessels since the banks providing 
the money for construction were becoming increasingly reluctant to fund projects 
with an unknown end price. Consequently, when vessel contracts changed to fixed-
cost pricing the yards were faced with the necessity of delivering the vessel at the 
contractually agreed time or paying heavy delay penalties.222 The British shipyards 
simply failed to manage this change well and it cost them dearly.223  
 
                                                 
221 Geddes Report, p. 12. The Report notes that in the past it was quite common for individual shipping 
firms to have considerably different design requirements for their vessels, hence the idea of each order 
being a “one-off” construction arrangement. 
222 These penalties can be extremely steep. The author was involved in the construction of a vessel 
which had a contractually agreed delay fee, including liquidated damages, of USD 160,000 per day. 
223 This was particularly damaging when compared to their Japanese and Swedish competitors, each of 
which boasted a much better percentage of on-time deliveries. 
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There was one other major cost associated with late deliveries. This was the cost 
added by inflation.  Inflation in the 1960’s in Britain was bad, running at more than 
six per cent per annum; in the 1970’s it was considerably worse. With inflation then 
running in double digits, increases in equipment and labor costs could quickly turn 
what was at signing a marginally profitable fixed-price contract into a major loss. It 
was due to inflation that the Report stated, “It is at present the level of profitability in 
the industry which jeopardizes its survival and not a shortage of orders. Indeed, while 
costs are rising fast an overlong order book may be a disadvantage.”224 This was a 
problem over which the shipyards had no control. They and the rest of British 
industry suffered greatly from it. 
 
Next in importance in the litany of British shipbuilding’s woes was its abysmal record 
of labor relations. The Report recognized this as an absolutely critical factor which 
played a very significant part in the two aforementioned problems with the industry, 
high costs and late deliveries. It actually stated, “We cannot emphasise too strongly 
that improvement in this field is one of the prime conditions of the survival of 
shipbuilding…” 225  
 
Shipyard management had a long list of complaints with their unions. Among them 
were  
 
 
…restrictions on output due to meticulous insistence on craft 
demarcation; insistence on overmanning of machines; strikes at short 
notice, often just before a launching, by groups of employees to 
enforce a wage claim which cannot be granted without repercussions 
on the wages of other groups; the creation of shortages of workers by 
restrictions on entry and then the exploitation of the shortage; bans on 
overtime or the insistence that all must work overtime if some are to do 
so; and bad timekeeping.226  
                                                 
224 Geddes Report, p. 142. 
225 Ibid., p. 123.  
226 Ibid., p. 110. 
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Of course, the unions saw things quite differently. They argued that the employers 
had voluntarily signed on to the agreements about which they now complained and 
that the employers had themselves originated the craft demarcations. Moreover, they 
claimed that the shipyards saw their unionized labor forces as disposable and had 
absolutely no concern for worker satisfaction, employment security or safety. Facing 
apathy at best and intransigently belligerent animosity at worst from shipyard 
managements, unions had found that strikes were the only way to get management to 
listen to union grievances.  
 
The two sides had diametrically opposed worldviews and the history of British 
shipbuilding shows the results of that divergence. As displayed in Table 8, in the post-
World War II era there was no other industry in the United Kingdom that had a worse 
record of labor strife. According to the Report, “the number of stoppages which are 
‘official’ is high—in terms of working days lost, fifty-four per cent as compared with 
about six per cent in the docks, two per cent in coal mining and fifty-one percent in 
engineering, including vehicle building.”227 This was “the British Disease” in full 
flower, with management and labor at complete loggerheads with one another while 
yet another British industry suffered horrific collateral damage.228 
 
 
                                                 
227 Ibid., p. 105. By “official” the Report referred to the fact that the stoppages are actually approved by 
the union involved as opposed to “unofficial” stoppages. The latter are industrial actions taken on a 
local level, usually by shop stewards who are unwilling to wait for the often cumbersome official 
disputes machinery to provide a quickly-needed resolution. The fact that so many shipyard strikes were 
“official” is indicative of serious dissatisfaction with the state of industrial relations at union 
management level, a larger problem than a more localized disruption would present. 
228 The term “the British Disease” refers to the ongoing series of strikes and industrial unrest in the 
1960’s, 1970’s and early 1980s which led to a major decline in British industrial competitiveness and 
which seriously weakened the British economy. 
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Table 8: TIME LOST TO INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES IN BRITISH INDUSTRY, 
1949-1964229  
 
Industry Groups 
Average Annual Number of Days Lost per 1,000 
Employees in Employment 
1949-58 1960-64 
Shipbuilding and Shiprepairing 1,862 1,457 
Coal Mining 717 667 
Construction 78 141 
Engineering and Vehicles 263 436 
Textiles 19 27 
Food, Drink and Tobacco 11 41 
Port and Inland Water 
Transport 
2,049 1,215 
 
Properly recounting the historic reasons for the poor state of British shipbuilding’s 
labor relations would require a book in its own right. However, its roots lay deep in 
the casualization of the industry’s labor pool. Shipbuilders in the past had shown no 
compunction whatsoever about discharging their workers on little more than one 
hour’s notice.
230
 Until 1963 and the passage of formal legislation, shipyard workers 
had no guarantee of a full week’s employment.231 The harsh and bitter legacy of 
management contempt and labor hatred was a relationship so poisoned that neither 
labor nor management had the slightest trust in the other side. As the Report stated, 
 
The past is very much alive in the minds of the workers in the industry 
and coupled with the general lack of confidence in the future of the 
industry, it has bred a deep feeling of insecurity which is at the root of 
most of the demarcation disputes and the practices in the industry 
                                                 
229 Ibid., P. 105, table taken from Ministry of Labour. 
230 Ibid., p. 103. 
231 This was not a given until the passage of the Contracts of Employment Act in 1963. 
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which are commonly known as “restrictive” but which the workers 
regard as “protective.232 
 
Tim Colton, who spent eight years working at Lithgow’s on the Clyde, made the 
following observation: “Industrial relations in British shipbuilding could not have 
been worse, particularly on the Clyde, which was known in those days as ‘Red 
Clydeside.’ I was amazed at the animosity and contempt shown both by managers for 
workers and by workers for managers.”233 
 
That animosity was of long standing. From the 1860’s onward there was a near-
continuous history of strikes and lockouts, with management suppression of labor 
followed by industrial action being the common pattern. It was not until the 1880’s 
that Clydeside shipyards would even recognize the existence of unions. In the 1860’s 
and 1870’s they repeatedly locked out as many as 20,000 workers to enforce an owner 
prohibition against them.234 As the Report noted, the British working class have long 
memories. Such harsh behavior invariably breeds retribution when circumstances 
allow, which in a cyclic industry such as shipbuilding was bound to happen eventually. 
As Table 9 shows, British shipbuilding labor even struck numerous times during 
World War II when Britain was literally fighting for its life against the Axis.
235
 The 
fact that British shipyard workers would undertake strike action at such a critical time 
                                                 
232 Geddes Report, p. 103. 
233 Colton, “Staying Afloat,” p. 15. 
234 Foster and Woolfson, “UCS Work-In,” p. 144-145. 
235 Nothing displays the differences between the contending parties in that war better than this statistic. 
One can assume that the response of the Gestapo or the Kempeitai to striking workers in Germany or 
Japan would have been somewhat different than the tolerant British one. However, Minister of Labour 
Ernest Bevin did threaten striking workers in one dispute with immediate induction into the British 
military.  
 92 
 
is a clear indication that their alienation from shipyard management and even their 
own government was all but complete.236  
Table 9: STOPPAGES OF WORK IN THE SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY, 1939-
1945
237
 
Year No. of Strikes 
Beginning in Year 
No. of Workpeople 
Involved 
Working Lost Days 
1939 39 4,300 37,000 
1940 65 10,100 37,000 
1941 147 27,300 110,000 
1942 111 42,000 192,000 
1943 196 32,000 137,000 
1944 199 44,000 370,000 
1945 186 27,700 143,000 
 
With the election of the Labour Government in 1945 and the implementation of the 
Beveridge Plan creating the first modern welfare state, shipyard managements were 
effectively put on notice that their workers had veto power over their activities. This 
state of affairs was a major influence on a management mindset that was already 
afraid of the costs of modernization. Management realized that any modernization 
planning threatening to reduce manning would automatically be attacked by the union 
facing job losses.   
 
                                                 
236 Foster and Woolfson, “UCS Work-In,” pp. 148-205. The entire book resonates with the theme of 
alienation and betrayal. Shipyard labor on the Clyde felt betrayed by everyone except Glaswegians and 
their local leadership. They had little trust in the Labour Party, less in the Conservatives, and none 
whatsoever in shipyard management. 
237 Johnman and Murphy, “British Shipbuilding,” p. 72. The information in the chart is taken from data 
found in the U.K. Public Record Office, CAB 102/877. 
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Management could not combat this problem effectively for two reasons, one tactical 
and one strategic. On a tactical level, for union grievances that entailed picketing, 
labor solidarity would generally preclude other union members from crossing picket 
lines. Therefore, in a yard with fifteen unions (the number cited as the average in the 
Geddes Report), any one union going on strike could actually paralyze a large part of 
the shipyard simply by making personnel movement impossible. Few union members 
would give the slightest consideration to crossing a fellow union’s picket line 
knowing that their own livelihood depended on other unions respecting all union 
picket lines.
238
 From a strategic standpoint, the only certainty in the relationship 
between shipyard unions and shipyard management was that both sides expected the 
worst, saw no hope of improved relations, and would do all they could to hurt the 
opposing side.239 Contemptuous as both groups were of the other, working together to 
improve productivity and increase business simply was not on the agenda for either. 
Both parties saw themselves in a zero-sum contest where any gain for one side 
represented a loss of exactly the same magnitude for the other. 
 
Management generally pictured their unionized workforce as cunning, lazy 
scroungers bilking the company out of excessively high wages for the absolute 
minimum of work. Unionized workers in general, and their leadership in particular, 
                                                 
238 Hansard, House of Commons Papers, Session 1983-4, 14 March 1984, Scottish Affairs Committee. 
“Scott Lithgow Limited: The Economic and Social Consequences of Closure,” p. ix. Taking Scott 
Lithgow as an example, “92.3 per cent of the hourly workforce lives within four miles of the yard.” In 
addition to the economic impetus, physical intimidation or the threat thereof played a large part in 
maintaining working class solidarity. Since most unionized shipyard workers lived in close proximity 
to the yard, their fellow workers knew where they lived and who their family members were. Any 
individual blatantly violating a collective action measure was putting both his and his family’s health 
and safety at risk. 
239 Lorenz, “Decline,” p. 105. The absolute certainty of both labor and management that the other party 
was not only wrong but despicable made any efforts at compromise on major issues a forlorn hope. 
Bitterly secure in this knowledge, options for institutional change by British shipbuilders were 
considerably self-circumscribed. 
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caricatured management as bloated plutocrats intent on “grinding the faces of the poor” 
with malice aforethought and great glee at the prospect.  
 
It is fair to note here that there was a considerable Communist component in the 
shipbuilding workforce and that Communists were certainly vastly overrepresented 
among Clydeside shop stewards.
240
 Their generally held and widely publicized belief 
was that shipbuilding employers “had starved the industry of the necessary investment 
and were now intent on extracting the last penny before moving off elsewhere.”241 
Consequently, management’s message to their unionized employees that times were 
tough and that there were no other choices but change or collapse invariably fell on 
deaf ears.
242
 It generally took the appearance of liquidators at the shipyard gates to 
make union leaders understand that management had been telling them the truth about 
potential insolvency. Of course, at that point the time for negotiating reasonable 
settlements was long past. 
 
From the management perspective, the efforts of the Geddes Report to deal with the 
problem of labor relations were damaged by its stance that employers, under 
conditions of full employment, “must keep a labour force together even at the price of 
taking orders at a loss.”243 This was an unrealistic viewpoint that was not in keeping 
with the general tenor of pragmatism that suffused the Report. The Committee should 
                                                 
240 Foster and Woolfson, “UCS Work-In,” pp. 154-156, 203. The three major leaders of the Upper 
Clyde Shipbuilders “Work-In,” Jimmy Reid, Jimmy Airlie and Sam Barr, were all active members of 
the British Communist Party.   
241 Ibid., p. 164. 
242 Alwyn W. Turner.  Crisis? What Crisis? Britain in the 1970’s. (London: Aurum Press, 2008), pp. 
84-85. To illuminate the absurdity of the situation Turner referenced British stand-up comic Bernard 
Manning. Manning used to tell a joke about Edward Heath showing Alexey Kosygin, Premier of the 
Soviet Union, around a British factory. Kosygin was shocked by the slack working hours and the 
prevalence of tea breaks. He boasted to Heath, “In Russia, we work from six in the morning till ten 
o’clock at night!” “You couldn’t get these lads to do that,” replied Heath. “Why not?” demanded 
Kosygin. Heath replied, “Because they’re all Communists.” 
243 Geddes Report, p. 112. 
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have realized that the shipyards, almost all of which were already losing money, were 
certainly not going to accept this deficit-increasing assumption at face value. Given 
that as commercial enterprises they were already having problems maintaining 
sufficient working capital, they simply couldn’t afford to bear the additional losses. 
Moreover, the position was also questionable from the perspective of technological 
modernization. The Shipbuilding Inquiry Committee was aware that if the capital 
investment and facility modernization it was calling for actually occurred, such 
investment would primarily be directed toward labor-saving devices. This meant that 
modernization would diminish the numbers of shipbuilding workers needed per ton of 
ship delivered. Consequently, even if productivity increased drastically, there would 
have to be a great many more ships ordered from British shipyards just to maintain 
the current workforce, much less expand it.244 
 
Another major issue that caused many problems in shipyard labor relations was the 
constant irritation caused by craft demarcation. All shipbuilding craft unions had, by 
contract or long-established prior practice, certain tasks specifically reserved to that 
craft. Unions clung fiercely to these demarcations due to the “fear that work may at 
any time become short.”
245
  These craft demarcations caused much wasted production 
time and greatly increased labor costs through forced overmanning of production 
                                                 
244 Ibid., p. 152. The Report provides three potential hypotheses. The first is “decline,” in which the 
industry attracts little additional investment, builds slightly more than 1 million gross tons per year and 
shows employment declining to 30,000.  The second hypothesis, “holding on,” projects a situation in 
which the industry does a better job of deploying its available resources but remains insufficiently 
capitalized. In this scenario there is approximately 1.75 million gross tons constructed per year. 
Shipbuilding employment remains steady at 50,000 but attracts little interest from potential new 
entrants. The last hypothesis, “growth,” is based on major reorganization and a considerable influx of 
new resources. This scenario projects the industry expanding to 2.25 million gross tons per year but 
only a “slight” increase in employment over 50,000. Note that this scenario posits a 22% increase over 
construction expectations for the “holding on” hypothesis but with very little increase in manpower 
requirements. 
245 Ibid., p. 104. 
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work.246 Many tasks which could have been done quite satisfactorily by workers from 
a different craft union already at the job site could not be accomplished by those 
workers because craft demarcation regulations prohibited it.  
 
As an example, in a Geddes Report-era British shipyard it really did take three people 
to change an overhead light bulb. Craft demarcation necessitated a laborer (member 
of the Transport and General Workers Union) carry the ladder to site, a rigger 
(member of the Amalgamated Society of Boilermakers, Shipwrights, Blacksmiths and 
Structural Workers Union) erect it and place it in the proper position, and an 
electrician (member of the Electrical Trades Union) actually remove the old bulb and 
screw in the new one.  Production was often halted while waiting for a member of the 
appropriate union to arrive to perform the job reserved by agreement for them. Such 
working conditions obviously considerably hampered productivity and were just one 
more impediment exacerbating the already difficult problem Britain’s shipbuilders 
faced in competing with overseas rivals. What made this impediment even more 
vexing was that it was so clearly self-imposed. As the Report stated, “the artificiality 
of many of the demarcations is illustrated by the fact that they are mainly decided by 
yard practice and vary from yard to yard; a job which belongs to a particular craft in 
one yard may be forbidden to that craft in the yard next door.”247 
 
These craft demarcations had gradually emerged out of the original craft structure for 
wooden sailing vessels. By the second half of the 20th century they had become work 
requirements all but graven in stone. Since the fifteen unions employed in most 
                                                 
246 Ibid., pp. 104, 116. The Report specifically referred to restrictive practices such as “all or none” 
embargoes where a trade would refuse to allow overtime unless the entire department was included. 
Noting the wastefulness of such requirements, the Committee stated that they were “strongly of the 
opinion that the existing craft structure will less and less match the realities of the industry….” 
247 Ibid., p. 104.  
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British shipyards had little reticence about stopping work over any management 
infringement of these demarcated boundaries, it is not surprising that British shipyard 
management often simply let union leadership at squad level handle such issues. If 
two unions disagreed over a demarcation boundary, shipyard management could often 
avoid being involved by simply insisting that the unions settle their own problem. 
This tactic was not always effective and often there were work stoppages despite the 
fact that the shipyard commonly had nothing to do with craft union members 
overstepping demarcation boundaries.   
 
More problematic, however, was that as shipbuilding declined in the areas where it 
had long been established, the industry began to suffer from a shortage of skilled 
labor made worse by the forced overmanning.  Shipbuilding’s diminishing importance 
in its traditional districts was accompanied by a fortunate increase in other industries 
such as light engineering and manufacturing. Such industries often sprang up on 
greenfield sites outside the established shipbuilding towns on the Clyde, Tyne, Tees 
and Wear Rivers. Many skilled shipyard workers who found themselves either 
redundant or working reduced hours discovered that they could obtain employment 
elsewhere in the local area, often with higher pay, better conditions and greater 
security of employment. Britain’s Shipbuilding Industry Training Board (SITB) noted 
in a 1967 report that for every 100 skilled workers who left shipbuilding to take up 
work elsewhere, only 85 came from other industries to replace them.  Taking into 
account both the loss of skilled workers and apprentices, the SITB stated that “the 
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industry’s loss of manpower to other industries is 20% over and above its recruitment 
of labour from those industries.”248  
 
It is not surprising that shipbuilding would have been losing people who had the 
opportunity to move to different industries. The Geddes Report noted that “of its 
nature a great deal of shipbuilding work must be conducted either in large sheds 
which are not easy to heat or on open berths where working has to take place 
sometimes in very cramped surroundings and sometimes in conditions which are cold 
and wet.”
249
 They also suggested that a code of minimum practice should be 
established wherein a) enclosed spaces would have minimum temperatures specified, 
b) canteen facilities would be made available allowing a worker to obtain a hot meal 
at mid-day, c) modern lavatories and urinals would be provided, including adequate 
temporary sanitary facilities in vessels under construction, d) adequate individual 
lockers would be provided along with washing and bathing facilities (including hot 
water), and e) recreational facilities would be provided where possible.250   
 
Such a recommendation, of course, was an all but explicit declaration that these 
practices were generally not in place at the time of the Report, and the experience of 
shipyard workers bears that out. Tim Colton, reminiscing about the “Dickensian” 
working conditions existing during his time at Lithgow’s, was considerably more 
colorful in his description. After noting that in the 1980’s Japanese shipyards found it 
difficult to attract young people to shipbuilding because potential workers viewed it as 
a “3D job,” i.e. dirty, difficult and dangerous, Colton remarked that “Japanese 
                                                 
248 Shipbuilding Industry Training Board. Report and Statement of Accounts. (London: HMSO, 1967), 
p. 8 
249 Geddes Report, p. 118. 
250 Ibid. 
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shipyards were like hospitals compared to those on the Clyde.” After favorably 
commenting on the rigorous Japanese safety procedures and their extensive training 
and education programs, Colton explained the realities of working life for a shipyard 
employee at Lithgow’s during his tenure there. 
 
First, there was mud: a relatively small part of the yard was paved and 
it rained all year round. Then, there was rust: the steel was delivered to 
the yard rusty and it got rustier before it was eventually painted. And 
wet rust is even nastier than dry rust. Then there was the lack of 
sanitation: there were no showers or changing facilities—workers went 
home in the clothes in which they had come to work—and many did 
not have indoor plumbing, let alone laundry facilities at home. The 
toilet facilities in the yard were both grossly inadequate and insultingly 
unsanitary, a condition made worse by the medieval restrictions on a 
worker leaving his post. Health, environmental and safety concerns? 
Forget about it.251 
 
 
Colton also confirmed the SITB Report’s conclusions with regard to workers leaving 
the industry. He noted that during his time at Lithgow’s he saw numerous light 
industries established in Glasgow. One of them was IBM, which established its largest 
European computer manufacturing factory there. He observed that “these companies 
had no difficulty in picking off the smarter young workers from the declining old-line 
industries.”252 With skilled workers experiencing both the “push factors” of poor 
conditions in a shrinking industry and the “pull factors” of higher pay, better working 
environment and greater employment security in a new industry, it is easy to see why 
British shipbuilding found itself facing a serious shortage of skilled labor in the 
1960’s. 
  
                                                 
251 Colton, “Staying Afloat,” p. 25. He notes that it was not until the mid-1960’s that Lithgow’s 
actually built a cafeteria in a building that also included showers and changing rooms. He remarked 
that initially shipyard management thought the workers would not use the facility and that “the 
investment was a complete waste of money.” Actually, it transpired that the workers took great 
advantage of it and utilized it fully. 
252 Ibid., p. 26. 
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While high costs, late deliveries and poor labor relations were serious and potentially 
fatal problems, their danger was magnified by the fact that British shipyard 
management was generally not up to the task of confronting them. The Geddes Report 
found that shipyard management in almost every area was deficient when compared 
to its overseas competitors. The most pressing problem was that in an increasingly 
competitive industry British shipyards did not successfully perform the financial 
management tasks—marketing, budgeting and procurement--necessary to build 
vessels profitably. Marketing, budgeting and procurement are absolutely critical 
financial functions at any shipyard and they must be skillfully managed if there is to 
be any hope of profitability. British shipyard management consistently 
underperformed in all three areas.  
 
On the input side of the financial equation the Report found that British shipyards 
didn’t market or publicize their product properly, thus losing by default a considerable 
amount of potential business to more active and energetic competitors. Some of this 
failure was due to complacency caused by the long period of full order books since 
the end of the Second World War. During that period much shipbuilding work had 
come to the shipyards on its own. It was a seller’s market and buyers were eagerly 
seeking berths at already overbooked British shipyards. In that halcyon period from 
1945 to 1960 not only had British shipyards fallen out of the habit of pursuing work, 
they had forgotten the primary rule of any customer-related business, which is that the 
customer is always right. Nor had they been concerned about British shipbuilding’s 
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increasingly poor public image, which was one of incessant union strife in an 
obsolescent industry suffering constant decline.253  
 
As an example, Lester Goldsmith, Chairman of the Gulf Oil Refining Company, 
approached one British yard about the construction of two steam turbine-driven oil 
tankers. Well briefed by Gulf Oil’s excellent marine superintendent’s office and with 
price no object, Goldsmith knew exactly what he wanted in his vessels when he 
presented the yard with his technical requirements. He specifically wanted a steam 
propulsion plant utilizing high pressure superheated steam. Because he was going to 
have that type of high-performance steam generating plant he also wanted modern 
“rolled” ends on the vessel’s main and auxiliary condenser tubes. These would last 
longer in the more taxing operating environment caused by higher steam throughput 
and temperature differential.254 Goldsmith was quite surprised when he was told by 
                                                 
253 Johnman and Murphy, “British Shipbuilding,” pp. 145-148. They were quoting British Shipbuilding 
Exports: The Norwegian Market, Report by L.S. Holt, 28 November 1967.  (London: Shipbuilder’s and 
Repairer’s National Association, 1967.)  Britain’s largest shipbuilding export customer had long been 
Norway, which had traditionally ordered most of its vessels from British shipbuilders. However, in the 
late 1950’s the Norwegians decisively shifted to the Japanese as their primary shipbuilders. One of the 
reasons for this was explained by a 1967 report commissioned by the British Shipbuilding Export 
Association. The author, L.S. Holt, stated that the Norwegian ship-owning community closely followed 
the public pronouncements made by senior figures in British shipbuilding. According to him, the 
Norwegians had come to the conclusion that British shipbuilders had tacitly acquiesced to poor 
delivery and construction performance because they had no idea how to address the issues causing that 
poor performance. 
254 The higher the steam pressure and temperature, the higher the operational efficiency of the 
propulsion plant. However, there is a cost for this in that the water chemistry in such high-pressure 
boilers must be scrupulously maintained at a level of purity much higher than potable water. Properly 
treated high pressure steam plant boiler water will not conduct electricity. In the steam cycle steam 
which has passed through the turbine is turned back into feed water in the condenser. This condenser, 
which operates under conditions of high vacuum, is cooled by salt water flowing over tubes carrying 
the condensing steam/water mixture. Any leakage of the salt water coolant into the steam/water side of 
the condenser is dangerous for the boiler as the salt and other solids cause both operating and 
maintenance problems. A salt level in boiler water which wouldn’t be noticeable in drinking water will 
cause a high pressure steam plant to be taken out of operation for “blowdown,” i.e. removal of much of 
the boiler’s water and replacement with water of higher purity. “Rolled” condenser tubes made for a 
permanent installation as the condenser tube was expanded to form a leak-proof metal-to-metal fit with 
the tube sheet. This was done by means of inserting an expanding mandrel into the end of the tube and 
“rolling” it until the end of the tube was wide enough to tightly press into the tube sheet. The reason 
“rolled” tubes were superior to “packed” tubes was that a “rolled” tube would normally go many years, 
quite possibly even the ship’s entire lifetime, without needing maintenance whereas “packed” tubes 
were prone to leakage and would inevitably have to have the “packing” changed every few years. 
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the shipyard that his vessels would receive a low pressure, low temperature steam 
plant and that it would be equipped with a condenser with “packed” condenser tubes, 
not rolled. When Goldsmith told the yard that he was not willing to accept that, their 
response was to inform him that “their order books were full” and to politely imply 
that he might wish to take his business elsewhere.255 Declaring himself “disgusted” 
with the attitude of British shipyards, Goldsmith took his business to Belgium where 
his vessels were built exactly as he requested.  
 
Geddes found that British merchant shipbuilders in 1965 had a passive attitude with 
regard to soliciting new business, making little effort to contact potential clients or 
remain in touch with former ones. What marketing activity took place generally came 
through the personal efforts of the yard’s chief executive since most British yards did 
not have a dedicated sales staff. This was clearly a major failing since British shipyard 
chief executives already had far too many tasks on hand to be able to successfully 
prosecute a thorough and sustained sales campaign.  
 
The Report recognized that the aggressive marketing techniques used by their 
overseas rivals had cost British yards a considerable amount of their market share. 
They addressed the problem by recommending that each proposed regional shipyard 
grouping establish a dedicated sales department.  This sales department was to be 
tasked with maintaining close contact with both current and former clients and to seek 
out potential customers. Moreover, it was suggested that the shipbuilding industry 
start paying much more attention to publicizing its successes. The Report recognized 
                                                                                                                                            
“Rolling” condenser tubes meant a considerable savings in operational and maintenance costs over the 
lifetime of the vessel.  
255 Johnman and Murphy, “British Shipbuilding,” p. 110. Public Record Office, ADM 205/106, 
‘Present Weakness of the Marine Engineering Industry and its Consequences,’ Appendix 4, extract 
from a private letter by Lester Goldsmith, 15 May 1953. 
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that by 1965 the reputation of British shipbuilding had been seriously damaged and 
that even if British shipyards were able to overcome their problems of high cost, late 
delivery and labor strife, it would take quite some time and a great deal of good 
publicity to overcome the generally negative perceptions of British shipbuilding that 
had been established in the world in general and the shipping community in particular. 
As the Report said, British shipbuilders needed to recognize that “shipbuilding has 
become the business of promoting the sale of ships as well as the art of designing and 
assembling them in the yard.”256 
 
As for British shipbuilding’s budgeting woes, they stemmed largely from the fact that 
Britain’s shipyards generally had inadequate design and production planning, a failing 
which far too often led to inaccurate estimates of time and manpower requirements.257 
Combined with relatively unpredictable reasons mentioned earlier such as industrial 
action, vendor delays and inflation, it was just extremely difficult for planners in 
British shipyards to provide accurate cost estimates when tendering for projects. 
There were simply too many variables that were almost completely out of the control 
of the shipyards but which could easily add huge amounts to the costs of any vessel.  
 
This problem was compounded by the fact that, in an effort to be competitive, 
planning generally erred on the optimistic side and assumed earlier completion dates 
and fewer required resources than were likely to be actually necessary. In practice this 
meant British shipyards routinely underestimated actual vessel construction costs and 
                                                 
256 Geddes Report, p. 46. 
257 Ibid., p. 77-80. This was an area the Report highlighted with regard to the lack of production control 
and production measurement. 
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therefore could lose money despite having full order books.258 Such unwarranted 
optimism also meant they often misjudged the likelihood of incurring additional costs 
due to late delivery. These financial penalties could be extremely heavy and increased 
with every additional day of delay. These cumulative result of these planning 
deficiencies meant that the actual cost of a completed vessel was usually unknown to 
the shipyard at any stage of construction prior to final delivery, thus making any 
fixed-cost project a potential financial disaster. Britain’s already undercapitalized 
shipbuilders soon realized this inability to accurately estimate final construction costs 
meant that every accepted contract was, in effect, “betting the firm.” In times of 
moderate inflation this lack of ability to accurately project final cost was dangerous. 
In times of high inflation such as the late 1960’s and 1970’s happened to be, it was 
critically so. Without at least relatively accurate time and cost estimates there was no 
way shipyard accountants could actually make any long-term projections about cash 
flow. This meant that the critical focus on short-term finances, for which the Geddes 
Report roundly criticized Britain’s shipbuilders, was really the only logical position 
for those shipbuilders to take. They clearly understood how closely they were skirting 
the abyss and how futile it was to worry about the long term when surviving the 
current quarter was in serious question.
259
  
 
                                                 
258 While British shipyards often charged less than the true final cost of vessel construction, their 
construction inefficiency was such that they still had higher costs than their competitors. In actuality, if 
British shipbuilders had been able to accurately predict their true construction costs their prices would 
of necessity have been even higher and they would have been even less competitive in world markets. 
259 While waiting for the Shipbuilding Inquiry Report to be issued, one Clyde shipbuilder, Fairfields, 
unexpectedly entered into receivership. Upon hearing of this announcement the union shop stewards 
and local Members of Parliament approached the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
directly requesting that the British Government provide sufficient financing for Fairfields to continue in 
operation until after the publication of the Report. The receiver had been appointed on 15 October 1965. 
On 29 October the receiver reported to the Bank of Scotland and the Chancellor, Mr. James Callaghan, 
that the yard’s resources were completely depleted and that only immediate financial assistance would 
prevent closure. On 4 November 1965 the Chancellor announced to Parliament that the Bank of 
England would provide £1 million to Fairfields to allow the yard to continue in operation until the 
following spring. The intent was to allow time for the Geddes Report to be published and provide its 
recommendations on what was the best way forward for yards like Fairfields. 
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GEDDES REPORT SOLUTIONS  
 
The Report had proposed that Britain’s 27 major shipyards be grouped into “at least 
four big and compact shipbuilding groups.” There were a considerable number of 
other recommendations but this was the primary one, the essential causative factor 
which the Shipbuilding Inquiry Committee believed would bring British shipbuilding 
back to profitability. The grouping concept appeared to address many of the inherent 
organizational problems faced by Britain’s relatively small and undercapitalized 
shipyards as well as permitting them to enjoy major economies of scale.  
 
The response to this proposal was uncritical acceptance. Even those prone to be 
critical of the industry agreed that the logic underpinning this suggestion was sound 
even if the details of achieving such groupings might require some difficult 
negotiation.
260
  What should be continually borne in mind with regard to the Report’s 
recommendations is the sense of urgency involved. The Report itself was undertaken 
in response to a serious crisis clearly visible to all concerned with the industry. 
“Muddling through” and “benign neglect” were not viable options. Both the 
Government and Parliament realized something had to be done or the industry would 
completely disappear. The Geddes Report did not promise miracles but it did provide 
a framework for halting British shipbuilding’s decline that appeared reasonable and 
not too costly. Once that framework was accepted the other recommendations were 
included as a matter of course.  
 
                                                 
260 Neither the Shipbuilding Inquiry Committee nor the British Government expected that the process 
of accomplishing the groupings would be a simple task. They counted on inducing the cooperation of 
recalcitrant yards through a combination of the carrot of Government financial largesse and the stick of 
losing that State assistance to other, more compliant domestic competitors. 
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The most important of those recommendations included having some yards narrow 
their scope of work to a specialization in certain types of vessel construction, 
Government assistance in matters of taxation reduction and steel pricing from British 
manufacturers, and the establishment of a Shipbuilding Inquiry Board to oversee the 
industry’s reorganization.261 The Shipbuilding Inquiry Board would be responsible for 
the administration and control of Government assistance, financial and otherwise, 
provided to the newly formed shipbuilding groups. The Shipbuilding Inquiry Board 
was to last for five years, by which time the Committee believed that the 
amalgamations should be complete. The Committee made it quite clear that the 
amalgamation process should take place as quickly as possible since they “attached 
great importance to the speed with which the industry is reorganized.”
262
  
 
Interestingly enough, in light of the massive sums the British Government later spent 
on assistance to the shipbuilding industry, the Shipbuilding Inquiry Report did not call 
for large amounts of state funding. It called for the Shipbuilding Industry Board to be 
provided with authority to grant up to £30 million in credit guarantees to UK ship 
owners on the same terms as those allowed for export orders.263 There was provision 
to make Government money available to coalescing groups which might need to 
purchase “an interest in a participating company which would otherwise hold up the 
                                                 
261 With regard to steel pricing, the Geddes Report noted that in the 1930’s British producers offered 
British shipbuilders prices on heavy plate approximately 20% lower than would be charged to other 
customers. Even during the Second World War, under conditions of maximum output, shipbuilders still 
received a discount of more than six per cent. In 1949 such discounts were ended and British 
shipbuilders were forced to pay full price for plate. With the cost of steel representing approximately 
25 per cent of an average vessel’s cost and British shipbuilders being the largest users of heavy plate in 
Britain, the Report saw great advantage for both parties in reverting to the arrangements existing in the 
1930’s. Unfortunately, for reasons both legal and economic this suggestion was not taken up by the 
British steelmakers. This failure to cooperate played a not inconsequential part in the U.K.’s loss of 
both industries. This is a perfect example of the type of structural impediment which would have been 
ruthlessly bulldozed aside by the Park Chung Hee-led Korean Government. 
262 Geddes Report, p. 148. 
263 This would have meant providing loan guarantees at an interest rate of 5.5 per cent. 
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integration of that company within the group.”264 The Report’s recommendation was 
that a limit of £5 million be placed on such loans. The Report also recommended that 
£12.5 million in loans be used for purchasing shipyard assets which would become 
unnecessary due to grouping, and £15 million be used for the construction of new 
“group” facilities where needed. Another £5 million was to be made available for 
grants to yards suffering “transitional losses.” The Committee expected that these 
funds would be required to assist shipyards while certain assets were unavailable due 
to grouping-required restructuring. The Report called for a total Government 
expenditure of £32.5 million in loans and £5 million in grants to be provided to 
facilitate the conversion from individual yards to shipbuilding groups.265  
 
The legislation incorporating the recommendations of the Shipbuilding Inquiry 
Committee was called the Shipbuilding Inquiry Act and it received the Royal Assent 
on 28 June 1967. While this was more than one year after the presentation of the 
Committee Report to Parliament, and thus considerably longer than the Committee 
hoped it would take to begin implementation of the grouping scheme, the Act hewed 
very closely to the Report’s recommendations. Shipyard groupings did eventually 
take place, if not quite in the manner expected, and the 27 shipyards studied by the 
Geddes Report were merged into twelve separate shipbuilding groups, only nine of 
which built commercial vessels.266  
 
                                                 
264 Geddes Report, p. 147. This facility was very useful in assembling Upper Clyde Shipbuilders. 
265 Ibid. 
266 The Geddes Report did not specify exactly how groupings were to take place or which yards should 
be in any particular group. In the event, all but one of the yards studied by the Report was eventually 
considered to be “grouped” even if, like Harland and Wolff and Cammell Laird, they were in a “group” 
of which they were the sole member. 
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Table 10: SHIPBUILDING INQUIRY REPORT SHIPBUILDERS PRE-AND POST-
MERGER267  
 
Original Shipbuilders Merged Grouping 
East Scotland: 
Henry Robb Shipbuilders, Ltd. 
Caledon Shipbuilding and Engineering Co., Ltd. 
Burntisland Shipbuilding Co., Ltd. 
Robb Caledon Shipbuilders Ltd. 
Lower Clyde: 
Scotts’ Shipbuilding and Engineering Co., Ltd. 
Lithgow’s Ltd. 
Greenock Dockyard Co., Ltd. 
Scott Lithgow Ltd. 
Upper Clyde (post-UCS): 
*John Brown & Co. (Clydebank Ltd.) 
*Yarrow & Co., Ltd. 
Yarrow (Shipbuilders) Ltd. (exclusively naval 
construction) 
Upper Clyde (post-UCS): 
*Chas. Connell & Co. (Shipbuilders), Ltd. 
*Alex. Stephen & Sons, Ltd. 
*Fairfield Shipbuilding & Eng. Co. Ltd. 
*Barclay Curle & Co., Ltd. 
Govan Shipbuilders Ltd. 
Northern Ireland: 
Harland and Wolff Ltd. 
Harland and Wolff Ltd. 
Tyne and Tees: 
Vickers Ltd. (Shipbuilding Group) 
Swan Hunter and Wigham Richardson Ltd. 
Hawthorn Leslie (Shipbuilders Ltd.) 
John Readhead & Sons Ltd. 
Furness Shipbuilding Co., Ltd. 
Smith’s Dock Co., Ltd. 
Swan Hunter and Tyne Shipbuilders Ltd. 
Wear: 
Austin & Pickersgill Ltd. 
Bartram & Sons Ltd. 
Austin & Pickersgill Ltd. 
 
Wear: 
Doxford and Sunderland Shipbuilding, comprised 
of  
Wm. Doxford & Sons (Shipbuilders) Ltd., 
Sir James Laing & Sons Ltd. and 
J.L. Thompson & Sons Ltd. 
 
Doxford and Sunderland, Ltd. 
 
Mersey: 
Cammell Laird & Co. (Shipbuilders & Engineers) 
Ltd. 
Cammell Laird Shipbuilders Ltd. 
Southampton: 
John I. Thornycroft & Co., Ltd. 
Vosper Thornycroft Ltd. (exclusively naval 
construction) 
Barrow: 
Vickers Ltd. (Shipbuilding Group) 
Vickers Ltd. Shipbuilding Group (exclusively 
naval construction) 
Blyth: 
Blyth Dry Docks and Shipbuilding Co., Ltd. 
No longer building ships 
Appledore (Devon):* 
Appledore Shipbuilders Ltd. 
Appledore Shipbuilders Ltd. 
*Appledore Shipbuilders was not included in the Shipbuilding Inquiry Committee 
Report. 
                                                 
267 “British Shipbuilding 1972,” p. 86. Chart derived from information provided in source. All yards 
marked with an asterisk were included in the original Upper Clyde Shipbuilders grouping. The Yarrow 
yard was subsequently de-merged in February 1971. 
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What no one at the time the Shipbuilding Inquiry Act was passed could have known 
was that the Geddes Report, and the opportunity it represented for a rejuvenation of 
British shipbuilding, was really Britain’s last chance to save its shipbuilding industry. 
Two unexpected historical events, the oil crisis of 1973 and the emergence of the 
most fiercely competitive shipbuilder in history, were less than a decade away from 
drastically changing the entire shipbuilding world. 
IMPLEMENTING THE GEDDES REPORT 
 
Britain’s shipbuilding industry in 1966 was ready to accept change. The Geddes 
Report had very clearly laid out both the problems of Britain’s shipbuilding industry 
and a proposed path back to profitability and international competitiveness. British 
shipbuilders knew they had to take drastic action or what remained of their declining 
business would also be lost to foreign competition. Moreover, the Shipbuilding 
Inquiry Committee was adamant that such action not only had to be taken, but that it 
had to be taken very quickly or the industry would suffer serious, possibly even fatal, 
damage. 
 
What then happened to British shipbuilding is one of the cruel ironies of history. 
Unexpectedly buoyed by the 1967 congruence of sterling devaluation, the Suez Canal 
closure, attractive delivery dates and British owners’ surprisingly strong response to 
the Geddes Report’s shipbuilding credit guarantee scheme, British shipbuilding in the 
next five years celebrated the largest order books in its long history. 268 
                                                 
268 The attractive delivery dates were due to the relative emptiness of British shipyard order books in 
1967. Because they had such a small backlog of work they could promise on-time delivery with at least 
some hope of fulfilling their promise. The response to the shipbuilding credit guarantee scheme came 
as a complete surprise to the Government, necessitating a number of sizable increases in the amount of 
money allocated for credit guarantees. The Geddes Report had called for £30 million. This was first 
raised to £200 million in the Shipbuilding Industry Act (1967), increased again to £400 million by the 
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Table 11: U.K. SHIPBUILDING ORDER BOOKS 1967-1971 ('000 Gross Tons)
269
 
 
  1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 
A (+) 
Beginning 
Year Order 
Book 
2259 2068 3559 4755 4893 
B (+) 
Orders 
Received 
1077 2565 2119 1769 1027 
C (-) Deliveries 1188 1047 828 1327 1233 
D (-) Cancellations 80 27 95 304 322 
A+B+(-
C) + (-D) 
End Year 
Order Book 
2068 3559 4755 4893 4365 
 
This unexpected cornucopia of orders delighted both the shipbuilders and the 
Government. 270 However, it turned out to be a very mixed blessing at best. The first 
casualty was the sense of urgency which had impelled the Geddes Report. That was 
all but washed away in the flood of new work. Shipyard groupings eventually took 
place but did so slowly, inefficiently and with considerably increased costs. The 
Shipbuilding Industry Board, along with various other British Government 
departments, disbursed public money in amounts far greater than imagined by the 
Shipbuilding Inquiry Committee.271 The Geddes Report had envisioned a five year 
lifespan for the Shipbuilding Industry Board. During that time it anticipated the 
Shipbuilding Industry Board would, in overseeing and assisting the goals described in 
the Report, expend £32.5 million in loans and £5 million in grants.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
Shipbuilding Industry Bill (1968), raised once more to £700 million in the Shipbuilding Industry Act 
(1971) and finally increased to a maximum of £1,400 million in the Industry Act (1972) as buyers took 
greater than expected advantage of the scheme. 
269 “British Shipbuilding 1972,” p. 86. 
270 Hogwood, “Government and Shipbuilding,” pp. 113-114. From October 1966 to September 1967 
British shipyards added only 422,000 tons of orders. From October 1967 until 31 December 1968 they 
received 3,200,000 tons of new construction orders. It was an incredible windfall. 
271 Ibid., p. 93. The amount of outright grant money called for by the Geddes Report, £5 million, was 
increased to £20 million by the Industrial Expansion Act of 1968. In the same act the requirement for a 
recipient to be a member of a shipyard grouping plan was waived. The amount of money disbursed in 
loans and grants by the Shipbuilding Industry Board was dwarfed by the amounts spent by the 
Department of Trade and Industry and the Northern Ireland Ministry of Commerce. 
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The reality was far different. Tables 13 and 14 below show that between 1967 and 
1972 the British government actually spent almost £160 million on the shipbuilding 
industry. Note also that, massive as this sum is, it does not include the much larger 
amounts which, while not spent, had to be reserved for covering potential losses in the 
shipbuilding credit scheme. What made the situation even worse was that, as the 
Committee on Public Accounts noted in 1972, most of the money had been spent for 
purposes other than intended. Government had allocated much of this funding for 
infrastructure improvements intended to improve efficiency and increase 
competitiveness. Instead, it was often spent simply to cover operating losses and 
avoid insolvency.272 Looking at the amount of money spent compared with the results 
achieved, anyone investigating shipbuilding subsidy expenditure since the Geddes 
Report had good reason to wonder if Britain had received sufficient value for money.  
 
While the Geddes Report specified regional proximity as its primary grouping 
criterion, it carefully avoided making any suggestions about which yards should be 
assigned which tasks in any given group. This allocation was left up to the individual 
owners and the Shipbuilding Industry Board to sort out. That was not a simple task as 
many of the yards came to the groupings with financial liabilities that neared or 
exceeded the value of their assets. Combining the managements of the profitable 
companies with the unprofitable ones and configuring the resultant business and 
financial structures took a great deal of time and negotiation. Once groups were 
assembled they then had to merge their operating systems, something that was 
particularly difficult with regard to financial and accounting matters and yet another 
                                                 
272 Johnman and Murphy, “British Shipbuilding,” p. 204. 
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problem exacerbated by the rush of new orders. The resulting schemes were certainly 
not optimized on a business basis. 
Table 12: AMOUNTS DISBURSED BY THE SHIPBUILDING INQUIRY BOARD 
TO MAJOR SHIPBUILDERS 1968-1971 (£’000s)
273
 
 
Shipyard/Year 1968 1969 1970 1971 Total 
Appledore 
0 0 0 1098.9 1098.9 
Austin & 
Pickersgill 
0 0 0 0 0 
Cammell 
Laird 
0 0 0 0 0 
Doxford & 
Sunderland 
12.6 0 0 0 12.6 
UCS/Govan 
3270.8 2689.5 6565.9 265.3 12791.5 
Harland & 
Wolff 
0 5185.4 4,662 5190.7 15038.1 
Robb Caledon 
10 0 200 304 514.0 
Scott Lithgow 
8.9 0 0 5236.8 5245.7 
Swan Hunter 
22.2 2865.5 1222.5 1728 5838.2 
Vickers 
0 0 0 10.3 10.3 
Vosper 
Thornycroft 
9.8 0 0 89 98.8 
Yarrow 
287.4 685.6 350.8 249.5 1573.3 
TOTAL 
3621.7 11426 12801.4 14172.5 42221.4 
 
 
                                                 
273 “British Shipbuilding 1972,” p. 180. Another £7,036,000 in loans and grants was disbursed to minor 
shipbuilders and ship repair yards. 
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Table 13: NON-SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY BOARD ASSISTANCE TO MAJOR 
SHIPBUILDERS 1967-1972 (£’000’s) 274 
 
Expenditure Codes: F=Fully Committed, P=Partially Committed, NYB= Not Yet 
Begun 
Company Government 
Department 
Type of 
Payment 
Purpose of 
Payment 
Expenditure  Total 
Expenditure 
Capital 
Expenditure 
Sum 
Cammell 
Laird 
Department of 
Trade and 
Industry 
Equity 
 
 
 
F: 1500 
 
 
 
1500 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Equity or 
Grant 
 
Standby 
facility 
 
NYB: 6000 
 
6000 
 
 
Equity or 
Grant 
Facility 
upgrades 
NYB: 14000 
 
14000 14000 
Harland & 
Wolff 
Northern 
Ireland Ministry 
of Commerce 
Loan 
 
Prevent 
insolvency 
F: 1500 
 
 
1500  
Loan 
 
Interest 
capitalization 
F: 1382 
NYB: 1382 
2764  
Equity  F: 4000 4000  
Grant 
 
To meet 
losses 
F: 14154 14154  
Waiver 
 
To waive 
loan interest 
F: 735 
NYB: 490 
1225  
Loans Capital 
expenditure 
P: 13000 13000 13000 
UCS/ 
Govan 
 Loan Prevent 
insolvency 
F: 7000 7000  
Advance Advance to 
liquidator 
F: 10000 10000  
 Purchase of 
yard 
NYB: 2800 2800 2800 
 Development NYB: 9200 9200 9200 
 Working 
capital 
NYB: 10200 10200  
 To meet 
losses 
NYB: 13100 13100  
Yarrow Ministry of 
Defense (N) 
Loan Working 
capital 
F: 4500 4500  
Other Ministry of 
Defense (N) 
Loan Working 
capital 
F: 1900 1900  
Total 
Expended 
- - - F:46671 
P: 13000 
NYB: 57172 
116843 39000 
 
                                                 
274 “British Shipbuilding 1972,” p. 181.  The Harland and Wolff numbers exclude another loan of £2 
million advanced in 1966. 
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The man who would become the Chairman of Upper Clyde Shipbuilders (UCS) had 
the following to say about its formation: 
 
When I reported as Chairman of the [Shipbuilding Industry Board] 
working party to the Vice-Chairman and to the Government and SIB at 
the time I made it very clear that in my view the formation of the 
Upper Clyde Group could not possibly be considered as a financial 
venture, that is to say one in which you put your money in with a hope 
of getting it out within a reasonable period of time.
275
 
 
 This was one of several grouping situations where the Shipbuilding Industry Board 
acted to include yards which rational economic management would have left to 
liquidation, from which the assets could have been recovered for much smaller 
amounts.  
 
With regard to the problem of undercapitalization, all groupings began their existence 
handicapped by debt group members brought to the merger from prior operations. 
There was also a serious shortage of working capital in all groups. This lack was 
particularly severe for Cammell Laird, Swan Hunter and Austin and Pickersgill. 
However, all of Britain’s merchant shipbuilding groups were having liquidity 
problems, with their working capital either at unusually low levels or in actual deficit, 
as is shown in Table 14. As a whole, the merchant shipbuilders had gone from having 
£11.1 million in working capital available to an £11 million working capital deficit in 
five years. As available working capital declined, groupings became increasingly 
dependent on Government funding since their past credit histories and lack of 
profitability made them poor candidates for commercial loans at favorable rates.276 
 
                                                 
275 Hansard, House of Commons Papers, Session 1971-2, HC 347-I, Sixth Report from the Expenditure 
Committee Trade and Industry Subcommittee, Public Money in the Private Sector, Q-2132. 
276 Ibid., p. 177. Of the warship builders, only Yarrow was having problems and these were closely 
related to its inclusion in Upper Clyde Shipbuilders. 
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The amount of available working capital had been rapidly decreasing since 1968. This 
was in large part due to losses incurred on fixed-price contracts. One of the reasons 
the huge influx of new fixed-price orders received between 1967 and 1971 would not 
be as beneficial as initially hoped was because many of those orders would also, due 
to the bedeviling problems of late deliveries and inflation, end up costing shipyards 
more than the received price. To cite just one example, during its financial troubles in 
1970 Cammell Laird went to great lengths to induce one of its customers to cancel an 
already-accepted order for four chemical tankers. Counterintuitive as this action might 
seem, Cammell Laird projected that inflation and late delivery penalties would result 
in a £2 million loss for the company if the four vessels were completed at the agreed 
price.
277
 Depending on the amount of delay, the penalties for late delivery could be as 
high as 20% of the original cost and inflation could add another 20%.278 For a British 
shipbuilding industry already prone to undercharging, the numbers simply did not add 
up to profitability. 
 
 
Consequently, between the contentious issues of grouping and the problems caused by 
trying to make major administrative and production changes in the midst of an 
unprecedented building boom, a great deal of valuable time was lost. The 
restructuring of British shipyards, where it happened at all, was done in a halting, 
piecemeal fashion disrupted by strikes, a heavy work load, and the issues of 
amalgamation. It would have to have been done much more comprehensively for 
there to have been any hope of making them efficient enough to compete 
internationally. Instead, lulled into a sense of complacency by five good years, British 
                                                 
277 Hogwood, “Government and Shipbuilding,” p. 120. 
278 BAH, “British Shipbuilding 1972,” p. 177. Inflation on direct labor, miscellaneous supplies and 
equipment and overhead, items which constitute approximately 40% of vessel cost, had been as high as 
50% between 1968 and 1971. 
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shipbuilding squandered its last chance to survive the desperately hard times that were 
coming.  
Table 14: SHIPBUILDERS' WORKING CAPITAL 1967-1971 (£'000s)279 
 
Company 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 
Appledore 
124 144 (76) (434) (520) 
Austin & 
Pickersgill 
(924) (682) (605) (605) (546) 
Cammell Laird 
1008 1263 (6377) (3121) (4814) 
Doxford & 
Sunderland 
2000 (28) (118) (73) 593 
UCS/Govan 
No Information Available: Effectively in Receivership 
Harland & 
Wolff 
5459 3664 4708 2612 2691 
Robb Caledon 
1210 1332 1175 430 286 
Scott Lithgow 
2288 2233 2328 169 1128 
Swan Hunter 
Not 
Available 
905 (2960) (8587) (9842) 
Total Merchant 
Shipbuilders 
11165 8831 (1925) (9609) (11024) 
Vickers 
1807 2335 3053 7088 7556 
Vosper 
Thornycroft 
733 1092 839 287 419 
Yarrow 
(161) 157 320 (1320) 74 
Total Warship 
Builders 
2379 3584 4212 6055 8049 
Total Working 
Capital 
13544 12415 2287 (3554) (2975) 
 
                                                 
279 Ibid., p. 178. It should be remembered that the Harland and Wolff numbers shown in Table 15 are 
deceptive. While Harland and Wolff had the largest amount of working capital of any merchant 
shipbuilder, this was due to Government subventions as the yard had been effectively bankrupt since 
1966. 
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BRITISH SHIPBUILDING 1972: A BAD REPORT CARD 
 
In March 1972 the Conservative Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, John 
Davies, announced that a long-term appraisal of the prospects for the future of the 
British shipbuilding industry would be undertaking by the consulting firm of Booz, 
Allen and Hamilton (BAH). Ordered approximately five years from the passage of the 
Shipbuilding Inquiry Act, the appraisal was intended to provide a review of the 
effectiveness of the Geddes Report recommendations, an assessment of the current 
status of the industry, and a forecast of the probable future for British shipbuilding. 
That British shipbuilding’s longed-for resurgence had yet to take place was clear from 
the widely publicized difficulties experienced by Upper Clyde Shipbuilders, Cammell 
Laird and Harland and Wolff.  Between 1965 and 1972 all three of these shipbuilders 
had been saved from insolvency only by last-minute Government financial 
intervention. In the cases of Upper Clyde Shipbuilders and Harland and Wolff this 
had happened repeatedly. At the time British Shipbuilding 1972 was commissioned 
each of these yards was owned wholly or in part by the British Government.280  
 
What British Shipbuilding 1972 (the BAH Report) did was bring two very important 
factors into stark relief. First, it publicly displayed just how lavish Government 
funding had been in its efforts to assist the industry. Second, it documented just how 
poorly the industry had responded to its challenges despite the large amounts of State 
                                                 
280 Ibid., p. 87. Between 1969 and 1971 Cammell Laird had suffered losses of more than £12 million on 
fixed-price contracts. These losses threatened to bankrupt the entire Laird Group. To insure the 
shipbuilding group’s survival, it was spun off into a separate company with 50 per cent of the new 
company’s shares being purchased by the British Government. Harland and Wolff had repeatedly 
flirted with insolvency and was bailed out by both the Shipbuilding Industry Board and the 
Government of Northern Ireland. At the time of the BAH Report the Northern Ireland Ministry of 
Commerce owned 47.6 per cent of Harland and Wolff. Upper Clyde Shipbuilders was allowed to go 
bankrupt in 1972 and the remnant was purchased by the British Government and reconstituted as 
Govan Shipbuilders Ltd. It was wholly owned by the Government. 
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subsidy received. The opening statement of British Shipbuilding 1972 is quite blunt in 
its assessment:  
 
This review of the U.K. shipbuilding industry is pessimistic about the 
general background situation, and critical of the industry in many areas. 
U.K. yards generally are under-capitalized and poorly managed; the 
industry has a poor reputation amongst its customers, particularly for 
delivery and labour relations; overseas competition has moved more 
rapidly to modernize and re-equip its facilities and is now better placed 
to face the forecast surplus of capacity which will exist for the 
remainder of the 1970’s281 
 
Booz-Allen and Hamilton had sound reasons for their pessimism. Recalling the list of 
deficiencies found by the Geddes Report, their investigation found that almost every 
problem listed was actually worse in 1972 than in 1967. The three most critically 
damaging major problems, high vessel costs, late deliveries, and poor labor relations, 
were considerably worse.  
 
With regard to vessel costs, these had risen due to both material and labor price 
inflation and were in 1971 anywhere from five to 25 per cent higher than competitive 
prices overseas.282 While this was a serious blow to British competitiveness, what 
made the situation even more damaging was that Booz-Allen found that the nine 
major British merchant shipbuilding firms they studied had their 1971 costs exceeding 
their 1971 sales revenue by an average of 4.5 per cent.
283
 Too expensive to be 
competitive in the world market, British shipyards still could not turn a profit even at 
those higher prices. This was the same situation as existed at the time of the Geddes 
Report and the BAH Report found there had been absolutely no improvement. In fact, 
                                                 
281 “British Shipbuilding 1972,” p. 4. 
282 Ibid., pp. 5, 232. The BAH Report later states that “UK prices quoted at present are on average 10-
15 per cent above those offered by European yards and up to 25 per cent above the best prices 
available.” The “best prices available” were undoubtedly Japanese. 
283 Ibid., p. 8 
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they stated that it would take a 10 to 15 per cent reduction in British construction 
costs just to match the prices of foreign competition.284 Worse, the BAH Report also 
estimated that achieving a 10-15 per cent cut in total construction cost would require a 
reduction in direct labor costs between 35 and 50 per cent.
285
 Within the context of the 
industry as it stood in 1972, for reasons both economic and political this simply was 
not possible.  
 
The interlocking nature of these three major problems arises when considering the 
actions that would be necessary to achieve such a large reduction of direct labor costs. 
Labor relations in the shipbuilding industry were already the worst of all U.K. 
industries at the time of the Geddes Report. Bad as they had been at that time, as 
Chart 1 shows they had since deteriorated. If the labor difficulties mentioned in the 
Geddes Report represented the “British Disease” in full flower, the labor activism at 
the time of the BAH Report represented it gone to seed and scattered. While industrial 
actions five years earlier were generally “official,” or union-approved, the “vast 
majority” of industrial action by 1972 was “both unofficial and unconstitutional,” 
meaning that it was initiated “in breach of agreed procedures” by an individual shop 
steward or group of shop stewards without notification to or approval from trade 
union leadership.286 This meant in practice that it was much more widespread and 
spontaneous since any shop steward having a bad day could order the men under his 
jurisdiction to “down tools.” In fact, it was quite common to see such unofficial 
                                                 
284 Ibid.  
285 Ibid. 
286 Ibid., p. 169. Also see B.J. Foley, “Industrial Relations in the United Kingdom,” Management 
International Review Vol. 17, No. 1, “Women in Management” (1977), pp. 3-13. Foley notes that 
“shop stewards have discovered that industrial action may be a quicker solution of contentious issues 
than going through a rather cumbersome disputes procedure designed to cope with problems of a less 
dynamic society and economy.” 
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“wildcat” industrial action take place against the expressed wishes of the local, and 
sometimes national, union leadership.287  
 
The fact that an unexpected strike action of unknown duration could take place at the 
direction of any given shop steward just added another layer of difficulty to the 
already problematic planning task facing Britain’s shipbuilders. There was no way 
they could possibly know when a “wildcat” strike might take place nor how long it 
might take to be resolved. Consequently, there was no way to account for any specific 
production disruption caused by such a labor outage. Knowing that there would be at 
least some strikes, the best that could be done was to make a certain allowance at the 
beginning of the project and hope that labor-related stoppages would not exceed that 
allowance. 
 
This inability to predict problems caused by industrial action tied into the last of the 
three major problems, delivery delays. Shipbuilding projects, like other construction 
engineering projects, are generally planned assuming rationally optimum production 
progress. Some allowance is made for delay due to conditions outside project control, 
such as acts of God or force majeure. However, because progress is planned from a 
conservatively optimal standpoint with as many variables as possible taken into 
account, pleasant surprises in engineering projects are rare indeed. Surprises are far 
more likely to be of the negative kind. The actual reason for so much incorrect 
delivery planning from British shipbuilders at the time of the Geddes Report was that 
the shipyard planning personnel simply had to deal with too many unknown and 
uncontrollable variables, variables that in most cases their overseas competitors did 
                                                 
287 Foley, “Industrial Relations,” p. 11. 
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not have to face. From the start these unknown variables introduced too much 
potential error into the planners’ calculations, thus seriously degrading their 
usefulness as a guiding implement for management purposes. 
 
Five years later, the BAH Report found British shipyards were still dealing with the 
same situation and still trying to do so with understaffed, marginally competent 
management teams that “in most spheres of activity …lack[ed] information in a form 
which provides a sound basis for management decisions.”288   
Table 15: LOSSES DUE TO BRITISH LABOR STOPPAGES
289
 
 
 
In fact, the situation had become even more difficult given the building boom and the 
increases in labor unrest and price inflation. The BAH Report, as did the Geddes 
Report, placed much of the blame for poor performance on shipyard management and 
                                                 
288 Ibid., p. 6. 
289 “British Shipbuilding 1972,” p. 170. Chart is derived from information originally provided by 
Department of Employment. 
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noted three items of particular interest. First, the BAH Report found “there is no 
evidence of significant improvement in productivity in the last five years, despite 
some rationalization in the industry.”290 Second, it noted that “a major strength of the 
shipbuilding industry is the skill and experience of the workforce who often operate in 
a poor working environment.”291 This assessment does not exonerate labor from 
responsibility for the industry’s problems but it certainly shows they were not the sole 
source. Third, and possibly most telling, the BAH Report continually refers to the fact 
that “changes are apparent in several companies, particularly in the last year.”292 In 
short, despite the Geddes Report standing as a clear indictment of British shipyard 
operating and management policy in 1966, very little had happened until 1972 to 
incorporate those internal changes that the Shipbuilding Inquiry Committee deemed 
necessary. 
 
Predictably, problems with late delivery had worsened. By 1971 less than half of 
British vessel deliveries took place on time. In an international industry where 
delivery punctuality was arguably the most important measurement metric, British 
shipbuilding’s continuing failure to correct this problem was critically damaging. The 
problem was exacerbated by the fact that Britain’s primary competitors, such as 
Sweden and Japan, had “particularly good delivery reputations.” As the BAH Report 
stated, “Shipowners report that poor delivery is one of the major reasons for them 
purchasing in overseas shipyards, where delivery is significantly better.”
293
 
 
 
                                                 
290 Ibid., p. 167 
291 Ibid., p. 168.  
292 Ibid., p. 116. This specific comment is about marketing.  
293 Ibid., p. 102 
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Table 16: SUMMARY OF THE U.K. INDUSTRY DELIVERY RECORD 1967-
1971294 
 
Delivery Per Cent of All Deliveries 
One or more months late: 39 
Two or more months late: 30 
Three or more months late: 21 
Six or more months late: 9 
 
The problem with late delivery was even worse on larger ships such as tankers. 
British yards were particularly bad at delivering these vessels on time. Due to the 
1967 Suez Canal closure spawning a demand for these increasingly massive vessels, 
they were taking up a much greater share of the market than before. In doing so they 
were making an already difficult situation for British shipyards much harder.  
Table 17: TONNAGE CHARACTERISTICS OF DELIVERED VESSELS 1967-
1971 ('000 DEADWEIGHT TONS PER VESSEL)295 
 
Year 
Delivered 
Oil 
Tanker/Oil-
Bulk-Ore 
Bulk 
Carriers 
General 
Cargo/Reefer/Container 
Other  
All 
Ships 
1967 51.0 43.2 11.8 1.1 19.6 
1968 68.0 49.6 12.3 2.7 25.3 
1969 26.7 34.8 14.2 2.4 18.9 
1970 98.4 31.0 16.4 3.5 30.5 
1971 89.0 37.9 15.4 8.4 33.2 
1967-1971 71.9 39.0 14.0 2.8 25.2 
 
As mentioned earlier, the British method of shipbuilding with its lack of planning and 
dependence on craft-level initiative was not well suited to dealing with larger vessels 
and long production runs. The BAH Report showed that the situation was not 
                                                 
294 Ibid. 
295 “British Shipbuilding 1972,” p. 100.  
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improving and that the only shipbuilders consistently delivering on time were those 
dealing with smaller vessels. In fact, when judged by tonnage delivered, only 30 per 
cent of British shipbuilding tonnage was delivered on time.296 
 
Revisiting the issue of labor relations, politics, economics and technology were on a 
collision course with regard to the successful modernization of the British 
shipbuilding industry. From a strictly political point of view, it has to be remembered 
that much of the impetus for Government aid to the industry was to avoid or reduce 
the effect of unemployment in economically disadvantaged areas of Britain such as 
the old shipbuilding industrial districts.297 The Shipbuilding Inquiry Committee 
Report was commissioned at least partially because the political costs of high 
unemployment in those predominantly Labour districts were too high for a Labour 
Government to tolerate without taking action. There was no doubt but that the demise 
of labor-intensive shipbuilding in already depressed places like Clydeside, Merseyside, 
Belfast and Northeastern England was going to mean a major increase in 
unemployment.  
 
A review of shipbuilding economics showed that more than 60 per cent of total vessel 
cost was expended on component parts purchased elsewhere and assembled at the 
yard. Costs for those parts were not under shipyard control. A shipyard’s negotiating 
position with its vendors is delicate and varies with a vendor’s assessment of its 
potential volume of future business with that yard. As the Geddes Report recognized, 
                                                 
296 Ibid., p. 102 
297 Wyn Grant and Stephen Wilks, “British Industrial Policy: Structural Change, Policy Inertia.” 
Journal of Public Policy Vol. 3, No. 1, Industrial Policies in OECD Countries, (Feb. 1983), 17. Writing 
in 1983 during the Conservative Government of Margaret Thatcher, the authors noted that “much of the 
aid directed toward declining industries is not really intended to ‘prop up’ those industries, but rather to 
aid the process of adjustment so that the inevitable social costs are spread over a longer period.” 
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larger customers generally wield greater influence with suppliers and vendors, such 
influence usually resulting in lower prices.  
 
That said, in a highly inflationary environment such as the late 1960’s and the entire 
1970’s presented, vendor price flexibility was of necessity extremely limited where it 
existed at all. The vendors were operating in the same inflationary environment, 
which is one of the reasons that the Geddes Report proposal for British steel 
manufacturers to provide below-market steel to shipyards came to naught. Given 
manufacturers’ normally slim operating margins and the prevailing uncertainty about 
future raw material and labor costs, few manufacturers of any stripe dared risk 
providing discounts that might put them closer to the brink of insolvency. It should 
also be noted that many vendors and suppliers had been forced to absorb losses 
without compensation in earlier shipyard failures.298 Consequently, shipyards could 
look for few savings to be garnered from procurement despite the fact it was the 
major financial expenditure for any given vessel.  
 
With little hope of cost savings on the equipment and supply front, from an economic 
standpoint the most promising place remaining to seriously cut spending was labor 
expenditure. The BAH Report recognized that labor expense was “the most important 
directly controlled cost in the shipyard.” 299 As such it was the logical place for 
management to look for retrenchment economies. However, with labor relations 
already poor and apparently worsening, any management effort attempting to make 
unionized shipyard workers redundant was a course fraught with peril. It was certain 
                                                 
298 Foster and Woolfson noted that several of the shipyards which eventually comprised Upper Clyde 
Shipbuilders were prime example of this tendency to leave vendors with unpaid invoices. 
299 “British Shipbuilding 1972,” p. 80. 
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that the shipbuilding labor unions would fight back with every public and private 
weapon in their arsenal.  
 
In one highly publicized 1972 instance of industrial action, after hearing that Upper 
Clyde Shipbuilders was going to be liquidated workers seized several of the facilities 
and declared a “work-in.”
300
 One of the workers’ arguments in the Upper Clyde 
Shipbuilders “work-in” was that workers had “the right to work.” While this “right” 
may have come as a surprise to classical economists, the Communist shop stewards 
leading the UCS “work-in” found little difficulty in managing wide acceptance of this 
position by a British public long steeped in the “full employment” rhetoric of post-
WWII Britain.
301
  
 
Through adroit internal personnel management and masterful handling of their 
external public relations, the shop stewards and their allies succeeded in pressuring 
Edward Heath’s Conservative administration into a “U-Turn” with regard to 
providing government support for Upper Clyde Shipbuilders. The reality that Upper 
Clyde Shipbuilders was poorly run, unsuitably located, cobbled together of 
mismatched, obsolescent shipyards and hemorrhaging government money counted for 
little or nothing in the public relations battle. The loss of jobs was what resonated with 
the British public. This episode clearly showed that reducing jobs or workers’ benefits 
was bound to bring an avalanche of public and press criticism crashing down on both 
                                                 
300 The “work-in” was a job action initiated by the UCS workers in which they refused to allow the 
facilities to be disrupted by liquidators and continued working without pay to complete the yard’s in-
progress projects. This was done after the Conservative Government in London definitively rejected 
emergency requests for additional liquidity funding. 
301 The Beveridge Report first called for full employment in 1942 and Beveridge elaborated on the 
concept with a book written in 1944, Full Employment in a Free Society. The principle was adopted by 
the Labour Party, which moved to fulfill the requirements of the Beveridge Report after its landslide 
election in 1945 and was reaffirmed by the Conservative Party in its 1950 Manifesto. By the time of the 
UCS Work-In, Britons had been governed for 30 years by a political system effectively committed to 
full employment. 
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shipyard management and any British Government that supported reductions. With 
shipowners having made very clear their belief that poor industrial relations was a 
major factor, if not the major factor, in late deliveries, such bad publicity was the last 
thing shipyard managements needed.
302
  
INCOMPATIBLE GOALS: PROFITABILITY AND JOB RETENTION 
 
While the loss of shipbuilding jobs caught the attention of the British public, what 
was not publicized was that job losses were inevitable no matter what happened with 
the British shipbuilding industry. Profitability with employment at 1972 manning 
levels was not achievable under any realistically expected amount of British 
shipbuilding work. British Shipbuilding 1972 analyzed the anticipated labor demands 
for British shipyards and found no circumstances that permitted the same number of 
shipyard employees and also achieved shipyard economic profitability. This posed 
both a political and an economic dilemma for the British Government, which was 
trying to reconcile two mutually incompatible goals within its industrial policy for 
shipbuilding.  
 
First, the BAH Report stated that the only way for British shipyards to successfully 
compete internationally was for them to become more efficient. Increasing efficiency 
to the levels attained by their foreign competitors could not be done without a great 
deal of capital expenditure on both labor-saving machinery and infrastructure 
modernization. No British shipyard had enough money to manage these changes 
privately. The only way the required labor-saving machinery and infrastructure 
                                                 
302 Foster and Woolfson, “UCS Work-In.,” p. 75. 
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modernization could be done was through Government intervention and subsidy. This 
was acknowledged both by the Geddes and BAH Reports.  
 
However, if the Government provided the money for the new machinery and 
modernization, shipyards implementing the new technology would need fewer 
workers, thus negating a major part of the government justification for the subsidies. 
A British government providing large subsidies to increase shipyard productivity was 
politically acceptable under certain conditions. Those conditions did not include 
having the industry, particularly those sections in private hands, simultaneously make 
thousands of workers redundant. That highly visible combination of business subsidy 
and labor redundancy would exact a high political price from any party since it looked 
far too much like a gift to British shipbuilders at the expense of both British labor and 
the British taxpayer. This left the British government dealing with a situation quite 
clearly delineated in the 1972 Hill Samuel Report assessing the viability of Govan 
Shipbuilders. It was specifically written of Govan but, with only slight changes in 
degree, equally applicable to all of Britain’s merchant shipbuilders. The pertinent 
comment went as follows: 
 
In our view there can be no question of the establishment of Govan 
Shipbuilders, in accordance with this Report, being a proposition 
which could attract commercial support. The decision whether or not 
to establish it must, therefore, be judged on other considerations.303 
 
It was a tactfully put statement that called for the British government to ask itself how 
much it was willing to spend to subsidize unprofitable shipyards when their closure 
would mean mass unemployment in already economically depressed areas. There was 
                                                 
303 Hill Samuel Report (1972). Shipbuilding on the Upper Clyde: Report of Hill Samuel & Co.  
(London: HMSO, 1972) 
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really no way for a Conservative administration to deal with this open-ended 
conundrum without violating their stated general principles of free trade and free 
markets. Ideologically opposed to subsidies and considering nationalization anathema 
(despite having nationalized in 1972 the aerospace parts of a failing Rolls-Royce to 
save them from liquidation), they were damned no matter what they did, or did not, do. 
Caught between the Scylla of their own policies and the Charybdis of the short-term 
effects of those policies, in the event they pumped in massive sums in subsidy all the 
while proclaiming that no more funds would be forthcoming and the industry would 
soon have to stand on its own.
304
 It would take a Labour Government to break the 
impasse. However, external events over which Britain had no control were about to 
cause the entire worldwide shipbuilding industry to undergo a paradigm shift. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
304 Such utterances were not reserved only to Conservative Governments; Labour Governments said 
them as well. As was shown by the repeated subventions provided to the industry even after such 
statements, neither Labour nor Conservative administrations was willing to face the dire short-term 
political consequences of a failure to intervene. Not until Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative 
administration was a British government finally willing to take on that difficult task. It can certainly be 
argued that Mrs. Thatcher’s government did so because the United Kingdom was in such dire financial 
straits they could not afford to do otherwise. 
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NATIONALIZATION AND COLLAPSE 
 
The BAH Report was published in May of 1973 and a Labour Government was 
returned to power in February of 1974.  Labour arrived in power with a stated 
determination to nationalize the shipbuilding industry and eventually did so with the 
passage of the Aircraft and Shipbuilding Industries Act of 1977. Their timing could 
hardly have been worse, as they nationalized the industry in the face of the worst 
shipbuilding slump since the 1930’s. The circumstances prevailing in world 
shipbuilding at the time guaranteed there would be massive losses for British 
shipbuilders; the only real question was just how large they would be.  
 
When Harold Wilson reentered 10 Downing Street in February 1973, the Arab oil 
embargo was just about to end.305 Its effect on world trade, however, was just 
beginning. The oil embargo, which caused a 400 per cent increase in price (from $2 to 
$8 per barrel), shocked the industrialized world into recognizing its vulnerability to 
the caprices of foreign oil suppliers. A second oil crisis, in 1979, brought the cost of 
oil to almost $40 per barrel and indelibly imprinted the lesson.
306
 Businesses world-
wide quickly realized that cheap oil was a thing of the past and they had only two 
choices: become more energy efficient or close their doors. Long queues for gasoline 
and steeply higher prices for home heating oil had also forcefully driven the point 
home to the average consumer. Conservation immediately became the order of the 
                                                 
305 The Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC), whose major members were 
Islamic states surrounding the Persian Gulf, undertook to drastically reduce output in reaction to the 
pro-Israel stance taken by the West and Japan in the 1973 Yom Kippur War between Israel and a 
coalition of Arab states. The embargo began in October 1973 and lasted for five months. 
306 The second oil crisis began in late 1978 when almost 75% of the Iranian oil output was curtailed due 
to politically motivated strikes at Iran’s oil refineries. These strikes aimed at bringing down the Iranian 
government led by the Shah of Iran. The Shah and his family fled Iran in early 1979 and he was 
eventually replaced by the Ayatollah Khomeini. Iranian production depended to a large degree on 
foreign oil workers and many of these fled the country during the chaos caused by the political 
transition. It took most of a decade for Iranian oil production to again reach its previous level. 
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day in the developed world, manifesting itself in lowered house and office 
temperatures, additional insulation, double-glazed windows, car pools, smaller cars 
and lower driving speeds.  Intensive energy efficiency assessments revealed a great 
deal of energy wastage; its newly heightened cost gave consumers a strong financial 
incentive to find and eliminate it. Both consumers and governments responded with 
alacrity. The resultant drop in oil demand shattered the tanker market, all but 
collapsed the dry bulk and container markets and forced freight rates into free-fall as 
world trade slowed drastically.  
Table 18: THE IMPORTANCE OF TANKERS IN SHIPBUILDING
307
 
 
As of Last Day of 
Tanker Tonnage on 
Order (million 
deadweight tons) 
Percentage of All 
Shipping Tonnage on 
Order 
Percentage of Existing 
Tanker Fleet (in 
previous July) 
1971 45.31 54.2 47.1 
1972 57.75 66.8 54.9 
1973 97.56 75.7 84.6 
1976 17.12 32.5 10.2 
1977 10.28 30.0 5.9 
1978 6.59 25.5 3.8 
1979 8.75 30.9 5.0 
1980 9.83 28.4 5.6 
1981 7.17 20.3 4.2 
1982 4.81 16.5 2.9 
1983 5.01 15.4 3.2 
1984 5.62 18.3 3.8 
 
 
                                                 
307 Todd, “Industrial Dislocation,” p. 6. Data is taken from various Lloyd’s Register Annual Reports. 
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Given the tremendous percentage of worldwide shipbuilding work that had been 
dedicated to tanker construction, such a drastic drop in demand was bound to be a 
serious blow. Combined with the major reduction in total world trade, which affected 
new construction of every kind, it was devastating. World shipbuilding hit its apogee 
at 34,203,000 tons in 1974 on the strength of orders placed before the October 1973 
Arab oil embargo. From that point total delivered tonnage would decline in absolute 
numbers every year until 1983, reaching its low point in 1980 at 13,101,000 tons (See 
Table 1). Delivered tonnage would not again surpass 20 million tons until 1992.  
 
The drastic decrease in tanker production drove shipbuilders worldwide into frantic 
efforts to expand their building competence as they desperately fought to garner some 
share of what little shipbuilding work remained. This was particularly true for 
Japanese shipbuilders, who had been far and away the industry leader in tanker 
construction and whose order books plunged commensurately. Having a desperate 
Japanese shipbuilding industry turn its world-dominant prowess to new sectors of the 
industry meant very bad news for the current suppliers of those sectors. Then, just in 
time to make a crushingly bad situation even worse, world shipbuilding capacity 
became considerably larger with the emergence in 1972 of strong and well-subsidized 
competition from newly industrializing countries such as Brazil, Taiwan and South 
Korea. From 1975 on, shipbuilding became a war of national subsidies. 
 
During the Conservative administration of Edward Heath, the Labour Party 
had engaged in close and intensive consultation with the Trades Union 
Council and the Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions about 
the future structure of Britain’s shipbuilding industry. Their consensus opinion 
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was that nationalization was an absolute necessity if the industry was to be 
preserved. The three parties published a pamphlet in 1973 entitled 
Nationalisation of Shipbuilding, Ship-repair and Marine Engineering. They 
cited five main justifications for nationalization: 
1) No other industry had failed to increase its absolute output for 25 years in 
a period when world output had grown fourfold; 
2) No other industry, with the exception of the aircraft industry, had received 
so much public finance and support, and shipbuilding would continue to 
need that support; 
3) Few other industries had failed to modernize and re-equip to the 
disastrous degree of shipbuilding and ship-repairing; 
4) The history of labor relations in the industry, despite recent improvements, 
had been poor;  
5) The coming few years would continue to be difficult for shipbuilding 
internationally, the industry needed a clear and firm national strategy, and 
this could only come from a nationalized shipbuilding organization.
308
 
 
They were certainly correct in their prediction that British shipbuilding would 
continue to need government support. Mr. Tony Benn, the new Labour government’s 
Secretary of State for Industry, barely had the chance to organize his office before he 
was dealing with several major crises in the industry. First, Court Line, which owned 
the Doxford & Sunderland shipyard on the Wear and Appledore Shipbuilding in 
Devon, found itself facing critically severe financial difficulties. Trading in Court 
Line shares was suspended in June 1974 and there was a serious threat of bankruptcy. 
                                                 
308 Joint Working Party of the Labour Party, Trades Union Council and Confederation of Shipbuilding 
and Engineering Unions, Nationalisation of Shipbuilding, Ship-repair and Marine Engineering. 
(London: Labour Party, 1973). Cited in Hogwood, “Government and Shipbuilding,” pp. 192-193. 
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Hansard records that, “On 19 June Court Line directors had approached the 
Department of Industry asking the Government for urgent financial assistance to 
avoid a complete and imminent collapse.”309 Forced by severe time constraints into a 
quick decision, Mr. Benn’s Department of Industry followed the proclaimed Labour 
policy and announced that the Government would take the shipbuilding and ship-
repairing segments of Court Line into public ownership. In the end, the Government 
paid £16 million to nationalize them.310 
 
Second, Harland and Wolff once more came back to the Government asking for more 
money to cover losses. Harland and Wolff stands as the classic example of British 
shipbuilding’s post-1960 combination of poor performance and bad luck. Specifically 
reconfigured in the mid-1960’s to build tankers of up to 1 million deadweight tons, it 
should have thrived during the 1967-73 large tanker boom. Instead, due to the typical 
British shipbuilding problems of high costs, low productivity, poor labor relations311 
and late delivery, it lost money even with a full order book.312 
 
In fact, just as Cammell Laird had previously done, Harland and Wolff in late 1974 
ended up paying a customer, Maritime Fruit Carriers, a considerable sum to cancel 
three already-accepted contracts for VLCC tankers.313 Harland and Wolff took this 
action for the same reason: due to inflation and delay penalties they faced a major 
                                                 
309 Hansard, House of Commons Papers, Session 1974-5, HC 498, “Fifth Report of the Parliamentary 
Commissioner for Administration,” p. 17. 
310 Johnman and Murphy, “British Shipbuilding,” p. 204. The Government only actually had to pay £8 
million in the end as it turned out that Court Line’s other subsidiaries owed the shipbuilding and ship 
repairing sections of the business £8 million.”  
311 Harrison, “Industrial Organization,” p. 195. In February 1973 H&W’s steelworkers began industrial 
action which eventually resulted in their complete dismissal on 6 April 1973. While a tentative 
settlement permitting work resumption was agreed on 11 June 1973, full cooperation was denied by the 
steelworkers and productivity for the year was only about two-thirds of the anticipated amount. This 
led directly to the financial problems which almost put the yard into receivership in May 1975. 
312 Hansard, House of Lords Debates, 01 May 1975, HC 360, cc 51. 
313 Hansard, House of Commons Debates, Session 1974-5, 08 May 1975, HC 891, cc 1765.  
 135 
 
financial loss if they constructed the vessels for the agreed price.314 Mr. Robert 
Bradford, MP for Belfast South, represented many Harland and Wolff workers and 
was very familiar with the yard’s problems. Bradford stated the shipyard’s own 
workforce openly admitted that, in addition to 50% overstaffing
315
, “most contracts 
are a year late, Harland and Wolff takes three times as long to produce a vessel as a 
foreign yard, and there is a lack of flexibility.”
316
 While he knew how important 
Harland and Wolff was to Northern Ireland in general and his constituents in 
particular, he also knew the yard must soon address and resolve its issues since it 
could not indefinitely continue on subventions from the British taxpayer.  
 
After 1973, with the market for large tankers having all but vanished, Harland and 
Wolff was also faced with finding work in other sectors of the industry. In this hunt 
for the remaining scraps of shipbuilding work they too were competing against the 
entire world and trying to do so with a much worse track record than Japanese yards. 
Harland and Wolff’s management had promised profitability by 1973 but it quickly 
became obvious the shipbuilding slump had taken them by surprise. Consequently, 
their estimates proved to be seriously mistaken.317 Rather than a return to profitability, 
Harland and Wolff’s 1973 operations required the Government to allocate £38 million 
in loss provision funding.  
 
 
                                                 
314 Ibid., 02 July 1975, HC 894, cc 439W-440W. See also Harrison, “Industrial Organization,” p. 198 
for further information. 
315 Ibid., 08 May 1975, HC 891, cc 1767. MP William Craig noted that “a team which was sent out 
from Belfast to a Swedish shipbuilding yard came back and reported that that Swedish yard, with half 
the labour force, had twice the output of Harland and Wolff. But from that time on there does not seem 
to have been any real change in the structure and organisation of Harland and Wolff.” 
316 Hansard, House of Commons Debates, Session 1974-5, 01 August 1975, HC 896, cc 2500-2501. 
317 Hansard, House of Commons Debates, Session 1974-5, 01 August 1975, HC 896, cc 2504. 
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Table 19: COMPARISON OF DELIVERED TONNAGE/PERCENTAGE OF 
WORLD OUTPUT, SELECTED COUNTRIES, 1974-1983 (‘000 Gross Tons/%)318 
 
Year 
United 
Kingdom 
Japan South Korea World 
1974 1198/3.6 16894/50.4 313/0.9 33541 
1975 1170/3.4 16991/49.7 410/1.2 34203 
1976 1500/4.4 15868/46.8 814/2.4 33922 
1977 1020/3.7 11708/42.5 562/2.0 27532 
1978 1133/6.2 6307/34.7 604/3.3 18194 
1979 691/4.8 4697/32.9 495/3.5 14289 
1980 427/3.3 6094/46.5 522/4.0 13101 
1981 212/1.2 8400/49.6 929/5.5 16932 
1982 434/2.5 8163/48.5 1401/8.3 16820 
1983 496/3.1 6670/41.9 1539/9.7 15911 
 
Parliament was vocally unhappy about this turn of events, which they attributed to the 
private management of Harland and Wolff.
319
 They forced the resignation of the 
yard’s managing director, Mr. Ivor Hoppe, who had been receiving an annual tax-free 
salary of over £78,000.
320
 Due in large part to the magnitude of its business losses and 
the obvious necessity of revamping management, in March 1975 the Secretary of 
State for the Northern Ireland Office, Mr. Stanley Orme, declared that the British 
                                                 
318 Table compiled from statistics taken from Lloyd's Register of Shipping's "World Fleet Statistics" 
(now published by IHS Fairplay), 11 October 2010. 
319 Hansard, House of Commons Debates, Session 1974-5, 08 May 1975, HC 891, cc 1770-1771. There 
was debate in the House about whether the private management had exacerbated a long strike through a 
wage freeze and whether or not the managing director, Mr. Ivor Hoppe, had benefited financially 
because of that strike. Hoppe was particularly unpopular with Ulster MPs. 
320 Hansard, House of Commons Debates, Session 1974-5, 13 Mar. 1975, HC 888, cc 792-793, 01 
August 1975, HC 896, cc 2504-2506. The Commons had good reason to be concerned with Mr. 
Hoppe’s salary. His successor earned an annual salary of £10,000. In addition to his salary, Mr. Hoppe 
also had a home and 42 acre farm specially built and provided for him in Northern Ireland at 
Government expense. 
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Government was going to increase the 47.6% equity stake it already held in Harland 
and Wolff to a “substantial majority.”321 When the review of Harland and Wolff 
accounts necessary for this action had been completed in November 1974, it was 
discovered that £22 million more would have to be provided to cover the firm’s 
obligations.322  
 
After discussions with the yard’s unions, management and customers, in keeping with 
its stated nationalization policy the Labour Government announced in March 1975 
that Harland and Wolff would be taken completely into public ownership.
323
 The 
Government deemed this the only way to “ensure that the necessary financial 
reconstruction is undertaken.”
324
 This action was accomplished through the 
Shipbuilding Industry (No. 2) (Northern Ireland) Order, which was approved by 
Parliament on 5 August 1975.  
 
Prior to the passage of that Order, due to the urgent necessity of providing immediate 
financial assistance to Harland and Wolff there had been an interim bill presented to 
Parliament. This legislation, Shipbuilding Industry (Northern Ireland) Order, 1975, 
was presented on 8 May. During the debate on this Order in the Commons, the 
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland presented the case in stark terms: “For the yard 
                                                 
321 Hansard, House of Commons Debates, 26 March 1975, HC 889, cc 498. This statement came from 
the Northern Ireland Office because the U.K. Government in London had taken direct rule of Northern 
Ireland via the Northern Ireland Act of 1974. This action was taken in response to the ongoing sectarian 
strife in the Province. Orders-in-Council are the normal method of enacting governmental directives in 
such situations. 
322 Hansard, House of Commons Debates, 26 March 1975, HC 889, cc 497. Part of this money was the 
payment to Maritime Fruit Carriers for the three cancelled VLCC contracts. 
323 Ibid. 
324 Hansard, House of Lords Debates, 5 August 1975, Vol. 363, cc 1469. Lord Donaldson elaborated on 
this position by saying, “So long as the Northern Ireland Department of Commerce holds only a 
minority of the shares the Government could not embark—even with the full co-operation of the 
company which it would expect to enjoy—on plans for financial reconstruction with confidence that 
they could be effected.” 
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to be kept open and given a chance to survive financial help must be provided now. 
The company will need funds by the end of May. If the Order is not made tonight the 
yard will immediately close.” Facing such a drastic situation, the Commons once 
again chose subsidies over unemployment and passed the Order. 
 
During the debate in the House of Lords over the Shipbuilding Industry (No. 2) 
(Northern Ireland) Order, the Parliamentary Secretary of State for the Northern 
Ireland Office, Lord Donaldson, quite candidly explained why this Order needed to be 
approved:  
 
The reason why the Government propose this enormous injection of 
new money is basically simple. Harland and Wolff is the largest single 
employer of male labour in Northern Ireland and it is perhaps difficult 
for us to imagine the possible repercussions if the firm were to close. 
Immediately, we would have 10,000 men, about 6 per cent of the male 
labour force in the Belfast area, out of work with the prospect of 
relatively few finding other jobs. I would remind your Lordships that 
male unemployment in Northern Ireland is already approaching 11 per 
cent.
325
 
 
 
In the earlier House of Commons debate, Mr. Gerry Fitt, the Catholic Social 
Democratic and Labour Party MP from Belfast West, bluntly stated,  
 
. . . the Belfast shipyard is no ordinary shipyard. It has an 
exclusiveness all its own, by virtue of the fact that it is situated in 
Northern Ireland and because of the political situation. My right hon. 
Friend the Minister of State mentioned, during the course of his 
remarks this morning something that we have known for a long time in 
Northern Ireland, namely, that the Belfast shipyard has been kept going 
and kept in existence because of political considerations. That has to be 
admitted. We in Northern Ireland have known that for quite a long 
time. . . . the Belfast shipyard is being treated as a separate entity. It 
bears very little relationship to other shipyards in other parts of the 
                                                 
325 Hansard, House of Lords Debates, 5 August 1975, Vol. 363, cc 1465. What went almost 
unmentioned in this debate was how that additional amount of almost completely Protestant 
unemployment might have affected the security situation with regard to the internecine warfare 
between Northern Ireland’s Protestants and Catholics. The Government opinion was that it could do 
nothing but signally worsen an already bad situation. 
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United Kingdom. Had it not been for the political situation in Northern 
Ireland, I am convinced—and my right hon. Friend has confirmed my 
impression—that the Belfast shipyard would have closed.326 
 
Fitt was simply stating an acknowledged but uncomfortable truth about Northern 
Ireland’s exceptional place in British politics. In the event, no MP disputed Fitt’s 
assertion and the Order was duly accepted. Once again, social considerations in 
Northern Ireland had overridden economic realities to the benefit of Harland and 
Wolff.
327
   
 
Dealing with those considerations, however, was proving to be increasingly expensive. 
In this Order the Government agreed to lend or grant another £60 million to the 
shipyard in addition to a partial dismissal of earlier loans. With this subvention, 
between 1966 and 1979 the Government had pumped more than £119 million of 
special assistance into Harland and Wolff.328 Including another £23 million in 
standard shipyard assistance given to Harland and Wolff, the total amount of 
government funding was actually £142 million.329 
 
Third, and possibly the worst disappointment to hit the British shipbuilding industry 
in the 1970s, was the Maritime Fruit Carriers (MFC) debacle. Maritime Fruit Carriers 
was an Israeli company that was almost singlehandedly responsible for the boom in 
British-ordered ships in 1973. They ordered six 333,000 ULCC tankers from Harland 
and Wolff and thirteen ships from Swan Hunter with an option for 13 more.
330
 They 
also ordered two 260,000 VLCC tankers from Scott Lithgow. By 1975, 35 per cent of 
                                                 
326 Ibid. 
327 Hansard, House of Commons Debates, Session 1974-5, 01 August 1975, HC 896, cc 2494. 
328 Ibid., cc 2475. The Minister of State for the Northern Ireland Office, Mr. Stanley Orme, was quite 
straightforward about the amounts of money that had been pumped into Harland and Wolff. 
329 Ibid. 
330 Hogwood, “Government and Shipbuilding,” pp. 186-7. 
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all tonnage ordered in British shipyards was for Maritime Fruit Carriers or directly 
related subsidiaries. 331    
 
Unfortunately for both Maritime Fruit Carriers and the British shipbuilders working 
with them, MFC was highly leveraged financially.332 Their continued economic 
viability was contingent on two separate factors. The first was a continuing rise in the 
used ship market to enable them to sell some of their older vessels at a profit. The 
second was that the tankers they were having built would quickly be profitably 
employed so as to provide funding for the remaining vessels under construction.  Both 
of these assumptions proved faulty as a result of the shipbuilding slump. When the 
demand for tankers collapsed, Maritime Fruit found itself with an unserviceable debt 
of more than $380 million and a group of large tanker assets they could neither sell 
nor productively employ.333 From 1974 on they were struggling to keep the receivers 
at bay and by 1976 they were bankrupt. Prior to that they had three of the six Harland 
and Wolff vessels cancelled as well as nine of the 13 optional Swan Hunter vessels. 
The remaining two Harland and Wolff ULCCs were completed, but for another 
buyer.334 The British Government, which had guaranteed funds for the construction of 
the vessels built in British yards, ended up seizing six Maritime Fruit Carriers 
vessels.335 The two VLCCs built at Swan Hunter for MFC were completed but 
purchased while under construction by another buyer.  
                                                 
331 Hansard, House of Commons Debates, Session 1975-6, 12 February 1976, HC 905, cc 385W. 
Information provided in response to written Parliamentary question by Secretary of State for Trade and 
Industry Mr. Gerald Kaufman. Mr. Kaufman stated Maritime Fruit Carriers had orders amounting to 35 
per cent of the total British order book of 4,947,000 gross tons, or 1,731,450 gross tons. 
332 Wilkins, Christopher and Hill, Peter. “How Maritime Fruit Carriers Went Adrift” The Times 
(London), 5 July 1976: 17.   
333 Ibid. 
334 Harrison, “Industrial Organization,” p. 198. These vessels were purchased by a Texas organization 
that refused to accept them at delivery claiming they were unseaworthy. Harland and Wolff took the 
case to arbitration, where they finally prevailed in 1979. 
335 Hansard, House of Commons Debates, Session 1975-6, HC 916, cc 86-7W. 
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With the collapse of Maritime Fruit Carriers the order books of British shipyards were 
beginning to look very thin by 1975 and the Government was hearing more calls for 
nationalization.  The Government was already well on its way to that goal, as by 
August of that year the portfolio of nationalized shipyards included Harland and 
Wolff, Doxford and Sunderland, Appledore, Govan and part of Cammell Laird. 
Intending to complete the task, the Labour Government put forward the Aircraft and 
Shipbuilding Industries Bill in late April 1975 to nationalize the remainder of 
Britain’s shipbuilding and shiprepairing industry.
336
  
 
The Bill had a long and extremely contentious passage through Parliament, being 
bitterly debated in the Commons and rejected three times by the House of Lords.337 
After almost two years of delay the Bill’s passage was still being stymied by a 
Conservative opposition adamantly opposed to nationalization. Only after the Labour 
Government agreed to remove ship repairers from the bill was it passed, receiving the 
Royal Assent in March 1977. It established a new corporation, British Shipbuilders, 
as the oversight management company with the various shipyards and companies cast 
as subsidiaries. 
 
More indicative of the future than this Bill was the establishment in February 1977 of 
a Shipbuilding Intervention Fund of £65 million “to assist the yards in Britain to 
                                                 
336 Ibid., p. 192-193 
337 Ibid. The Bill set a House of Commons record by being 58 days in committee. At one point during 
the Commons debates, a Labour Party whip engaged in a pairing arrangement for a critical division 
was instructed to break it and vote for the bill. This allowed its passage by one vote. This egregious 
violation of Parliamentary custom thoroughly outraged the Conservative opposition, which actually 
broke off all communication with the majority party. The imbroglio was only resolved after face-to-
face discussions between the Prime Minister, Harold Wilson and the Leader of the Opposition, Edward 
Heath. It was agreed by them that the vote would have to be redone. 
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obtain orders”338 as well as “a redundancy scheme similar to that for the British Steel 
Corporation.”339 The £65 million was to be provided as grants to “suitable” shipyards. 
This, of course, was an open admission that for British yards to obtain any work at all 
would require government subsidization. Worse, the announcement of the redundancy 
scheme in the same Parliamentary debate clearly showed the government’s belief that 
even massive subsidies and nationalization could not save a considerable number of 
Britain’s shipbuilding jobs.  
 
Complicating the situation even further was Britain’s requirement to live up to the 
commitments it had made when it joined the European Economic Community in 1973. 
The position of the EEC was somewhat at odds with itself in that it allowed two 
apparently exclusive actions to take place: First, countries could “digressively” 
subsidize merchant shipbuilders in hopes of keeping the industry alive until recovery 
occurred. However, the EEC also mandated a concurrent reduction in shipbuilding 
capacity under the assumption that the industry would not survive. Reconciling these 
two goals was complicated at best and in Britain it had highly damaging 
consequences for the shipbuilding industry, particularly as the emphasis shifted over 
time from subsidization to capacity reduction in keeping with the changes in Britain’s 
political landscape.  
 
 
                                                 
338 Hansard, House of Commons Debates, 24 Feb. 1977, Vol. 926, HC 1653.  
339 Ibid., HC 1654. This would become the Shipbuilding (Redundancy Payments) Act of 1978. 
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Table 20: U.K. SHIPBUILDING ORDER BOOKS 1975-1984 ('000 Gross Tons)
340
 
 
Year Ships Completed 
Number            GRT 
Order Intake 
   Number                    GRT 
Order Book Dec. 31 
 Number                GRT 
1975 134 1201.3 45 66.6 263 4944.4 
1976 145 1458.8 109 405.9 207 2945.7 
1977 48 754.6 43 389.6 113 1440.4 
1978 55 714 41 214.2 98 913.3 
1979 54 547 29 313.5 71 655.7 
1980 57 405 30 364.6 43 615 
1981 25 195.2 45 468.5 63 886.2 
1982 32 354.9 26 246.1 56 754.1 
1983 33 460.6 11 144 32 375.5 
1984 21 232.4 11 55.3 22 215.5 
 
 
1 July 1977 was the vesting day for British Shipbuilders Corporation. The 
nationalized entity began with 27 building sites, 66 berths and a work force of More 
than 87,000 employees, 65,000 of whom were employed in either merchant vessel or 
warship building.
341
 Harland and Wolff, despite being nationalized, was not included 
in the new organization and remained a separate entity. Britain paid £75 million in 
compensation to private owners for the Corporation’s assets and a considerable 
amount more in clearing up remaining debts as the intention was to have British 
Shipbuilders start with zero initial debt. The company had some teething problems 
concerning where its headquarters should be located and finding appropriate people 
                                                 
340 Rother, Detlef. The Restructured West European Shipbuilding Industry. (Bremen:  Institute of 
Shipping Economics and Logistics, 1985), p. 93. The chart information is taken from data provided by 
the Association of Western European Shipbuilders and the Institute of Shipping, Economics and 
Logistics. 
341 This total excludes Harland and Wolff, which was not taken into British Shipbuilders. 
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for its staff. However, these were insignificant compared to the truly daunting 
problem of finding business for its shipyards in the teeth of the worst shipping slump 
since the interwar years. Gerald Kaufman, Secretary of State for Industry, had stated 
in February 1977 that “it is a fact that without further orders about half the yards in 
the British shipbuilding industry will run out of work this year. A very few yards have 
work running beyond 1978.”
342
 
 
The response to this situation in practice was for British Shipbuilders to solicit 
whatever work they could find to keep the yards employed. This meant they 
knowingly accepted bids requiring subsidization of work likely to incur very heavy 
losses.
343
 Two such actions in particular were quite politically contentious, acceptance 
of a Polish order for 28 ships and an Indian order for six cargo liners. British 
Shipbuilders effectively provided the Poles with 100% credit for this order, something 
which caused outcry in the Commons as MPs held very serious doubts about whether 
a penurious Communist country like Poland would even be able to service the debt, 
much less actually repay it.
344
 Moreover, the vessels proposed for construction were 
to be used in trades which would directly compete with established British shipping 
companies. Those companies were quite naturally unhappy that huge amounts of 
British state funding were to be used to subsidize the construction of foreign 
competition able to undercut their prices because of that funding.345 As for the Indian 
order, the £52.8 million in funding for these vessels was to be completely drawn from 
                                                 
342 Hansard, House of Commons Debates, 24 Feb. 1977 Vol. 926, cc 1661 
343 Johnman and Murphy, “British Shipbuilding,” p. 210. 
344 Ibid. 12 Dec. 1977, Vol. 941, cc 53-115. Such full credit funding was highly unusual, particularly 
for a buyer with questionable credit. 
345 Hansard, House of Lords Debates, 24 Nov. 1977 Vol. 387 cc 1026-31, House of Commons Debates 
12 Dec. 1977, Vol. 941 cc 8-10. The opposition Conservatives on 12 December were so unhappy with 
the performance of the Secretary of State for Industry, Eric Varley, that they proposed a motion to cut 
his pay by 50%. The motion failed by a vote of 246 to 295. Much of that unhappiness stemmed from 
the 28-ship “deal” arranged with the Polish Government. The debate on this matter became quite 
heated. 
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Britain’s annual Overseas Development subvention to India.346 However, since the 
cost of the British vessels was higher than what would have been on offer from 
Japanese yards, the Indian Government objected and asked for the price to be lowered. 
In the event, Britain provided an additional sum of approximately £2.5-5.0 million to 
mollify the Indians. As Hogwood put it, “The [British] government was subsidizing a 
free gift!”
347
 
 
No matter one’s position on nationalization of industry, one of the undoubted benefits 
is that a nationalized industry becomes a public subject with its financial records 
normally open to public scrutiny. That said, the first set of financial records presented 
by British Shipbuilders placed the Labour Government in an unenviable position. The 
Corporation’s initial annual report was published in November 1978 and showed a 
loss of £109 million in the first nine months of operation despite an injection of £46.6 
million from the Shipbuilding Intervention Fund. It had quickly become apparent that 
the Government had not made sufficient allowance for clearing up debt accrued prior 
to nationalization as £57 million of the loss was due to meeting obligations incurred 
before vesting day. Nevertheless, it was an ugly record to defend and it was not made 
easier by the shipbuilding unions announcing in the same month that British 
Shipbuilding was planning to cut more than 12,000 jobs.348  
 
                                                 
346 Hansard, House of Commons Debates, 20 Mar 1978 Vol. 946 cc 1175-1176.  
347 Hogwood, “Government and Shipbuilding,” p. 201. Hansard, House of Commons Debates, 16 Dec. 
1977 Vol. 941 cc 566W. 
348 Hansard, House of Commons Debates, 15 Jan 1979 Vol. 960 cc 1293. 
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There is no doubt that Labour Governments were concerned for the yards and the 
workers in the industry.349 One needs only to read the Parliamentary speeches of 
Labour Ministers such as Tony Benn and Gerald Kaufman, or backbenchers such as 
Donald Dixon of Jarrow and Dr. Norman Godwin of Greenock, to see there was an 
emotional tie with the shipyard workers that the Conservatives simply did not possess. 
Labour almost certainly would have provided more financial support for the industry 
had the money been available to fund it. Knowing this it is ironic that that they so 
badly missed what was the final chance to save British shipbuilding.  
 
Despite the horrifically bad shipbuilding slump after 1974, out of the entire world, 
British shipbuilders alone were blessed with one last opportunity to diversify into a 
closely related business and save themselves from the global collapse. From 1970 on, 
the development of the North Sea’s oil and gas resources demanded construction of a 
great many drilling platforms and offshore supply vessels. With the vast majority of 
this development occurring in the British sector of the North Sea, the British 
shipbuilding industry was the clearly obvious choice for supplying the necessary 
vessels and structures. There was nothing to prevent British Governments from 
demanding that the required infrastructure be supplied from British shipyards as it 
was to be used to exploit a British national asset. Britain’s shipbuilders could have 
used the decade of work this huge windfall of offshore construction would have 
granted them to ride out the shipbuilding slump. It would have allowed them to firmly 
                                                 
349 It is notable that neither Wilson nor Callaghan had anything approximating the same level of interest 
in the industry as their ministers and backbenchers, much less the burning concern for it shown by 
President Chung-Hee Park. 
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establish themselves as a world leader in what has proven to be an extremely 
remunerative segment of the energy industry.350   
 
It was certainly possible for this to occur. The BAH Report of 1972 actually 
specifically recommended an emphasis on offshore activities.351 Some British 
shipyards had even dabbled a bit in the offshore sector between 1961 and 1969, with 
five rigs being built at John Brown’s Clydebank yard alone out of a total of eleven 
built in Britain.352 None of the involved yards, however, seemed to think offshore 
work was something they were interested in seriously pursuing and all left it as soon 
as possible to return to regular shipbuilding.  
 
This can only be viewed as a major mistake on the part of both British shipbuilders 
and the British Governments that were so heavily subsidizing them. Properly 
developing these oil resources meant there was a huge amount of infrastructure to be 
constructed in the British sector of the North Sea. Moreover, the Norwegian 
shipbuilding industry was far from being capable of providing all the infrastructure 
necessary in their sector. Had the work in both sectors been seriously sought by 
British yards,  a sizable majority of it would have almost certainly been given them as 
the British Government would have been easily been able to enforce preferential 
purchasing policies.353  
                                                 
350 As of 2013, dynamically positioned 6th generation drill ships and semi-submersible drilling rigs 
delivered equipped and ready to conduct drilling operations generally cost approximately USD 1 
billion per vessel. 
351 BAH Report, p. 51, which stated that “Semi-submersible craft should be assigned priority [of 
shipbuilding research]. . . with particular emphasis on offshore drilling, pipe laying and other offshore 
operations.” 
352 Johnman and Murphy, “British Shipbuilding.” There were a total of eleven rigs built, with two also 
being built at Smith’s Dock and one each at Swan Hunter, Clelands, Furness and Harland and Wolff. 
353 “Cammell Laird Wins £61 Million Order from Dome Petroleum.” The Times (London) 4 June 1981: 
17. The article notes that “Dome may have decided to place the contract with a British yard with 
further exploration licenses in mind.” 
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As it happened, Scott Lithgow in 1978 received a £60 million order from BP for an 
offshore emergency support platform354and an order from Britoil in 1981 for a semi-
submersible oil rig at a price of £88.6 million.355 Cammell Laird also received a semi-
submersible order in 1981 from Dome Petroleum with a value of £61 million.
356
 
These were good contracts at decent prices and adequate performance could have 
solidly established the British shipbuilding industry in the forefront of petroleum 
extraction technology. However, just as with the construction of ships, poor planning, 
late deliveries and industrial action ended up causing the yards involved to lose 
money on the contracts.  
 
British Shipbuilders, after its initial losses of £109 million in 1977-78 and £110 
million in 1978-79 had rebounded to a loss of only £41.5 million in 1979-80.357 The 
loss for 1980-81 was the same and British Shipbuilders, initially optimistic about the 
offshore sector, was predicting there would be zero net loss in 1981-82. However, the 
company’s hopes were rudely dashed as the losses in 1982-83 amounted to £117 
million, with offshore losses accounting for £76.8 million of the total. As Table 21 
shows, 1983-84 was even worse, with most of the loss being attributable to offshore 
projects. What could have been a solid lifeline to save Britain’s shipbuilding industry 
vanished in a smothering cloud of poor performance and heavy financial losses. The 
opportunity for not just survival but resounding success was there for the taking. 
Unfortunately, as with so many previous chances for British shipbuilders, neither the 
vision nor the will was sufficient to meet the challenge and it slipped out of their 
                                                 
354 Hill, Peter. “Scott Lithgow Lands Biggest £60 M Order.” The Times (London) 5 August 1978: 16 
355 Hansard, House of Commons Debates, 20 Dec. 1983, Vol. 51, cc 281. 
356 “Cammell Laird Wins £61 Million Order from Dome Petroleum.” The Times (London) 4 June 1981: 
17 
357 Hansard, House of Commons Debates, 17 Nov. 1981, Vol. 13, cc 191. 
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grasp. Offshore construction was British shipbuilding’s last, best hope--and they blew 
it. 
Table 21: BRITISH SHIPBUILDERS CORPORATION PROFIT (LOSS) BY 
SPECIALIZATION, 1982-1985
358
 
 
Category of Work 1982-1983 1983-1984 1984-1985 
Merchant Ship 
Building 
(85.5) (49.2) (59.3) 
Warship Building 54.7 43.8 45.5 
Engineering (2.0) (12.6) (8.8) 
Ship Repairing (5.3) (3.7) (0.8) 
Offshore (76.8) (100.9) (3.5) 
Other (2.6) (38.3) (1.7) 
Total (117.5) (160.9) (28.6) 
Note: includes special depreciation provision of £37.9m in 1983-1984. 
 
Since 1960 Britain’s shipbuilding industry had been suffering an increasingly severe 
decline, with the speed of the slide slowed only by ever more expensive government 
financial intervention from both parties. 3 May 1979 was the day that interventionist 
policy acquired an end date. The election of Margaret Thatcher and a Conservative 
Government sounded the death knell for British shipbuilding.  Mrs. Thatcher’s 
Government was very much different from the last Conservative Government to deal 
with the industry’s problems.  The ideological differences between the Heath and 
Wilson administrations were minimal compared to those between Mrs. Thatcher and 
James Callaghan’s Labour Government.  
 
Mrs. Thatcher came to office armed with a trained chemist’s attention to detail and a 
successful shopkeeper’s concern for sound finances. Britain’s poor economic 
circumstances meant that drastic expenditure reductions had to be made in many 
                                                 
358  Johnman and Murphy, “British Shipbuilding,” p. 214. Chart data derived from the Report by the 
Comptroller and Auditor General, Department of Trade and Industry, Assistance to Shipbuilders. 
(London: HMSO, 1986).  
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places. Shipbuilding stood out as an obvious target for funding cuts because it was 
extremely costly, unlikely to become profitable in any foreseeable future, and based 
primarily in Labour constituencies. Mrs. Thatcher was far too shrewd a politician to 
miss such an opportunity and her eighteen year tenure as Prime Minister meant she 
was in office long enough to carry her plans through to fruition.   
 
With regard to British shipbuilding, the difference in opinions between the parties 
could not have been greater. As an example of the Labour opinion, Mr. Gerald 
Kaufman, Minister of State of the Department of Industry, in 1978 stated the 
following: 
 
The Government's record in saving jobs in the British shipbuilding 
industry is unrivalled by any other shipbuilding industry in the world, 
and we are proud of it.359 
 
This is considerably different from what Mr. Robert Atkinson, Chairman of British 
Shipbuilders, experienced in his 1980 discussion with Sir Peter Carey, Permanent 
Secretary of the Department of Trade under Mrs. Thatcher’s Conservative 
Government. After outlining his Corporate Plan, which Carey listened to politely, Sir 
Peter told Atkinson the following: 
 
Robert, Margaret wants rid of shipbuilding, remember that. 
 
With typical British understatement, Atkinson later commented that Carey’s response 
was “not very encouraging.”360 During his tenure as Chairman of British Shipbuilders, 
he had opposed privatization but had done his best to make the Corporation as 
                                                 
359 Hansard, House of Commons Debates, 13 Nov. 1978, Vol. 955, cc 2-4. 
360 Johnman and Murphy, “British Shipbuilding,” p. 217. 
 151 
 
efficient and productive as possible.361 With that as Atkinson’s prime goal, by the end 
of 1981 British Shipbuilders had considerably diminished in size. While at vesting 
day in 1977 the Corporation began with 27 building sites, 66 building berths and a 
work force of more than 87,000 employees, 65,000 of whom were employed in either 
merchant vessel or warship construction, by 1981 it had 66,000 total employees, 15 
building sites, 28 berths, and its engine building companies had shrunk from five to 
two.362  Atkinson retired on 1 September 1983 and was succeeded by Mr. Graham 
Day.363 Day had originally been chosen by the Labour Government to head British 
Shipbuilders in 1975. As a result of the long delay in enactment of the nationalization 
legislation, he eventually declined the position prior to vesting day. However, after 
having been offered the position once again by the Conservatives, he accepted 
knowing his remit was to cut the losses at British Shipbuilders and to privatize the 
warship-building sectors as quickly as possible.  
 
This policy was bitterly opposed by Labour as they knew that the only profitable 
sections of British Shipbuilders were the warship yards. If they were privatized there 
was no doubt the merchant shipbuilding rump of British Shipbuilders would quickly 
drown in a tsunami of red ink.
364
 However, the Conservatives could with honesty say 
that considerably more than £1 billion had been spent between 1979 and 1984 on 
subsidizing British Shipbuilders, a far cry from the less than £40 million suggested by 
the 1966 Geddes Report.
365
  
                                                 
361 Atkinson, Robert, “Staying Afloat,” The Times (London) 7 October 1981: 17. Atkinson wrote a 
strong letter to The Times in response to an article critical of British shipbuilding published on 21 
September 1981. 
362 Ibid., p. 210. 
363 Townsend, Edward. “Major Job Losses and Closures Warning at British Shipbuilders.” The Times 
(London) 2 September 1983: 13. 
364 Hansard, House of Commons Debates, 25 July 1984, Vol. 64, cc 999. 
365 Ibid., The Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, Mr. Norman Tebbit, made this statement. 
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Having spent such a munificent sum of taxpayer money on shipbuilding subsidization, 
it was simply not realistic for Labour to attack the Conservative administration on the 
grounds of not having supported the industry. As the elected government, they had the 
civil obligation to spend the public’s money wisely and, after 1983, could refute 
Labour’s complaints about poor British Shipbuilding management with the fact that 
they had installed the man Labour originally tapped for the job. Given the generally 
poor performance of British Shipbuilders, it was certainly legitimate for the 
Conservative Government to question the usefulness of the large sums expended on 
them. Moreover, they were justified in doing so from a philosophical standpoint since 
a major tenet of Conservative thinking is that all government funding used to 
subsidize a money-losing industry must first be taken by government from a 
profitable one. The people of Britain had twice freely elected a government with that 
philosophy, a fact which presupposes the majority of Britons wanted such government 
at the time. Graham Day in 1985 stated, 
If there was no government support there would not be merchant 
shipbuilding in Britain.  . . .if government said to us, “You must only 
carry on with those companies which were profitable and stand aside 
on privatization,” we would have no choice but to close all merchant 
shipbuilders because they are all unprofitable. This has been the case 
since 1977.366 
 
 
When asked by the Committee if he could envision “a future for British Shipbuilders 
building only merchant ships,” Day replied, “I think the future will be much the same 
as the past. British Shipbuilders has not made money since nationalization.” With the 
Chairman of British Shipbuilders being on record to Parliament that shipyard 
subsidization would be necessary for the foreseeable future, it was not surprising that 
                                                 
366 British Parliamentary Papers (1984-85), Trade and Industry Committee, “British Shipbuilders,” 
Minutes of Evidence, 24 July 1985, p. 33. 
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the Conservatives decided to divest Great Britain PLC of what they had come to see 
as a major and incurable financial drain. After eight years of extremely heavy losses it 
is hard to argue the decision was unjustified. 
 
However, justified or not, the groupings originally envisioned by the Geddes Report 
were all back in the private sector by 1988. The Robb Caledon shipyard had been 
closed in 1981. British Shipbuilders had been able to sell Scott Lithgow in 1984 to a 
group of private buyers led by Trafalgar House for £12 million, thus preventing its 
immediate closure although its demise was only temporarily postponed.
367
 The 
profitable Yarrow’s was sold in 1985 to GEC while Vosper Thornycroft was acquired 
through a management buyout in the same year. Cammell Laird was sold to Vickers 
(VSEL) in 1986 after VSEL itself had been privatized in the same year. Swan Hunter 
was privatized in 1987 while Austin and Pickersgill, Doxford and Sunderland, Govan, 
Appledore and Harland and Wolff were privatized in 1988. All of these reprivatized 
yards were mere shadows of what they had been at the time of the Geddes Report 
with both output and manpower greatly diminished in all cases.  
 
With the privatization of Harland and Wolff and the remaining parts of British 
Shipbuilders, Britain’s days as a volume shipbuilder came to a close. None of the 
yards that were privatized was successful as a stand-alone merchant shipbuilding 
facility. This could only have been expected since the only way they had obtained 
work under nationalization was through massive subsidization, a tactic generally not 
possible in the private sector. While there is still on occasion a vessel built in one of 
the few remaining British shipyards, it is almost invariably a warship or naval 
                                                 
367 Scott Lithgow carried on as an offshore yard for three more years, making major losses and finally 
ceasing to trade in 1988. 
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auxiliary, usually for the Royal Navy. The facilities that still exist from Britain’s 
shipbuilding past that are not specifically dedicated to military shipbuilding are 
relatively small ship repair yards or closed completely. The British Government has 
stated that the total cost of subsidy for the ten years of British Shipbuilders was £1.85 
billion.368 That sum does not include the £537.2 million in subsidies for Harland and 
Wolff between 1975 and 1988 or the considerable amount of expenditure prior to 
1975 for the P200 modernization program.369 The cost of the financial effort to save 
British shipbuilding ran to well over £2.3 billion, a tremendous amount of money 
expended in an ultimately futile attempt to save the industry. Despite the expenditure 
of a king’s ransom in subsidies, it took only thirty years for British shipbuilding to go 
from world leader to global irrelevance.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
368 Hansard, House of Commons Debates, 27 May 1988, Vol. 134, cc 638. In that debate the Under-
Secretary of State for Trade and Consumer Affairs, Mr. John Butcher, noted that in 1987 “£20,000 was 
spent for every job in British Shipbuilders. That is a great deal of support.” 
369 Johnman and Murphy, “British Shipbuilding,” p. 236. 
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WHY KOREA? THE POLITICS OF KOREAN SHIPBUILDING 
 
Any discussion about the success of the modern Korean shipbuilding industry is 
incomplete without first mentioning the partnership of the two men who deserve the 
lion’s share of credit for establishing it: Korean President Chung-Hee Park and 
Hyundai Chairman Ju-Yung Chung. These two men had the vision to see that 
shipbuilding was an industrial sector in which Korea could have not only have a 
significant presence but one in which it could become the world leader.  
 
Korea faced a tremendous number of obstacles on its way to world shipbuilding 
primacy. Reaching that peak was the work of many people who struggled mightily to 
help Korea overcome those obstacles and attain that pinnacle. Moreover, Korean 
shipbuilding also had some luck in the timing of its emergence; the rules of the world 
economy happened to favor Korea’s fledgling industry just when it most needed 
assistance. However, without the decisive actions of President Park and Chairman 
Chung, Korean shipbuilding primacy simply would not have happened.370 Those two 
men led, pushed and sometimes dragged Korea to a position where, when the 
opportunity arose, the nation had the industrial means to grasp it and the financial 
strength to hang on until it was fully developed. Preparing for that opportunity took 
not only decades of assiduous effort but a truly extraordinary combination of foresight, 
intelligence and raw political and business courage. The path to the top of world 
shipbuilding was not a smooth or easy one; both Park and Chung certainly had many 
faults and made many mistakes. That said, despite those faults and mistakes they 
                                                 
370 Richard M. Steers, Made in Korea: Chung Ju-Yung and the Rise of Hyundai. (New York: Routledge, 
1999.), p. 10. Steers has been accused of writing a hagiography of Ju-Yung Chung but his assessment 
of Chung’s importance to Korea’s industrial success is in complete accord with that of Donald Kirk, 
whose book on Ju-Yung Chung was quite critical. 
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succeeded in accomplishing something that in 1970 would have been considered 
absolutely impossible. Even their most vehement critics, who are numerous, have 
been forced to admit that the nineteen-year cooperation between Park and Chung was 
critically important to creating the modern, industrialized Korea of the 21
st
 Century. 
Without their contributions, the South Korea that ended the 20th Century as one of the 
world’s most advanced nations would be a very different place.
371
 
A LONG AND WINDING ROAD TO POWER 
 
President Chung-Hee Park is the most unusual character in the story of Korean 
modernization.
372
 His personal qualities and life experiences uniquely fitted him for 
the indispensable role he played in modernizing Korea. Key to Korea’s economic 
development in general and Korean shipbuilding’s advancement in particular, Park’s 
leadership is the most critical factor in Korea’s progression from agrarian backwater 
to industrial giant. Without Park deftly manipulating the power and position of the 
Korean state to provide the economic surplus necessary for industrialization, gifted 
entrepreneurs such as Ju-Yung Chung would quite probably never have had the 
opportunity to compete on the world stage.  
 
Henry Kissinger once stated that, once in office, senior political figures must always 
draw on their prior intellectual background since the pressing challenges of daily 
national affairs leave little time to increase that store of knowledge. What supported 
                                                 
371 Stein Ringen, Huck-Ju Kwon, Ilcheong Yi, Taekyoon Kim and Jooha Lee. The Korean State and 
Social Policy: How South Korea Lifted Itself from Poverty and Dictatorship to Affluence and 
Democracy. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 20. It is clear that the biases of the authors 
of this work are strongly against authoritarian government and they list many of the deficiencies and 
shortcomings of the Park regime. Grudging though the admission might be, they do concede that, “Like 
it or not, [Park] took hold of the nation and steered it forward. The counterfactuals are unknown.” 
372 Seungsook Moon, “Cultural Politics of Remembering Park Chung-Hee,” Harvard Asia Quarterly, 
Vol. XI Spring/Summer 2008, 26-44. Park remains a controversial character in Korean history. Moon 
in this article provides an excellent example of how radically different opinions about Park still remain 
in Korea. 
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President Chung-Hee Park’s intellectual convictions as he ascended to the pinnacle of 
Korean power was a thorough understanding of Japan’s Meiji Restoration, firsthand 
experience of watching Japan’s Kwantung Army build Manchuria into an industrial 
powerhouse, and a firm grounding in Korean and Japanese history.
373
 Park knew the 
mistakes of Korea’s past and thought they could be used as cautionary tales on the 
way to a bright future. Equally important were Park’s moral qualities of confidence 
and courage. He had the confidence to believe he both knew and could lead the way 
forward to a better life for all Koreans, and the courage to risk not only his career, but 
most probably his life for the opportunity to put his beliefs to the test.  
 
During the eighteen years of Park’s rule, the government he led was always 
authoritarian and arguably dictatorial.  It certainly had few internal political 
constraints on its actions. With the exception of the junta years, during which he was 
consolidating power, Park’s goals were always effectively the nation’s goals. His 
insistence on industrialization combined with his all but unquestioned governmental 
authority to allow specifically focusing the nation’s energies on advancing this issue. 
Because the Korean governmental structure permitted him such tremendous power, 
Park was able to guide the Korean economy in a way no British prime minister could 
possibly manage short of a major and immediate danger to Britain’s continued 
existence as a nation. Because Park’s beliefs and actions are so critical to this story, a 
digression to explain Park’s background is in order. 
 
Born in 1917, Chung-Hee Park was the youngest son of an impoverished member of 
the yangban, the Korean hereditary ruling class. His father, Seong-bin Park, though 
                                                 
373 Chung-in Moon and Byung-Jun Joon , “Modernization Strategy,” p. 120. See also Lee, pp. 153-154. 
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the eldest son of his family, had been disinherited for joining the unsuccessful 
Tonghak uprising against the venal Choson Dynasty rule of Queen Min and King 
Kojong.374 To avoid starvation, Seong-bin had then been forced to move his family to 
a small plot of barely accessible land in his wife’s home town, a tiny mountain village 
named Sangmo-dong.375 He there spent the remainder of his life in dire poverty. 
Young Chung-Hee Park was allowed to attend the nearest elementary school, in Kumi, 
another village five miles away over mountain trails. His daily round trip of ten miles 
on foot took at least four hours and was often done in rain or snow. Due to the 
family’s grinding poverty, he often had the barest minimum of cheap food to eat for 
lunch. Occasionally he was forced to go without food at all as his lunch froze in its 
box on the way to school and there was no way to thaw it once there. As President, 
Park attributed his diminutive stature to the fact that he was woefully undernourished 
as a child.376 However, he did not blame his father for the family’s poverty and indeed 
grew up admiring the fact that he had been willing to take a stand against corrupt 
government despite the heavy cost. This admiration apparently increased as he grew 
older.
377
 Both his youthful poverty and his father’s example had a pronounced effect 
on his behavior once he attained positions of power. 
 
                                                 
374 Chong-Sik Lee, Park Chung-Hee: From Poverty to Power. (Palos Verdes: KHU Press, 2012), p. 34. 
Such disinheritance was very uncommon. Lee speculates that it occurred in order to prove to 
government officials that Seong-Bin had truly acted on his own. Whether Seong-Bin’s father actually 
believed this action was warranted is unknown. What is certain is that had the Park family not acted to 
formally distance themselves from the rebellious actions of their eldest son, the entire family would 
have been in serious danger of losing their yangban status. Because that status effectively exempted 
them from taxes, losing it would have had devastating economic consequences for the family and 
probably impoverished all of them 
375 Ibid., p. 329-331. Lee wrote about visiting Park’s childhood home. He noted there is “a seven or 
eight story apartment building across the street” from it and that “even the top of the apartment 
building does not reach the level of their house. This shows how steep the Park family’s climb was 
each day to reach their hovel.” 
376 Chong-Ryon Kim.  Ah, Park Chung-Hee. (Seoul: Chungang M&B, 1997), p. 318. 
377 Lee, “Park Chung-Hee,” p. 28. 
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Chung-Hee Park graduated from the Kumi Elementary School with a very good 
academic record, one high enough to allow him to be accepted to the Taegu Normal 
School for education which would eventually lead to a teaching degree. This was an 
even more difficult situation than the Kumi school since it required Park to live in a 
dormitory and pay for meals, train trips, shoes, and other school-related expenses. The 
education was free but for a poor farming family such as Park’s, which was almost 
completely devoid of ways to access hard cash, coming up with even the minimal 
sums required was extremely difficult. There were several years where Park was late 
in beginning school simply because his family could not afford the money to pay for 
him to take the train back to Taegu or pay for the dormitory meals.378 The cost of 
those meals was only $3.25 per semester but even this small sum represented a 
crushing financial burden for Park and his family. He had been accepted into the 
school ranked 51st in the school’s incoming class of 100. However, due to repeated 
absences and problems caused by his dire poverty his class ranking decreased every 
year until at graduation he was ranked 69th of the 70 graduating students.  
 
Even though there were extenuating circumstances, this was a very poor record which 
normally would have precluded any future advancement. Chung-Hee Park had 
decided while still a boy that he wanted to be a military officer. Unfortunately, his 
poor academic performance at Taegu Normal made that aim impossible through 
normal channels. However, Park did have one branch of study at Taegu Normal in 
which he excelled and it proved to be critically important for his future. He was a 
superb performer of military arms drills. Park was so good at them that he became a 
favorite of the Japanese drill master at Taegu Normal, Col. Arikawa Kazuichi. All 
                                                 
378 Ibid., p. 64. Park missed no days his first year at Taegu Normal School but his record grew worse as 
his education continued. He missed 10 days in his second year, 41 in his third, 48 in his fourth and 41 
in his last year. Lee states that with such a record Park was very lucky to graduate. 
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students had to learn these drills and Kazuichi often used Park to demonstrate proper 
rifle and bayonet drill performance to the rest of the school.379 Taegu Normal School 
had a rifle shooting team, membership of which was selected by Colonel Kazuichi 
and considered to be a very special privilege. Chung-Hee Park was the only Korean 
on the team with ten Japanese teammates. He was actually chosen to be team leader 
during his senior year, a very surprising honor given his poor academic standing and 
the common Japanese practice of discrimination against Koreans.380  
 
After graduation, Park’s poor academic record meant there was a very good chance he 
might not obtain a school posting. He did, however, and was assigned to the town of 
Munkyŏng, not far from his home village. While Park did well there and was fondly 
remembered by the townspeople, he had not surrendered his desire to be a military 
officer. When an opportunity to achieve that goal presented itself in 1939, he leapt at 
it. After his two year teaching obligation was completed, Park applied for admission 
to the Manchukuo Military Academy as an officer candidate. Manchukuo was a 
puppet state comprised of territory seized by Japan from China after the Mukden 
Incident in 1931. While the last Manchu Emperor, Pu Yi, was the nominal head of 
state, the country was actually a de facto colony run by the Japanese Kwantung Army 
on behalf of the Japanese Emperor.381 The elected Japanese Government’s writ was 
quite limited in Manchuria.382 
 
                                                 
379 Ibid., p. 60.  
380 Mason, “Modernization,” p. 90. Lee also notes that Kazuichi generally disdained both Koreans and 
Japanese in Korea as not having been good enough to be successful in Japan. Lee’s opinion is that Park 
must have been both extraordinarily good and dedicated to have obtained Kazuichi’s approval. 
381 There is no proof that the Emperor desired this; the officers of the Kwantung Army took it upon 
themselves to seize the three Chinese provinces that constituted Manchuria and consolidate them into a 
state they could present to the Emperor. 
382 Sadako N. Ogata. Defiance in Manchuria. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), p. xvi. 
Ogata notes that “The highest official policy makers—cabinet ministers, including the service 
ministers—generally lacked control over the developments in Manchuria.” 
 161 
 
Normally Park would not have been considered an admissible candidate for a number 
of reasons, chief among them his prior academic record and the fact that he was, at 23, 
three years over the age limit for entry.383 Still, at least the possibility existed even if it 
was a terribly slim one and he was not going to let it go past without doing his best to 
seize it. 
 
 Park was well aware that he was asking the Manchukuo Military Academy for quite 
extraordinary consideration which was highly unlikely to be granted. Consequently, 
he buttressed his admission application by a somewhat unusual inclusion. He added to 
the normal forms an “Oath in Blood,” a statement written in Park’s own blood 
swearing service unto death for the country. While Park’s initial application was 
“regretfully” declined by the Manchukuo Military Academy, it received some 
favorable newspaper attention which was seen by his former drill master, Colonel 
Kazuichi.384 Kazuichi, who by that time was serving as a senior military adviser to the 
Manchukuo Government, apparently intervened with the Academy acceptance 
committee and secured Park’s admission in March 1940.
385
  
 
This was unusual but two things worked in Park’s favor. First, the Manchukuo 
Military Academy was formed only in 1939 so, unlike the Japanese Military 
Academy at Zama, its rules were not yet completely solidified. Second, Japan by this 
time was already deeply involved in a full-scale war with China and quickly preparing 
for a second with the Soviet Union. The Japanese Army needed all the junior officers 
                                                 
383 Lee, “Park Chung-Hee,” p. 99. Park had also been forced by parental pressure to marry a woman he 
had never met and quickly discovered that he did not like. From that marriage Park had a daughter. 
These facts would have absolutely debarred his acceptance at the Manchukuo Military Academy. Park 
omitted this information from his application. 
384 Ibid., pp. 104-5 
385 Ibid. 
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it could produce. A young man with Park’s talent, maturity and apparently fervent 
willingness to serve would have been a welcome addition to the incoming class of 
Academy cadets. 
 
Kazuichi’s confidence in Park was not misplaced. Chung-Hee Park did 
extraordinarily well in the two years he spent at the Manchukuo Military Academy. 
He graduated at the top of his class and was honored in front of the entire Academy 
by the presentation of a gold watch and a special citation, both directly received from 
the hands of the Emperor of Manchukuo, Pu Yi.
386
 His excellent academic 
performance and high level of Japanese-language competence influenced his 
superiors to send him to the Japanese Military Academy at Zama, Japan. A small 
number of outstanding cadets from the Manchukuo Military Academy were permitted 
this privilege and Park was among them. This allowed Park to complete the normal 
four-year course provided to Japanese military officers.  
 
Park was an exemplary cadet at Zama. Several of his biographers believe that his 
training at the Manchukuo and Japanese Military Academies was the most influential 
factor in his intellectual development.
387
 The Japanese Military Academy did its best, 
which was extraordinarily good, to hammer its graduates into proper warriors and 
practitioners of the code of bushido.388 Among the qualities it sought to imbue in its 
students were fervent Japanese nationalism, fearlessness, loyalty, bravery, 
                                                 
386 Ibid., p. 126.  
387 Chong-Sik Lee and Kōhei Yukawa, among others. 
388 With regard to what Park would have learned at Zama, courage and self-sacrifice would have been 
high on the list. Field Marshal Sir William Slim intimately knew the Japanese way of war, having 
fought them from 1942 to 1945. The most successful British general in World War II’s Pacific Theater, 
Slim wrote a very good history about the Burma Campaign in his book, Defeat Into Victory. He 
commented that he had seen Japanese soldiers routinely perform acts of bravery in battle that would 
have earned a British or Indian soldier the Victoria Cross. Having seen too many of their wartime 
atrocities, Slim did not like the Japanese and it was rare to find him complimenting them. However, as 
the fair man he was he gave credit where it was due.  
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decisiveness, respect for superiors, courtesy, benevolence, and frugality. Their 
teachings definitely fell on fertile ground in Park. He was certainly a far different type 
of leader than the two generals who succeeded him as President, Doo-Hwan Chun and 
Tae-Woo Roh. Both of them, once in office, proved unable to resist the allure of the 
riches proffered to those wielding political power in Korea. It is germane to note that 
neither attended the Japanese Military Academy, having come of age after Korean 
independence. 
 
Park, who was awarded medals for bravery during the Korean War
389
, was renowned 
for his asceticism and stringent separation of official and personal affairs.390 He once 
severely reprimanded his daughter Geun-Hye (later also elected President of Korea) 
for having improperly used official transportation. Her offense was having accepted 
an offer from Park’s official chauffeur to drive her to school on a particularly snowy 
day. Park’s predecessor Syngman Rhee, as well as the seven Korean Presidents who 
succeeded Park, were all involved in financial scandals. However, Park, for all the 
anger he engendered in his political opponents during his rule, was and still is 
                                                 
389 Yong-Sup Han, “The May Sixteenth Military Coup,” The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation 
of South Korea.  Editors:  Byung-Kook Kim and Ezra F. Vogel. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2011), p. 38. Han notes that Park was awarded the 충무무공훈상 (Order of Military Merit Ch’ungmu) 
in December 1950for bravery in the Mid-East Battle which took place that year. He was awarded the 
화랑무공훈장 (Order of Military Merit Hwarang) in December 1951 for his service as commandant of 
the Army Intelligence School and the 충무무공훈상(Order of Military Merit Ch’ungmu) again in 1953 
for service as the artillery commander of the Second Corps. 
 
390 Lee, “Park Chung-Hee,” p. 151. Lee recounts an incident shared by one of Park’s military duty 
officers. The officer, P’illip Choe, was assigned as the overnight military duty officer at 총와대(the 
Blue House), the official residence of the Korean President. Upon being served the evening meal, Choe 
complained to the cook that the meal, which consisted of a few vegetable dishes with no meat, was 
insufficient. The cook responded by taking Choe into the kitchen and showing him the dining table 
which had just been removed from the presidential dining room. That table had exactly the same food 
as had been served to Choe. From that time on, whenever Choe was assigned as duty officer he ordered 
hamburgers from a nearby hotel and had them delivered to the Blue House. 
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considered a “clean man.391 Park’s reputation for honesty and bravery proved critical 
in his rise to power in Korea. 
 
Park, at the end of his first year at the Manchukuo Academy, had taken a Japanese 
name, Takagi Masao. While this was a requirement for all Koreans after 11 February 
1940, Park took a name far more akin to Japanese than most.
392
 This action is 
indicative of Park’s opinion of Japan, a factor which was crucially important to South 
Korea’s economic performance after the war. Many Koreans still retain a great deal of 
animosity for Japan due to the sometimes brutal treatment received by Koreans under 
Japanese rule. The widely publicized issue of Korean “comfort women” is just one of 
a number of seriously contentious matters still affecting Korea’s relationship with 
Japan. Those emotions burned even hotter immediately after independence. 
 
However, even if they were not directly intended to be so, the effects of Japanese 
colonial rule in Korea were beneficial to the country in many ways.393 The Japanese 
Government and Japanese industry invested much capital and provided a great deal of 
technical expertise to develop Korea’s agricultural, mineral and hydroelectric 
resources.
394
 These actions added quite considerably to Korea’s economic capacity 
and gave many Koreans an opportunity to experience the functioning of a modern 
industry. This experience proved of great use after the war when all the Japanese 
investment and infrastructure was left in Korean hands.
395
  
                                                 
391 Lee, “Park Chung-Hee,” p. 150. Lee notes that Park’s tenure in office was not without scandal but 
that none of the scandal ever touched Park or led to any accusations that Park himself benefited 
financially. The inheritance Park left his surviving children was no more than could have been expected 
from a person living on the official salary of the Korean President. 
392 Robinson, “Korea’s Twentieth-Century Odyssey,” p. 95. 
393 Mason, “Modernization,” p. 448 
394 Ibid., pp. 74-91. 
395 Ibid., p. 449. Mason notes that “Korean employment in manufacturing increased from 23,000 
household heads in 1910 to 440,000 in 1940. By 1944 there were nearly 1,900 Korean engineers and 
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To understand Chung-Hee Park, it must be realized he came from what Koreans call 
the “Japanese Generation.” This term refers to those Koreans who grew up between 
1910 and 1945 and who had never known Korea as anything other than an integral 
part of the Japanese Empire. “Japanese Generation” members were born into the 
world as subjects of the reigning Japanese Emperor. They attended schools conducted 
in Japanese, were often taught by Japanese teachers, studied a Japanese curriculum, 
saw only Japanese civil and military officials governing the country, and each day 
recited the Japanese Imperial Rescript on Education which began with a declaration of 
loyalty toward the Emperor and his family. They would never have seen Koreans in 
positions of real authority. The “Japanese Generation,” grew up with the hinomaru, or 
rising sun, flag as their national emblem and “Kimigayo” as their national anthem. 
During the 35 years that Korea was under Japanese rule, the Japanese always had the 
intent of assimilating the Korean people and worked very hard at the task. Because of 
that intent, any manifestations of Korean nationalism were suppressed quite harshly.  
 
Many Koreans of this generation resolved to make the best of the situation as it 
certainly appeared to be all but permanent. Moreover, they were certainly rational in 
realizing that the costs--imprisonment or death--of a probably futile resistance were 
very high. Chung-Hee Park was a Korean nationalist but he was also an extremely 
pragmatic individual. His nationalist tendencies were tempered by the realization that 
his family had been condemned to backbreaking, soul-destroying poverty because of 
                                                                                                                                            
technicians employed in manufacturing, another 1,300 in mining and 2,000 in service industries. 
Altogether in 1944 there were in 1944 some 7,000 Korean managers and 28,000 professional and 
technical workers.” He also notes that as early as 1937 there were more than 2,000 Korean-owned 
factories and at least 100 of them had more than 50 workers. 
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the actions of a corrupt Korean government.396 He also recognized that he would 
never have received the education he had under any previous Korean government. 
Park justifiably held most past Korean governments to have been self-serving looters 
of the public fisc.
397
 Consequently, with his nationalistic tendencies tempered by 
historical knowledge and personal experience, he was able to rationally assess the 
benefits and shortcomings of both Korean and Japanese governance.  
 
Park knew Japanese history very well.398 He had studied it at Taegu Normal and at 
both the Manchukuo and Japanese Military Academies, where it was one of his best 
subjects.399 He deeply admired the Japanese penchant for order and their talent for 
organization. He had researched the Meiji Restoration very carefully and had a 
profound respect for Japan’s accomplishment in being the only major Asian country 
to successfully resist colonization by Western powers.400 Park knew Korea had a great 
deal to learn from Japan and he fully intended to use the Japanese example as a 
template for Korea.401 He just wanted the relationship to be one between equals. 
 
                                                 
396 Park, “To Build A Nation,” pp. 43-44.  
397 Chung-Hee Park, 지도자도 (The Leader’s Way) (Seoul: Supreme Council of National 
Reconstruction, 1961). Published shortly after the military coup, this short book was extraordinary in 
its general denunciation of previous Korean governments for both personal dishonesty and neglect of 
their duties. What Park found most damnable about those previous governments was that the example 
of corruption they set had deeply infected the Korean people with the same disease of moral 
degeneracy. 
398 Chung-in Moon and Byung-Jun Joon, “Modernization Strategy: Ideas and Influences,” The Park 
Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea.  Editors:  Byung-Kook Kim and Ezra F. Vogel. 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), p. 120. They quote Tong-yeon Lee, Park’s Chief of Staff 
from 1962-1964, as saying Park was a man “busy studying Japan. He frequently took clippings from 
Japanese newspapers and read The History of the Japanese Economy until midnight. A great portion of 
Park’s modernization policy emerged from the emulation of Japan. He compared Korea’s economic 
situation to that of Japan all the time, even through the 1970’s.” 
399 Chong, Un-yeon, 실록 박청희 (True Story of the Soldier Park Chung-Hee) (Seoul: Kaema, 2004), 
p. 118. 
400 Chung-in Moon and Byung-Jun Joon, “Modernization Strategy,” p. 118. 
401 Ibid., p. 120. During a domestic crisis, Lee Tong-yeon mentioned Great Britain as a country whose 
historical experience could serve as a valuable example to Korea. Park replied, “Why should we learn 
from a faraway country like Great Britain? We have lots to learn from Japan, which is near to us.” 
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When Park graduated from the Japanese Military Academy in 1944, he was returned 
to Manchukuo and sent to a remote village, Banbishan, on the edge of Inner Mongolia. 
Park was very lucky that he was not sent directly to the Japanese Army after his 
graduation from the Japanese Military Academy. There were many casualties among 
Park’s Academy classmates as the war drew closer to the home Japanese islands. Park 
was also lucky in that when Japan surrendered on 15 August 1945, he was a long way 
away from where all the fighting between the Japanese Kwantung Army and the 
invading Soviet Red Army had taken place. Many captured Japanese and Korean 
soldiers were taken as prisoners of war to Siberia. Used by the Soviet Union as forced 
labor and working under harsh conditions with insufficient food, a large number of 
them died. The last of the survivors were not repatriated until 1956. Had Park been at 
Kwantung Army headquarters rather than far distant Banbishan, this could easily have 
been his fate.402 
 
Because the likelihood of encountering Soviet forces in Manchuria was so high and 
posed so many dangers, Park and three other demobilized Korean officers from his 
unit decided to return home via Beijing.403 Eventually managing to find passage back 
to Korea, he soon found his professional military training to be a highly valuable 
asset.404 The American Military Government in Korea, responsible for Korea below 
the 38th Parallel since September 1945, was trying to establish a military force to 
provide order in what was rapidly becoming an anarchic situation. Park was quickly 
recruited into what became known as the Korean Constabulary in September 1946 
                                                 
402 Lee, “Park Chung-Hee,” p. 225. 
403 Ibid., p. 225. 
404 Ibid. As a graduate of the Japanese Military Academy Park was undoubtedly one of the most 
professionally qualified soldiers in Korea. Such credentials were very scarce at the time. 
Approximately one dozen Koreans in the entire peninsula could match Park’s high level of professional 
military training. With the need to establish some type of national armed force increasing with every 
passing day, it was clear Park was destined for rapid promotion and very high rank. 
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and his military career resumed from that point. By the time the Republic of Korea 
succeeded the American Military Government on 15 August 1948, Park had been 
promoted to Captain in the Korean Constabulary.405 He was known to his peers as a 
serious and extremely competent professional officer, and was well on his way to 
fulfilling his childhood dream to become a general. Then it all collapsed. 
 
Park had joined a political group, the South Korean Workers’ Party (Namnodong), in 
1947. At the time he joined it was legally recognized by the American Military 
Government in Korea as a legitimate political party.
406
 However, there were several 
violent outbreaks of Communist-inspired revolutionary activity in South Korea before 
the establishment of the Republic of Korea, the most serious of which was the Cheju 
Rebellion of 1948.407 South Korean efforts to suppress this rebellion led to an October 
1948 mutiny by troops preparing to go to Cheju as part of the government crackdown. 
These rebellions quickly led to a brutal and widespread purge of suspected 
Communist sympathizers in the South Korean military. Members of Namnodong 
were high on the list of those sought by the anti-Communists and Park was arrested 
on 11 November 1948.  
 
Park’s trial took place on 8 February 1949 and he had good cause to be worried about 
the outcome. There were many death sentences handed out by the military court and 
those so sentenced in the morning were usually executed in the afternoon of the same 
                                                 
405 The Korean Constabulary was renamed as the Republic of Korea (ROK) Army after 15 August 
1948. 
406 Lee, “Park Chung-Hee,” p. 226. A U.S. Army major actually attended the party’s inaugural 
conference as a personal representative of Gen. John Hodge, head of the American Military 
Government in Korea.  
407 These uprisings were not solely inspired by a desire for Communism; dissatisfaction with the Rhee 
government and separatist tendencies played large roles as well. However, the rebels were fully 
supported by Communists on the grounds that anything embarrassing to the Southern government was 
good for the North. 
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day. Park agreed to cooperate fully with the authorities in their investigation of leftists 
and this action, along with intervention from senior officers who thought highly of 
him, saved his life. Despite his cooperation, he was originally sentenced to life 
imprisonment. However, the Army quickly came to realize the purge net had been 
cast far too widely and soon reduced Park’s sentence to fifteen years.408 Shortly after 
that it was suspended. Park was released in December 1948. 
 
He was allowed to return to his old position as section chief in the Operational 
Intelligence section of the Republic of Korea (ROK) Army, but that was not the end 
of the matter. To his surprise and shock, Park found himself dishonorably discharged 
from the ROK Army in April 1950. This action by the Army was a devastating blow 
and it appeared to finish his military career. Only through the self-interested 
generosity of the senior officer in his section, who hated to lose Park’s undoubted 
competence, was he allowed to continue working there as a civilian. 409 He was lucky 
in that he at least still had a job, but it left him in the deeply humiliating position of 
being a disgraced former officer reporting to men who were once his subordinates.  
 
That situation did not last long. When the Communists invaded on 25 June 1950, Park 
had the chance to display not only his extraordinary professionalism as a military 
officer but his leadership and loyalty to South Korea as well. The North Koreans 
captured Seoul on 28 June, only three days after war broke out. Acting on personal 
initiative, Park led the Operational Intelligence section personnel in gathering and 
                                                 
408 Ibid., p. 260. 
409 Ibid., p. 261. Park was an excellent intelligence officer. He and his section were responsible for 
evaluating information received from North Korean refugees and deserters. Using knowledge gained 
from these and other sources, in late December 1947 Park authored an intelligence report predicting 
that the North Koreans would invade the South in the spring of 1950. His prediction was off by only 
one month. 
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organizing the necessary files, maps and other key documents required to reconstitute 
the section elsewhere. He then evacuated with them and the section staff to Daejeon, 
the designated regrouping point. Park’s cool-headed behavior insured that this 
critically important intelligence section could later be restarted with a minimum of 
delay.  
 
An impressive feat in itself, given the chaos reigning in Seoul at the time of the retreat, 
it is even more so when considering that Park was legally only a civilian while taking 
these actions. He had no warrant to give orders or make decisions, particularly in a 
military organization. He just recognized the crisis for what it was and followed his 
Japanese Military Academy training in acting swiftly when action needed to be taken. 
It speaks volumes for Park’s command presence that despite his lack of any formal 
authority the rest of the section just followed his lead and did as he directed. 
Moreover, by retreating with the Southern forces despite his cashiering, Park resolved 
any doubts about his dedication to South Korea. Had he truly been a Communist 
sympathizer it would have been very easy for him simply to wait in Seoul for the 
Northern armies to arrive. Ernest Hemingway has defined courage as “grace under 
pressure.” Park certainly displayed it in this situation. 
 
When the senior South Korean military staff reassembled in Daejeon, they found that 
it was primarily due to Park that the Operational Intelligence section had conducted 
an efficient and orderly withdrawal allowing them to resume work as soon as directed. 
The senior leadership was duly impressed and recognized that Park’s well-organized 
retreat with the Southern forces demonstrated both his loyalty and his undoubted 
competence as a professional military officer. Chung-Hee Park was reinstated in the 
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ROK Army as a major on 14 July 1950 and promoted to lieutenant colonel on 15 
September 1950. In less than two years Park had experienced unexpected arrest, an 
imminent death sentence, a levied sentence of life imprisonment, dishonorable 
dismissal from the Army, a hostile military invasion of his country, a frantic and 
demoralized retreat when all seemed lost, reinstatement in the Army and high 
promotion. Park certainly showed the truth of Nietzsche’s dictum that experiences 
which do not destroy an individual actually strengthen them. Having been tried so 
severely before he came to power, he was well prepared to handle the vicissitudes of 
high office when he arrived there. 
 
Park continued to rapidly rise up the military career ladder. He was promoted to full 
colonel in May 1951, to brigadier general in November 1953, and to major general in 
March 1958. He held this rank when he launched his military coup against the Chang 
Myeon government on 16 May 1961. Park had previously raised objections to the 
corrupt influences he had encountered in both the Army and the civilian government, 
and was well aware that such complaints were not appreciated by the senior members 
of either group. The election of March 1960 had been rigged to allow the 85 year old 
Syngman Rhee to be returned to power.
410
 This was common knowledge in Korea and 
evoked many student protests in April 1960, protests with which Park sympathized.411 
Park himself had been pressured by politically connected senior Army officers to 
influence troops under his command to vote for Rhee.
412
 Park flatly refused to do 
                                                 
410 Robinson, “Korea’s Twentieth-Century Odyssey,” p. 125. 
411 Park, “To Build a Nation,” pp. 94-95. 
412 Kim, Se-Jin, The Politics of Military Revolution in Korea. (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1975), p. 75. According to Kim, Rhee’s Liberal Party fundraisers pushed politically 
connected Army generals to contribute large amounts of cash to Rhee’s political campaigns. This 
occurred since the ROK Army received roughly $400 million annually in American military aid as well 
as 40% of the national budget. The officers usually produced the desired funds, which came from sales 
of civilian-useable military gear, such as vehicles and petroleum.  They also sold the food that should 
have been provided to the soldiers, either replacing it with goods of lower quality or not replacing it at 
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so.413 The student protests spread rapidly to universities across Korea and were 
particularly intense in the Seoul area.414 Rhee’s government attempted to suppress the 
demonstrations through police and military repression, in some instances actually 
firing live ammunition into crowds of protestors. This resulted in the deaths of 183 
student demonstrators on April 19 alone and the wounding of thousands more.415 
Given Rhee’s long service to the cause of an independent Korea, the situation was a 
bitter and deeply saddening national tragedy. After a week of bloody violence, Rhee 
was forced to accept that the Korean people would never consider his election as 
legitimate and that the cost of maintaining power through repression was too high. 
This acknowledgement led to his resignation on April 26 and departure for exile in 
Hawaii on April 29.
416
 
“A BANKRUPT FIRM TO MANAGE” 
 
Rhee was replaced by Chang Myeon of the Democratic Party, who became both 
Prime Minister and leader of the government. Chang Myeon found himself presiding 
ineffectually over an increasingly chaotic country and trying to deal with legislative 
deadlock in the National Assembly. The country drifted for a year as the political and 
economic situations grew progressively worse.417 Then, on 16 May 1961, General 
Chung-Hee Park led a military coup which overthrew the Chang Myeon government 
and installed a junta in its place. Park’s rationale for the coup was as follows: 
 
                                                                                                                                            
all. What outraged Park was what had angered him about earlier Korean governments: the bad example 
set by the leaders corrupted their subordinates as well. 
413 Lee, “Park Chung-Hee,” pp. 283-284. According to one eyewitness, an envoy came to Park’s office 
to ask him to order his officers to “mobilize” the troops to vote for Rhee. Park asked the envoy, “How 
could I commit such a foul act!” Park then took the ballots brought by the envoy, ripped them up and 
threw them into the burning office stove. 
414 Park, “To Build a Nation,” p. 94. 
415 Han, “The May Sixteenth Military Coup.” p. 40. 
416 Cumings, “Korea’s Place,” p. 350. 
417 Park, “To Build a Nation,” pp. 101-102 
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Both the April 19 student revolution and the May 16 military 
revolution grew out of the chronic poverty of the nation. They were 
passionate expressions of the people’s desire to live better. If poverty 
had been allowed to weaken them, as had happened before, they would 
have had national collapse. Food comes before politics. Only with a 
full stomach can one enjoy the arts and talk about social development. 
Before May 16 the Korean economy was in disorder. Accumulated 
political blunders and misguided economic policies had utterly 
disarranged it. . . Farmers’ debt rose sharply. On the other hand a 
handful of select bureaucrats and business profiteers enjoyed luxury at 
popular expense.418 
 
 
Park initiated the military coup d’état because he believed that the corrupt and 
indecisive civilian government was failing to do what was necessary to hold off the 
imminent Communist threat.419 Once the coup had seized the main government 
buildings in Seoul and seemed to be on its way to success, Park publicly declared 
martial law, dissolved the National Assembly, proscribed all political activities and 
had many of the leading politicians arrested.420 Three days after the coup, when it was 
all but certain it had succeeded, Park formed the Supreme Council for National 
Reconstruction (SCNR) which assumed executive, legislative and judicial authority in 
South Korea.  
 
Park and the SCNR justified their actions by claiming the nation had not been led 
properly and that the military had been forced to step in to restore order and to lead 
the nation toward achieving its national goals. As seen by the SCNR, those goals 
consisted of opposing Communism, respecting the U.N. Charter, strengthening ties 
with the U.S. and rooting out national corruption. The SCNR also aimed at instilling 
moral character and national spirit in the people, reducing national poverty, increasing 
                                                 
418 Ibid., pp. 101-102. 
419 Ibid., p. 96. 
420 Ibid., p. 105. 
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the independence of the national economy and preparing the nation to achieve 
national unification under a non-Communist government. 421  Park and the SCNR 
promised that once these goals were achieved, they would turn the government back 
over to “conscientious politicians” and return to their military duties. 
422
 
 
For the next two years Park was fully occupied with a host of issues, the two most 
important being consolidating power in his own hands and keeping the Americans 
happy with his governance. Both of those issues are outside the scope of this study 
other than to note that in adroitly outmaneuvering his rivals within the junta, his most 
often used, and most effective, tool for purging potential challengers was an 
accusation of corruption. This worked very well because in most cases the accusations 
were true. There were so many in the Korean military tainted with it that finding 
someone who had not been involved to at least some degree was quite rare.423 As for 
the Americans, Park’s fervent anti-Communism and his government’s record of fast-
paced accomplishment quickly impressed them.424 With these prerequisites 
appropriately handled, Park moved on to dealing with Korea’s central problem: its 
economy. 
 
                                                 
421 Han, “The May Sixteenth Military Coup,” p. 51. 
422 Ibid. 
423 Kim Se-Jin, “Military Revolution,” p. 76. The amounts of money a Korean soldier was paid under 
the Rhee regime were incredibly low. In 1952 a private was making less than $0.50 per month. A 
captain was making approximately $6 per month. According to Lee, a lieutenant’s monthly salary 
would not buy more than two bowls of noodles. Lee, “Poverty to Power,” p. 287. In such circumstance 
corruption was bound to flourish. 
424 Kim, Hyung-A, “State Building,” The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea.  
Editors:  Byung-Kook Kim and Ezra F. Vogel. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), pp. 105-
107. Kim describes the quick and efficient restructuring of South Korea’s chaotic electric power 
industry. Park made Major General Nae-Hyeok Cheong head of the Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry in May 1961 and directed him to reform the industry. Cheong treated the task like a military 
operation and completed it within one month, rationalizing the industry, firing surplus personnel and 
restructuring it on an orderly and efficient basis. Civilian governments had been futilely trying to 
accomplish this task since 1951. The speed and success of this operation highly impressed the 
Americans responsible for disbursing aid to Korea. 
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What Park deemed most crucial was providing economic progress for the country.425 
He was always aware that his government would be very closely scrutinized on this 
particular issue and that failing to produce an increase in national prosperity was not 
an option. This was when his study of the Meiji Restoration and the insights gained 
while watching the Japanese Kwantung Army leadership came to the fore. Park knew 
what he wanted to do and how he wanted to do it. He wasted no time in setting his 
plans in motion. 
 
The first task he faced was taming the chaebôl. As the earlier quotation from Park 
showed, he and his fellow officers initially held them in very low esteem.426 He very 
quickly moved against them after the coup through the “Special Measure for the 
Control of Illicit Profiteering,” which was enacted by the SCNR on 28 May 1961.427 
“Illicit profiteers,” as cited by this measure, had done some or all of the following: 
 1. Earned profits of more than 100 million hwan through purchasing or renting 
publicly owned properties. 428 
 2. Earned profits of more than 200 million hwan through monopoly utilization 
of foreign exchange. 
 3. Earned profits of more than 200 million hwan through illegal contracting or 
bidding for public works and/or commodity trade. 
                                                 
425 Chung-Hee Park, The Country, Revolution and I (Seoul: Hollym Corporation, 1970), p. 177. Park 
states here that “the key factor of the May 16 Military Revolution was …an industrial revolution in 
Korea. . . . My chief concern, however, was economic revolution." 
426 Chung-Hee Park, Our Nation’s Path. (Seoul: Hollym Corporation, 1970), p. 201. In referring to the 
chaebôl Park used the term “rapacious wolves.” The two groups clearly did not understand one another 
at first. Woo stated that the junta members were “men of peasant origin and harbored, like 
ultranationalist Japanese officers in the 1930’s, a peasant’s suspicion of the wealthy.” Woo, “Race to 
the Swift,” p. 81. 
427 Kim, Hyung-A. Korea’s Development Under Park Chung-Hee. (London: Routledge/Curzon, 2004), 
p. 81. 
428 Taehyun Kim and Chang Jae Baik., “Taming and Tamed by the United States,” The Park Chung 
Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea.  Editors:  Byung-Kook Kim and Ezra F. Vogel. 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), p. 75. The hwan was the unit of currency used in South 
Korea prior to the coup. It was replaced during the June 1962 currency reform by the current currency 
unit, the won. The rate of exchange was 10 hwan to 1 won. 
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 4. Gave more than 50 million hwan to political parties to illegally procure 
bank loans. 
 5. Tax evasion of more than 200 million hwan. 
 6. Transferred funds abroad without authorization. 
 7. Obtained more than $100,000 of bank or government-owned foreign 
exchange. 
Since all of the above actions were commonplace under the Rhee regime, the SCNR 
was in effect retroactively criminalizing most chaebôl business conduct during the 
Rhee era.
429
 This edict, if stringently enforced, could bankrupt every chaebȏl in South 
Korea and place their senior management in jail for an indeterminate period. With the 
junta now wielding the power of life or death over them, what remained to the 
chaebôl was to see how the junta intended to use it. 
 
The Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) had been one of the first 
organizations formed after the coup. Formed on June 10, the KCIA could “control and 
supervise both international and domestic intelligence activities, and the criminal 
investigations undertaken by all government intelligence agencies, including that of 
the military.”
430
 The KCIA combined the powers of the American Central Intelligence 
Agency with those of the American Federal Bureau of Investigation and from its 
origin it proved a fearsome instrument of coercion in the hands of the government. 
When a dozen chaebôl owners were arrested by the KCIA on charges of having 
violated the illicit profiteering law, it sent a very strong message to the remainder. The 
                                                 
429 Woo, “Race to the Swift,” p. 83. 
430 Kim, “State Building,” p. 91. Kim also notes that the first law promulgated after the coup was the 
“Law Regarding the Extraordinary Measures for National Reconstruction.” This law explicitly stated 
that if there should be conflicts between the South Korean Constitution and itself, “the latter would 
prevail.” This meant there was effectively no check on what the KCIA could do other than executive 
intervention, a state of affairs which undoubtedly terrified the chaebôl leadership and contributed 
mightily to their willingness to cooperate with the junta. 
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arrested were deemed “illicit profiteers and tax evaders,” ordered to surrender all 
illegal profits, and given six months to pay all fines and outstanding taxes.431 The 
stringency of this repayment schedule meant bankruptcy for most of them and they 
knew it.
432
  
 
Lee Pyeong-cheol, founder of Samsung and the richest man in Korea, was in Japan at 
the time of the arrests. He fully expected to be arrested upon his return and was 
indeed met at on June 27 at Kimpo Airport by the KCIA. Instead of taking Lee to jail 
however, they took him to a meeting with Chung-Hee Park. Lee always considered 
himself a “Japanese gentleman” and carried himself as such, to the point of having 
married a Japanese wife.
433
 During the meeting Lee apparently convinced Park that 
both Korea and his government would be better served by having the willing 
assistance of the chaebôl leadership rather than having them rotting in jail.434 The 
outcome was that the chaebôl leadership collectively agreed to “voluntarily donate” 
all their assets to the SCNR if needed for “national construction.”435 While the 
chaebôl did not “voluntarily donate” much of anything to the Korean Government, 
they did quickly begin to fully cooperate with Park’s government. In the end, by 
January 1962 the fines had been reduced to almost nothing.
436
  
                                                 
431 Cumings, “Korea’s Place,” p. 312. According to Cumings, the arrested businessmen were marched 
through the streets of Seoul wearing dunce caps and sandwich boards emblazoned with statements such 
as, “I am a corrupt swine” or “I ate the people.” 
432 Kim, “State Building,” p. 94. 
433 Ibid., p. 326 Also, in 삼성중공업 30 년사, 1974-2004 (Thirty Years of Samsung Heavy Industries, 
1974-2004) (Seoul: Samsung Heavy Industries, 2005), p. 7. Lee attended Waseda University in Japan 
and was accused of colonial-era collaboration with the Japanese. A portrait of him wearing 
a 두리마기(durimagi), a traditional Korean man’s outer coat, is included in this history, possibly in an 
attempt to emphasize his Korean background. His ties with Japan were a political liability after Korean 
independence; however, Lee’s Japanophilia may have favorably influenced Park. 
434 Eun Mee Kim and Gil-Sung Park, “The Chaebôl,” The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of 
South Korea.  Editors:  Byung-Kook Kim and Ezra F. Vogel. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2011), p. 274. 
435 Kim, “State Building,” p. 95.  
436 Ibid., p. 99 
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What had really transpired was that Park had demonstrated to the chaebôl leadership 
who was in charge and served notice that things were now very different than in the 
Rhee era. It is doubtful that Park ever truly intended to do much more than what he 
did to the businessmen despite the fact that some extremist junta factions were 
actually calling for executions.437 He knew from his Manchukuo experience that it 
was government-directed capitalists and entrepreneurs who turned Manchukuo into an 
industrial powerhouse.438 He was under no illusions that Korea’s transformation to an 
industrial country could be done without them. However, he needed them to know 
that the days of buying government influence were over and that if they wanted to 
stay in business they needed to do exactly as they were told by the state. That lesson 
came through very clearly.
439
 
 
What was even more effective in Park’s campaign to bring the chaebôl to heel was an 
action taken by the SCNR on 16 June 1962. This was the “Emergency Banking 
Measure.”440 This nationalized the five major commercial banks and effectively put a 
choke chain around the neck of the chaebôl.441 Korean chaebôl were not like Japanese 
zaibatsu, with a bank at the heart of the conglomerate providing financing for the 
attached subsidiaries. The chaebôl were dependent on external bank financing which 
was now controlled by government. With the banks nationalized and lending only at 
government direction, the chaebôl had only two choices: follow government direction 
or limit themselves to only what their own financial resources would allow.
442
 The 
                                                 
437 Ibid., p. 95 
438 Lee, “Park Chung-Hee,” p. 307, p. 317. 
439 Kim and Park, “The Chaebôl, p. 272-275. 
440 Kim, “Korea’s Development,” p. 81. 
441 Amsden, “Asia’s Next Giant,” p. 72-73. According to Amsden, the subject banks were close to 
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itself complete control over the financing available to the chaebôl. 
442 Mason, “Modernization,” pp. 265. Referring to the government’s ability to influence chaebôl 
behavior, Mason noted, “A firm that does not respond as expected to particular incentives may find that 
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second choice led only to stagnation, decline and eventual dissolution and the wiser 
chaebôl leadership realized that. If a chaebôl wanted to have the financial lifeblood to 
expand, it needed to toe the government line, and the government line after Park took 
control was to increase exports at all costs.
443
 
 
This was much easier said than done. Korea in the early 1960’s was a desperately 
poor country, one which many external observers thought might always be a “basket 
case” dependent on external aid.444 Park had no illusions about the country’s 
desperate condition. 
 
When I took over power as the leader of the revolutionary group on 
May 16, 1961, I felt, honestly speaking, as if I had been given a 
pilfered household or a bankrupt firm to manage. Around me I could 
see little hope. The outlook was bleak.
445
 
 
 
Park is not overstating the case here. With a clearly hostile and very dangerous 
neighbor to the north with which it was still technically at war, corrupt, ineffective 
government and a poor record of economic advancement since the end of the Korean 
War, South Korea justifiably held little appeal for international investors. Park’s 
military coup worsened that international image, adding an impression of 
                                                                                                                                            
its tax returns are subject to careful examination, or that its application for bank credit is studiously 
ignored, or that its outstanding bank loans are not renewed. If incentive procedures do not work, 
government agencies show no hesitation in resorting to command backed by compulsion.” 
443 Sudip Chaudhuri, “Government and Economic Development in South Korea, 1961-1979.” Social 
Scientist. Vol. 24, No. 11/12, p. 19-21. In presenting Korea’s efforts to increase exports, Chaudhuri 
remarked that the figures were being followed so closely that “Daily contacts [by government agencies, 
primarily the Ministry of Commerce] were made with the major exporters and problems, if any, were 
directly tackled.” 
444 Mason, “Modernization,” p. 7; Kirk, “Korean Dynasty,” p. 75. Kirk quotes Donald Macdonald, a 
senior State Department official responsible for Korea, recalling that in 1960, “A group of about 15 
Americans were sitting around a table in the White House office building drafting U.S. Policy on Korea. 
The majority position was that Korea was an economic basket case that would always depend on 
American handouts for its existence.” 
445 Park, “To Build A Nation,” p. 105 
 180 
 
governmental instability to the already depressing economic and political landscape. 
Consequently, when Park’s post-coup government went looking for international 
investment, they found little interest.446  
 
Park realized that “economic development in the capitalist manner” was going to take 
an “immense amount” of capital investment and that Korea at that time simply could 
not provide such funding from its own resources.447 However, Park held no belief 
more firmly than pukuk kangbyeong and he was a man whose whole life exemplified 
the 하면 된다 (hamyeon toenda), or “can do,” spirit. Park fervently believed that for a 
poor nation like Korea to become rich it first had to become industrialized.448 
Logically derived from that conclusion was the realization that the money for 
industrial development must be somehow procured since the nation’s future was 
critically dependent on it.449 Park and his economic advisers, determined to find a way 
to finance that development, quickly came to realize that Korea’s limited national 
resources meant a multi-pronged approach was required.  
 
The first approach was to endeavor to increase national savings as much as possible. 
Korean bank deposits paid little and this fact was reflected in their relative scarcity: 
private savings in 1960 amounted to 1.6 percent of Korea’s gross national product 
(GNP).450  Korean taxation was also far too low for the country, amounting to only 
9.9 per cent of a very low GNP.
451
 This was a more serious problem. It reflected the 
persistent and widespread tax evasion by the chaebôl, the only groups in the country 
                                                 
446 Kim and Baik, “Taming and Tamed,” p. 75. 
447 Ibid. 
448 Park, “To Build A Nation,” p. 100 
449 Ibid., p. 105. 
450 Woo, “Race to the Swift,” p. 81. 
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who really had much money, and the failure of previous governments to pursue and 
ensure compliance. The junta tried to address the issue with an ill-considered 1962 
currency reform.452 They also reformed tax collections and exchange controls.453 
While these actions were needed to publicly demonstrate the intent to utilize domestic 
resources for modernization, they did not actually accomplish much with regard to 
increasing the capital available for investment.
 454
  More had to be done. 
 
The second approach was a truly consequential move in that direction. This was the 
1962 Payment Guarantee Act for Foreign Loans.
455
 This legislation provided a 
government guarantee for foreign lenders providing capital to Korean businesses. 
This Act made Korea a much safer prospect for investment capital and ameliorated at 
least some of the uncertainty inherent in foreign lending to Korean firms. A 
government loan guarantee eliminated the risk of both default and exchange rate 
depreciation.456 It soon transpired that the vast majority of foreign loans to Korean 
businesses had a government loan guarantee.457 This was very important at the time as 
foreign lenders were quite skeptical about lending to Korean firms; however, the 
                                                 
452 Park, “To Build A Nation,” p. 123. Park refers to this currency reform as “the representative blunder 
of the first five-year plan.” 
453 Woo, “Race to the Swift,” p. 82. Both of these issues would be addressed several more times during 
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454 Mason, “Modernization,” p. 96, p. 320-322. Mason also notes that the Park government addressed 
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455 Sang-Cheol Lee, “Industrial Policy in the Park Chung-Hee Era,” Developmental Dictatorship and 
the Park Chung-Hee Era: The Shaping of Modernity in the Republic of Korea.  Editor:  Byeong-Cheon 
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457 Ick-Jin Seo, “Industrialization in South Korea: Accumulation and Regulation,” Developmental 
Dictatorship and the Park Chung-Hee Era: The Shaping of Modernity in the Republic of Korea.  Editor:  
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and Cumings, “Korea’s Place,” pp. 314-318. Cumings has a very amusing description of how these 
loan guarantees generally tended to work in Korea for favored firms. 
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effect of this Act changed as the international respect accorded the Korean 
Government increased.458 
 
1965 was the year that the Park administration took its most effective actions toward 
providing sufficient investment capital for Korean industrialization. The third 
approach made was to institute an interest rate reform. Interest rates on banked time 
deposits were raised in September from 15 to 30 per cent, a rate which closely 
approximated the interest rates paid by the informal money lending market in Korea, 
usually referred to as the “curb” market. Prior to this change Koreans had saved a 
relatively small amount of their money in banks, preferring to invest their savings in 
the “curb” markets where they could obtain interest rates of from 3 to 7 per cent 
monthly.459  
 
This interest rate reform proved to be extremely popular with Korean savers: savings 
deposits flooded into the banks, growing by 25 percent in one month, by 50 percent in 
three months, and by 100 percent in three years.
460
 Table 22 below shows that from 
1965 on there was only one year where household gross savings had negative growth 
even though the chart relates savings to a rapidly increasing GNP. Gross government 
and business revenues were never again negative over the period of sampling and the 
amount of domestic investment steadily grew as a proportion of overall total capital 
investment.
461
 
                                                 
458 Woo, “Race to the Swift,” pp. 157-158. As Woo notes, by 1975 Korea was considered one of the 
safer places for foreign investment. The Act then served more as a compliance method for keeping the 
chaebôl in line. 
459 Ibid., pp. 333-335. Mason estimates that prior to the reform the “curb” markets may have accounted 
for as much as up to 40% of bank loans.  
460 Woo, “Race to the Swift,” p. 103; Amsden, “Asia’s Next Giant,” p. 74. 
461 Mason, “Modernization,” p. 334. Mason notes that while the rate of domestic savings obviously 
grew during the time period in question, other sources claim that this may not have been a net gain but 
rather a redistribution of money to the banks and away from the “curb” market. He also notes that other 
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Table 22: TRENDS IN THE RATIO OF SECTORAL GROSS SAVINGS TO GNP, 
1960-1982 (%)462 
 
Year  Gross Domestic Savings Rate Foreign 
Savings 
Rate 
Statistical 
Discrepancy 
Gross 
Savings = 
Gross 
Investment 
Government 
 
Business 
 
Household 
 
Total 
1960 -2.0 5.3 -2.5 0.8 8.6 1.5 10.9 
1961 -1.8 5.9 -1.3 2.9 8.6 1.7 13.2 
1962 -1.5 7.1 -2.3 3.3 10.7 -1.1 12.8 
1963 -0.4 7.1 2.0 8.7 10.4 -1.0 18.1 
1964 0.5 6.5 1.8 8.7 6.9 -1.6 14.0 
1965 1.7 7.7 -2.1 7.4 6.4 1.2 15.0 
1966 2.8 7.5 1.6 11.8 8.4 1.3 21.6 
1967 4.1 7.9 -0.6 11.4 8.8 1.7 21.9 
1968 6.1 7.8 1.1 15.1 11.2 -0.4 25.4 
1969 5.9 7.7 5.2 18.8 10.6 -0.6 28.8 
1970 6.5 7.5 3.4 17.3 9.3 0.2 26.8 
1971 5.4 7.5 2.5 15.4 10.7 -0.8 25.2 
1972 3.6 9.1 3.0 15.7 5.3 0.7 21.7 
1973 4.2 11.4 7.9 23.5 3.8 -1.7 25.6 
1974 2.3 12.1 6.1 20.5 12.4 -1.9 31.0 
1975 4.0 11.3 3.4 18.6 10.4 0.4 29.4 
1976 6.2 10.9 6.0 23.1 2.4 0 25.5 
 
                                                                                                                                            
factors such as taxation reform, the large amount of money entering the country after 1965 from 
Japanese loans and grants and the funds earned by Korea for its participation in the Vietnam War may 
skew these results. It is germane to note that the rise in interest rates was revoked in 1972. However, 
the effects of that revocation may have had less effect than it might normally have had due to the 
Emergency Decree for Economic Stability and Growth issued in that year, which froze the “curb” 
market for three years and restructured all commercial loans to have a maximum interest rate of 16 per 
cent. With the “curb” market effectively frozen, savers had no place to deposit funds except the banks. 
One other point to be made here is that no matter where the money may have been drawn from to 
increase the amount of domestic savings, whether it came from the “curb” or elsewhere, what the 
growth in official bank loans insured was that the tax authorities got their “cut” of the interest paid to 
savers. This legal obligation was quite often disregarded on informal loans. 
462 Kwang-Suk Kim and Park Joon-Kyung. Accounting for Korea’s Rapid Economic Growth, 1963-
1982. Working Paper 84-01, Korea Development Institute. (Seoul: Korea Development Institute, 1984), 
p. 30. Information is extracted from Bank of Korea chart, “National Income in Korea, 1982.” 
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Table 22 (continued): TRENDS IN THE RATIO OF SECTORAL GROSS SAVINGS 
TO GNP, 1960-1982 (%)463  
 
1977 5.6 10.9 8.6 25.1 0.6 1.6 27.3 
1978 6.5 9.9 10.0 26.4 3.3 1.5 31.1 
1979 7.2 9.7 9.7 26.6 7.6 1.2 35.4 
1980 6.2 8.2 5.5 19.9 10.2 1.4 31.5 
1981 6.7 8.3 4.6 19.6 7.9 0.9 28.4 
1982 6.7 9.7 5.1 21.5 4.8 -0.1 26.2 
 
THE 1965 NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH JAPAN 
 
The interest rate reform in 1965, along with tax reform, would eventually provide a 
much larger domestic source to help slake Korea’s thirst for capital investment.
464
 
However, Chung-Hee Park was a man in a hurry. For him, the future was now and he 
wanted Korean industrialization to proceed as quickly as possible. The limiting factor, 
however, was capital and Korea simply could not produce or acquire enough of it in 
the early 1960’s to industrialize at the pace Park thought necessary. It soon became 
clear that a sufficient economic surplus to permit rapid industrialization could not be 
extracted quickly enough from domestic sources. Park also soon found that Korea’s 
foreign aid sources would not step forward to fill the funding gap. Consequently, Park 
and his advisers decided to try leveraging Korea’s political status in an attempt to 
obtain development capital.  
 
                                                 
463 Kwang-Suk Kim and Park Joon-Kyung. Accounting for Korea’s Rapid Economic Growth, 1963-
1982. Working Paper 84-01, Korea Development Institute. (Seoul: Korea Development Institute, 1984), 
p. 30. Information is extracted from Bank of Korea chart, “National Income in Korea, 1982.” 
464 Park, “To Build A Nation,” p. 113. Park claimed a “seven-fold increase in bank savings” in the next 
five years after the implementation of the interest rate rise. Park also mentioned that the tax reform, 
which produced greater compliance, “allowed the government to formulate a balanced budget.” 
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Korea and Japan had coexisted in a state of cold hostility since the end of the Second 
World War. Most Koreans felt they had been brutally treated during the colonial era 
and retained many justified grievances against Japan. The popular anger against Japan 
was visceral, intense and widespread and it had been strengthened by anti-Japanese 
educational indoctrination conducted in Korean schools since independence.465 The 
Rhee regime had been quite vocal in its public denunciations of Japan.
466
  
If one considers inter-Korean relations as distinct from strictly “foreign” policy, there 
was no more politically volatile issue in Korea’s international relations than its 
relationship with Japan. As President, Chung-Hee Park was well aware that any 
attempt to normalize relations with Japan was fraught with risk. Normalization of 
diplomatic relations with Japan was bound to be a dangerous topic for any Korean 
politician since there was a very large group of Koreans whose anti-Japanese anger 
could not be assuaged and who would never countenance it under any circumstances.  
 
Adding to the inherent difficulty was the propaganda coup normalization would 
provide to the North. Il-Sung Kim had actually built in the North what Communists so 
often condemn, a “cult of personality,” and a great deal of the mythos upon which it 
rested focused on exaggerated tales of his success as an anti-Japanese guerilla 
fighter.467  Park knew Il-Sung Kim would take great pleasure in castigating him as a 
traitor betraying Korea to the hated former colonial power. Because Park was a 
former Japanese Army officer who had seized power through a military coup, such 
criticisms had a certain amount of apparent credibility to the uninformed or those 
opposed to the government. Park’s democratic 1963 election notwithstanding, taking 
                                                 
465 Ibid., p. 130. 
466 Cumings, “Korea’s Place,” p. 318-320. 
467 Ibid., p. 160-162. Even Cumings, who is by no means unsympathetic to North Korea, refers to the 
stories commonly heard in North Korea concerning Kim’s war record as “ridiculous tales.” 
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the lead on this issue left him very vulnerable to accusations of being 친일(chin’il, or 
pro-Japanese) at Korea’s expense and he knew it.  
 
Distasteful as the thought of it was for many Koreans, normalization was not a 
completely unvisited subject. While the issue of normalization with Japan was 
extremely contentious within Korea, it had been discussed to some degree with both 
the Syngman Rhee and the Chang Myeon governments. Korea’s negotiating position 
under Rhee started with blanket demands for massive reparations and an imperial 
apology.
468
 In both areas the Japanese believed that the Koreans were asking far too 
much and, after initial contacts, the discussions were terminated.469 However, the 
situation could not be left alone. It was no secret that the United States had wanted 
South Korea to normalize relationships with Japan since the 1950’s as part of its 
regional plan to strengthen East Asia against Communism.470 Urged by the Americans 
to present some position on the issue, the Rhee regime had refused to even consider 
normalization for anything less than $2 billion in reparations. Its short-lived successor, 
the Chang Myeon government, dropped the figure to $1.2 billion.471  
 
Chung-Hee Park, facing an absolute decline in American foreign aid and Korea’s 
demonstrated and continuing inability to attract foreign capital, could not afford to be 
unreasonable. Nor was he as viscerally intransigent about the issue as Rhee, who the 
Americans saw as a saboteur intentionally adopting policy stances he knew would 
                                                 
468 Jung-Hoon Lee, “Normalization of Relations with Japan: Toward a New Partnership,” The Park 
Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea.  Editors:  Byung-Kook Kim and Ezra F. Vogel. 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), p. 433. 
469 Cumings, p. 318-9. 
470 Mason, “Modernization,” p. 48. Amsden, p. 74. Amsden notes that the U.S. was putting “enormous 
pressure” on Korea to normalize relations in the 1960’s 
471 Lee, “Normalization,” p. 444. 
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ensure Japanese rejection.472 Park correctly recognized normalization as a valuable 
bargaining chip which Korea could trade for desperately needed development funding 
and technology transfer. 
After the coup, Park did not waste time. Through intermediaries he started discussions 
with the Japanese shortly after taking power. He actually conducted a state visit to 
Japan in November 1961.
473
 While his visit was a good start and clearly demonstrated 
a changed Korean attitude, arriving at a suitable agreement proved no easy task. Once 
the actual process of negotiation began, it transpired that there were many issues to 
resolve, some of which required extremely delicate handling.
474
 In a reversal of earlier 
negotiations where Korea had deliberately obstructed progress, the Japanese now 
found themselves excusing their delays on the grounds that the Japanese political 
system did not have the speed and flexibility of Park’s Korea, where “the military 
regime can put into effect its decisions instantly.”475  
 
In the event it turned out that Park’s government did not have quite the latitude the 
Japanese thought. As word spread in Korea about the progress of the negotiations, an 
anti-government backlash emerged. Park ended up forced to declare martial law and 
close numerous universities nationwide as rioting and other disturbances erupted 
throughout 1965. Park, writing in 1971 about the protests, noted that  
 
I knew this opposition was motivated by patriotism. However, the 
force of conservative public opinion could not be allowed to stand in 
the way of national development. I attempted to convince the people 
                                                 
472 Cumings, “Korea’s Place,” p. 318. Rhee truly hated Japan and Japanese; Park obviously had a much 
better opinion of them. 
473 Lee, “Normalization,” p. 440-441. 
474 The Dokdo/Liancourt Rocks issue was one of them. The normalization treaty makers simply had to 
agree to sort it out by diplomatic means at a later time. As of this writing, fifty years later, that time has 
yet to arrive. 
475 Ibid., p. 18. Lee here is quoting Japanese Prime Minister Ikeda speaking to U.S. Secretary of State 
Dean Rusk in November 1961. 
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that a changed international situation made normalized relations with 
Japan a necessity. In spite of my effort, the situation worsened and a 
proclamation of martial law was necessary.476  
 
 
The size and frequency of the student protests was such that they were described as “a 
sea of demonstrators” who were “vowed to oppose unto death any attempt at restoring 
relations.”477 There is no doubt Park took a major political chance in forwarding 
normalization against such strong popular opposition. He was certainly aware that 
student-led demonstrations had brought down the Syngman Rhee government and 
provided justification for Park’s own coup. However, Park was certain he was right 
and he would not be thwarted. Realizing that his own government was in serious 
danger, Park responded to the challenge by calling out four infantry divisions (almost 
50,000 troops) to suppress the dissent. His government forcibly censored the media as 
well.
478
 Park’s actions were certainly not democratic but they were highly effective in 
ending the protests.  
 
With the opposition successfully quelled, normalization was finally accomplished in 
late 1965 after a considerable amount of behind-the-scenes urging by the United 
States.479 In the end, the sum agreed between Japan and the Park government was 
$800 million: $300 million in grants, $200 million in Japanese government loans and 
$300 million in private commercial loans.
480
 For South Korea, a nation whose total 
                                                 
476 Chung-Hee Park, “To Build A Nation,” p. 130. See also Joo-Hong Kim, “The Armed Forces,” The 
Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea.  Editors:  Byung-Kook Kim and Ezra F. 
Vogel. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), pp. 172-173. 
477 Woo, “Race to the Swift,” p. 86. 
478 Joo-Hong Kim, “The Armed Forces,” p. 172. Kim notes that armed soldiers forced recalcitrant 
judges at gunpoint to issue warrants for student leaders and broke into certain newspaper and television 
facilities to insure they did not write or broadcast opinions critical of the normalization. 
479 Woo, “Race to the Swift,” p.  
480 Seung K. Ko, “South Korean-Japanese Relations since the 1965 Normalization Pacts.” Modern 
Asian Studies Vol. 6, No. 1 (1972), p. 52. Ko notes that the total claim fund of $500 million in grants 
and government loans was supposed to be disbursed within a ten-year period. Ko also notes that $45.7 
million in debts owed by Korean firms to Japanese businesses was paid out of the grant funding. 
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1964 exports amounted to roughly $200 million, such a large sum of investment 
capital proved extremely helpful.481 Moreover, the $300 million in private loans was 
just the start of what would become a much bigger flow of Japanese capital.482 Most 
important of all, however, was that this money was what allowed Chung-Hee Park to 
accomplish his most cherished industrial aim. 
 
Of all the investment projects possible, Park most desired an integrated steel mill for 
Korea.483 Park was fond of saying, “철은 국력 (steel is national power),” and he was 
determined to have that power for Korea as he correctly believed it essential for both 
industrial progress and national defense.484 Park had visited the massive Mitsubishi 
factories in Japan while a cadet at the Japanese Military Academy.485 For him, that 
impressive manufacturing capacity epitomized the Japanese national power that 
sprang from the Meiji Restoration modernization. He also knew that the Japanese 
military officers who ran Manchukuo believed Japanese industrial might was what 
had allowed them to defeat the Russians in 1905 and expand the Japanese Empire.486 
These lessons were not lost on him.487 
 
Park knew an integrated steel mill was critically important for Korean 
industrialization. Park’s problem was that no one in the world wanted to help Korea 
                                                 
481 Woo, “Race to the Swift,” p. 87. 
482 Sung-Hwan Jo, “The Economic Relations between South Korea and Japan: Review and Prospects,” 
Working Paper No. 7808, Korea Development Institute, 1978, 35-36. Jo notes that by June 1977 
Japanese commercial loans to Korea had amounted to $981.4 million. 
483 Sang-Young Rhyu and Seok-Jin Lew. “Pohang Iron and Steel Company,” The Park Chung Hee Era: 
The Transformation of South Korea.  Editors:  Byung-Kook Kim and Ezra F. Vogel. (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2011), p. 323. 
484 Woo, “Race to the Swift,” p. 120. 
485 Chung-in Moon and Byung-Jun Joon , “Modernization Strategy,” p. 119. 
486 Michael A. Barnhart. Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919-1941. 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987) pp. 21-27, 34-36, 46-49. During Park’s time in Manchuria he 
would have heard a great deal about both the successes and deficiencies of Japan’s mobilization 
preparations. 
487  
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build such a mill and Korea had neither the technological knowledge nor the capital to 
do so on its own. Through chaebôl intermediaries Park tried in 1961, 1962, and 1964 
to obtain international financing for an integrated steel mill.488 In all of these attempts 
Park found that the potential lenders thought Korea had neither the market nor the 
comparative advantage to justify such a facility.489 Park and his economic advisers 
understood that a properly sized integrated steel mill would benefit Korea’s economy 
both through import substitution and export sales.490 These were critical areas since 
Korea had a worsening balance of payment problem exacerbated by the fact that by 
1970 iron and steel products were second only to crude oil on the list of import 
expenses.491  
 
Finally, after one last unsuccessful attempt in 1967 to obtain external financing, Park 
directed his government to approach Japan about using some of their reparation funds 
for the construction of an integrated steel mill.492 In February 1969 a retired Army 
general, Tae-Jun Pak, approached senior members of the Japanese steel industry on 
behalf of President Park and Korea’s Economic Planning Board. Pak’s suggestion was 
that Japan’s steel industry consider helping South Korea build a steel mill in order for 
Japan to retain a sizable share of the Japanese funding committed to Korea. Pak’s 
proposal was favorably received by the Japanese and a feasibility study was 
                                                 
488  Rhyu and Lew. “Pohang Iron and Steel Company,” pp. 325, 328-9. 
489 Ibid., p. 331. This was a rational judgment on the basis of what was known at the time. Korea had 
neither iron ore nor coal in sufficient quantities to operate an integrated steel mill. All raw materials 
would have to be imported thus adding another drain on Korea’s already problematic balance of 
payments. 
490 Amsden, “Asia’s Next Giant,” p. 295. Amsden notes that one of the problems with external 
investors’ unwillingness to back a Korean integrated steel mill was the size of the mill the Koreans 
wished to build. The international investors were certain that the Koreans were overreaching. In the end 
it turned out even the most optimistic Korean estimates were far short of the actual amounts of steel 
required in Korea. 
491 Rhyu and Lew. “Pohang Iron and Steel Company,” pp. 324. 
492 The Japanese never referred to the money provided to South Korea as “reparations,” fearing that use 
of the term would have pernicious effects on their international image. The term they preferred was 
“development grant” or “development loan.” 
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conducted which returned a positive appraisal. After some heavy lobbying for the 
project from the heads of Fuji Steel and Yawata Steel, opposition from Japanese 
government ministries was overcome and the project was approved in September 
1969.
493
 Surprisingly enough, given the previous seven long years of fruitless 
searching for a way to obtain an integrated steel mill for Korea, Park’s negotiators 
completed this deal in only nine months. The Japanese handled all design engineering 
and material procurement; construction started in April 1970. The mill was completed 
in July 1973. Its final cost was $123.7 million and its initial output was slightly over 1 
million tons per year.
494
 
 
Once the mill was complete, its progress surprised everyone. Confounding the 
skeptics, the new enterprise, named Pohang Iron and Steel Company (POSCO) after 
the town where it was located,495 proved profitable from its outset.496 Deliberately 
retained as a state-owned enterprise (SOE) to avoid giving any one chaebôl such 
tremendous influence over Korean manufacturing,497 POSCO’s unexpected financial 
success was a major accomplishment.
498
 Chung-Hee Park had deduced that Korea had 
an imperative necessity for an integrated steel mill if it was going to become an 
industrial power, and he was the most important driving factor in accomplishing that 
                                                 
493 Ibid., pp. 333-334. It is interesting that the public justification provided by the Japanese steel 
manufacturers rested on South Korea’s ability to resist Communism. 
494 Amsden, “Asia’s Next Giant,” p. 293. 
495 Kyoung-Ho Shin and Paul S. Ciccantell, “The Steel and Shipbuilding Industries of South Korea: 
Rising East Asia and Globalization, Journal of World-Systems Research .Vol. XV, Number 2, p. 179. 
The authors note that one of the major reasons for choosing Pohang as the location for the mill was its 
deepwater port, capable of berthing large bulk carriers bringing iron ore and coal in and taking finished 
steel products out. 
496 Rhyu and Lew. “Pohang Iron and Steel Company,” p. 325. 
497 Amsden, “Asia’s Next Giant,” p. 295. 
498 POSCO has been highly subsidized in that it was provided with large amounts of long-term low 
interest loans and major infrastructure improvements including construction of dedicated paved roads, 
railroad spurs, and major port facilities. Given POSCO’s stellar economic performance, however, the 
Korean Government’s investment has paid off quite handsomely. 
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feat.499 However, even he could not have anticipated just how much POSCO was 
going to benefit both Korean business and the national economy.500 The clearly 
apparent demand for POSCO’s steel induced the Korean Government to announce an 
expansion of POSCO even before completion of the initial mill.
501
   
 
POSCO’s first piece of Korean-made steel emerged into a Korea voraciously hungry 
for its products; it could have sold everything it made in Korea without bothering with 
exports.502 However, in keeping with Korea’s plan for the mill to serve both as an 
import-substitution facilitator and an export generator, POSCO set export targets of 
30% in 1974 and 1975 and actually exported 40% of production.503 POSCO’s success 
should be seen as a microcosm of what made the Park regime so successful in its 
promotion of Korean industrialization. From the government side, highly placed 
bureaucrats, answerable personally to President Park, paid close attention to insuring 
the industry’s technical and economic requirements were met while also constantly 
evaluating its production results.504 From the business side, men like Tae-Jun Pak and 
Ju-Yung Chung had extremely easy access to President Park. Park wanted this 
industrialization to succeed and through having close access to both the government 
                                                 
499 Rhyu and Lew, “Pohang Iron and Steel Company,” p. 336, 340, 344. These historians refer to Park 
as both POSCO’s “mother” and the “pivotal variable.” 
500 Amsden, “Asia’s Next Giant,” p. 296. Amsden notes here that Korean labor costs per ton of shipped 
steel in 1973 were $7.06. This compares with Japanese costs of $23.83, British costs of $27.06, 
German costs of $32.86 and American costs of $37.83. As with many other industries in South Korea, 
such low labor costs provided a competitive advantage which allowed Korea to sell their products 
cheaper and to build up investment capital. 
501 Rhyu and Lew, “Pohang Iron and Steel Company,” p. 340. This announcement came in July 1973, 
with President Park stating that Korea would increase its steel production from one million tons in 
1973 to ten million tons by 1980. 
502 Amsden, “Asia’s Next Giant,” pp. 301-304. Amsden notes that up to 1978-9, POSCO’s prime 
function was to increase output to satisfy the excess demand from home industry for its products. 
503 Ibid. 
504 Eprime Eshag, “Successful Manipulation of Market Forces: Case of South Korea, 1961-78,” 
Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 26, No. 11/12, Annual Number (Mar. 1991), p. 635. Eshag notes 
that in the 1960’s the export targets were very closely followed by the Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry, to the point where they had “a computer printout of progress on targets by industry, by firm 
and by geographic areas up to date to the preceding day.” 
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view and the business assessment, Park could obtain a solid understanding of what 
was really happening in any given industry. 
 
Economic history has, over time, produced a conventional wisdom about nationalized 
industry. Based on long experience in many countries, it posits that nationalized 
industries are highly subject to the stultifying influences of both monopolistic rent-
seeking and moral hazard.505 Also, with their survival putatively guaranteed through 
state funding, such entities are less focused on external business performance than 
internal politics since they are all but immune from Schumpeterian “creative 
destruction.”506 Consequently, the conventional wisdom is that state-owned industries 
are invariably inefficient, poorly run and unviable without massive subsidies.  
 
POSCO’s performance proved that the conventional wisdom is not always correct. 
Chung-Hee Park took an intense interest in this project; between 1970 and 1973 he 
made thirteen trips to the construction site and also regularly conferred with Tae-Jun 
Pak on the recruitment of top managers.
507
 Hiring at POSCO was strictly based on 
merit; there was no “featherbedding” or nepotism allowed. Those good enough to be 
hired as POSCO employees received a great deal of both theoretical and practical 
training in Korea and overseas.508 Almost six hundred were sent abroad for technical 
                                                 
505 Anne O. Krueger, “Government Failures in Development,” The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
Vol. 4, No. 3 (Summer, 1990), pp. 9-23. Krueger does an excellent job of laying out the many pitfalls 
awaiting nationalized business and the poor judgment of those who so eagerly called for governmental 
intervention in developing countries during the 1960’s. One of her key points is to note that “One must 
ask why economists were ever comfortable with the simultaneous beliefs that individuals in the private 
sector act in their self-interest and individuals in the public sector are motivated by a Benthamite vision 
of social justice.” 
506 The interminably extended discussion about where to put the headquarters of British Shipbuilding is 
an excellent example of this tendency. 
507 Rhyu and Lew, “Pohang Iron and Steel Company,” p. 336.  
508 Amsden, “Asia’s Next Giant,” p. 302. 
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education.509 Managers were trained to be able to understand and operate all plant 
equipment. When the plant was initially started, the best engineers POSCO had were 
placed on the production line; shift foremen were experienced engineers with college 
degrees.
510
  
 
Park was determined to see this venture succeed and took a very “hands-on” approach 
to seeing that it did. Between choosing competent, honest leadership and making sure 
that leadership knew of the Blue House’s strong and continuing interest in POSCO’s 
performance, Park did all he could to mitigate the all but inevitable problems 
pertaining to state ownership. Park’s personal experience in Manchukuo and his study 
of Japan’s economic history had convinced him that “regulated capitalism” was the 
proper form for Korean industrialization.511 He looked at POSCO as an unusual 
circumstance where state ownership was an unavoidable necessity. He knew the 
problems inherent with such ownership and took pains to insure that they were 
avoided where possible and kept under control where not.  
 
The nationalization of this industry paid one particularly large dividend for Park’s 
industrialization drive: it allowed governmental interference in both client selection 
and product pricing. For the purposes of this study, those were critical features since 
POSCO was directed to provide steel at bargain price levels to domestic customers.512 
Since 80% of all the thick steel plates POSCO produced were going to Korea’s 
shipyards by 1975, the discount rates helped Korea’s shipyards work through the 
                                                 
509 Ibid., p. 305.  More than 1500 workers were sent overseas for training between 1968 and 1979. 
510 Ibid., p. 315. 
511 Lee, “Park Chung-Hee,” p. 130 
512 Amsden, “Asia’s Next Giant,” p. 296. 
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decade-long shipbuilding slump and subsidized an even more important export 
industry.513  
 
Britain and Korea handled the potential synergies of steelmaking and shipbuilding in 
diametrically opposed fashions. While provision of discounted steel to British 
shipbuilders was strongly recommended in the Geddes Report, Britain’s efforts to 
encourage this failed completely, running aground on the shoals of government 
regulation and steelmaker reluctance.514 Despite the obvious connection and the 
Geddes Report’s urging, the British Government did not consider forcing even a 
nationalized company such as British Steel to sell at a discount. They did not see such 
actions as part of their remit as a government. Money for subsidies they might hand 
out freely but setting pricing policy for a business, particularly to another domestic 
manufacturer, was not acceptable. The Korean Government had no such qualms and 
POSCO management would never have even entertained the idea of declining a 
government directive. If the Korean Government told POSCO to sell steel at a certain 
price to Korean shipbuilders, they would know arguing was fruitless. They were fully 
aware that Chung-Hee Park’s government would not accept anything less than full 
and immediate compliance and would compel it if it was not granted freely.
515
  
 
THE VIETNAM WAR AND ITS CONTRIBUTION TO KOREAN 
INDUSTRIALIZATION 
 
                                                 
513 Ibid., p. 296. Amsden here quotes a Paine Webber report analyzing POSCO’s suitability as an 
investment possibility for American capital. 
514 Geddes Report, pp. 58-59. 
515 Given the close relationship between Tae-Jun Pak and President Chung-Hee Park, the matter would 
almost certainly have been discussed and settled to Park’s satisfaction long before a formal directive 
would have been required. The major difference between Korea and Britain on this issue would have 
been the presence of a Chung-Hee Park in a position to command a synergistic outcome. He, working 
through his proxies, the Economic Planning Unit, could demand accurate financial information from 
both businesses. Park could then order each side to make whatever sacrifices were deemed necessary to 
provide the desired level of assistance. 
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President Chung-Hee Park found that 1965 presented him with another golden 
opportunity to leverage South Korea’s political position for economic gain. The 
United States under Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy had provided relatively 
modest amounts of financial and military aid to the government of South Vietnam. 
What Kennedy might have done had he lived is a moot question; after his November 
22, 1963 assassination Kennedy’s successor, Lyndon Johnson, chose to make a major 
commitment of American military forces to South Vietnam.516 Once that decision was 
made and implemented, South Korea was requested by the United States on May 1, 
1964, to dispatch troops to South Vietnam in a display of anti-Communist 
solidarity.517 While the initial number of troops dispatched was small and confined to 
non-combat forces and medical personnel, the requests from the U.S. escalated 
rapidly and soon involved combat troops. In 1965 the first combat troops from South 
Korea, the Tiger Division, were dispatched to South Vietnam. South Korea eventually 
had as many as two divisions of combat troops serving there along with their 
auxiliaries, a force which at its height numbered in excess of 50,000 military 
personnel.
518
   
 
Park was most certainly opposed to Communism and that fact could not have been 
more clearly demonstrated by his firmly capitalist desire to extract the best deal 
possible from the Americans in exchange for South Korean military support. He came 
away with a very good one; South Korea’s finances received a major boost from the 
                                                 
516 Min Yong Lee, “The Vietnam War: South Korea’s Search for National Security,” The Park Chung 
Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea.  Editors:  Byung-Kook Kim and Ezra F. Vogel. 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), p. 408. Min notes that General Chung-Hee Park, acting 
in his capacity as junta leader at his meeting with President Kennedy in November 1961, told Kennedy 
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517 Ibid., p. 409. Lee also notes that the South Vietnamese President, Ngo Dinh Diem, had requested 
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518 Ibid., p. 403. 
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Vietnam War.519 In 1966 the U.S. requested a second division of South Korean 
combat troops for Vietnam. After considerable negotiation, an explicit agreement 
between American ambassador Winthrop Brown and President Park’s Chief of Staff, 
Lee Tong-Weon, guaranteed the U.S. would do the following: 
1. Provide South Korea with additional funding to meet all costs for mobilization, 
deployment and maintenance of South Korean troops in Vietnam. The U.S. 
also agreed to cover the costs of mobilizing and maintaining one combat-ready 
reserve division and one brigade. U.S. support was to cover all supporting 
units as well.  
2. Suspend Military Assistance Program transfers as long as South Korea 
maintained two combat divisions in South Vietnam.
520
 
3. To the extent possible, commensurate with the principles of fair competition, 
the U.S. would utilize South Korea as a supply base for military equipment, 
supplies and services to be provided to South Korean troops. Under the same 
constraints, where possible U.S. Agency for International Development would 
purchase from South Korean sources goods destined to be used for rural 
construction, pacification, relief and supply projects in South Vietnam. 
4. Increase technical assistance to South Korea in the general area of export 
promotion. 
5. Provide new U.S. Agency for International Development loans for South 
Korea in addition to the $150 million already designated  in May 1965, said 
                                                 
519 Hak Chung Choo, Effects of the Viet Nam War and the Normalization of Korean-Japanese 
Relations on Korean Economic Development in the 1960’s. (Seoul: Korea Development Institute, 
1972), p. 10. Choo notes that “the economic consequences of the Viet Nam War were all favorable.” 
520 The Military Assistance Program (MAP) Korea, as with other U.S. Military Assistance Programs, 
had a procedure for providing excess U.S. equipment to assistance recipients. Much of this equipment 
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loans to be provided under the same eligibility requirements as the initial loan 
package. 
6. Provide $150 million in program loans in FY 1966 to support South Korean 
exports and development projects in South Vietnam.
521
 
These commercial requests were in addition to ten other military assistance requests 
included in the memorandum, one of which was to “provide over the next few years 
substantial military equipment for the modernization of the South Korean armed 
forces.522 Direct payments from the United States to South Korea between 1965 and 
1972 were in excess of 1 billion dollars.
523
 This sum does not include the foreign 
currency remittances provided to South Korea from South Vietnam as payment for 
South Korean exports or services. Much of this money originated in the U.S., going to 
South Korea via a short detour through the South Vietnamese Treasury.  The United 
States also in 1971 agreed to provide 1.5 billion dollars to the South Korean military 
over a five-year period to assist in further modernization of the South Korean 
military.524 In short, the Vietnam War remittances provided more money for South 
Korea’s industrialization drive than normalizing diplomatic relations with Japan. 
 
South Korea’s investment capital did not come cheaply. The country paid a heavy 
price for its Vietnam intervention. The butcher’s bill was 4,960 Republic of Korea 
soldiers killed, 10,962 wounded and 6 missing in action. In addition, by 1992 there 
were almost 37,000 South Korean Vietnam veterans dealing with the aftereffects of 
Agent Orange exposure. Despite the cost, Park’s opinion was that South Korea really 
                                                 
521 Lee, “The Vietnam War,” p. 419.  
522 Ibid. While the South Korean forces dispatched to South Vietnam did have modern equipment with 
which to fight, only two of the six regiments in South Vietnam when the troops were withdrawn were 
allowed to take their modern equipment with them back to Korea. 
523 Woo, “Race to the Swift,” p. 94. 
524 Lee, “The Vietnam War,” p. 425. 
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had little choice but to become involved in the war. Speaking in Daejeon in 1967, 
Park made the following statement. 
 
I will give you a more frank reason for the troop deployment instead of 
saying, as I have been, that we have to repay our debt or that 
communization of South East Asia will affect us adversely. We could 
have chosen not to deploy our troops when asked. Then the two U.S. 
divisions deployed in South Korea would have been transferred to 
Vietnam. How could we have been able to stop them while not sending 
our own forces? We could not have. 525 
 
 
This was a legitimate concern. The American ambassador to Korea, Winthrop Brown, 
had intimated in 1964 that at least some troops would be withdrawn if South Korea 
did not assist in the war effort.
526
  The U.S. was not seeking to extricate itself from 
South Korea. However, the U.S. was well aware that sending South Korean forces to 
Vietnam was a much cheaper alternative than the same number of American troops 
and wanted to take advantage of that cost differential.527 Consequently, had South 
Korea not contributed troops a partial drawdown was probable but it almost certainly 
would not have resulted in all troops being withdrawn.   
 
Despite its losses, the South Korean military gained a lot from the war. Along with a 
great deal of new equipment, the South Korean military acquired large-scale combat 
experience, something Korean soldiers had not seen since 1953. This would augment 
                                                 
525 Hong-Koo Han, “South Korea and the Vietnam War,” Developmental Dictatorship and the Park 
Chung-Hee Era: The Shaping of Modernity in the Republic of Korea.  Editor:  Byeong-Cheon Lee. 
(Paramus: Homa and Sekey Books, 2006), p. 261. 
526 Lee, “The Vietnam War,” p. 410. 
527 Woo, “Race to the Swift,” p. 93. Woo is here quoting Jack Valenti, Special Assistant to President 
Lyndon B. Johnson, commenting to Johnson that the cost of sending South Koreans to Vietnam was 
“peanuts compared to what it would be to send a comparable number of Americans.” Jack Valenti to 
the President, February 25, 1966, Executive File, Box 49, WHCF, LBJ Library. 
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the lessons learned during the Second Korean Conflict.528 The two generals who 
would succeed Chung-Hee Park, Doo-Hwan Chun and Tae-Woo Noh, were both 
Vietnam War veterans.  
THE WORLD MEETS HYUNDAI 
 
The military was not the only group of Koreans that would be involved in, and 
financially benefit from, the Southeast Asian conflict. In 1965 the Hyundai 
Construction Company was awarded its first major construction project outside of 
Korea, a World Bank-funded development project in Thailand.
 529
 The task was to 
build a 58-mile (98 km) road through thick jungles between Pattani and Narathiwat. 
Even though by 1960 Hyundai was Korea’s largest construction company, the fact 
that a Korean firm had won an international construction bid was a major national 
news story.530 The initial departure of Hyundai workers to Thailand was broadcast 
live to the nation by the Korean Broadcasting System.
531
 Despite the initial euphoria, 
once their bid had been accepted and the work started, Hyundai had good reason to 
wonder if they had been wise to want it.  
 
The litany of problems was long. First, Hyundai’s bid of $5,220,000 proved to be far 
too low as estimated costs of construction equipment and time were much greater than 
                                                 
528 Maj. Daniel P. Bolger, “Scenes from an Unfinished War: Low-Intensity Conflict in Korea, 1966-
1969,” Leavenworth Papers, No. 19, U.S. Army, Combat Studies Institute (Ft. Leavenworth: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1991), pp 75-87. The Second Korean Conflict was the series of guerilla 
attacks on South Korean and American objectives between 1966 and 1969. This included the 20 
January 1968 assassination attempt on President Park by the North Korean 124th Army Unit, commonly 
referred to as the Blue House Raid. 
529 Woo, “Race to the Swift,” p. 96. Woo lumps this Hyundai project in with other Vietnam-war era 
Korean projects and intimates that this award was given to Hyundai as part of the American economic 
remuneration to Korea for its assistance in Vietnam. 
530 Hyundai Heavy Industries, Traditions of Excellence: Hyundai Shipyard, Yesterday and Today. 
(Seoul: Hyundai Heavy Industries, 1998), p. 37. Hyundai had some experience in building to foreign 
construction specifications. They had performed a considerable amount of work for the U.S. military in 
Korea. 
531 Kirk, “Korean Dynasty,” p. 76.  
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predicted.532 Second, the Koreans found themselves working in much more difficult 
circumstances than they had expected or had ever experienced. Thailand’s drenching 
monsoon season washed out much of their work, a problem exacerbated by the fact 
that they had not properly followed some construction specifications. There were 
certain aspects of the project where Hyundai had tried to “cut corners” as they 
sometimes did in Korea. That approach quickly redounded to Hyundai’s detriment.
 533
 
As examples, they had originally purchased used and unsuitable construction 
equipment which quickly broke down and had to be replaced. Eventually Hyundai 
ended up buying new, top-of-the-line equipment to complete the project. Hyundai 
initially set wage scales for Thai workers at a much lower rate than Koreans received. 
That attempt ended when Hyundai supervisors found themselves confronted by angry 
Thai workers armed with knives and pistols.534 With their personnel literally held at 
gunpoint, Hyundai quickly realized they had no choice but to concede pay parity. 
When the project was finally satisfactorily completed, Hyundai had lost more than $3 
million dollars on it.535 Hyundai learned some tough lessons in Thailand, two of 
which were that if a company intends to be successful in international construction, it 
needs to meet international quality standards and be very respectful of the customs 
and culture of the local citizenry. Most important, however was that the project had 
been satisfactorily completed. It took more time and was more costly than expected, 
but it did get successfully finished. 
 
To say it was a difficult project for Hyundai is to understate the problem. Hyundai’s 
founder, Ju-Yung Chung, describes it as a “complete failure” and “a coming-of-age” 
                                                 
532 Ibid., p. 75. 
533 Ju-Yung Chung, 시련은 있어도, 실패는 없다 (Ordeals but No Failures). (Seoul: Jae Samkihoek, 
1991), p. 99. In this autobiography, Chung wrote, “I took risks and I was burned.” 
534 Kirk, “Korean Dynasty,” p. 76. 
535 Steers, “Made in Korea,” p. 64. 
 202 
 
initiation.536 However, it did three very good things for Hyundai. First, it gave many 
of Hyundai’s managing personnel, Ju-Yung Chung not least, some very useful 
experience in dealing with international business requirements. He compared this 
project’s effect on Hyundai with that of a frog peering out from a well for the first 
time in its life.537 Second, it demonstrated to Chung-Hee Park and the remainder of 
the South Korean Government’s inner circle that Hyundai Construction had the 
capability of taking on international projects and successfully completing them. Third, 
it showed Ju-Yung Chung just how accommodating Park and the South Korean 
Government were willing to be for a major exporter.
538
 This last would be a matter of 
major importance to Hyundai as they were an industrial upstart trying to break in to 
Korea’s top economic stratum. In 1965, the majority of Korea’s ten major chaebôls 
were still those who had reached the top through import substitution practices.539 Ju-
Yung Chung and Hyundai came away from their Thailand experience knowing there 
was change in the air and, as a Korean business hoping to obtain favorable treatment 
from Korean officialdom, being a solid exporter was the path to success. 
A KOREAN HORATIO ALGER 
 
Hyundai’s founder, Ju-Yung Chung, was a true Horatio Alger, rags-to-riches 
entrepreneur who had done incredibly well in rising from agrarian poverty to being 
the head of a major construction company in South Korea. Chung was the eldest son 
of a farmer in Asan, a small village located in what is now North Korea. Asan lies 
approximately thirty miles north of the eastern end of Korea’s Demilitarized Zone.  
                                                 
536 Kirk, “Korean Dynasty,” pp. 76-77. 
537 Steers, “Made in Korea,” p. 63. 
538 Hyundai, “Traditions,” p. 37. The Pattani-Narathiwat Highway Project represented 4.3% of Korea’s 
total exports for 1965. When Se Yung Chung had asked if Hyundai could bid on the project, he had 
been told that they would have to show they could afford to spend $2 million on the project. The South 
Korean Government quickly provided a letter guaranteeing that Hyundai would have the needed 
funding. This large and immediate display of support for exporting businesses impressed Chung greatly. 
539 Kirk, “Korean Dynasty,” pp. 58-59.  
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Chung’s family was poor but they had the means to send Chung to an elementary 
school run by his grandfather. 
 
Table 23: CHANGES IN RANKING OF THE TEN MAJOR CHAEBȎLS540  
Ranking 1960 1972 1979 1987 
1 Samsung Samsung Hyundai Hyundai 
2 Samho LG LG Samsung 
3 Gaepung Hanjin Samsung LG 
4 Taihan 
Electronic Wire 
Sinjin Daewoo Daewoo 
5 LG Ssangyoung Hyosung SK 
6 Dongyang Hyundai Kookje Ssangyoung 
7 Geokdong 
Shipping 
Taihan Electric 
Wire 
Hanjin Hanhwa 
8 Hankook Glass Hanhwa Ssangyoung Hanjin 
9 Donglib Geokdong 
Shipping 
Hanhwa Hyosung 
10 Taechang 
Spinning 
Daenong SK Lotte 
 
 
By the time he was in his teens he had recognized that there had to be an easier way to 
make a living than farming rocky, relatively unproductive soil. After several earlier 
attempts failed, in 1934 Chung finally managed to permanently escape his home town 
and go to Seoul. There, after an initial stint as a stevedore at the Inchon docks, he 
found work delivering heavy sacks of rice by bicycle. He obtained this position 
despite the fact that he had no idea how to ride a bicycle when he accepted the job, a 
fact he neglected to mention to the rice store proprietor. In fact, Chung assured the 
proprietor that he could ride a bicycle quite well. Chung crashed the bicycle numerous 
times before he learned to ride it properly but he did quickly acquire bicycling skill 
                                                 
540 Young-Chol Cho, “The Chaebôl Regime and the Developmental Coalition of Domination,” 
Developmental Dictatorship and the Park Chung-Hee Era: The Shaping of Modernity in the Republic 
of Korea.  Editor:  Byeong-Cheon Lee. (Paramus: Homa and Sekey Books, 2006), p. 120. Chart data is 
taken from information provided by the Korean Fair Trade Commission. 
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and soon became very good at the job. He did so well in fact that the owner of the rice 
store gave Chung much more responsibility and taught him the rice vending business. 
Moreover, upon his retirement in 1937, he gave the store to Chung.541  
 
Chung, who had married a girl from his village during his time in Seoul, was doing 
quite well with it until the Japanese shut down all Korean-owned rice shops in 1939. 
Although the shop had been ordered closed as a war measure, which meant without 
compensation, Chung had been able to save some money and soon started looking for 
a new business opportunity. Undaunted, he returned to his father’s village for a short 
while and purchased some land. Then, in 1940, he returned to Seoul and bought a car 
repair shop with money he borrowed from the rice mill owner with whom he had 
worked when he owned his store. The mill owner lent Chung the money to buy the 
shop and lent him even more money to rebuild it after it burned down a month after 
the initial purchase.542 Chung’s comment on this matter exemplified his whole 
business philosophy. He said, “Trust is wealth. When you have trust, there’s always 
money.”
543
 
 
While running an automobile repair shop was a far cry from delivering rice by bicycle, 
one thing tied the two together: Chung entered both businesses with great 
determination despite knowing nothing whatsoever about how to make them work. 
Chung had never driven a car or worked as an auto mechanic.
544
 However, he did 
understand that his primary customers, the Japanese, were anxious to have their 
automobiles back as soon as possible and that they were willing to pay a lot of money 
                                                 
541 Steers, “Made in Korea,” p. 37. Steers comments that the store owner gave the store to Chung rather 
than his own “irresponsible” son. 
542 Kirk, “Korean Dynasty,” p. 27.  
543 Ibid. 
544 Steers, “Made in Korea,” p. 37. 
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for the privilege. Chung commonly worked overnight, learning the manuals and 
breaking down cars to see how they actually worked. He became a very good 
automobile mechanic and his business soon became a notable success. However, it 
was nationalized by the Japanese in 1943 to help with the war effort and Chung again 
received no compensation.  
 
Chung had often had to go to the Japanese colonial government to get payment for his 
auto services. While there he noticed that people constructing buildings were 
receiving a great deal more money than people repairing automobiles.  When his 
automobile repair shop was closed down, he worked for a while as a subcontractor for 
a Korean construction firm doing work for the Japanese. He left after a short period to 
go back to his home town once more, but this short experience taught him that he 
enjoyed construction work. When he left Asan and returned to Seoul in 1946, Chung 
opened another auto repair shop but did not forget construction. Chung’s brother, In 
Yung, had learned enough English to be understood and made some contacts with U.S. 
military personnel associated with the American Military Government in Korea. 
Chung had observed that the Americans needed things built in a hurry and had a lot of 
money; he was determined to earn some of it. With his brother negotiating for him 
with engineers from the U.S. Eighth Army and Chung negotiating for himself with the 
Korean Government, Hyundai found a considerable amount of construction work 
available in a subcontractor role while still maintaining the automotive repair business. 
 
Because of their experience of working with Americans and knowing American 
military contracting requirements, when the Korean War broke out on 25 June 1950 
and American supplies and troops started pouring into Busan, Ju-Yung Chung and his 
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team were perfectly placed. The war years for Chung and Hyundai were very 
lucrative, with Chung working very hard to establish a reputation as a man whose 
commitment to job performance was absolute. Chung and Hyundai suffered several 
instances where job commitments had been interrupted by fighting. Rather than use 
that as an excuse, once the fighting stopped Chung and his men went back to the job 
and completed it despite taking a loss on the work.
545
 American contracting officers 
came to know Chung as a man who might charge a hefty fee but would be certain to 
have the task done on time and to acceptable standards.546 Consequently, Chung 
received a great deal of work and the breadth of Hyundai’s expertise grew with each 
job. With most of South Korea left in ruins after the war ended in 1953, there was no 
letup in Hyundai’s schedule as all of the country’s major cities except Busan and most 
of its infrastructure needed to be rebuilt. Hyundai was not a chaebôl in the 1950’s; 
they were just one of Korea’s more competent construction companies. Still, they 
were growing and they were doing it relatively honestly and without bribing 
government for favors. This relative dissociation with the Rhee or Chang Myeon 
regimes would pay dividends when Chung-Hee Park and the military staged their 
coup in 1961. 
 
One incident in the early 1960’s is extremely indicative of Ju-Yung Chung’s multi-
faceted business strategy. As the largest construction company in Korea, Hyundai 
used a great deal of cement, most of which had to be imported. Chung did not like 
paying import prices or Korean customs duties. In 1962 Park’s military junta decided 
to make Korea self-sufficient in cement and provided loans to three Korean 
companies to build cement factories. Hyundai leaped at the chance to be one of them, 
                                                 
545 Kirk, “Korean Dynasty,” p. 70. 
546 Ibid., p. 71. 
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receiving a $4.25 million loan at very favorable rates and terms.547 This was 
Hyundai’s first attempt at building a manufacturing plant. Unfamiliar with the process, 
they hired an American firm, George A. Fuller Company, as technical support. Fuller 
recommended using another American company, Allis-Chalmers, as general 
contractors and process-management directors. Hyundai agreed and built the plant 
under Allis-Chalmers’ direction. It was completed in 1964 and its output immediately 
cut Hyundai’s cement costs in half.548  
 
Even more important than its cement output was the plant’s service as a training 
facility for Hyundai managers to learn how to build a manufacturing facility.549 
Hyundai took every opportunity to have its personnel shadow the foreign technicians 
and garner every scrap of information possible. Table 24 shows clearly how quickly 
Hyundai progressed in “learning-by-doing.” Also, Ju-Yung Chung always worried 
about depending on external sources; his thinking was that he could only count on 
what he and Hyundai actually controlled. The cement industry was just the first large-
scale example of this trait which would be much more clearly manifest in the 
construction of Hyundai’s shipbuilding and motor car industries. Chung’s approach 
was to always learn as much as possible from the foreigners but, once the lessons 
were learned, Hyundai quickly dispensed with external help.550 
 
                                                 
547 Kirk, “Korean Dynasty,” p. 59. Hyundai did not have to start paying the loan back for two years, 
after which it had ten years to complete repayment at an interest rate of 6.75 per cent. By comparison, 
according to the Economic Planning Board’s Major Statistics of Korean Economy cited by Dornbusch 
and Park, the real interest rate in Korea for the years 1960-1964 was 31.1 per cent for “curb” market 
loans. Rudiger Dornbusch and Yung Chul Park, “Korean Growth Policy,” Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity Vol. 1987, No. 2 (1987), p. 413. 
548 Steers, “Made in Korea,” p. 57. A considerable amount of the cement produced in this plant would 
be exported to Vietnam for use on Hyundai construction projects undertaken for the U.S. and Korean 
military. 
549 Amsden, “Asia’s Next Giant,” p. 296. 
550 Kirk, “Korean Dynasty,” p. 102. 
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Table 24: HYUNDAI'S INVOLVEMENT IN HYUNDAI CEMENT PLANT 
ERECTIONS/EXPANSIONS551 
 
 Initial Plant 1964 First Expansion 
1968 
Second Expansion 
1974 
Basic Engineering Allis Chalmers Fuller Fuller 
Detailed 
Engineering 
Allis Chalmers Fuller Fuller, Hyundai 
Procurement Allis Chalmers Hyundai Hyundai 
Supervision Allis Chalmers Hyundai Hyundai 
Construction  Hyundai Hyundai Hyundai 
Start-Up Allis Chalmers Fuller, Hyundai Fuller, Hyundai 
 
 
CHUNG-HEE PARK AND JU-YUNG CHUNG 
 
 
Ju-Yung Chung made his first serious impression on President Chung-Hee Park with 
Hyundai’s completion of the Pattani-Narathiwat highway. Hyundai’s relative 
anonymity to that point was actually good for Chung and Hyundai; they had not been 
big or connected enough to be targets of the anti-chaebôl anger which accompanied 
the junta into power in 1961.552 During the Pattani-Narathiwat road project Hyundai 
had also expanded its efforts into assisting the U.S./Korean forces during the Vietnam 
War. Primarily employed as a subcontractor, Hyundai workers dredged the Mekong 
River, developed much of the U.S. naval base at Cam Ranh Bay, and even provided 
laundry and dry-cleaning services.553 Park, who always paid very close attention to 
Korean export numbers and who personally chaired a monthly trade promotion 
meeting with senior officials and business leaders, would have seen Hyundai’s 
growing contribution to Korea’s export totals. His knowledge of Hyundai’s 
contributions in this sector undoubtedly influenced him favorably toward the 
company. Park’s approbation would prove to be very useful to Hyundai. 
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552 Kirk, “Korean Dynasty,” p. 61. 
553 Ibid., p. 77.  
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Since 1957 South Korea had been considering the possibility of building a dam on the 
Soyang River, 65 miles (108 km.). Though the dam promised to provide badly needed 
hydroelectric power and flood control, no action had been taken on the project. In 
1967 Park decided the project had waited long enough and directed the Korean 
Ministry of Construction to solicit bids for building a dam. Hyundai was invited to bid 
although the Ministry of Construction had already invited one of Japan’s leading 
engineering firms, Nihon Kyoei, to submit plans. At a meeting to discuss the issue it 
transpired there was a difference in opinions about how to build the dam. The 
Japanese wanted to build a concrete dam 413 feet (126 m.) in height; Chung and 
Hyundai argued for a zone-fill dam made of earth that would be 328 feet (100 m.) in 
height. The Hyundai proposal would be 30 per cent cheaper than the Japanese 
proposal but the weight of Ministry opinion and professional qualifications was with 
the Japanese. The Japanese rather rudely questioned Chung’s knowledge of dam 
construction by asking about his qualifications, a query which he did not answer. The 
meeting came to no conclusion.  
 
The issue was submitted to President Chung-Hee Park for consideration. Park, ever 
the professional military officer, looked at the contending plans and saw a security 
flaw the Japanese had overlooked. A hardened concrete dam upstream of Seoul, if 
breached by North Korean rockets or bombs, would send hundreds of thousands of 
tons of water cascading toward Korea’s capital. Conversely, an earthen zone-fill dam 
would be much more likely to accept such damage without failing. If it did fail, the 
failure was much more apt to be only partial thus minimizing the downstream damage. 
Based on the national security issues involved, Park requested that the Japanese and 
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the Ministry of Construction return and once again review the dam’s construction. 
Two months later, the Japanese returned and agreed that Chung’s proposal was the 
better of the two. They also privately rendered Chung a profound apology for their 
questioning of his competence. The South Korean Government issued a contract to 
Hyundai for construction and the dam was completed in 1973. 
 
This incident solidified Park’s appreciation for Chung’s engineering capability and it 
was not long before Chung was called in again for a major national project.  This time, 
the proposal was one that would change the economy of South Korea like nothing had 
since the Korean War. Chung-Hee Park had been to Germany on an official state visit 
and seen the German Autobahn. Park immediately recognized how helpful such a 
road system would be in Korea and returned intent on finding a way to obtain one. 
Park’s goal was to have a major motorway traversing the country from Seoul in the 
northeast to Busan in the southwest and connecting the major cities in between. When 
he announced Korea’s Second Five-Year Plan in April 1967, construction of this road 
was a major component.  
 
As this would be the largest civil engineering project ever undertaken in Korea, the 
outcry was immediate. Many thought it would be too expensive or questioned the 
country’s ability to actually perform the job. 554 A thorough World Bank study of the 
proposal both questioned Korea’s ability to accomplish the project and deemed it 
unnecessary for Korea even if it could be done.555 Park had the Ministry of 
Construction, the Korean Army Corps of Engineers, the Ministry of Finance and the 
Seoul Metropolitan Government prepare estimates for the project. With the exception 
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of the Seoul Metropolitan Government, all of the proposed estimates came back with 
extremely high costs; the highest, from the Ministry of Construction, was 65 billion 
won.556 Because of Park’s position as President he wielded enough power to get this 
project started. He was well aware, however, that if it turned out to be a debacle his 
position was going to be very seriously weakened. Both Park and his critics realized 
this highway project was going to be a major national challenge. Park needed to make 
absolutely certain of both its physical and economic viability prior to initiation since 
once started, both his and his government’s credibility rested heavily on its successful 
completion. 
 
Park sent for Ju-Yung Chung to come to the Blue House. This was their first private 
face-to-face meeting. Park told Chung he was aware of Hyundai’s success in road 
construction despite difficult conditions in Thailand. Now Park wanted to know if a 
road between Seoul and Busan really was feasible. If it was, Park wanted Chung to 
provide a cost estimate. Park gave Chung twenty days to return with his figures.557 
Having received his marching orders and knowing exactly how important this project 
was to both South Korea as a nation and Hyundai as a firm, Chung turned 
immediately to work. He understood that failure in this matter was not an option.  
 
Chung immediately gathered Hyundai engineers and explained the nature of the task 
at hand. In the next 20 days he repeatedly overflew the area by plane and helicopter 
and consulted with his engineering staff. They determined that it could be done and 
Hyundai had the capability to accomplish it. When he returned to Park, his answer 
                                                 
556 Chung, “Ordeals,” p. 108. The Seoul Metropolitan Government’s estimate of 18 billion won was 
considered not valid as it was quickly realized they had no idea of the costs of building highways 
outside of Seoul. 
557 Kirk, “Korean Dynasty,” p. 78. 
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was unequivocal: “I can do it.”558 Hyundai’s bid was 38 billion won.559 Park took him 
at his word and told Chung to assemble a consortium of builders to accomplish the 
task. Construction work was initiated 1 February 1968. 
 
Chung and Hyundai received 40 per cent of the total work, including the most 
difficult parts.
560
 There were many difficulties, particularly at the Dangjae Tunnel 
between Okcheon and Daejeon, where there were numerous cave-ins and worker 
deaths.561  Chung had to take drastic actions to insure that progress continued, such as 
doubling wages and spending $8 million on earthmoving equipment.
562
 Chung 
himself was almost living on the construction site. He often encountered President 
Park there; Park was receiving daily updates about progress and personally visiting 
the project as often as possible.563 The Gyeongbu Expressway opened on 7 July 1970, 
almost a year earlier than expected.564 Hyundai made only a modest profit on the job 
but it was completed successfully and ahead of schedule. What was most important 
about this project was that it cemented a solid relationship between Chung-Hee Park 
and Ju-Yung Chung. From this time on they would be good friends and Chung would 
often have dinner with Park at Cheong Wa Dae. Park often referred to Chung as his 
“Minister of Construction.”
565
 From this project until the end of Park’s life, he and 
Chung would maintain a close friendship, something which would be of great benefit 
to Hyundai. 
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IMPETUS FOR THE “BIG PUSH” 
 
Hyundai was working in Vietnam, building the Soyang Dam and the Gyeongbu 
Expressway, and just about to get involved with Middle Eastern projects when Korea 
received a major foreign policy/national defense shock. U.S. President Richard 
Nixon’s announcement of his “Guam Doctrine” on 25 July 1969 took President 
Chung-Hee Park and the Korean Government very much by surprise. The new 
American foreign policy position called for the U.S. to continue providing a nuclear 
“umbrella” to friendly countries that requested one. However, those countries would 
now be asked to provide the vast majority of their own defensive manpower. What 
Nixon was in effect saying was that there would be no more Vietnams for the United 
States. 
 
In 1969 approximately 56,000 U.S. troops were stationed in Korea as part of the 
defense against the military threat posed by the North.566  The announcement of the 
Guam Doctrine caused Park to start seriously questioning the reliability of the United 
States as an ally.567 That logic led immediately to considerations of what South Korea 
needed to maintain its own defense. Park asked the Korean military to conduct an 
investigation of South Korean indigenous defensive capability and the results shocked 
him.568 He was informed that without U.S. military assistance South Korea would be 
in very grave danger within a week.
569
 There was no Korean small arms or 
ammunition manufacturing capacity and little stockpiled ammunition not under joint 
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Industry (HCI),” Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 39, No. 2 (May, 2005), pp. 371-373. 
569 Ibid. 
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U.S.-South Korean control.570 The investigation showed that South Korean forces 
restricted to solely South Korean resources would have approximately three days’ 
worth of ammunition in a serious combat situation.571  
 
North Korea at the start of the 1970’s had approximately three times the military 
capacity of the South and was well equipped with large-scale rifle, cannon, tank and 
ammunition manufacturing capacity.572 The South Koreans, by contrast, had none of 
these things and were tremendously dependent on both U.S. manpower and logistical 
support. With American help South Korea had been fighting the Second Korean 
Conflict since 1966. 573 It was still ongoing in 1969 and the North Korean campaign 
of seaborne and DMZ infiltration continued; American and South Korean targets were 
under guerilla attack just as they had been for the preceding three years.574 At that 
time Park and his ministers had no justification for thinking that the Second Korean 
Conflict was about to end. It would have been much more logical to assume that a 
post-Guam Doctrine U.S. was preparing to remove troops from Korea and that the 
North would increase the tempo of their military strikes commensurately.  
 
Having watched the minimal, non-violent response of the U.S. to North Korea’s 1968 
U.S.S. Pueblo capture and its 1969 destruction of a U.S. EC-121 electronic 
reconnaissance plane, Park recognized the U.S. was an increasingly flimsy support 
                                                 
570 Ibid. 
571 Ibid. This lack would have been pointed out for the great danger that it was by Generals Doo-Whan 
Chun and Tae-Woo Roh, among others. As Vietnam War veterans, they would have recently 
experienced what a voracious appetite for materiel modern warfare displays. Any South Korean 
military leader with recent combat experience, particularly large-scale combat experience, would have 
been extremely concerned. The military truism, “Amateurs talk tactics; professionals talk logistics,” 
has grown more accurate over time.  
572 Ibid. 
573 Bolger, “Unfinished War,” pp. 139-140. 
574 Ibid. 
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upon which to rest South Korea’s national existence.575 This view would only have 
been strengthened by President Nixon’s 1969 initiation of actions aimed at 
normalizing diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China and the 6 July 
1970 announcement that the U.S. was withdrawing the 7
th
 Infantry Division’s 20,000 
troops from Korea.576  
 
Given the confluence of events that were taking place between 1969 and 1972, Park 
would have been remiss had he not started having South Korea make preparations for 
“going it alone.”
577
 Much of what he did in the years from 1969 to 1973 was based on 
justified concerns about Korean national security.578 Obviously, if South Korea was 
going to be required to defend itself, it had to have a defense industry to make arms 
and ammunition. The POSCO integrated steel mill was an integral part of the 
preparation for that industry and part of the impetus for its development came from 
national security considerations.579  The remaining items of the “Big Push” as well as 
the Yushin Constitution would be impelled by the same considerations.580 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
575 Sung Gul Hong, “The Search for Deterrence: Park’s Nuclear Option, ” The Park Chung Hee Era: 
The Transformation of South Korea.  Editors:  Byung-Kook Kim and Ezra F. Vogel. (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2011), pp. 483-490. In the aftermath of President Nixon’s withdrawal of 7th 
Infantry Division from South Korea in 1971, President Chung-Hee Park seriously investigated the 
possibility of South Korea clandestinely developing nuclear weapons. Informed of this intent, the U.S. 
determined that the actual production of nuclear weapons was well within the capabilities of the South 
Korean economy. They brought tremendous diplomatic and economic pressure to bear on Park to 
dissuade him from doing so. 
576 Lee, “Developmental Dictatorship,” p. 343. 
577 Horikane, “Political Economy,” pp. 372-373. 
578 Chung-Hee Park, “To Build a Nation,” pp. 142-147. 
579 Rhyu and Lew. “Pohang Iron and Steel Company,” pp. 323. 
580 Woo, “Race to the Swift,” p. 119. 
 216 
 
THE COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM FOR HEAVY INDUSTRIES 
 
On 24 June 1970 Deputy Prime Minister Hak-Yeol Kim announced that the Korean 
Government was beginning a new program to emphasize large-scale industrialization. 
Called the “Comprehensive Program for Heavy Industries,” its proclaimed intentions 
were to guide the construction of “Four Core Projects.” These projects, including a 
special steels plant, an iron casting plant, an integrated machinery/machine tool plant 
and a large-scale shipyard, were announced just before the Fourth Korea-Japan 
Ministerial Conference in July 1970.
581
 At the Conference, the Korean side presented 
the four projects as POSCO-related, with the shipyard to be a major consumer of 
POSCO production. Their intention was to induce loans and technical assistance from 
Japanese sources to facilitate building these projects.  
 
While the “Four Core Projects” were actually intended to be the nucleus of an 
indigenous Korean defense industry, the Korean Government explicitly denied that 
aim.
582
 The Japanese delegation were not deceived and soon realized that assistance 
given to these projects would violate Japan’s “Three Principles on Arms Exports,” the 
tenets of which forbade selling arms to countries either actually or potentially engaged 
in war.
583
 In the Conference and in later meetings the Japanese sounded cautiously 
optimistic about a $100 million dollar loan but Korean negotiators were unable to 
obtain a firm commitment.
584
 With regard to shipyard construction, the Japanese did 
conduct a feasibility study in Korea headed by the Ministry of International Trade and 
                                                 
581 Horikane, “Political Economy,” p. 375.  
582 Ibid. 
583 Ibid., p. 374. 
584 These negotiations were taking place at very near the same time as Chinese Premier Chou En-Lai 
announced Communist China’s “Four Principles” of foreign trade. Among these principles was that 
China would not have any dealings with companies that had substantial investments in either South 
Korea or Taiwan. As China increased in economic power, this restriction weighed more heavily on 
potential investors in South Korea. 
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Industry Heavy Industry Bureau Chief, Shoichi Akazawa. After their tour, Akazawa’s 
group decided that large-scale shipbuilding in Korea was impractical and advised the 
Shipbuilders’ Association of Japan that cooperation with Korea in this matter was 
unwise.
585
 In the event, the eagerly anticipated Japanese investment funds did not 
materialize and Korea was left to its own devices to find the capital for these 
projects.
586
 
 
Ju-Yung Chung and Hyundai were fully aware of the “Four Core Projects” and were 
already planning to be the company which built the shipyard. Chung and his Hyundai 
executives had been looking since 1969 for a way to enter into the shipbuilding 
business. Chung was not intimidated in the slightest by the idea of technical challenge 
of building floating structures. His attitude was that it was just like constructing steel 
structures on shore, something Hyundai had done many times. With that experience 
Chung had no doubt they could certainly build a steel structure that floated.587  
 
Moreover, all the necessary supporting factors for a bold move into a new venture 
were now in place for Hyundai. Hyundai was Korea’s preeminent construction 
company and had a long track record of successfully completed major 
accomplishments. It possessed a talented group of executives with considerable 
international experience and a hard-working, competent workforce. The Gyeongbu 
Expressway was now completed, thus making for quick and easy transit between 
Seoul and Korea’s east coast, where the shipyard would be located. Possibly most 
important, Ju-Yung Chung enjoyed the confidence and trust of President Chung-Hee 
Park. If Chung told Park he could get something done, Park would take him at his 
                                                 
585 Hyundai, “Traditions of Excellence,” pp. 41-42. 
586 Horikane, “Political Economy,” p. 377. 
587 Hwang, “Let There be a Yard,” pp. 26-27.  
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word and back Hyundai with full Korean Government support.588 Chung was well 
aware that his credibility was on the line with every project but he welcomed the 
challenge.589 
 
In 1970, as has been mentioned earlier, shipbuilding was booming and the demand for 
huge oil tankers was tremendous. The closure of the Suez Canal and the economics of 
shipping oil put a premium on VLCCs. Ju-Yung Chung decided that this was a very 
good way to make lucrative export earnings and plunged ahead into shipbuilding. 
Hyundai purchased land at Mipo Bay in 1970 and signed technical agreements with 
Scott Lithgow and A&P Appledore in September 1971.590  
 
Building the shipyard was a matter of finding sufficient investment capital. The way 
Ju-Yung Chung accomplished this is the stuff of Hyundai legend. The estimated total 
cost of the project was $63 million dollars. Hyundai could supply $10 million from 
their corporate resources and the South Korean Government would provide another 
$10 million.
591
 It had been hoped that the remaining $43 million would be provided 
by the Japanese; that hope came to naught. Chung, therefore, was on his own to obtain 
the needed funding. After Hyundai opened its London office in 1971, Chung went to 
several European countries in search of venture capital for his shipyard. Word had 
spread about the Japanese assessment of Korea’s shipbuilding capability and Chung’s 
                                                 
588 Kim and Park, “The Chaebôl,” p. 281 
589 Ibid., p. 287. 
590 Hyundai, “Traditions of Excellence,” p. 43. The technical service from A&P Appledore and Scott 
Lithgow cost Hyundai $1.7 million and 0.5% of vessel sales price. 
591 Kirk, “Korean Dynasty,” p. 98. Kirk notes that the remaining $43 million was more than the value 
of all Hyundai assets combined. 
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inquiries met with little interest and no success.592 When he went to Britain, it was his 
last hope.593  
 
In London Chung met with Charles Longbottom, the chairman of A&P Appledore, in 
March 1971 to discuss Hyundai’s potential as a ship builder. Chung not only wished 
to employ Longbottom’s firm as the designers for Hyundai’s proposed new shipyard, 
he hoped to persuade him to write a letter to Barclay’s Bank recommending they grant 
Chung a loan for the amount necessary to build the shipyard. Chung, through his 
translator, spoke about Korea’s high labor quality, its incredibly low wages and 
Hyundai’s record of solid accomplishment. Longbottom responded by noting that 
Korea had no confirmed buyers for its vessels and no track record of shipbuilding 
capability. At this point, Chung pulled out his wallet and extracted a 500 won note.594 
The note had a picture of Admiral Sun-Shin Lee’s “turtle ship” on it.595 Chung 
showed this to Longbottom and said, “Korea built an ironclad ship in the 16th Century. 
You cannot compare Korea with England, which did not start building steel ships 
until the 19
th
 Century. The idea of shipbuilding in Korea was simply postponed; once 
it starts Korea’s hidden potential will blossom.”596 This plea did not completely sway 
Longbottom; he did have to make a trip to Korea to see for himself what Hyundai had 
accomplished.597 However, what he saw there convinced him. He did eventually write 
                                                 
592 Hyundai, “Traditions of Excellence,” p. 44. 
593 Steers, “Made in Korea,” p. 2. Steers here is quoting Ju-Yung Chung’s front-page article, “Have a 
Goal!” The article was published in the Hyundai Newsletter of August 1990.  
594 Chung could not have done that in 2013; there are no 500 won notes any more. They have been 
replaced by a coin bearing a picture of a flying crane. 
595 These innovative ships were Admiral Sun-Shin Lee’s primary weapons when he defeated a much 
larger Japanese invasion force off the coast of Geoje Island in 1592. Bruce Cumings describes one of 
these ships as having “iron plates on its top, a large sail reminiscent of Chinese ‘junks,’ a dozen sailors 
pulling long oars from within, cannon at every point to blow the Japanese out of the water, and a 
dragon at the head to scare the hell out of everyone.” Koreans are very proud of this victory and there is 
a huge and impressive monument to Admiral Lee in the Geoje Island town of Okpo. 
596 Kirk, “Korean Dynasty,” p. 98 
597 Hyundai, “Traditions of Excellence,” p. 45. 
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the letter and the loan was granted subject to issuance of a Korean Government loan 
guarantee.598 
 
In the conservative and skeptical world of international shipping, finding buyers for 
ships to be delivered by a shipbuilder with no shipyard and no track record of building 
ships was no mean task. It posed a problem even for a man as indomitable as Ju-Yung 
Chung. However, in order for the loan to receive the required guarantee from the 
Korean Import-Export Bank, Chung had to find one. Finally, through the good offices 
of Charles Longbottom, Ju-Yung Chung was introduced to George Livanos, a wealthy 
Greek shipowner. Livanos owned a fleet of tankers, was said to be in the market to 
purchase some newbuildings, and was intrigued by this brash new entrant into 
shipbuilding.  
 
Chung’s intention was to build VLCCs, huge tank vessels for which the selling price 
in 1971 was approximately $36 million each. When they started to discuss business, 
Chung, armed only with a picture of a sandy beach at Mipo Bay and a drawing of a 
260,000 deadweight ton tanker, presented Livanos with a standard market rate offer of 
$36 million per vessel.
599
 Greek shipowners, however, have a well-deserved 
reputation for driving a hard bargain and Livanos was no exception. He knew Chung 
badly needed a buyer and insisted on a heavily reduced price. They eventually settled 
on a 16 per cent discount, with Livanos offering a price of $62 million for two ships 
and a fixed delivery date of two years and six months from contract signing.600 
Livanos was required to provide a down payment of 10 per cent of the purchase price 
                                                 
598 Steers, “Made in Korea,” p. 3. Barclay’s Bank actually put together a consortium of European 
Banks to make the loan, Banks from Britain, West Germany, Spain, France and Sweden all contributed. 
Hyundai actually received an increase in the size of the loan. The final amount was $50,570,000. 
599 Hyundai, “Traditions of Excellence,” p. 46. 
600 Ibid. 
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at that time.601 Included in the contract were hefty penalties for late delivery.602 Chung 
knew that if Hyundai did not have the vessels ready on time they were going to pay an 
extremely heavy price.  
 
Chung was taking a huge risk with this investment and would undoubtedly never have 
received the necessary funding without the Korean Government’s loan guarantee, a 
guarantee which almost certainly would not have been given in a country with 
independent banks. The initial funding of the Hyundai Ulsan Shipyard is a sterling 
example of the intersection between business, politics and finance in South Korea 
during the Park era. A company without Hyundai’s past accomplishments and Ju-
Yung Chung’s close relationship with President Park would have been very unlikely 
to have received the initial bank funding, much less a government guarantee. Because 
Park knew Chung and had witnessed Hyundai’s successes in Thailand, the Soyang 
Dam and the Gyeongbu Expressway, Hyundai received governmental support that 
sound banking principles would normally deny. Park’s gamble on Hyundai paid off 
spectacularly well for Korea but the fact it did so takes nothing away from the fact it 
was a tremendous risk to take. 
“THERE WERE NO SUNDAYS FOR US” 
 
Ju-Yung Chung returned to Korea in September 1971with a signed contract and a 
tremendous amount of work to do. Hyundai had committed itself to build one of the 
world’s largest shipyards and two of the world’s biggest ships in two and one-half 
years. It was a daunting task; most developed shipbuilding countries would have 
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anticipated shipyard construction alone to take a minimum of three years.603 There 
were many both inside and outside of Korea who questioned Hyundai’s capacity for 
meeting a challenge of the magnitude it had taken on. Most professional industry 
observers did not think it was possible.
604
  
 
The loan guarantees were formally approved by the Korean Government in December 
1971 and the money received. Hyundai’s first move was to select and dispatch 60 
engineers and naval architects to Scott Lithgow Shipyard in Clydebank to learn how 
they were building VLCCs.
605
 Under the terms of Hyundai’s contract with Livanos, 
Hyundai was obligated to build their vessels to the same specifications as Scott 
Lithgow’s vessels.
606
 Their second move was to begin planning how to turn a sandy 
beach and empty fields into a shipyard.  Hyundai had already purchased the land and 
relocated the people living there starting in mid-1971.607 By the end of December 
1971, A&P Appledore design work as well as some site preparation had already 
started; on March 23, 1972 the official groundbreaking ceremony was conducted. 
President Chung-Hee Park and Hyundai Chairman Ju-Yung Chung together pressed 
the button that set off the first detonation.  It was a major milestone for Chung and 
Hyundai but there was still a long way to go. 
 
Hyundai moved two-thirds of all the heavy equipment owned by the company to 
Mipo Bay to work on the new shipyard. 1,200 workers were spending day and night 
                                                 
603 Hwang, oral interview, 24 November 2009. 
604 Ibid. 
605 Hwang, “Let There be a Yard,” p. 41. Sung Hyuk Hwang, a naval architect, was one of the initial 
group of Hyundai personnel sent to Scotland. They departed for Scotland in March 1972. 
606 Amsden, “Asia’s Next Giant,” p. 276. 
607 Hyundai, “Traditions of Excellence,” p. 50. This was yet another case where Korean law permitted 
the expropriation of private property for business purposes in a manner which would have been 
extremely difficult in the United Kingdom. The people were housed in better quarters than they had 
previously enjoyed and they were paid compensation for their land at reasonable rates. However, they 
did not have any choice in the matter. 
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working on the shipyard. The work day began at 6 A.M. and often extended until 3 
A.M. the next morning.608 Ju-Yung Chung said the following: 
  
 Most of the workers would be up at the break of day, splash a little water on 
 their face and head for the work site, where they would stay until late into the 
 night. Returning to their dormitories, they would be so tired that they would 
 fall asleep with their shoes on. This did not happen for just one or two days; it 
 went on like this for an entire year. I too, practically lived at Ulsan.609 
 
 
Another Hyundai manager remembered, “There were no Sundays for us. We got to go 
up to Seoul to see our families only once or twice a year. For three years we arrived at 
the site looking at the stars and left the site looking at the stars.”
610
 Hyundai’s building 
plan called for building two drydocks of 700,000 deadweight ton capacity.611 As the 
drydocks were being built, construction of the first vessel was progressing at the same 
time. Sung-Hyuk Hwang remembered that, “As soon as the concrete base in the 
middle part of the building dock had solidified, the keel of the VLCC was laid upon it. 
As the dock expanded, so did the ship.”612  
 
Building both the shipyard and the ships simultaneously posed a number of serious 
problems. As mentioned earlier, cranes are the “muscles” of a shipyard, used to lift 
heavy sections into place during construction. Difficulties arose when construction 
required the use of high tonnage lifting equipment that had yet to be installed. One of 
the best-known stories in Hyundai history comes from this period. When the bow 
block of the first VLCC was ready to be placed in the drydock, there was no lifting 
appliance in the shipyard capable of doing so. The “Goliath” 450-ton gantry crane 
                                                 
608 Amsden, “Asia’s Next Giant,” p. 278. 
609 Hyundai, “Traditions of Excellence,” p. 50. 
610 Ibid., p. 47. 
611 Ibid., p. 51. The first drydock was 400 meters (437 yards) long, 80 meters (87.5 yards) wide and 
12.7 meters (13.9 yards) deep. The second was 500 meters (546.8 yards) long and the same width and 
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612 Hwang, “Let There be a Yard,” p. 30. 
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Hyundai had ordered from Krupp had yet to be delivered. The bow block weighed 
more than 50 tons and no single crane or combination of cranes currently available 
could be utilized to make the lift. 
 
 Logic and safety dictated that the block should not be moved until a properly capable 
crane was in place. The problem with that was that the 450-ton “Goliath” crane would 
not be installed for another three months. Ju-Yung Chung carefully considered the 
issue and decided that if the heavy block was put on a trailer with a bulldozer attached 
to the trailer from behind to act as a brake, it could be driven down an inclined ramp 
and delivered to the bottom of the drydock safely. There was no doubt Chung’s plan 
was a risky venture. If the trailer broke loose the resulting crash would smash the bow 
block and do considerable damage to the still-unfinished drydock. Chung recognized 
the danger but knew better than anyone else that something had to be tried; Hyundai 
was already behind in construction and could not afford a three month delay. He 
directed that the block be securely mounted on a trailer and the bulldozer attached. 
The actual move was a very anxious moment but Chung’s idea worked perfectly and 
the block was safely delivered into place at the bottom of the drydock. Chung’s 
innovative response to this problem is now a part of Hyundai lore and has been used 
for decades as a company training tool to demonstrate the Hyundai motto, “Nothing is 
impossible.” 
 
The infrastructure construction tasks that are necessary to create a shipyard are legion 
and most of them needed to take place at the same time as ship construction. One of 
the biggest ones took place at the entrance to Mipo Bay. Because of its north-south 
orientation, Mipo Bay was known to experience extremely large waves during 
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typhoons, a nearly annual event in Korea. Since these would have wreaked havoc on 
the shipyard, HHI had to build a 700-meter breakwater. This entailed not only 
dumping huge boulders and large amounts of crushed rock progressively further into 
the ocean but also making very large numbers of tetrapods, four-footed interlocking 
concrete structures that look like a child’s jacks, and placing them on the ocean-facing 
side of the breakwater.
613
  In addition to the breakwater and the construction of the 
drydocks, Hyundai was building office structures, training facilities, fabrication 
buildings, plate shops, blasting shops, painting shops, machine shops, roads, cafeterias, 
dormitories for 5,000 workers and all the other appurtenances necessary to a shipyard 
all at the same time as well as building two ships.614 It was truly a massive 
undertaking and nothing like it had ever been done before. Ju-Yung Chung and 
Hyundai certainly deserve the largest share of credit for successfully entering Korea 
into the top ranks of world shipbuilding. Korea Shipbuilding and Engineering 
Company (KSEC) had been building ships for a longer period but, as shown by Table 
25 below, their output was always insignificant compared to that of Hyundai.615 It was 
Hyundai that made Korea a feared competitor in the world shipbuilding industry. All 
other Korean shipyards followed the path they blazed. 
 
In the end Hyundai did what they had said they would. Despite all the obstacles, they 
built the shipyard and the ships at the same time and came surprisingly close to 
having the vessels delivered on time.
616
 The first Livanos vessel, the Atlantic Baron, 
                                                 
613 Hyundai, “Traditions of Excellence,” p. 52. 
614 Ibid., p. 55. 
615 Hwasook Nam. Building Ships, Building a Nation: Korea’s Democratic Unionism Under Park 
Chung-Hee. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2009), pp. 206-207. The Hyundai Ulsan 
Shipyard would eventually hire many of the experienced workers away from KSEC. KSEC claimed 
that “it had lost one-third of its best engineers to HHI.” This is very probable as Hyundai would have 
provided higher salaries and better career opportunities. 
616 The vessels were actually launched on time. Post-launch outfitting and trials took longer than 
expected so there was a seven month delay in the actual vessel delivery. 
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was launched on 15 February 1974, christened on 26 June 1974 and delivered on 27 
November 1974.The total construction time was three years and two months, eight 
months later than the contract specification but an amazing feat nonetheless given all 
that had to be done to make it possible. The vessel went on to work a full and 
satisfactory 16 year career before it was lost to an accident in 1991. 
 
With the delivery of Atlantic Baron, Hyundai had proven itself deserving of being 
included among the world’s preeminent shipbuilders. President Park and his wife Yuk 
Young-Su attended the christening, which was broadcast live to all South Korea over 
national television. Park congratulated all Hyundai employees on their 
accomplishment and noted that “this is a symbol of our advancing national power.”
617
 
Chung-Hee Park had always taken a great deal of interest in the construction of the 
shipyard. Sung-Hyuk Hwang, who became Hyundai’s Senior Vice President in charge 
of ship sales, made the following comment about Park and the Mipo Bay shipyard: 
 
Park often expressed his joy and wonder at the rapid daily 
developments. He frequently visited the shipyard to see the progress 
for himself and he was also fond of being briefed about it from time to 
time. He thought of Hyundai Shipyard as one of the symbolic projects 
representing his “Modernization Plans for Korea,” something to which 
he devoted himself entirely at the time. His personally hand-written 
Chinese calligraphy, 造船立國 (조선입국, or  “Founding the nation 
with shipbuilding“), still decorates the walls today. 
 
 
Given the near-absolute power that Park wielded in the Korean Government, his close 
interest in this project and dedication to its success undoubtedly was a tremendous aid 
to Hyundai in their effort, particularly since Hyundai had certainly lost money on the 
                                                 
617 Hyundai, “Traditions of Excellence,” p. 55. 
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Table 25: OUTPUT OF PRINCIPAL KOREAN SHIPYARDS, 1973-1983   (Gross 
Tons)618 
 
YEAR HYUNDAI KSEC* DAEWOO SAMSUNG 
1973 126,000 2,980 -- -- 
1974 451,700 2,980 -- -- 
1975 512,000 75,400 -- -- 
1976 573,000 52,450 -- -- 
1977 505,568 76,322 -- -- 
1978 614,790 116,694 -- -- 
1979 383,763 103,060 -- 13,858 
1980 518,565 60,448 -- 52,000 
1981 907,040 137,655 21.500 126,000 
1982 861,206 186,988 148,329 73,400 
1983 864,782 129,573 128,270 123,974 
*Korea Shipbuilding and Engineering Company 
 
construction of its first two vessels.619 There would not have been anything the 
Korean Government could have done to help that would not have been done.620 
 
                                                 
618 Amsden, “Asia’s Next Giant,” pp. 272-273. Statistics are derived from data provided by the Korean 
Ministry of Commerce.  
619 Nam, “Building Ships,” p. 205. According to Nam, Hyundai ended up using more than 60% more 
material than originally anticipated in building the first two ships due to construction errors. S.H. 
Hwang noted that the expenses for Atlantic Baron were much higher than anticipated due to demands 
by Livanos personnel for the use of more expensive materials, e.g., bronze casings rather than steel 
ones for salt water pumps, etc. The original Scott Lithgow specifications required. Livanos also argued 
for, and received, a higher quantity of spare parts. 
620 Hyundai was undoubtedly benefited by the August 1971 Emergency Decree for Economic Stability 
and Growth, which placed a moratorium on “curb” loans. Due to the opacity of Korean chaebôl 
financial holdings and the lack of accurate public records, it cannot be determined if Hyundai itself had 
taken loans from the “curb” market. It is all but certain, however, that at least some of its 
subcontractors had done so and this decree quite probably saved many of them from bankruptcy. 
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In addition to governmental help, Hyundai had another very great advantage in the 
completion of this project. They were able to draw from the knowledgeable and 
experienced personnel working in other sections of the Hyundai chaebôl. Hyundai 
Construction had many highly experienced engineers and construction supervisors in 
their workforce. These men had dredged channels and built breakwaters, roads, 
buildings and fabrication shops elsewhere; doing it at Mipo Bay was nothing new for 
them. For Hyundai the fact that seconding these people to the shipyard project was an 
internal company issue obviated the need for external recruitment; moreover, their 
salaries and other financial expenses could also be charged to their parent Hyundai 
unit at cost.  
 
This represents a sizable internal subsidization of the shipyard construction effort and 
stands in direct contrast to the experience of British shipyards, which were generally 
individual enterprises. Even if they were receiving subsidies from the British 
Government, any assistance from external personnel received by them had to be paid 
for at regular commercial rates. Chung-Hee Park’s insistence on creating “national 
leaders” of sufficient size to compete with the world’s largest companies paid major 
dividends in this instance. 
FIGHTING THROUGH THE SLUMP 
 
When Atlantic Baron sailed away from Ulsan in late November 1974, she left behind 
a shipyard that had orders for another eleven VLCCs, including Atlantic Baron’s 
sister ship, Atlantic Baroness.621 However, the world oil slump had already started to 
                                                 
621 Hwang, oral interview, 24 November 2009. This vessel would never be delivered to the Livanos 
Group. Contractual difficulties caused by Hyundai’s unilateral declaration of a 10 per cent price 
increase resulted in four years of arbitration that was eventually dropped by HHI. According to Hwang, 
Hyundai was legally at fault here. There was no contractual justification for them to simply change the 
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affect the world shipping market. Of those eleven VLCCs, three of them were 
canceled by their prospective owners and that eventually caused Hyundai’s Ulsan 
Shipyard to have cash flow problems.622 Kurt J.W. Schou had been manager of 
Odense Shipyard in Denmark, a major VLCC building yard. He was induced by HHI 
in 1972 to become the first President of the Hyundai Ulsan Shipyard. Schou made a 
trip to Europe in search of new business in the summer of 1974 and returned greatly 
concerned about future prospects. Schou stated that his discussions with potential 
clients invariably went as follows: “Why are you talking about VLCCs? The era of 
the VLCC is gone forever. Don’t talk nonsense. Let’s change the subject.”
623
 Schou 
even had shipowners bluntly tell him that his newly constructed shipyard was doomed 
to failure.
624
  
 
Schou’s experience accurately reflected the shipping industry’s thinking and was a 
harbinger of much bad news to come. 1975 was a terrible year in the shipbuilding 
industry with new orders at less than half those of 1974; 115 ships and 29 million tons 
of shipping capacity were canceled by July.
625
 As for HHI, it would not receive 
another VLCC order again until 1986. For a shipyard specifically designed to build 
VLCCs, as was the Hyundai Ulsan Shipyard, the outlook was dire.
626
  
 
                                                                                                                                            
terms of a signed agreement and the Livanos Group was well within their rights to refuse to accept the 
price increase. The vessel known as the Atlantic Baroness was renamed prior to delivery as the Korea 
Sun. She was delivered on 31 August 1976 and became a part of Hyundai Merchant Marine. 
622 Hyundai, “Traditions of Excellence,” p. 62. Ju-Yung Chung directed that all of the canceled VLCCs 
be completed as he believed they would be able to be sold at some point. He proved to be correct in 
that assumption. They were the initial vessels of what is now known as Hyundai Merchant Marine. 
However, that did not help cash flow in 1975. 
623 Hwang, “Let There be a Yard,” p. 53.  
624 Ibid. 
625 Todd, “Shipbuilding,” p. 211. Todd cites Lloyd’s Register of Shipping Annual Report, 1982 
showing new orders for 1974 at 28.37 million gross tons and new orders for 1975 at 13.79 million 
gross tons. Hyundai, “Traditions of Excellence,” p. 62. It should be noted that the figures for 1975 were 
so bad that Hyundai omitted them in their formal history of the Hyundai Ulsan Shipyard.  
626 Hyundai, “Traditions of Excellence,” p. 62, 67. 
 230 
 
Hyundai’s order books were full and the yard was still being constructed in 1974 so 
they had a small bit of breathing space. However, the knowledge that their new and 
expanding facility was designed to build a type of ship that was now completely out 
of favor led them quickly to start an intensive search for new business.
627
  
 
Almost as an afterthought, during his European trip Schou had chosen to visit the 
President of Kuwait Shipping Company (KSC). He found that Kuwait Shipping 
Company was looking for a yard to build some 24,000 deadweight ton multipurpose 
freight carriers, vessels not even a tenth as big as the VLCCs in which Hyundai 
specialized. They had a contract with Govan Shipyard in Scotland to provide these 
vessels but Govan could only build five per year. Disregarding the fact that Hyundai 
had no experience on this type of vessel, Schou induced KSC to have Govan 
subcontract some of the work to Hyundai. Hyundai ended up building 24 
multipurpose freight carries for KSC and did so to KSC’s complete satisfaction.628 
This work kept much of Hyundai Ulsan Shipyard occupied for almost five years and 
made Kuwait Shipping Company (later United Arab Shipping Company) a very 
satisfied customer. In remembering how important this work had been to HHI at the 
time, Mr. Sung-Hyuk Hwang stated that “the order for the twenty-four cargo ships 
[from KSC] was a blessing from God at a time when we had run out of works and the 
VLCC era was coming to a close.”629 
 
Mr. Sung-Hyuk Hwang was Hyundai Heavy Industries Senior Vice President for Ship 
Sales when he resigned from HHI in December 1989. He had been involved in vessel 
                                                 
627 Ibid., p. 48. Hyundai had announced a shipyard expansion in 1975 which would make it the world’s 
largest shipyard. 
628 Ibid., p. 63. 
629 Hwang, “Let There be a Yard,” p. 69.  
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sales since the inception of the yard in the early 1970’s. In describing these years, he 
commented that the reception Hyundai sales staff often received from potential 
customers was as follows:  
 
Japan will suffice. She has more experience than Korea and has 
developed heavy industries with higher skills. She can be our business 
partner. Korea? Too risky. We cannot be partners with you. Please 
look for someone else. Good luck!
630
 
 
Hwang noted that overcoming such attitudes required HHI to repeatedly demonstrate 
its willingness to go anywhere, do anything and successfully complete everything 
they started. For the shipbuilding industry as a whole, the years between 1974 and 
1979 were desperate ones. As difficult as times were, however, Hyundai Heavy 
Industries gained market share in each of those years.631  
 
There were two keys to Hyundai’s success despite the industry’s dismal state. The 
first was its hard-charging, “nothing is impossible” attitude of eagerly seeking out and 
accepting all available work. Hyundai sales people were not waiting for work to come 
to them; they were out chasing it down. 632The second was Hyundai’s positioning as a 
diversified company capable of doing anything related to shipbuilding and marine-
related construction work. Many companies were not willing to step outside their area 
of specialization. Hyundai was. Ju-Yung Chung did not draw a differentiation 
between construction and shipbuilding and neither did his sales staff.633 This ability to 
                                                 
630 Ibid., p. 134. 
631 Hyundai, “Traditions of Excellence,” pp. 61, 67-68, 103. 
632 Given the incredible willingness of Hyundai to pursue all available work anywhere, one can only 
imagine what Ju-Yung Chung and his management team thought when they read of British shipyards 
such as Cammell Laird and Harland and Wolff actually paying customers to withdraw their work and 
take it elsewhere. 
633 Hwang, oral interview, 24 November 2009. 
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quickly move into new sectors as they appeared served Hyundai well as it meant they 
found enough work to keep them operating when other firms failed.634  
 
The work from KSC made Ju-Yung Chung start thinking that Hyundai needed to go 
where the money was, which in the 1970’s was the Middle East. Awash in 
petrodollars, the region was beginning to make infrastructure improvements and was 
trying to develop industries that would enable more of the profit from their oil 
resources to be kept in the region. Hyundai actively searched for job opportunities all 
over the Persian Gulf area. They found them but also found the competition to be very 
stiff.  
 
As an upstart new entrant in the region, Hyundai realized they would have to show 
they could provide equal quality for less cost to be considered legitimate competitors. 
The majority of their potential customers were state ministries. These people knew the 
major American, European and Japanese construction companies. They did not know 
Hyundai and there would have to be an inducement to learn. Hyundai’s tools to effect 
that inducement were familiarization, high quality, low prices and bribery. Since 1974 
Hyundai had been “inviting scores of political and business leaders from the Middle 
East to tour the Ulsan Shipyard.”635 Below is one description of what happened when 
these “leaders” came to Korea: 
 
 
Hyundai would pick up the first-class air fare for an “orientation” that might 
begin with a stopoff in the fleshpots of Bangkok and then on to Seoul. “Film 
starlets would be in the greeting party at Kimpo Airport,” said journalist Bruce 
Cheesman. “The guy would be taken to a kisaeng 636 party or room salon”—a 
private room where the liquor flowed freely from a bottle poured by a hostess 
                                                 
634 Amsden, “Asia’s Next Giant,” pp. 286-287. 
635 Hyundai, “Traditions of Excellence,” p. 64.  
636 Kisaeng are Korean female entertainers whose work often includes prostitution. 
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hired to serve every need of the guest. “He could be sure of a different girl 
every night. It was wall-to-wall room service, order what you like. Champagne, 
women, anything.” In Hyundai’s case the fun got better when the guest arrived 
in Ulsan away from prying eyes and rival spies.
637
  
 
Hyundai’s “orientations” paid dividends and influential Middle Easterners began to 
know who Hyundai was. Having opened offices in Iran and Saudi Arabia, Hyundai 
began to win contracts there. Hyundai in 1975 won a $10 million contract with the 
Iranian Government to build a shipyard and marine railway in Bandar Abbas and a 
$114 million order to build the Arab Shipbuilding and Repair Yard in Bahrain.638 
Establishing this record of competence was critical to earning the right to compete for 
Saudi Arabia’s Jubail Industrial Harbor Project.639  
JUBAIL: THE SUCCESS THAT SECURED HHI’S FUTURE 
 
In 1976 Saudi Arabia announced a huge infrastructure project for its Eastern Province 
city of Jubail. The Jubail Industrial Harbor Project (JIHP) was an adjunct of the Jubail 
Industrial City Project, arguably the world’s largest civil engineering project at the 
time. Hyundai Engineering and Construction won the $941 million contract to 
construct the JIHP. This was an incredibly big project; the JIHP required the pouring 
of 1.1 million cubic meters of concrete and the use of 4.4 million cubic meters of 
rock.
640
  
 
The most difficult part of the project was the requirement to build the Open Sea 
Tanker Terminal, a 3.48 kilometer (2.09 mile) long  pile/jacket mounted structure 
                                                 
637 Kirk, “Korean Dynasty,” pp. 86-90. Kirk clearly notes, however, that the Koreans were not doing 
anything different than most of the other companies soliciting business in the Middle East. Bribery was, 
and remains, a normal part of business there. 
638 Seung-Ho Kwon and Michael O’Donnell. The Chaebol and Labour in Korea: The Development of 
Management Strategy in Hyundai. (New York: Routledge, 2001), p. 58.  
639 Ibid. 
640 Hyundai, “Traditions of Excellence,” p. 66.  
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suitable for berthing and loading up to four 300,000 DWT tankers simultaneously. 
The structure was to be built approximately seven miles from shore at the end of a 
long causeway in water depths varying from 3 meters (1.1 yards) to 29 meters (31.7 
yards). It required approximately 104,000 tons of steelwork, mostly in the form of 
piles, jackets and deck structures.641 Most of this steelwork was constructed at the 
Hyundai Ulsan Shipyard.  
 
This was yet another case where Ju-Yung Chung’s experience led him to disregard 
the conventional wisdom on building. Chung was advised to have the piles and 
jackets constructed on site; he refused and directed they be built at HHI to insure 
quality and save on labor costs.
642
 The 89 jackets weighed approximately 500 tons 
each and were roughly ten stories high. As if the fabrication task alone was not 
difficult enough, once these huge structures were fabricated, Hyundai faced the 
problem of getting them to Saudi Arabia over typhoon-swept seas. Chung solved this 
problem by using two barges, one of 15,800 tons and a second of 5,500 tons, 
connected nose-to-tail by wire hawsers. This assemblage was then connected to a 
10,000 horsepower tugboat and towed the 6,750 miles from Mipo Bay to Jubail. 35 
such trips were made; there were no losses and only two minor accidents.
643
 None of 
these cargoes was ever insured. Since the jacket legs were hollow, Chung devised a 
way of sealing them so that if a barge had capsized the jackets would still have floated 
and could have been retrieved by another vessel.
644
 
 
                                                 
641 Nicholas J. Burt and Richard Harris, “Design Installation and Testing of Belled Pile Foundations,” 
Conference Paper, Offshore Technical Conference, 5-8 May 1980, Houston, Texas. Doc. I.D. 3872-MS. 
642 Hyundai, Traditions of Excellence,” p. 66.  
643 Ibid., p. 66-67. 
644 Steers, “Made in Korea,” p. 114. 
 235 
 
What the Jubail project did for HHI was to guarantee a very large quantity of work 
until 1979. In addition, this work was paid for in hard currency, something Korea 
desperately needed in 1975. Obtaining this nearly one billion dollar contract for Korea 
was a spectacular financial achievement on the order of Chung-Hee Park’s 
normalization of relations with Japan or the Vietnam War capital influx.  
 
Having this guaranteed work meant that HHI could afford to accept what they knew 
would be losses in learning how to build different types of vessels. With the VLCC 
era at what looked like a permanent end, HHI had to learn to build whatever its sales 
staff could contract. Forced by circumstances to diversify, HHI learned how to build 
almost everything in the commercial spectrum and thus became arguably the world’s 
most knowledgeable shipyard as well as its largest one.645 Demonstrating their ability 
to build almost anything, between 1975 and 1980 HHI built work barges, cargo 
barges, jacket barges, pipelay barges, sand dredgers, general cargo vessels, large bulk 
carriers, small bulk carriers, roll-on- roll-off vessels, forest products carriers, 
container ships, tug boats, car/bulk carriers, floating cranes, pure car carriers and 
small tankers. In addition to these types of vessels, in 1980 Hyundai would begin 
fabricating jackets and spars for offshore work.
646
 By 1980 it was certain that Hyundai 
Heavy Industries was solidly established as one of the world’s best shipyards with a 
capability of building almost anything that floated. 
 
Three other things that HHI did also greatly enhanced their international reputation. 
First, HHI developed its own marine engine building facility. Hyundai Engine 
Manufacturing Co. was founded in 1978 and promptly obtained licenses to build 
                                                 
645 Hyundai, “Traditions of Excellence,” p. 55. With the addition of the No. 3 Drydock, Hyundai 
officially became the world’s largest shipyard.  
646 Ibid. 
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MAN, Sulzer, B&W and SEMT-Pielstick engines.647 HHI could therefore avoid the 
costs of having to buy engines from other countries. Second, HHI established its own 
casting plant. HHI was able to cast its own propellers and rudder horns, thus ending 
the necessity for the shipyard to make purchases of these items from Japan.
648
 Third, 
HHI established Hyundai Electrical Equipment Manufacturing Corporation. This 
permitted Hyundai to make all its own electric motors.
649
 With these three units up 
and in operation, by 1980 Hyundai was one of only a handful of shipyards in the 
entire world that could make all of the major components for ship construction in its 
own facilities.  
“IMITATION IS THE MOST SINCERE FORM OF FLATTERY” 
 
If Hyundai had any doubts about having achieved a successful entry into the top 
echelons of world shipbuilding, they would have been quelled by the 1979 entry of 
Samsung into the shipbuilding market, followed by the 1981 entry by Daewoo. Once 
Hyundai had proven that shipbuilding was a lucrative way to meet export targets and 
earn large amounts of hard currency, these two chaebȏls decided that the field could 
not be left strictly to Hyundai and started building their own shipyards. With their 
additions to Korea’s shipbuilding totals, Korea in 1982 finally passed Germany in 
world shipbuilding tonnage and became the world’s second-leading shipbuilding 
nation.  
 
Japan in 1982 was a long way ahead but the Koreans were gaining and in 1999 would 
catch and surpass the Japanese to become the world’s leading shipbuilding nation. For 
a country which had almost no shipbuilding in 1972 to have come to lead the world in 
                                                 
647 Amsden, “Asia’s Next Giant,” p. 280.  
648 Hyundai, “Traditions of Excellence,” p. 69. 
649 Ibid. 
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less than three decades was an incredible accomplishment. President Chung-Hee Park 
did not live to see Korean shipbuilding reign supreme but Ju-Yung Chung did. Chung 
lived until 2001. One must assume he took his full share of pleasure in knowing that 
he and his friend and fellow economic warrior, Chung-Hee Park, had set in motion an 
industry that had, against heavy odds, become the best on Earth. 
Table 26: COMPARISON OF HYUNDAI AND WORLD SHIPPING ORDERS, 
1972-1982650 
 
YEAR WORLD MARKET  HYUNDAI 
New Orders Market Share New Orders Market Share 
1972 29,567,000 GT 100% 250,000 GT 0.8% 
1973 73,601,000 GT 100% 950,000 GT 1.0% 
1974 28,370,000 GT 100% 600,000 GT 2.1% 
1975 13,793,000 GT 100% N.A. N.A. 
1976 12,937,000 GT 100% 266,000 GT 2.1% 
1977 11,091,000 GT 100% 463,000 GT 4.2% 
1978 8,026,000 GT 100% 374,000 GT 4.7% 
1979 16,843,000 GT 100% 946,000 GT 5.6% 
1980 18,969,000 GT 100% 1.030,000 GT 5.4% 
1981 16,877,000 GT 100% 843,000 GT 5.0% 
1982 11,187,000 GT 100% 292,000 GT 2.6% 
1983 19,423,000 GT 100% 2,075,000 GT 10.7% 
 
 
                                                 
650 Hyundai, “Traditions of Excellence,” pp. 61, 68, 103. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
At the start of this discussion, the questions to be answered were these: how could 
Britain, with its rich seafaring history and numerous technological and economic 
advantages, so completely lose this industry? Conversely, how could poor, backward 
South Korea, with no seafaring history worthy of note since the 16th Century, have 
come to eclipse not only the British, but the world, in the building of ships? What did 
South Korea and Britain do differently that led to such diametrically opposed 
outcomes? What were the major factors in each country that influenced their 
respective shipbuilding industries to travel such divergent paths? 
 
If one starts measuring in 1965, any comparison between Britain and Korea showed 
Britain with all the advantages: world’s second-largest shipbuilder, a long-developed 
industry, a large body of experienced shipbuilding personnel, one of the world’s 
biggest shipping fleets and the support of a much richer country. Britain was still less 
than a decade away from having been the world’s largest shipbuilder. Korea’s 
shipbuilding industry was miniscule and still spent as much, if not more, time 
building and repairing wooden ships than it did steel vessels. In 1965 it would have 
been a safe assumption that no major commercial shipping firm knew Korea even had 
a shipbuilding industry. A suggestion to any worldwide shipping firm that in another 
decade they might wish to buy vessels from a Korean shipbuilder would have been 
met with disbelieving laughter. A sporting event between two such unevenly matched 
sides would almost certainly not be permitted. Yet by 1982 the Koreans were the 
world’s second largest shipbuilders. They had all but seen off their European 
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competition651 and were gaining rapidly on the world leader, Japan. So, the question 
to be answered is this: what did Korea and Britain do differently that produced such a 
surprisingly unexpected outcome? 
 
That difference in outcome hinges on the differing national treatment of three critical 
factors: shipbuilding technology, labor relations and government economic policy. 
South Korea and Britain approached these matters in very divergent ways and that 
variance in approach was in large measure responsible for the difference in outcome. 
Neither country was able to act in a totally unconstrained fashion; there were both 
economic and historic forces shaping the actions taken by Britain and South Korea. 
South Korea, however, as a much poorer country ruled by a quasi-dictatorship and 
under serious external threat, had considerably more latitude in its scope of action 
than Britain did and considerably less to lose from exercising a strictly mercantilist 
economic philosophy. From very shortly after the military coup in 1961, the Chung-
Hee Park-led South Korean government effectively operated a national command 
economy with the power to completely control what freedoms businesses and 
individuals were permitted to exercise. Untrammeled by a South Korean National 
Assembly that possessed little independence at best and which during his regime was 
often nothing more than a rubber stamp for executive decisions, Chung-Hee Park 
could unilaterally take diplomatic and economic actions that no British Prime 
Minister would have even considered without extended Parliamentary consultation 
and general agreement among affected parties.  
 
                                                 
651 Rother, “Restructured West European Shipbuilding Industry,” p. 5. Writing in 1985, Rother 
comments, “Though the situation is different from country to country, Western European shipbuilders 
have learned their lessons. Capacity reduction of almost 50% has already made large shipbuilding 
disappear from Europe.”  
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Given Britain’s internationally diverse economic interests and its long-established 
tradition of constitutional monarchy, British governments had many more binding 
obligations to consider when making and carrying out policy. In addition, political 
constituencies that were tremendously important in Britain, such as the financial 
industry and organized labor, either did not exist in South Korea or possessed so little 
political influence that their interests could swept aside with impunity. Britain’s 
latitude for unilateral action was even further circumscribed after 1973 due to 
commitments stemming from its entry into the European Economic Community. In 
short, the South Koreans were free to utilize every diplomatic and economic tool 
available to the mercantilist developmental state while the British were restrained by 
the limitations inherent in their multi-level regulatory state.
652
 
SHIPBUILDING TECHNOLOGY 
 
With regard to technology, Korea as a late-industrializing nation had the good fortune 
to have its first truly major shipyard designed at the end of the long postwar boom. 
When construction began on the Hyundai Ulsan Shipyard in 1972, all of the major 
design features required to implement modern flow-line production techniques and 
drydock fabrication had been put into practice elsewhere. The Koreans and their 
British shipyard design consultants, A&P Appledore, had the results of those 
innovations available to them and selectively adopted those which best suited their 
                                                 
652 Woo-Cumings, Meredith, ed., The Developmental State. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), 
pp. 1-14. Woo-Cumings defines the term “developmental state” as “shorthand for the seamless web of 
political, bureaucratic and moneyed influences that structures economic life in capitalist Northeast 
Asia.” Elaborating on this statement Woo-Cumings sees the “developmental state” as being one that is 
“plan-rational” and “partners with the business sector in a historical compact of industrial 
transformation.” In practice this means that the developmental state has a strong industrial policy and 
actively uses state power to induce/persuade/coerce private businesses and individuals to conform to 
that policy. The regulatory state, by contrast, generally eschews industrial policy and restricts itself to 
restraining private business from taking actions detrimental to the public weal. 
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intended goals.653 Constructing Hyundai’s new shipyard was an expensive and 
difficult task but by 1975 they possessed the world’s largest and most modern 
shipbuilding facility. Their management and workforce still needed to gain 
shipbuilding experience but the technology and infrastructure supporting their effort 
was world-class. 
 
The British shipbuilding industry, on the other hand, had a great deal of capital 
investment in long-established shipyards with already sunk plant and machinery costs. 
Their problem was that almost all of those facilities were obsolescent if not obsolete 
and becoming more so by the day. Worse, British shipyards for the most part were 
located in places where neither the surrounding areas nor the water depth were 
conducive to expansion. Those two problems generally meant there was no way to 
satisfactorily change the yard layout to meet the requirements of modern flow-line 
production and large vessel construction. Out of date as their facilities were, however, 
they did solid work with what they had; British shipyards built good, sound, 
seaworthy ships and were well experienced in doing so. “Clyde-built is Best” was 
more than just a Glasgow rallying cry; there was enough truth in it for the statement to 
be known around the world in 1950. The ships British shipyards delivered in the 
1950’s were fine vessels, built with the old methods to the old standards. 
 
Unfortunately for the British shipbuilding industry, their craft administration method 
of building them was, like their construction facilities and shipyard locations, unsuited 
to the very different vessels rapidly coming into demand from the mid-1950s. To 
remain competitive, British shipbuilding needed to quickly and radically transform its 
                                                 
653 A&P Appledore was just one example of many instances where internationally competitive parts of 
the British shipbuilding and marine equipment industry redirected their efforts toward Asian customers.  
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construction methods, its facilities and, most of all, the mindset of its workforce. 
However, none of those factors was very amenable to change. Sir Kenneth Berrill, a 
senior British civil servant who headed the Central Policy Review Staff and was chief 
economic advisor to the Treasury, described Britain’s postwar mentality very well 
when he said, “We had won the war and we voted ourselves a nice peace.”  
 
British shipbuilders in the 1950’s, 1960’s and 1970’s were competing in an 
increasingly worldwide industry which was experiencing Schumpeterian “creative 
destruction” on steroids. Ships, ship production methods, ship production facilities 
and the shipbuilding business model were all changing drastically and doing so at 
breakneck speed relative to prior industry transitions. The shipping industry now 
wanted series construction of larger, standardized vessels and it wanted them built for 
a fixed price and delivered at a time agreed at contract signing.  
 
For British shipbuilders long accustomed to building one-off, bespoke and relatively 
smaller vessels on a cost-plus basis, adjusting to the industry’s paradigm shifts posed 
a tremendous challenge. They did not respond well to it. The changed building 
circumstances exposed serious planning and facility deficiencies in the British 
shipbuilding industry, deficiencies which resulted in unintentional underbidding of 
contracts and inability to deliver vessels on time. Both of these problems severely 
affected profitability and made it an increasingly difficult achievement. To cite just 
one example, Britain’s largest shipbuilder by tonnage, Harland and Wolff, returned its 
last profit as a major shipbuilder in 1964.
654
 This was despite spending considerably 
                                                 
654 Johnman and Murphy, “British Shipbuilding,” p. 155. 
 243 
 
more capital on modernization than any other British shipyard. Britain’s other 
merchant shipbuilding yards were in equivalent or worse condition. 
 
As has been mentioned earlier, Britain was the only major shipbuilding country to 
have no growth in its shipbuilding market share after World War II. A critical 
personnel factor contributed to that outcome. For British shipyards utilizing craft 
administration techniques to oversee production, expansion under any circumstances 
was going to be difficult because of manning constraints posed by an insufficient 
number of skilled workers. Depending as it did on personnel with much previous 
internal shipyard training and direct construction experience, craft administration of 
production posed a major scaling problem to plans for expanding British production. 
Had shipbuilders wished to expand, sufficiently experienced skilled craftsmen capable 
of properly administering production were in short supply and there was no quick way 
to increase their numbers.655 It generally took five years of shipyard work for an 
apprentice to obtain journeyman status; it took several more years serving in positions 
of regularly increasing responsibility to become a master craftsman. Under craft 
administration of production the master craftsmen and foremen often informally 
served as design engineers at critical points. To do so successfully they had to have 
judgment guided by training and long experience. There was no shortcut to obtaining 
that knowledge; the tuition dues of time in service had to be paid.  
 
                                                 
655 This was one of the reasons that no British shipyards in the 1960’s or 1970’s ran more than a 
skeleton second shift, if indeed they even did that much. Not only did the workers not want to work 
that shift, under the craft administration of production there was seldom, if ever, anyone to guide them 
if they did. The knowledgeable senior personnel capable of providing such guidance, by virtue of their 
union seniority, only worked the day shift. The BAH Report cited this lack of a second shift as one of 
the major impediments to increasing productivity in British shipyards. Korean shipyards routinely run 
second shifts and will operate third shifts as well when the production schedule calls for it. 
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Since the craft unions controlled admission to their apprenticing programs and there 
was no path to journeyman/master craftsman other than through apprenticeship, 
expanding the number of skilled workers was critically dependent on increasing 
apprenticeship training. This posed a problem since the shipbuilding unions were no 
more optimistic about British shipbuilding’s future than the shipyard owners. They 
were very chary of having too many trained masters and journeymen and generally 
restricted admission to the anticipated numbers required to replace retirees and people 
leaving the industry. Consequently, a manpower limitation choke point existed for 
British shipbuilding that Korean shipbuilders, utilizing bureaucratic administration 
techniques for production oversight, did not face. Needing large numbers of degreed 
engineers, Korean shipyards quickly developed the practice of recruiting them from 
universities or other businesses and incorporating them into their production systems.  
 
The British, however, would not do this. As the BAH Report noted, British shipyard 
management was prejudiced against utilizing degreed engineers, believing them to be 
lacking in practical application skills. Even if hypothetically accepting the very 
questionable assumptions that shipyard management was willing to employ such 
engineers and they were available to be hired, there was another major obstacle. 
Personnel attempting to shift between trades in British shipyards found it all but 
impossible in most cases due to union reluctance to accept entrants from outside the 
apprenticeship system. Consequently, it is almost certain newly hired degreed 
engineers would not have been allowed into the applicable craft union. Any attempt to 
force such acceptance would have led to major industrial strife. Consequently, the 
method Korea’s shipyards later adopted to answer calls for ramping up production 
was not a solution that British shipyards could practically hope to implement.  
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To use a military analogy, Korean shipyards oversaw shop floor production with 
“shavetail” second lieutenants, young engineers right out of four-year courses at 
university. Korean shipyards could do this because they had invested heavily in 
design and planning departments, the shipyard equivalent of a general staff. These 
departments provided those second lieutenants with extremely specific and detailed 
orders. All the second lieutenants needed to do was follow their orders and direct their 
subordinates accordingly.  
 
The British, on the other hand, had invested very sparingly in design and planning 
departments. Their designers laid out the general plan of the vessel but left a 
considerable amount of the design work to be done on the shop floor by foremen and 
master craftsmen, the equivalent of long-service noncommissioned officers. This 
saved British shipyards a considerable sum on design and planning personnel but had 
two very serious deficiencies. First, it meant a lack of consistency in work since there 
was no guarantee that any two given craft foremen would handle the same problem 
the same way. This was a huge problem when producing vessels in series. Second, it 
takes four years to produce a second lieutenant. It takes from fifteen to twenty years to 
produce a senior noncommissioned officer. Korea could produce at least three second 
lieutenants in the time it took Britain to produce one senior noncom. Britain’s craft 
administration of production oversight was poorly suited for quickly increasing output 
because there were often not enough experienced personnel to meet requirements and 
training new personnel took so long. 
 
 246 
 
Retrospective analysis shows that to keep abreast of the industry’s progress British 
shipbuilding would have had to undertake a major, drastic and very expensive reform 
incorporating flow-line production techniques, bureaucratic administration of 
production, drydock construction and greatly expanded planning departments. Even 
with complete cooperation from all involved parties and unlimited financial support, 
conditions which were always highly unlikely and which in the event did not occur, 
these changes would still have been extraordinarily difficult since they required 
extensive facility rearrangements/modifications and the recruitment of many degreed 
specialist engineering personnel. Given Britain’s engineering deficit, many of those 
personnel would have had to be recruited from outside the country. To be fully 
competitive some facilities would have needed to be closed and relocated to 
greenfield locations with deeper water depths. Worse, these massive changes would 
have had to come at a time when the need for them was not yet completely apparent 
but profit margins and available capital to implement them were shrinking.  
 
In the end the adjustment required simply asked too much of an undercapitalized, 
deeply conservative industry scarred by its past history. At the time when their future 
viability demanded they be most responsive to critically important modernization 
requirements, British shipbuilders refused to recognize the impending danger. As their 
international competitiveness slowly slipped away they remained content with a 
situation where their order books were full and “reasonable profits were being made 
using largely traditional methods.”656 
                                                 
656 J.R. Hume and M.S. Moss, Shipbuilders to the World: 125 Years of Harland and Wolff, Belfast 
1861-1986. (Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 1986), pp. 378-381. The authors here were discussing the 
launching of the S.S. Canberra in 1960. This was the last major vessel built with a partially riveted hull. 
The Canberra is used to illustrate the point that even though Harland and Wolff management knew that 
other shipyards had long since implemented all-welded construction, they declined to do so because it 
would cost money to modernize. 
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 Such a wide-ranging restructuring of the shipbuilding industry might not have been 
possible at any time, but the presence in top management positions of men who had 
learned their trade during the bitter interwar years made the task even more 
formidable. Unlike what occurred after World War I, after World War II British 
shipbuilders deliberately chose to forego expansion because of their fear of another 
interwar slump; they had no faith that the post-World War II boom would last any 
longer than the ephemeral post-World War I boom had. Shipyard owners and 
managers remembered only too well the desperately hard years of the economically 
depressed 1920’s and 1930’s where shipyards had failed by the dozens and the only, 
exceedingly dim, ray of hope for saving any British shipbuilding at all was massive 
capacity reduction. In those interwar years they had seen it confirmed that 
modernization was no guarantee of profitability. They also believed those years had 
seen the British government abandon their industry at its time of most desperate need. 
While the post-World War II British shipbuilding industry was happy to call for all 
the government assistance Westminster was willing to dispense, shipbuilders were 
very wary of relying too much on it. For those shipbuilders who had survived the 
interwar period, government would always be too capricious, its commitment to 
shipbuilding too uncertain and too easily withdrawn.  
 
Consequently, when men like Sir Graham Cunningham and documents like the DSIR 
and Patton Reports called for modernization and additional investment, their 
recommendations were viewed with a gimlet eye by tight-fisted shipbuilders still 
deeply mindful of the Great Depression years. Until the British Government became 
seriously involved in 1966 with the Geddes Report, such shipbuilding modernization 
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as did occur was piecemeal and scrimping. Unfortunately for British shipbuilding, by 
the time the British Government actually decided to take serious action on the 
industry’s problems, Japan had a fifteen-year technological lead and Britain’s 
European competitors were ahead by a decade. Britain only truly awoke to its need 
for massive change after its lead in the shipbuilding industry was long since 
squandered. Constrained by outdated facilities, antiquated production techniques, fear 
of recession and abrasive, self-defeating industrial relations, British shipbuilding 
between 1960 and 1982 fell further behind its international competitors with every 
passing year. In the final analysis, when shipbuilding technology evolved to meet 
changing customer demand, the British shipbuilding industry’s failure to evolve 
accordingly led to extinction. 
LABOR RELATIONS 
 
The divergence in national labor relations policy between Britain and South Korea is 
one of the most important factors, if not the most important factor, leading to the 
collapse of British shipbuilding. Britain and South Korea had completely different 
policies and preferences when it came to dealing with organized labor, with the 
British going to great lengths to appease labor while the South Koreans restricted and 
eventually suppressed it. See Table 27 below for a comparison of time lost to labor 
activism. 
 
Britain, whose Parliamentary system had more than a century of dealing with 
incorporating organized labor into the political structure, had eventually allowed 
labor’s representatives into the political process as a way of obtaining their consent to 
it and preemptively coopting radical forces. Britain’s organized labor had its own 
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political party, the Labour Party, and their dues and contributions provided the vast 
majority of Labour’s financial support.657 Consequently, organized labor interests in 
the 20th Century almost always found a fair hearing in government councils, 
particularly when Britain was being governed by a Labour administration. However, 
in the critical time period from the late 1960’s until the 1984 National Union of 
Mineworkers strike, organized labor in Britain exercised an extraordinary influence 
on government policy. This was conclusively demonstrated in 1973-4 when violent 
industrial action by coal miners caused drastic national electricity cuts and forced 
Britain onto a three-day work week.
658
  
 
Edward Heath’s Conservative government, which had been in office since 1970, had 
been humiliated numerous times during its administration by union refusals to comply 
with government legislation. The 1973-4 miners’ strike was the last straw. An 
exasperated Heath finally called a snap general election in February 1974, with the 
underlying theme being, “Who Governs Britain?” Given the presence of 300,000 
presumably leftist union shop stewards in the country and the tremendous amount of 
national disruption caused by labor activism that the elected government clearly could 
not control, the question was a legitimate one that deserved a clear answer. 
Unfortunately, it didn’t receive one.  
 
                                                 
657 Towers, Brian. “Running the Gauntlet: British Trade Unions under Thatcher, 1979-1988. Industrial 
and Labor Relations Review Vol. 42, No. 2 (Jan. 1989), p. 181. 
658 The miners picketed docks and storage depots preventing access to ships looking to unload coal and 
trucks intended for transporting it. The climactic action of the strike took place at Saltley, 
Warwickshire where as many as 10,000 miners showed up on 10 February to insure the closing of this 
critically important coal depot. The police, who were also there but with insufficient force to keep the 
depot open, conceded and allowed its gates to be closed. Margaret Thatcher, Education Minister for 
Heath’s Conservative government at the time, later wrote that “There was no disguising that this was a 
victory for violence. From now on many senior policemen put greater emphasis on maintaining ‘order’ 
than on upholding the law. In practice, that meant failing to uphold the rights of individuals against the 
rule of the mob.” 
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Heath obviously hoped to be returned to office with a greater majority and a mandate 
to tame the unions. Instead, in a very close election which set a record for the number 
of votes cast, the result was a hung Parliament with no party receiving a majority of 
seats. In the end, Heath could not form a coalition government and Labour’s Harold 
Wilson returned to 10 Downing Street as the head of a minority government. It was 
widely accepted in Britain that unions had brought Heath and the Conservatives down 
and that if Britain was not yet in the grip of syndicalism, the country was certainly 
within hailing distance of it.659 This state of affairs had a chilling effect on all British 
industry, shipbuilding not least. 
 
It is pertinent to note here that Britain in 1970 lost almost 11 million man-days to 
strikes, the highest amount of time lost since the General Strike of 1926.660 Injurious 
as that was, the situation further deteriorated in 1972 when industrial action cost 
British industry almost 24 million days of lost work.661 The industrial discontent was 
exacerbated by the galloping inflation Britons were suffering: 19 per cent in 1974 and 
26 per cent in 1975.
662
 To compensate, wages had risen 28.5 per cent in 1974.
663
 The 
problem of wages chasing inflation continued through the 1970’s despite desperate 
attempts by the Labour Party to institute “incomes policies,” which were voluntary 
agreements to limit pay raises. Labour was elected to office in 1974 largely due to its 
                                                 
659  Towers, “Gauntlet,” p. 169-182. Harold Wilson’s 1974-1979 Labour Government passed 
legislation which provided unions unprecedented rights and left them in a much stronger position than 
they had previously held. Among those rights was the ability to apply to a government body, the 
Central Arbitration Committee, for legally enforceable awards on the grounds that workers in one plant 
were being paid less than the generally prevailing rates for the industry as a whole. The Employment 
Protection Act of 1975 also provided that workers engaging in industrial action could not be dismissed 
selectively; all involved workers must be either permanently dismissed or retained as a group. Workers 
recognized the shifting balance of power; trade union membership in Britain rose to its highest level 
ever by 1979.  
660 Alwyn W. Turner. Crisis? What Crisis? Britain in the 1970’s. (London: Aurum Press, 2008), p. 11. 
661 Ibid. The smallest number of days lost in any year of the 1970’s was 3.2 million. See Table 27. 
662 Ibid., p. 101. 
663 Ibid. 
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claim that it could control Britain’s unions. Labour was dismissed from office in 1979 
for having conclusively demonstrated its inability to do so, the British electorate 
correctly deducing that Margaret Thatcher was a very different person than Edward 
Heath and that under her leadership Conservatives would be better at the task.  
 
The difficulties caused by industrial action in British shipyards have already been 
discussed at length elsewhere in this paper. However, to see them in proper context, 
the following point needs to be emphasized. Britain in the late 1960’s and 1970’s was 
a nation gripped by labor activism to a degree and duration never before seen in that 
country. In those years British shipbuilding lost more time due to labor activism than 
any other British industry. 
 
In contrast to Britain, Park’s South Korean government and its chaebȏl partners 
recognized that Korea’s low wage and benefit costs constituted the largest part of 
Korea’s comparative advantage in manufacturing. They were fully aware that the only 
lever they had for breaking into established markets was the temptingly low price of 
their products. This was particularly so at the inception of Korea’s shipbuilding effort 
given that there was no demonstrated proof Korea could properly build modern ships. 
Potential ship buyers already had suppliers and in 1972 Korea was trying to break into 
a shipbuilding market already heavily overpopulated with experienced competitors.  
 
Given the magnitude of the world shipbuilding slump after 1974, even being the 
lowest-cost provider was no guarantee of success. However, it was South Korea’s 
only hope, which meant all costs had to be restrained as tightly as possible. Much of 
the cost of ship construction in those early days of Korean shipbuilding came from 
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imported materials and equipment. These prices South Korea could not control.664 
What South Korea could control was the cost of the Korean labor required to build the 
ships. That fact was not lost on the South Korean government. They addressed it in 
1972 with the Yushin Constitution’s formal grant of Presidential rights to restrict labor 
activities.665 
 
From the early 1960’s, under the slogan, “선성 장 후 분배 (growth first, distribution 
later),” the South Korean government diverted the economic surplus produced by 
labor productivity gains into industrial investment instead of higher wages. In 1961 
the government instituted the Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU) which, in 
practice, did more to restrain unions than to represent them.666 Organized labor in 
South Korea under the Park regime was always considered as a necessary evil at best 
but it was not directly suppressed until the introduction of the 1972 Yushin 
Constitution.
667
 The Yushin Constitution allowed organized labor to be stripped of the 
legal right to collective action, instead forcing labor groups to receive permission 
                                                 
664 POSCO did not start to ease the shipbuilding industry’s reliance on imported steel until after 1975. 
Prior to that almost all shipbuilding steel had to be imported. Most of the required steel came from 
Japan. Most of the equipment came initially from Europe but Hyundai gradually changed its sources of 
supply to Japan where possible. 
665 San-Soo Kim, “Labor Policy and Industrial Relations in the Park Chung-Hee Era,” Developmental 
Dictatorship and the Park Chung-Hee Era: The Shaping of Modernity in the Republic of Korea.  Editor:  
Byeong-Cheon Lee. (Paramus: Homa and Sekey Books, 2006), pp. 162. 
666 This institution was created on August 30, 1961, after the junta lifted its injunction on trade unions. 
The South Korean Government was always wary of organized labor. Given the long track record of 
organized labor serving as a stalking horse for Communist goals, their suspicions were understandable 
if not necessarily justified. In practice, the FKTU served more as a vector for transmitting government 
directives to unions than as a communicator of union opinions to government. 
667 Hyug Baeg Im, “The Origins of the Yushin Regime: Machiavelli Unveiled,” The Park Chung Hee 
Era: The Transformation of South Korea.  Editors:  Byung-Kook Kim and Ezra F. Vogel. (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2011), p. 256-257. This is not to say that the South Korean Government did 
not already have a strong method to control labor; they did. Article 9 of the 1971 Act of Special 
Measures for National Security and the 1970 Temporary Special Act on Labor Unions and Disputes 
Involving Foreign Invested Firms tightly restricted the freedom of unions with regard to collective 
bargaining and labor activism. These laws provided government with authority to restrict or prohibit 
labor activism at any time it chose to do so; in some cases activism was formally banned. What the 
1973 implementation of the Yushin Constitution did was formalize this authority. 
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from a government body prior to any such behavior.668 Laws governing labor activity 
were explicit in banning any of the normal methods of labor activism such as strikes, 
sit-ins, overtime stoppages, etc. without first obtaining government permission.669 For 
some export industries located in free-trade zones and created through foreign 
investment, Korean law expressly forbade industrial action of any type for any 
reason.
670
 The Federation of Korean Trade Unions fully supported these governmental 
restrictions.671 
 
More importantly, after the Yushin Constitution was instituted, violations of the laws 
prohibiting labor activism were treated as criminal offenses punishable under criminal 
law.
672
 Prior to the constitutional change, labor disputes often ended up in the civil 
courts with fines as punishment. After Yushin labor leaders contemplating breaching 
the law quickly learned the price for such violations would be long prison terms and 
quite probably disbandment of their union.673 Consequently, it must be acknowledged 
that the South Korean government deliberately suppressed organized labor in order to 
support the chaebȏls leading Korea’s industrialization effort. As a result Korean 
workers worked far longer hours than anyone in the industrialized world.  
 
Park’s government was undoubtedly authoritarian, although it could have been much 
more so than it was. It generally operated with a relatively light touch compared to 
                                                 
668 Ringen, “Social Policy,” p. 54. This body was the Office of Labor Affairs (OLA). Deyo notes that 
the selection of a former national police director as Director General of the OLA gives something of an 
indication as to the purpose this organization was to serve. Deyo, “Beneath the Miracle,” p. 136. 
669 John Minns, “The Labour Movement in South Korea,” Labour History, No. 81 (Nov. 2001), pp. 181. 
Minns noted that strikes could not be initiated until three months after the beginning of a dispute and 
that the government had the authority to order an immediate return to work. 
670 Deyo, “Beneath the Miracle,” p. 136. 
671 San-soo Kim, “Labor Policy,” p. 174. 
672 Eun Mee Kim, “Contradictions and Limitations of a Developmental State: With Illustrations from 
the South Korean Case,” Social Problems. Vol. 40, No. 2 (May 1993), p. 234. 
673 Kwon and O’Donnell, pp. 29-30. 
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Table 27: COMPARISON BETWEEN INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT IN UNITED 
KINGDOM AND SOUTH KOREA, BY YEAR674 
 
YEAR S. KOREA 
WORK 
STOPPAGES 
S. KOREA 
WORKERS 
INVOLVED 
(‘000s) 
S. KOREA 
WORKING 
DAYS LOST 
PER 
THOUSAND 
WORKERS 
S. KOREA 
WORKING 
DAYS LOST 
TO 
STOPPAGES 
(‘000s) 
U.K. 
WORKING 
DAYS LOST 
TO 
STOPPAGES 
(‘000s) 
1965 12 4 2.1 19 2925 
1966 12 31 4.4 41 2400 
1967 18 3 1.1 10 2787 
1968 16 18 6.8 63 4690 
1969 7 30 17.4 163 6846 
1970 4 1 0.9 9 10980 
1971 10 1 1.1 11 13551 
1972 0 0 0 0 23909 
1973 0 0 0 0 7197 
1974 58 23 1.4 17 14750 
1975 52 10 1.1 14 6012 
1976 49 7 1.3 17 3284 
1977 58 8 0.6 8 10142 
1978 102 11 1.0 13 9405 
1979 105 14 1.2 16 29474 
1980 206 49 4.2 61 11964 
1981 186 35 N.A. 31 4266 
1982 88 9 0.8 12 5313 
                                                 
674 Deyo, “Beneath the Miracle,” pp. 60-61. This chart is compiled from ILO Yearbook of Labour 
Statistics (various years), Bank of Korea: Monthly Economic Statistics (various issues), and the Korean 
Statistical Yearbook (1985). The U.K. statistics are taken from the U.K. Office of National Statistics, 
“Labour Market Trends,” 2003. 
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TABLE 28: HOURS OF WORK IN MANUFACTURING, 1960-1985
675
 
Hours per Week 
Period Korea Greece Mexico Japan U.S.A. Germany 
1960-69 55.5a 43.9 45.9 45.4 40.6 44.0 
1970-79 51.8 42.9 45.6 41.1 40.1 42.1 
1980-85 53.8 39.1 46.1 41.2 40.0 40.9 
a. Average for 1963-1969. 
 
 most regimes wielding that much untrammeled authority. 676 Moreover, real wages 
were increasing very rapidly in Korea during the 1970’s and most workers were 
seeing a major increase in their standards of living. Even though the increase was 
from a very low initial level, this fact undoubtedly tended to moderate labor 
discontent.677  
 
As a student of history and a former member of Namnodong, Park knew that labor 
organizations could be dangerous adversaries and that they tended to be strongly left-
wing in their politics.
678
 His government responded to that threat by rewriting the laws 
to strip labor and its prospective organizers of any economic or political power. Park 
had no qualms about quickly crushing public defiance from any source and his regime 
made quite certain organized labor was not allowed to impede South Korea’s 
industrialization.679 South Korea dealt with its labor problems through legal 
                                                 
675 Dornbusch and Park, “Korean Growth Policy,” p. 398. Chart source: International Labor Office, 
Yearbook of Labor Statistics, various issues. 
676 Ringen, p. 19. 
677  Nam, “Building Ships,” p. 194. Nam notes that from 1969 to 1979, real wages for South Korean 
manufacturing workers increased by 250 per cent. 
678 Lee, “Park Chung-Hee,” pp. 241-247. According to Lee, Namnodong supported the Cheju and 
Yeosu uprisings. 
679 Park, “To Build a Nation,” p. 179. 
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suppression, the domestic and military intelligence services and the police.680 
Democracy and true freedom for Korean organized labor did not arrive until 1987, by 
which time the market-shifting impact of Korea’s low wage structure had already 
reaped its gains in the shipbuilding industry.  
 
In Britain, organized labor had strength equal to, and sometimes greater than, either 
business or the elected government. It had clearly broken Edward Heath’s 
Conservative government in Britain and arguably destroyed much of British 
manufacturing through making it economically uncompetitive. By contrast, Chung-
Hee Park’s government decided organized labor’s influence in the political process 
was a luxury South Korea could not afford. From the outset Park’s regime maintained 
a very close rein on organized labor and, during the most important decade of Korea’s 
shipbuilding industrialization, it legislatively insured that organized labor had no 
power at all. That this was absolutely a part of Korean business strategy for increasing 
Korean shipbuilding’s economic competitiveness is shown by the following comment 
made by MP Dr. Norman Godwin to the British House of Commons: 
 
 
James Davis, a director of Kleinwort, Benson Ltd., spoke at a meeting of the 
Greenwich Forum about a visit that he and other western European 
industrialists made to South Korea, and about the attitudes of shipbuilding 
directors there. He said: The best way of describing their attitude is perhaps by 
describing the extreme answer we got from one of them, Mr. Hong of Daewoo. 
He said that of course we all came from halftime Europe. That was an opening 
remark and we asked him what he meant by it. He told us that his men expect 
to work six-and-a-half days a week, unless there was a big job on, in which 
case they could not take all that time off … They work intensively. He said, 
                                                 
680 Amsden, “Asia’s Next Giant,” p. 324. Nam noted that prior to 1966, South Korean intelligence 
personnel (KCIA, police detectives or Counter-Intelligence Corps officers) visited the KSEC offices 
“an average of 4.7 times per month.” After 1969, the surveillance grew much tighter. From June to 
December 1970, detectives visited the KSEC union offices 65 times and KCIA agents visited eight 
times. Nam stated that “the heavy police presence and the constant KCIA surveillance of union affairs 
continued through the 1970s and into the 1980s.” Nam, “Building a Nation,” pp. 190-191. 
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'the trouble is now it is a time of comparative advantage. It is Korea's turn. 
You had your turn in Europe. Japan has had its turn. Now it is our turn.681 
 
 
It may have been Korean shipbuilding’s turn but it certainly was not organized labor’s 
turn. Neither Hyundai nor any other major chaebôl shipyard had any union presence 
until 1987.682 This must be considered as a tremendous advantage for South Korea. 
One can only imagine what British shipbuilding might have been able to accomplish 
with an equivalently quiescent work force. 
GOVERNMENT ECONOMIC POLICY 
 
Because they were so intertwined, for the purposes of this discussion Korean 
government economic policy must be considered to include national industrial policy. 
South Korea, from the time of the 1961 military coup, was intent on modernizing its 
industry and promulgated five-year industrial policy plans to guide that process. The 
major restraint on progress was always the minimal availability of investment capital. 
Chung-Hee Park wanted to initiate a program of heavy industrialization as soon as he 
came to power in 1961. He was initially stymied in that effort because international 
aid donors did not think Korea was justified in doing so. Groups like the World Bank 
looked at South Korea and said there was no need for them to have steel mills or 
chemical industries; those inputs could be supplied from Japan. According to them, a 
poor but heavily populated country like Korea held comparative advantage in labor-
intensive light industry and import substitution. If there was to be any investment at 
all from donor sources, those were the areas to which it would be directed. 
 
                                                 
681 Hansard, House of Commons Debates, 09 January 1985, Vol. 70, cc 823. 
682 Nam, “Building a Nation,” p. 207. It took lengthy, large-scale, and violent strikes to obtain them. 
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Chung-Hee Park knew his country and its people better than the World Bank and the 
U.S. Agency for International Development did. He had the vision to see Korea as a 
major industrial power, possibly even a “second Japan,” and was determined to give 
his nation a chance to attain that goal. He was aware that it would take a tremendous 
amount of sacrifice on the part of his people and that painful and difficult choices 
would have to be made. However, given his constant concern with the looming 
existential danger from the North, Park believed there was no choice but to force 
South Korea to make the best effort humanly possible. Park shrewdly leveraged his 
nation’s people and its diplomatic position to obtain desperately needed investment 
capital. He then used that capital to pursue a deliberately unbalanced development 
plan aimed at making Korea an export-intensive industrial powerhouse.  
 
Many other parts of the economy, such as agriculture, either stagnated or suffered due 
to the deliberate allocation of most available investment capital to the heavy industrial 
sector and the chaebȏl who operated it. Workers certainly had their wages suppressed 
and their rights curtailed where those rights were not completely expunged. Park and 
his regime did this knowingly; their mantra was, “선성 장 후 분배 (growth first, 
distribution later)” and they hewed as closely as they could to that line.  
 
Though Park suppressed organized labor, he most certainly was not a puppet for the 
chaebȏl. Once in power Park quickly and deliberately broke them to his will. He 
forced them to do his bidding primarily by controlling their funding.683 He had other, 
more forceful means at his disposal for commanding compliance but generally 
                                                 
683 Woo, “Race to the Swift,” p. 191. Woo’s primary argument is that the Korean developmental state 
gained its most powerful means of peaceful inducement by repressing independent financial markets 
and arrogating all financial authority to itself.  
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preferred not to use them; it was less publicly disruptive to just sharply yank the 
financial choke chain. Chaebȏl owners were generally very bright people; it did not 
take them long to realize that conforming to government policy made life much easier 
and more profitable.  
 
Park’s demand from them was simple: he wanted an exponential increase in exports. 
He insisted the chaebôl find or make something that would sell to foreign customers 
so as to procure the desperately needed hard currency and investment capital. Chaebȏl 
owners who met the challenge of becoming successful exporters quickly found that 
everything the South Korean Government could provide in the way of assistance was 
available to them and life was very good. Those who would not, or could not, comply 
went to the wall. 
 
For Korea’s Third Five-Year Plan (1972-1976), Park determined shipbuilding was 
one of five heavy industries Korea was going to aggressively develop. Park had risked 
his political life to obtain the money for the POSCO integrated steel mill for Korea. 
Having chanced and won such a dangerous gamble he was not going to see it wasted; 
he was absolutely determined that POSCO would be successful. Park envisioned 
shipbuilding as one of the major contributors to POSCO’s future success through 
being a very large and solidly reliable consumer of POSCO’s products. However, it 
was abundantly clear that establishing a world-class shipbuilding industry from 
almost nothing was going to be a very difficult task. Park dealt with the issue by 
handing the shipbuilding portfolio to Ju-Yung Chung, promising him full support and 
turning him loose. Park knew his man; he had faith that Chung would find a way to 
build large ships in South Korea and Chung justified that faith. Machiavelli noted that 
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the quality of a leader can be determined by the caliber of his subordinates. Judging 
by that criterion and using Ju-Yung Chung as a salient example, President Chung-Hee 
Park rates very highly.  
 
Against all the odds, Chung succeeded. He procured a foreign buyer for multi-million 
dollar vessels to be supplied from a non-existent shipyard. He procured foreign loans 
to build that shipyard when he had no demonstrable experience in shipbuilding. He 
built the ships at the same time the shipyard was being constructed and persuaded his 
people to work inhumanly long hours for years to do it. He delivered his vessels in 
reasonable time and they worked. At its inception no one outside of Korea thought 
Chung could accomplish this feat; few people inside Korea other than Chung-Hee 
Park did. The skepticism was justified since nothing like what Chung was proposing 
to do had ever been done before. As Sung-Hyuk Hwang said in recalling the 
construction of the Hyundai Ulsan Shipyard, “In ignorance they had the courage to 
venture into unknown territory.”684 Ignorant though they may have been at the start, 
Chung and Hyundai succeeded in establishing the world’s largest and most modern 
shipyard. They made it happen through a combination of tremendously hard work and 
relentless determination. 
 
Park had promised Chung full support and kept his word. As an example, when 
Chung got in trouble due to the collapsing shipbuilding market in the mid-1970s, Park 
used the Korean Government to help Hyundai. Three of the first 10 VLCCs Hyundai 
constructed were refused by their initial owners due to the crash in the tanker market 
and there was no chance of finding another buyer. Chung in 1976 used those vessels 
                                                 
684 Hwang, “Let There be a Yard,” p. 41. 
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to start his own shipping line, which would become Hyundai Merchant Marine.685 
Park guaranteed work for Chung’s VLCC fleet by facilitating the quick passage of 
legislation reserving to Korean vessels at least 50 per cent of all crude oil delivered to 
the national oil refinery.
686
 Chung repaid Park’s confidence by successfully 
concluding several huge construction and shipbuilding deals in the Middle East. The 
more than one billion dollars of work Chung secured in the Middle East represented a 
financial coup equal to those arising from Park’s normalization of Japanese 
diplomatic relations and Korea’s involvement in the Vietnam War.  
 
Chung was a brilliant businessman who knew every trick in the book. That said, he 
always delivered what he promised. The money he made underbidding Western 
companies for Middle East construction contracts was money he used to support 
Hyundai Heavy Industries as the world slowly worked through shipbuilding’s 
disastrous 1970s decade. Hyundai’s profitable components cross-subsidized 
unprofitable ones until they too became profitable, and Hyundai under Ju-Yung 
Chung could always depend on President Chung-Hee Park to provide whatever 
assistance the Korean Government could give to forward his projects. Chung and Park 
launched Korea into the shipbuilding business and gained market share when every 
other major shipbuilder on Earth was either cutting back or getting out of the business 
entirely. The key to their success in shipbuilding was perseverance and a willingness 
to do whatever it took to be the “last man standing” in the industry.  
 
                                                 
685 Hyundai, “Traditions of Excellence,” p. 68. 
686 Ibid. 
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Amsden refers to massive behind-the-scenes subsidization of Korean industry.687 
Shipbuilding in the 1970s and early 1980s would have been the most likely 
beneficiary of such subsidization and there is undoubtedly much truth in Amsden’s 
claim.
688
 Still, in an era when all the major players were subsidizing their shipyards as 
well, Korea was not doing something others did not do. Korea succeeded where 
others failed because they worked harder at it and refused to quit despite the costs. 
The most powerful politician in South Korea, Chung-Hee Park, and the nation’s most 
competent industrialist, Ju-Yung Chung, were intensely focused on this industry and 
determined to see Korea become a world-class shipbuilding nation. Working in close 
partnership, they together wielded the full power of the South Korean Government 
and Korea’s richest chaebȏl to do whatever it took to make that happen. With that 
much support backing the already impressive range of comparative advantages 
enjoyed by Korean shipbuilding, it was certain Korea would establish a major 
presence in the industry.  
 
Because of the opacity of financial accounting with regard to both the South Korean 
Government and the various segments of the Hyundai chaebôl, no one will ever truly 
know just how much money was spent in subsidizing South Korea’s entry into world 
shipbuilding.689 It was undoubtedly a tremendous sum. However, it is quite likely that 
Korea did not spend as much money on clandestine subsidization as Britain spent 
publicly. No matter where they were, the commercial shipbuilders who survived the 
slump of the 1970s did so because they had well-run, technically competent, 
                                                 
687 Amsden, “Asia’s Next Giant,” p. 105. 
688 Ibid., pp. 275-278. 
689 The same comment can be made about the Daewoo and Samsung shipyards, both of which were 
heavily cross-subsidized by other sections of their chaebôl. Daewoo almost went bankrupt in 1989 
because the shipyard’s losses dragged down the rest of the organization. The South Korean 
Government saved the Okpo Shipyard by turning it over to the Korea Exchange Bank. 
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extremely efficient yards that utilized modern production techniques and delivered 
excellent value for money. They also either had rich parent companies or direct 
governmental support because every shipbuilder that survived through the 1970s and 
1980s did so with the help of external funding. It was impossible to do otherwise; 
there was too little business at too low a price for a commercial builder of large ships 
to survive alone. 
 
With regard to the effects of government economic policy on shipbuilding, a special 
subset of that policy very pertinent to this discussion concerns the financial industry 
as it existed in both countries at the time. In Britain, there is arguably no more 
influential part of the private sector. London remains primus inter pares with regard 
to world financial centers and the financial services sector of the British economy was 
critically important to Britain in the second half of the 20th Century.  
 
It would be hard to argue that manufacturing was as important to Britain as finance at 
any time in the 20
th
 Century; certainly in the years from 1960 to 1990 there was no 
question that finance was more important. British manufacturing in its entirety in that 
period did not come close to matching the value of the British financial industry.
690
 
British manufacturing was then in rapid decline as shown by the many failures of 
British industries such as British Steel, British Leyland, British coal mining and 
eventually British Shipbuilders, among others. Successive British Governments, both 
                                                 
690 Hansard, House of Lords Debates, 16 May 1973, Vol. 342, 858, 883, 896. The financial industry 
includes banking, insurance, foreign exchange dealings and commodity trading. In 1971 the financial 
industry was responsible for net earnings of £580 million; the car/chassis and steel industries had a 
gross income of £719 million but the net value was much less due to the cost of the imports needed to 
produce these exports. In this debate Lord Selsdon pointed out that in the preceding 18-year period 
Britain’s invisible earnings were £14,600 million while its deficit on visible trade was £3,600 million. 
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Labour and Conservative, pumped many millions of pounds into these loss-making 
industrial sectors in ultimately futile efforts to retain a British presence in them.  
 
Subsidization is normally a zero-sum game.
691
 To subsidize an unprofitable economic 
sector there generally must be a profitable one from which the funds can be extracted. 
The financial markets of the City of London provided one of the most profitable 
sectors of the British economy. Moreover, financiers and merchant bankers had the 
social cachet and the close connections to the British Establishment necessary to 
insure that their opinions and interests were always given extremely careful 
consideration. This was something that could generally not be said for “metal-bashing” 
industrialists.
692
  
 
With regard to the shipbuilding industry there is no doubt British politicians of both 
parties were concerned about its decline. However, even those from the Labour Party 
whose interests were most affected recognized that relative to British manufacturing 
in total it was a relatively minor industry and that compared to the British financial 
industry it hardly registered. 693 Consequently, when weighed in the balance of 
national importance, the concerns of the financial industry were always certain to be 
adjudged as of greater merit than those of any industrial concern. If circumstances 
                                                 
691 Subsidization can obviously be done by monetization as well but the resulting inflation hurts the 
entire national economy. Consequently, inflationary subsidization has a relatively limited scope of use. 
For a good example of this, see Indivar Kamtekar, “England and India, 1939-1945,” Penultimate 
Adventures With Britannia: Personalities, Politics and Culture in Britain. Ed. Wm. Roger Louis (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 129-134.  
692 P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins spend much time in British Imperialism discussing the metamorphosis 
of Britain’s landed gentry into the merchant banking and investment banking classes. They, along with 
the political elite, were the British Establishment. 
693 BAH Report, p. 107. In 1972, the combined financial turnover of all twelve shipbuilders examined 
in the BAH Report would have amounted to £250 million, which would have made the industry the 
56th largest industry in the United Kingdom. The total number of employees was slightly under 70,000, 
a figure which equated to one-quarter of one per cent of the United Kingdom’s working population and 
three-quarters of one per cent of the United Kingdom’s manufacturing employees. 
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forced a British government into having to choose between sacrificing the interests of 
manufacturing or finance, manufacturing was going to the wall and the decision 
would not be close.    
 
Conversely, in South Korea the banks were nationalized as one of the first acts of the 
junta after the 1961 coup. From then until the 1980’s, banks were nothing more than 
organs of the “developmental state” charged with providing financing to companies 
approved by the South Korean government. The South Korean government told the 
bankers who to lend to, how much to lend them, the time span of the loan and what 
interest rate to charge. Bankers were government employees who had no choice in the 
matter other than to comply, resign or be fired.
694
 Given that the South Korean 
government during the Park era was determined to keep risk-taking chaebȏl exporters 
afloat at almost any cost, this meant the banks were forced to make large numbers of 
loans that were not economically sound and which ended up on their books as 
massive, often non-performing, liabilities.695 Completely subordinated to the 
manufacturers of the exporting economy, South Korea’s nationalized banks, just like 
the chaebȏl, were kept afloat by questionable bookkeeping, government financial 
guarantees and the blatant use of state power to distort the domestic markets.  Unlike 
Britain, in Chung-Hee Park’s South Korea export manufacturing reigned supreme in 
the list of governmental support priorities. 
                                                 
694 Byung-Kook Kim, “The Leviathan: Economic Bureaucracy,” The Park Chung Hee Era: The 
Transformation of South Korea.  Editors:  Byung-Kook Kim and Ezra F. Vogel. (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2011), p. 213. Kim notes that the Ministry of Finance, which controlled the 
nationalized banks for the South Korean Government, between 1965 and 1967 had its minister fired 
five times and its vice-minister fired four times. Park’s industrial policy called for using the Ministry of 
Finance as “a mere resource mobilizer for industrial projects decided by the Economic Planning Board 
and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry.” Kim believes that “the Ministry of Finance thought it had 
no choice but to rebel” because government policies on financial expansion “meant a de facto 
divestiture of its coordinating authority on the basis of interest rates and foreign exchange policy.” 
Their complaints were legitimate but against governmental policy. One suspects that the sixth head of 
the Ministry of Finance finally understood that message. 
695 Woo, “Race to the Swift,” p. 170-172. 
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As a nation with a mature, developed economy and large international commitments, 
Britain had many more interests to consider than South Korea. A single-minded 
mercantilist drive to increase exports was not something Britain could do without 
suffering serious repercussions. Both the Geddes Report and the BAH Report are 
notable for warning that Britain risked retaliation from other nations should it choose 
to implement shipbuilding subsidization over a certain level. British officials, 
formulating trade and industrial policies for a nation that had a worldwide commercial 
presence and which made a great deal of its income from “invisible” earnings, had to 
take such threats very seriously.  
 
South Korea, on the other hand, could adopt mercantilist policies because they had 
nothing to lose by doing so. As an impoverished and somewhat diplomatically 
isolated parvenu trying to break into the world economy, it had no national 
investments elsewhere that could be held hostage and no “invisible” income from 
financial service sectors to lose. Moreover, the world economic system in what Woo 
has called the “Development Decade” of the 1960’s facilitated such mercantilist 
behavior by allowing undeveloped countries like South Korea to maintain 
protectionist tariff barriers in their own countries while “dumping” their manufactured 
goods in the markets of more developed economies to obtain market share. South 
Korea’s government under Chung-Hee Park was free to use any and every possible 
political and economic method that it could devise to help South Korean businesses 
meet export goals and expand their markets. The normalization of diplomatic relations 
with Japan, the provision of troops for the Vietnam War, the massive behind-the-
scenes subsidies, the suppression and subordination of finance and organized labor, 
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all are examples of the lengths to which the South Korean government under Park 
would go to support and assist Korean businesses. 
 
It should be noted here that the South Korean government’s economic policies also 
had a component that British policies did not and could not match. This component 
was political stability. South Korea’s institution of the new Yushin Constitution in 
1972 effectively allowed Chung-Hee Park to retain the presidency for as long as he 
chose to occupy the office. Under Park’s authoritarian leadership, the South Korean 
government and Korea’s big businesses had evolved a close-knit symbiotic 
relationship. The chaebȏl were implicitly assured that if they met their government-
set export targets, the government would back to them to the hilt and find ways to 
compensate them for incurred losses. Park was known and trusted as a partner who 
kept his word and supported even failing chaebȏl until every measure of government 
support had been tried short of nationalization.  
 
Britain’s parliamentary democracy held no such certainty. A government could be 
brought down by a motion of no confidence at any time and there was no guarantee of 
policy continuity across administrations.
696
 Business leaders considering investment 
under a Conservative administration would have been foolish to disregard the loud 
voices in the Labour Party clamoring for nationalization of “the commanding heights 
of industry” starting the day after a Labour electoral victory. Those calls certainly did 
not fall on deaf ears in Britain’s private shipbuilding sector which, while loudly 
calling for government capital investment in the industry, resolutely declined to 
commit private capital to it. The British government itself added to the uncertainty by 
                                                 
696 There were two national elections in 1974 alone. 
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its repeated insistence after every shipbuilding industry subvention that the subvention 
in question was the last one, after which no further support would be given and the 
industry would be cast adrift to sink or swim on its own. Whether the politicians, 
Labour or Conservative, who were making those threats actually believed them to be 
serious at the time they were spoken is moot. Their effect on public perception was to 
make all parties concerned with British shipbuilding acutely aware that the industry 
could not survive without government support and that its continued existence 
depended on a very unwilling partner whose withdrawal was only a matter of time.  
 
Despite the huge sums expended on it, British government support for shipbuilding 
was fitful, grudging and generally exasperated. There was never any sense among 
British shipbuilders that the British government saw their industry as of crucial 
national importance and was determined to see it through to success in the manner 
that Park’s South Korean government displayed. British shipbuilders started out 
undercapitalized; the British government’s shipbuilding industry policy, while 
actually providing a considerable amount of funding for capital improvements, 
negated much of its impact by its penny-packet, piecemeal disbursement and its 
abysmal failure at public relations for the industry.  
 
Nor did any British government ever take the steps it easily could have to insist that 
the British shipping and offshore industries patronize British shipbuilders or that 
British steelmakers provide British shipyards with discounted products. Unlike 
President Park, no British Prime Minister of either Labour or Conservative persuasion 
ever considered shipbuilding a matter of personal interest. The only British political 
figure of major public note to be involved with shipbuilding was Labour’s Tony Benn, 
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a stormy petrel whose interest almost certainly hurt as much as it helped.697 For Heath, 
Wilson and Callaghan shipbuilding was a declining industry that had far too many 
problems and was best kept at arm’s length.  
 
It cannot be said that the British government provided insufficient money; they did 
not. However, what was also needed was leadership and vision, two critical qualities 
that proved to be sadly lacking in both the public and private sectors. With regard to 
shipbuilding, the Geddes Report in 1966 trenchantly asked the question, “If Britain 
cannot stand on this front, where does she mean to stand?” Given the importance of 
shipbuilding to Britain’s past, Geddes was right to ask it. However, by 1983 it was 
clear Britain needed an answer to the second half of that question because there was 
no longer any doubt that Britain could not “stand on this front.”   
 
In South Korea, the government’s relation to shipbuilding was very different. 
President Park took great interest in the development of the Hyundai Heavy Industries 
Ulsan Shipyard, the largest shipyard in Korea. He went there often and kept close tabs 
on the progress of its construction and development. He met with Hyundai Chairman 
Ju-Yung Chung on at least a monthly basis if not more frequently.  Park saw 
shipbuilding as a logical and required extension of Korean industrialization once 
Korea was capable of making its own steel. Shipbuilding, for him, was one more step 
toward pukuk kangbyeong in that it would increase export earnings and reduce Korean 
dependence on imports. When POSCO finally began putting out ship-suitable steel in 
                                                 
697 Turner, “Crisis,” pp. 37, 40. Benn was despised by most members of the Conservative party as a 
traitor to his class and a radical leftist malcontent. Anything which Benn favored would be almost 
certain to draw a knee-jerk Conservative response against it. This propensity was humorously captured 
in a British television program entitled George and Mildred. One of the major characters, Jeffrey 
Fourmile, “a stalwart of his local Conservative Association,” had read in his newspaper that 
unemployment in Britain had reached 1.5 million. Fourmile solemnly declared to his wife, “I blame 
Anthony Wedgwood Benn.” His wife replied, “Oh Jeffrey, you blame him when you get dandruff!” 
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1975 it was already agreed that their biggest customer for thick steel plates would be 
Hyundai and that Hyundai would receive them at manufacturer cost or below. Would-
be Korean shipowners found that once Hyundai was in business the South Korean 
government took a dim view of overseas procurement for any vessel that could be 
built in Korea. In short, Korea approached the business of shipbuilding just as if it 
was a military campaign. All Korean resources were put at the disposal of the export 
drive and the focus stayed on that drive because the man at the top of the South 
Korean government, Chung-Hee Park, made it very clear it was the nation’s most 
important priority. Shipbuilding was a major part of that export drive. 
 
It must also be remembered that shipbuilding represented different things in each 
country. In Britain, it was a job. Not a really good job and certainly not a great job, 
but a decent job. Moreover, it was often the only job on offer in some places and thus 
desirable even though the work was hard and the conditions usually cold and dirty. 
No one in Britain was going to get rich from shipbuilding in the 1960s and 1970s. The 
best they could hope for was continued employment and ability to stay off the dole. If 
offered a choice between shipbuilding and an equivalently secure and well-paying job, 
most British shipbuilders would have moved without a qualm.  
 
In Korea, shipbuilding jobs fall on the scale between good and excellent. The industry 
is considered critically important to the nation and the average citizen knows this. 
Working for one of the chaebôl in an export industry means good pay, excellent 
benefits and social status. It is common to see Koreans in Ulsan, Gohyeon and Okpo 
wearing their Hyundai, Samsung or Daewoo work uniforms in town because they are 
proud of working for those companies and want people to know they work there. 
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Bright and talented university students compete fiercely for internships and jobs at the 
major shipyards. It is telling that in a country with the lowest birth rate in the OECD, 
there are many baby carriages to be seen on the streets of Okpo and Gohyeon, far 
more than are usually seen in cities of equal size. Being a shipyard worker in one of 
the big shipyards in Korea means one has a good present and a bright future, a future 
worth working and sacrificing for. On a relative scale, the rewards of being a 
shipbuilder in Korea since the 1970s have always been higher than for the equivalent 
job in Great Britain. 
 
In the final analysis, the three main reasons why Britain lost the industry and Korea 
gained it, shipbuilding technology, labor relations and economic policy, come down 
to one salient fact. South Korea wanted this industry and was willing to endure 
whatever financial and individual sacrifices had to be suffered to win and keep it. 
Britain was not. Both countries faced serious challenges that necessitated major 
capital investment and radical change in order to be a competitor in the last half of the 
20
th
 Century. Though both countries grappled with those challenges, only South 
Korea met them successfully. Both countries wanted the work. South Korea just 
wanted it more. 
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